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INTRODUCTION1
Globalization is understood and promoted as absolute freedom for all forms of  capital, 
above all financial capital, while restrictions continue to shape the markets for goods, 
labor and technology. This has reduced the power of  nations to regulate and control 
their own economic space, shifted the playing field against labor and industry, and 
led to growing financialization of  the world economy. Two important consequences 
are increased instability and inequality. Moreover, for developing countries (DCs) the 
benefits of  unleashed finance have proved to be highly elusive. It has not only meant 
loss of  crucial policy tools for industrialization and development, but has also exposed 
them to severe global financial cycles, as seen once again during the recent turmoil 
originating in the US and Europe. Thus, the belief  that DCs have decoupled from the 
North and become new engines of  global growth has turned out to be a myth.
This book urges DCs to be as selective about globalization as advanced economies 
(AEs), better manage their integration into an inherently unstable international financial 
system, rebalance domestic and external sources of  growth, and manage market forces 
by strengthening public control. It brings together several papers written since the 
mid-2000s, except the first one which goes back two decades. It is organized in two parts. 
Part One examines the impact of  financial liberalization on stability and growth in DCs 
and national, regional and global policy options in reducing instability. Part Two focuses 
on the current financial crisis in AEs, its spillovers to DCs and consequences for their 
medium-term prospects.
Chapter I, on the pitfalls of  financial liberalization, was written in the heydays of  
globalization and the Washington Consensus and addresses the kind of  issues that have 
become hotly debated since the onset of  the financial crisis in AEs. It examines potential 
risks associated with domestic financial deregulation and capital account liberalization 
that were widely pursued by DCs at the time. Its main message is that the focus of  
financial policies in DCs should be stability, industrialization, growth and development, 
noting that in all modern examples of  industrialization, finance was made to serve 
industry and trade not the other way round. This necessitates a considerable degree of  
public intervention and control over financial institutions and markets. While in some 
cases interventions may have been misguided in the past, the waste and inefficiencies 
they generated cannot be compared with enormous damages and misery resulting from 
the operation of  unfettered financial markets, as seen time and again during recurrent 
crises in emerging and mature economies since the great waves of  liberalization in the 
1980s and 1990s. Ironically and for the same reason, liberalization has not diminished 
but significantly increased public intervention in finance, though in different forms – to 
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clean the mess and repair the damages that financial crises create, including bailouts and 
nationalization of  insolvent financial institutions. 
The chapter starts with a critical examination of  orthodox propositions on the 
benefits of  financial liberalization, notably removal of  control over interest rates and 
credit allocation, recommended as a remedy to many ills of  DCs including poor savings, 
investment and productivity. It is argued that there are no compelling theoretical 
reasons for a shift to a regime of  higher real interest rates to raise aggregate savings and 
investment. On the other hand, while liberalization often leads to financial deepening, 
this does not always result from higher savings or a shift from unproductive assets to 
productive investment. A shift into financial assets does not necessarily improve efficiency 
because financial markets and institutions often fail to direct resources to their socially 
more productive uses. Market signals governing resource allocation do not always reflect 
fundamentals. This is a main reason why DCs need government intervention in the 
form of  directed and preferential credits to support socially productive investment and 
accelerate industrialization, as successfully practised in late industrializers such as Japan 
and Korea. Nor are financial institutions always productively efficient. Liberalization 
may reduce intermediation costs by creating competition, but can also raise the risk 
premium and hence the cost of  finance by leading to greater instability and uncertainty.
 Stability is an essential attribute of  an efficient financial system and this is what 
governments strive to achieve through prudential regulations. However, the record in 
this respect is quite dismal. There has been a constant battle between regulators and the 
market, with the latter successfully innovating and introducing new practices to escape 
restrictions or moving business to unregulated segments of  the system. Regulations 
are often designed to fight the last crisis not the next one, thereby falling behind 
market practices. The international community has now landed on “macroprudential 
policy” – not an altogether reliable or well-developed tool to curb excessive risk taking 
(Elliott et al. 2013).
The efficiency and stability of  the financial system also depend on how it is organized. 
Traditionally a distinction is made between two systems. In the Anglo-American market-
based system of  finance, banks focus on short-term lending and hence need only adequate 
reserves and access to lender-of-last-resort financing to avert liquidity crises, while 
corporate investment depends mainly on share and bond issues in the capital market. 
By contrast, the German–Japanese bank-based system involves long-term lending by 
banks and hence necessitates substantial own capital to safeguard solvency. Historically 
the latter is found to be more stable. It reconciles the Keynesian dilemma of  the need 
of  the society for productive investment with the desire of  individuals to remain liquid 
without leading to short-termism and instability. 
However, there are a number of  prerequisites for an efficient and stable bank-based 
system and these are not always fulfilled in practice. Thus, important instances of  severe 
banking instability and crises are found not only in DCs but also in AEs. Moreover, not 
only are there variations within the bank-based and market-based systems, but also the 
distinction between the two has become hazy over time. For instance with the repeal of  
the Glass–Steagall Act in 1999, the US moved toward a system of  market-based banking 
with a significantly increased role for banks (Hardie and Howarth 2013). Overall, the 
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benefits claimed for market-based systems are unsubstantiated and DCs are well advised 
to strengthen their banking system to suit their needs rather than emulate the market-
based model. However, it should not be forgotten that under a hands-off  approach, any 
system of  finance can go awry.
Chapter I finally turns to financial openness. It is argued that the mainstream view, 
widely held at the time of  the writing of  the chapter, that capital account liberalization 
may cause difficulties only if  there are imbalances and distortions elsewhere in the 
economy, has no sound theoretical or empirical basis. This is also true for the benefits 
claimed for international capital flows in the allocation of  global savings. The bulk of  
gross flows of  capital are motivated by prospects of  short-term gains rather than real 
investment opportunities and considerations of  long-term risks and return. Rather 
than securing greater fiscal and balance of  payments discipline they tend to support 
inappropriate policies with potentially very damaging consequences for economic and 
social welfare. 
The chapter goes on to examine the recovery of  capital inflows to Latin America 
in the early 1990s, after a ten-year drought during the preceding debt crisis, and finds 
parallels with the surge to the Southern Cone in the 1970s, which had culminated in a 
severe crisis. It thus anticipates a series of  subsequent crises in emerging economies (EEs) 
beginning in Mexico in 1994–95.2 While the ideal response to such a surge is to raise 
investment in traded goods sectors, the conditions attracting foreign money such as high 
interest rates and currency appreciations do not favor such investment. Nor could this 
always prevent an eventual crisis because of  maturity mismatches due to the financing of  
long-term investment with short-term and highly fickle foreign money. Thus, there is a 
need to exercise considerable control over capital inflows. 
Chapter II focuses in greater detail on policy options in managing financial 
instability in EEs, noting that boom–bust cycles in such economies are closely related 
to global financial cycles and international capital flows. In the past two decades in 
the developing world currency and balance of  payments crises have occurred under 
varying conditions with respect to current account and budget balances, inflation, 
currency appreciations, public or private indebtedness, consumption or investment 
booms, and regulatory oversight of  financial institutions. This experience casts 
serious doubts on the orthodox thinking that such crises arise mainly from domestic 
policy shortcomings and inconsistencies and exposes the dogma that price stability is 
necessary and sufficient for macroeconomic and financial stability. The endogenous 
unstable dynamics analysis developed by post-Keynesians, notably Hyman Minsky, 
goes a long way in providing a framework for understanding boom–bust cycles driven 
by international capital flows in EEs. 
Keynesians do not have much faith in monetary policy in restraining bubbles or 
fighting debt deflation and recessions. Bubbles can better be checked by controlling 
the growth of  bank assets through regulatory instruments. During downturns, the “Big 
Bank,” the lender-of-last-resort, can deal with debt deflation while a “Big Government,” 
a spender-of-last-resort, can stimulate income and employment. However, as the 
chapter warns, such interventions could sow the seeds of  the next crisis. For instance, 
the monetary policy response to the bursting of  the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s 
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played an important role in the subsequent subprime bubble while the response to the 
subprime crisis through zero-bound rates and quantitative easing (QE) now risks creating 
yet another bubble. 
In EEs, where boom–bust cycles are closely intertwined with swings in capital flows 
and external debt is denominated in reserve currencies, stabilization is much more 
complicated than in the US and other major reserve-currency issuers. In these economies 
during downturns and capital flight, the “Big Government” cannot borrow abroad 
in reserve currencies and the “Big Bank” cannot print international liquidity. Even a 
straightforward liquidity crisis can thus lead to widespread insolvencies among banks and 
other private debtors, as seen in Asia in the 1990s. For these reasons, it is all the more 
important to start countercyclical policy in good times and manage surges in inflows and 
avoid the build-up of  fragility.
 However, under capital account openness the erosion of  monetary policy autonomy 
goes well beyond what is portrayed in the standard theory of  the impossible trinity.3 
There are limits to how effectively macroeconomic policy can be used to simultaneously 
overcome currency and payments imbalances and credit and asset bubbles caused by 
a surge in capital inflows and without compromising domestic policy objectives. Still, 
in its latest institutional view on capital controls the Fund insists that in managing 
capital flows “a key role needs to be played by macroeconomic policies, including 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate management” while capital controls should be used 
in exceptional circumstances, only as a last resort and on a temporary basis.4 However, 
there is no practical or theoretical reason for any economy with judiciously designed 
policies to attain stability and growth, and debt and balance of  payments sustainability 
to alter the mix and stance of  its macroeconomic policies when faced with an externally 
generated unsustainable surge in capital flows. For such an economy, capital controls 
can be the first best measures to insulate domestic conditions from external financial 
pressures.
In reality many governments in EEs use interventions in currency markets to deal with 
surges in capital inflows and accumulate reserves as self-insurance against sudden stops 
and reversals. Indeed, contrary to expectations that the need for reserves would diminish 
as DCs gained access to international capital markets, there is a strong correlation 
between reserve holding and capital inflows. Interventions and reserve accumulation 
could no doubt prevent appreciations and deterioration of  the current account, but they 
cannot always be fully sterilized. Nor can they prevent currency and maturity mismatches 
in private balance sheets. They, in effect, provide public insurance against private risks 
with the full carry costs, estimated to be in the range of  $100 billion per annum in 2007, 
borne by governments. There is little rationale to allow hot money to enter the economy 
and invest it in low yielding reserve assets as self-insurance against its exit. 
The chapter concludes that a central and permanent role should be played by 
financial regulations and capital controls in managing surges in inflows. Prudential 
rules appropriately extended to foreign exchange positions and transactions including 
quantitative limits, special loan loss provisions, and liquidity, reserve and capital 
requirements can help mitigate maturity and currency mismatches and exchange-related 
credit risks. But, since a very large proportion of  capital inflows are not intermediated by 
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the banking system, there is a need to go beyond such measures and introduce market-
based and/or direct controls over portfolio and FDI inflows and foreign borrowing. 
Chapter III reviews the record under globalization, as of  2006, on capital formation 
and job creation, focusing on the role played by liberalization of  capital flows as well 
as macroeconomic policy. Its main message is that increased international capital flows 
have served to redistribute investment and jobs among countries rather than leading 
to a generalized acceleration of  capital formation and employment generation. Capital 
has become increasingly footloose in all its forms and this, together with a large global 
reserve army of  labor, has created opportunities for labor arbitrage for transnational 
corporations. However, this has not produced a significant convergence of  wages 
between DCs and AEs, but swung the playing field in favor of  capital, reducing the share 
of  labor income in world output – a trend that has continued unabated since the writing 
of  the chapter (UNCTAD TDR 2013; Stockhammer 2012). Increased concentration of  
incomes has not resulted in faster accumulation of  productive capital. Indeed, a distinct 
feature of  the period since the 1980s is that investment typically generates more profits 
while profits are invested less and less in productive capital.
In DCs in the past two decades, inward FDI as a percentage of  GDP has shot up 
but the investment ratio has shown no tendency to rise. A large proportion of  FDI, as 
conventionally defined, constitutes financial operations involving transfer of  ownership 
of  existing assets rather than expansion of  productive capacity. As the chapter shows, the 
record of  DCs that embraced a strategy of  reigniting capital accumulation and growth 
through a combination of  rapid external liberalization, increased reliance on foreign 
capital and reduced public investment is particularly dismal. 
Macroeconomic and financial policies have played a major part in the paucity of  
productive accumulation and jobs. Governments in many AEs have shifted to fiscal 
orthodoxy and abandoned fiscal policy as a tool of  macroeconomic management whereas 
procyclical policy has been widespread in DCs, except for a brief  period after the collapse 
of  Lehman Brothers in 2008. However, despite the growing aversion to Keynesian fiscal 
management, chronic public deficits emerged and public debt has grown faster than 
output in most major AEs, in large part due to supply-side tax policies and financial 
bailout operations. In DCs, although external sovereign debt generally declined, there 
has been an unprecedented accumulation of  domestic liabilities, an increasing proportion 
of  which has been acquired by nonresidents. 
Almost all financial bubbles are associated with excessive investment, not only in 
property but also in industry, which cannot be sustained with the return to normal 
conditions, leading to prolonged underutilization and even destruction of  productive 
capacity. This is a main reason why investment is the most unstable component of  
aggregate demand and why its volatility has increased in the recent period of  financial 
liberalization. Typically, it falls a lot faster under financial busts than it rises during booms. 
This is also true for wages and employment. 
Recoveries from recessions brought about by financial crises are weak and protracted 
because it takes time to repair balance sheets – to remove debt overhang and unwind 
excessive and unviable investments generated during the bubbles that culminate in such 
crises. They also tend to be jobless and yield little investment as increases in incomes are 
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used to pay off  debt. This was the case in the US during recoveries in the early 1990s 
and 2000s from recessions brought about by the bursting of  credit and asset bubbles. It 
has been even more so in the current recovery from the subprime recession – the precrisis 
income had been restored by the second quarter of  2011, but employment was lower 
by some 6.5 million. In this latter case policy shortcomings regarding debt restructuring 
and fiscal stimulus have also played a major role in delaying recovery, thereby leading 
to unnecessary losses of  output and employment (Akyüz 2014). A similar pattern of  
sluggish job and investment growth is also a common feature of  recoveries in DCs 
following financial crises.
Chapter IV turns to exchange rate management, noting that it occupies a central 
position in the policy debate in DCs for two reasons. First, as a result of  the increased 
emphasis on export-led growth and reduced barriers to trade, the exchange rate has 
gained added importance. Second, because of  growing integration of  DCs into 
international financial markets, exchange rate gyrations have become a major source of  
macroeconomic and financial instability.
Trade is the main link between the exchange rate and economic growth but this is 
not always adequately accounted for in the literature. The conventional trade theory 
emphasizes supply-side linkages between trade and growth while the Keynesian analysis 
focuses on the demand-side and the balance of  payments constraint. However, since 
growth cannot be sustained without accumulation, any link between trade and growth 
should encompass investment. Successful examples of  late industrializers in East Asia 
suggest a virtuous link between exports and investment, or a dynamic “export–investment 
nexus,” incorporating both supply and demand linkages. While there are limits to what 
the exchange rate can achieve on its own, stable and competitively valued exchange rates 
are an essential part of  industrial development and call for a judicious management of  
capital flows. 
It is the capital account regime not the exchange rate regime that holds the key to 
success in maintaining stable and appropriately aligned exchange rates. Under a hands-
off  approach to capital flows, neither fixed nor freely floating rates can work. Stable 
and competitively valued exchange rates would require occasional adjustments in the 
nominal value of  the currency in order to realign them and avoid gyrations. A viable 
system thus combines a certain degree of  flexibility in the exchange rate regime and a 
considerable degree of  control in the capital account regime. 
While most East Asian DCs use considerable discretion in the management of  capital 
flows and exchange rates, there have been large swings in intraregional exchange rates 
during the boom–bust cycles in capital flows in the new millennium. This instability owes 
a great deal to inconsistencies in the exchange rate regimes pursued by the countries 
in the region, spanning the whole spectrum between the two corners of  independent 
floating and the currency board, with the intermediate regimes also showing significant 
variations with respect to how tightly the pegs are managed. The coexistence of  a variety 
of  regimes entails significant intraregional swings at times of  large movements of  the 
dollar against other reserve currencies. This is a matter of  concern at a time of  rapid 
economic integration of  the region and provides a strong rationale for intraregional 
exchange rate cooperation.
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The scope for replicating the European Monetary System (EMS) by pegging bilaterally 
and floating collectively faces a number of  hurdles. Fixing all regional currencies to the 
dollar (or any other reserve currency) would secure intraregional stability, but this would 
imply loss of  monetary policy autonomy as well as wild fluctuations against third currencies. 
Such an option might be appropriate for countries looking for a credible external anchor 
but not for East Asia which has a better record of  monetary and fiscal discipline than 
the US. A viable option could be a crawling peg vis-à-vis a common basket of  reserve 
currencies with agreed central parities and bands. This would have to be supported by 
regional institutions and mechanisms designed to prevent the emergence of  imbalances 
and crises. A number of  lessons can be learned from the EMS, including its shortcomings in 
areas such as macroeconomic policy coordination, currency adjustment, market regulation 
and surveillance, the capital account regime and intraregional lending. 
Regional arrangements are second best, defensive mechanisms against systemic global 
financial instability. Addressing the root causes of  the problem requires a major overhaul 
of  the international financial architecture to establish its key missing ingredients. These 
include effective multilateral disciplines over misguided policies in systemically important, 
reserve-issuing countries whose macroeconomic and exchange rate policies and financial 
institutions exert a disproportionately large impact on international monetary and 
financial conditions. Effective rules and regulations needed to bring inherently unstable 
international financial markets and capital flows under control are also lacking. 
 As discussed in Chapter V, the IMF holds a central position in this undertaking.5 
However, it has increasingly moved away from its central task of  prevention of  
imbalances and crises toward crisis lending as well as areas which fall outside its 
mandate and expertise. The IMF needs to go back to its core objectives and stay out of  
development finance and policy and poverty alleviation. Its main task is crisis prevention 
not crisis lending. The more it has failed to prevent instability and crises, the more it has 
become involved in crisis lending; so much so that it has come to depend on crises to 
remain relevant. IMF bailouts tend to add to systemic instability by undermining market 
discipline and creating moral hazards for lenders. They also distort the balance between 
creditors and debtors. There should be strict limits to IMF crisis lending and ways and 
means should be found to involve private creditors in crisis resolution through voluntary 
and involuntary mechanisms and orderly debt workouts. Temporary debt standstills 
and exchange restrictions should become legitimate ingredients of  multilateral financial 
arrangements. 
To bring greater authority and legitimacy to the IMF, any reform should address 
shortcomings in its governance system. The IMF cannot be an impartial institution if  
it continues to rely on a handful of  its members for funds needed to lend to others in 
payments difficulties and if  its financial operations remain linked to bilateral debtor–
creditor relations among its members. Consideration should be given to using special 
drawing rights to fund the resources needed. This would also help move away from 
the dollar-centered international reserves system and the problems associated with it 
(Akyüz 2012a).
Part Two has three overlapping papers written at different points of  time during 
the crisis in AEs. Chapter VI, written in the early months of  2008 before the collapse 
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of  Lehman Brothers, focuses on the causes and depth of  the subprime crisis and its 
potential impact on DCs, notably in Asia. It traces the subprime crisis back to financial 
deregulation that started in the early 1980s. 
The US banks lost their cost advantage as a result of  removal of  control over deposit 
rates in the early 1980s, at a time when deposits were losing importance as a source of  
funds for financial intermediation and growth of  markets for commercial papers and 
increased securitization put a downward pressure on lending rates. They responded 
by going into riskier areas of  lending, including for property and leveraged buyouts, 
and expanding their fee-based off-balance-sheet activities in the capital market through 
subsidiaries and affiliates. Simultaneously, securities firms and insurance companies 
started engaging in traditional banking activities without being subject to conventional 
prudential oversight. 
All these strengthened the link between credit and asset markets, with credit 
expansions increasingly translated into asset bubbles and the bubbles leading to credit 
growth thanks to the practice of  mark-to-market valuation. Rather than adapting 
regulatory policies to the new financial environment, the US authorities submitted 
to pressures for further deregulation, effectively demolishing the firewalls between 
commercial banking and investment banking in the late 1990s. This, together with 
sharp cuts in interest rates made in response to the bursting of  the dot-com bubble in 
the early 2000s, allowed rapid expansion of  speculative lending and investment which 
culminated in the subprime crisis. 
The chapter maintains that a vigorous monetary policy response to the crisis would 
be helpful, but would not be able to overcome the difficulties since the crisis was one of  
solvency rather than liquidity. In the absence of  measures directly addressing the debt 
(mortgage) overhang in the household sector, the recovery would be slow since market-
driven balance sheet restructuring is a protracted process. 
The vulnerability of  DCs to adverse financial spillovers from the crisis varied according 
to their prevailing macroeconomic and financial conditions which, in turn, depended 
largely on how the precrisis surge in capital flows was managed. Most Asian countries 
had been successful in avoiding unsustainable currency appreciations and balance of  
payments positions and were able to accumulate sufficient reserves through interventions 
in currency markets to counter any sudden stops and reversals in capital flows. However, 
they had not been able to prevent the surge of  inflows from generating asset, credit and 
investment bubbles, in large part because of  their reluctance in imposing sufficiently tight 
controls. As a result, they were exposed to certain risks from a reversal of  capital flows, 
but not of  the kind that had devastated the region during 1997–98. 
The chapter argues that a sudden stop and reversal in capital inflows could happen 
as a result of  a widespread flight toward quality, with investors taking refuge in the safety 
of  government bonds in AEs, and/or of  a growing need to liquidate holdings in EEs 
in order to cover mounting losses and margin calls – something that indeed happened 
later in the year after the collapse of  Lehman Brothers. However, this was not expected 
to create serious payments difficulties in Asian DCs, but several countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe with large current account deficits and high levels of  external debt. On 
the other hand, it was also recognized that capital flows to Asian DCs could accelerate if  
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Europe joined the US in easy monetary policy – as indeed happened after the Lehman 
collapse. 
The prevailing view before the Lehman collapse was that Asian DCs would not 
be affected very much by the subprime crisis, partly because the severity of  the crisis 
was underestimated and partly because exports to the US were seen to constitute 
a relatively small percentage of  GDP in both China and other Asian DCs. However, 
the chapter argues, this did not account for the dependence of  intraregional trade and 
domestic manufacturing investment on exports. Furthermore, the impact would deepen 
significantly with a possible spread of  the crisis to Europe. Even then, however, sound 
macroeconomic conditions in the region would allow a strong countercyclical policy 
response to counter the contractionary impulses from the crisis. Nevertheless, China 
needed more than a countercyclical policy response – a durable shift from exports toward 
domestic consumption – since the crisis was expected to bring a sizeable and possibly 
durable external adjustment in the US. 
Chapter VII, written in 2010, two years into the crisis, returns to these themes and 
makes an ex post assessment of  the impact of  the crisis on Asian DCs, their policy 
response, performance and prospects. Like many other regions, these countries too did 
not feel the adverse impact of  the financial turmoil and economic contraction in the 
US until the collapse of  Lehman Brothers. Subsequently, as a result of  a combination 
of  financial and trade shocks, several Asian economies including Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore and Turkey had negative growth in 2009 while China, India and 
Korea experienced significant slowdown compared to precrisis years.
On the financial side, despite increased holdings of  foreign assets, the region did not 
incur heavy losses on the so-called toxic derivatives because of  a relatively small share 
of  such assets in total portfolios. However, the impact of  the sudden stop and reversal 
of  capital inflows were felt strongly in asset, credit and currency markets, in large part 
because in the aftermath of  the 1997 crisis many Asian countries had liberalized foreign 
entry to domestic securities markets, resulting in a sharp increase in foreign presence. 
Thus, equity markets came under heavy pressure, losing more than half  of  their values 
in most countries in the region. Booms in several Asian property markets also came to 
an end. Redemption by highly leveraged hedge funds from the US and UK played a 
major role in the withdrawal of  nonresident investment. In effect, Asian EEs started to 
provide liquidity to portfolio managers and institutional investors in mature markets in 
order to cover their losses and margin calls and allow them to reduce debt. Coming on 
top of  a cutback in cross-border interbank lending and local lending by foreign banks’ 
affiliates, this resulted in a sharp contraction in domestic credit. Finally, even though most 
countries had ample reserves and strong payments positions they chose not to defend 
their exchange rates in view of  weakening export prospects. 
In most Asian DCs contraction in exports caused much bigger dislocations than 
financial spillovers. After having seen double digit growth for several years, exports fell 
by similar rates in the course of  2009. Even without accounting for spillovers to domestic 
demand, this shaved five to six percentage points off  growth. The more successful East 
Asian exporters of  manufactures, deeply integrated into global production networks 
supplying consumables to the US and Europe, were hit particularly hard, whereas others 
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including India, where domestic demand was a more dynamic component of  precrisis 
growth, suffered relatively less.
Policy response to fallouts from the crisis diverged significantly from earlier episodes 
of  capital flight with almost all countries implementing countercyclical measures. There 
was no recourse to interest rate hikes in defense of  currencies, except for a brief  period 
in Indonesia. However, several countries extended deposit insurance to external liabilities 
of  banks in an attempt to boost confidence. As capital flows stabilized within a few 
months after the Lehman collapse, interest rates were lowered in an attempt to stimulate 
domestic demand. 
The countercyclical fiscal response was unprecedented, especially in East Asia, 
and the spending packages introduced were far greater, as percentages of  GDP, than 
those in AEs, including the US where the crisis originated. China, however, missed an 
opportunity to design a stimulus package so as to address underconsumption. Rather 
than boosting household incomes and private consumption, it focused on investment in 
infrastructure, property and industry, pushing its investment ratio toward 50 percent of  
GDP. This aggravated the problem of  excess capacity in several sectors and left a legacy 
of  a large stock of  debt in public enterprises and local governments – problems that 
China is still grappling to overcome. 
While countercyclical measures were quite effective in stabilizing output and 
promoting recovery, the paper argued, growth momentum in the South could not be 
sustained in the absence of  a strong recovery in AEs. In the event, this is ultimately what 
happened. As the effects of  stimulus packages of  DCs faded, the US recovery remained 
sluggish and the eurozone went into a second dip, DCs could not avoid recoupling, 
slowing considerably from 2011 onwards.
Over the medium term DCs are unlikely to go back to the unprecedented economic 
performance they had enjoyed in the years preceding the financial crisis. This would 
require a return to “business as usual,” with the US acting as a locomotive to major 
surplus economies (China, Germany and Japan) and growing running deficits. This 
would eventually wreak havoc on the international monetary system. Global growth 
and stability will depend not only on rebalancing between China and the US, as was 
popularly emphasized at the time, but also on an expansionary adjustment in the two 
other major surplus economies, Germany and Japan, that have been relying on exports 
for growth. In particular, the German policy of  “competitive disinflation” is seen not 
only as a major source of  global imbalances but also a key destabilizing force in the 
eurozone – something which has contributed significantly to the deepening of  the 
financial turmoil and prolonged the decline in the region. 
The final chapter was written at a time when US recovery was well underway but 
sluggish, there was considerable uncertainty about the depth of  the eurozone crisis, and 
DCs were enjoying a strong upswing after an initial dip. It provides a critical examination 
of  the myth, widely entertained until the recent loss of  growth momentum in the South, 
that major EEs are “decoupled” from the North and have become new engines of  global 
growth. 
In one interpretation, decoupling is understood as desynchronization of  business 
cycles. At a time when global interdependence has been deepening, decoupling in this 
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sense could only mean increased capacity of  DCs to sustain growth independent of  
cyclical positions and strengths of  AEs by pursuing appropriate domestic policies and 
adjusting them to neutralize any shocks from the North. However, the evidence cited in 
the chapter shows that deviations of  economic activity from underlying trends continue 
to be highly correlated between the North and the South. In another sense, decoupling 
could mean a shift in the trend (potential) growth of  DCs relative to AEs. In such a case, 
even when business cycles are synchronized, growth in the South would exceed that in 
the North by a larger margin. However, the chapter sees no evidence of  such an upward 
shift in potential growth in DCs. 
 The decoupling thesis first appeared when DCs started to enjoy exceptionally rapid 
growth in the years before the outbreak of  the crisis while growth in AEs remained weak. 
In the early days of  the crisis there were also widespread expectations that growth in 
the South would be little affected by the difficulties facing AEs. The thesis came back 
with full force when DCs recovered rapidly after a short-lived downturn in 2009, while 
recovery in the US remained weak and Europe went into a second dip. This hype about 
the “rise of  the South,” together with the policy of  easy money in AEs, was a major factor 
in the surge of  international lending and investment in DCs both before the outbreak of  
the crisis and after the Lehman collapse. Governments in major EEs also subscribed to 
the view that they had become key autonomous players in the global economy since this, 
in effect, meant that their policies were on the right track.
The IMF has been a major advocate of  the decoupling thesis. It underestimated 
not only the depth of  the financial crisis, but also its impact on DCs, maintaining 
that the dependence of  growth in the South on the North had significantly weakened 
(IMF WEO April 2007 and April 2008). After 2011 it has constantly overprojected 
growth in DCs. But eventually it has had to recognize the possibility that “recent 
forecast disappointments are symptomatic of  deeper, structural problems” revising 
downward the medium-term prospects of  these economies (IMF WEO April 2013, 19). 
In a more recent report submitted to the St Petersburg meeting of  the G20, the IMF 
“has dropped its view that EEs were the dynamic engine of  the world economy” in 
a “humbling series of  U-turns over its global economic assessment” (Giles 2013). Its 
latest verdict is that the “world’s economies moved much more in lockstep during 
the peak of  the global financial crisis than at any other time in recent decades […] 
The increased co-movement was not confined to the advanced economies, where the 
global financial crisis was centered, but was observed across all geographic regions and 
among advanced, emerging market, and developing economies” (IMF WEO October 
2013, 81).
These “U-turns” reflect the failure of  the IMF to develop a sound understanding of  
growth fundamentals in DCs and their global linkages. Looking at such fundamentals 
as savings, investment, productivity and industrial growth, the final chapter concludes 
that the growth surge in DCs in the run-up to the crisis owes a lot more to exceptional 
but unsustainable global economic conditions than improvements in their underlying 
fundamentals. Until the global crisis, the credit, consumption and property bubbles in 
AEs, particularly the US, produced a highly favorable global environment for DCs in 
trade and investment, capital flows and commodity prices and these accounted for much 
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of  the acceleration of  growth in the South. China also played a key role in the commodity 
price surge, but its own growth was driven by exports to AEs.
Again, some special external conditions played a major role in the resilience of  DCs to 
the crisis. With the subprime crisis the international economic environment deteriorated 
in all areas that had previously supported expansion in DCs, capital flows and commodity 
prices were reversed and exports to AEs collapsed. However, for three reasons most DCs 
were able to rebound quickly. First, as noted, a strong countercyclical policy response was 
made possible by favorable payments, reserves and fiscal positions built up during the 
preceding expansion and this has allowed DCs to turn to domestic demand for growth. 
Second, capital flows recovered briskly thanks to sharp cuts in interest rates and QE in 
AEs. Third, China launched a massive stimulus package in infrastructure and property 
investment and this gave an even stronger boost to commodity prices than the precrisis 
export-led growth because of  the very high commodity intensity of  such investments 
compared to exports of  manufactures. 
However, the chapter concludes, the pace and pattern of  domestic-demand-driven 
growth that EEs enjoyed after 2009 cannot be sustained. First, the risk–return configuration 
that has created the surge in capital flows to DCs, notably the historically low interest rates 
and rapid liquidity expansion in AEs, cannot last forever. Second, China could not keep 
on creating investment bubbles in order to fill the demand gap left by the slowdown of  its 
exports to AEs and act as a locomotive to commodity-dependent DCs. Nor could it go 
back to the precrisis pattern of  growth. It needs to shift to consumption-led growth, but 
this faces political hurdles because it would require a significant redistribution of  income. 
Even a moderate slowdown in China could bring an end to the commodity boom. The 
most vulnerable DCs are those which have enjoyed the twin booms in commodity prices 
and capital flows since the early years of  the millennium.
These considerations have been corroborated by developments since the final chapter 
was written. With continued instability and slowdown in AEs, structural weaknesses 
in DCs have been exposed. Although conditions in global financial and commodity 
markets have remained generally favorable since 2009, the strong upward trends in 
capital flows and commodity prices that had started in 2003 have come to an end and 
exports to AEs have slowed considerably. The prospects of  the exit of  the US Federal 
Reserve Bank from ultra-easy monetary policy have already triggered considerable 
instability in capital inflows, with several major EEs, notably those with large current 
account deficits, facing outflows and considerable pressures in their currency and asset 
markets. Growth in the South, including China, has decelerated considerably. In Asian 
DCs as a whole, the most dynamic developing region, it is five percentage points below 
the rate achieved before the onset of  the crisis; in Latin America less than half  of  the 
precrisis rate. 
Five years into the crisis, growth in the US is still below potential, Europe is struggling 
to get out of  recession and major EEs are slowing rapidly after a temporary resilience. 
Longer-term prospects are not much brighter largely because the key problems that 
gave rise to the most serious postwar crisis, income inequalities, external imbalances 
and financial fragilities, remain unabated and have indeed been aggravated. On the one 
hand, the jury is still out on the survival of  the eurozone, at least as currently constructed 
 INTRODUCTION 13
(O’Rourke and Taylor 2013). On the other hand, in the US a renewed bout of  instability 
remains a real possibility not only because the underlying issues that caused the debacle 
have not been fixed and financial market and institutions have not been brought under 
adequate regulatory discipline and oversight (Blinder 2013), but also because of  the way 
the crisis has been managed. 
The US has relied excessively on monetary policy, including unconventional means for 
an extended period, because of  its reluctance to directly address the debt overhang and 
provide adequate fiscal stimulus. The ultra-easy monetary policy has created financial 
fragility by promoting search-for-yield in risky assets and leverage and posed serious 
policy dilemmas.6 On the one hand, if  the Fed persists much longer with historically 
low interest rates and QE, it could generate another boom–bust cycle. On the other 
hand, exit and normalization of  monetary policy could trigger a severe shock to markets 
accustomed to plenty of  cheap money. A Goldilocks scenario in which the Fed engineers 
an orderly exit without endangering financial stability or choking off  growth looks an 
implausible fairy tale. 
Thus, five years since the collapse of  Lehman Brothers, developing economies are 
again exposed to severe shocks with a potentially devastating impact on their stability, 
growth and development.7 Ten years ago Goldman Sachs identified the BRIC countries 
as the “emerging markets” with the brightest economic prospects. A few years later it 
became BRICS with the addition of  South Africa. Now, in September 2013, three of  
them, Brazil, India and South Africa, are listed among the countries dubbed the “fragile 
five” by Morgan Stanley (Lord 2013), with the addition of  Turkey and Indonesia, again 
countries among the rising stars of  recent years.
***
A fundamental issue raised by systemic instability and recurrent crises in mature and 
emerging economies is how to put financial markets and institutions in the service 
of  economic and social development. The inherent instability of  the international 
monetary and financial system, and the resistance of  major AEs to a genuine reform, 
pose particularly difficult policy challenges to DCs, since instability and crises in the 
South are now increasingly produced by global financial cycles and the associated surges 
and reversals of  capital flows. DCs need to use all possible policy tools to control the 
financial system and international capital flows in order to prevent build-up of  financial 
fragility and reduce the likelihood of  crises. 
However, attention should be paid not only to how best to regulate the existing 
financial institutions and markets, but also how to restructure and reorganize them. 
A rebalancing between state intervention and market forces in search of  greater stability 
and sustained industrialization and growth is both necessary and urgent. In this context 
at least five key issues need to be re-examined, drawing on the recent experience of  
both mature and emerging economies: the pros and cons of  bank-based and market-
based financial systems; the role of  state-owned banks; public intervention in private 
banking, including in the allocation and cost of  credit; the impact of  foreign banks on the 
efficiency and stability of  the financial system; and the capital account regime.8
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Greater financial and macroeconomic stability also requires action on other fronts. 
Despite growing disillusionment in the South, the Washington Consensus is dead only 
in rhetoric. There is little rollback of  policies pursued and institutions created on the 
basis of  that consensus in the past two decades. On the contrary, the role and impact of  
global market forces in the development of  DCs has been greatly enhanced by continued 
liberalization of  trade, investment and finance unilaterally or through bilateral investment 
treaties and free trade agreements with AEs, and this has narrowed the policy space of  
DCs and heightened their exposure to external shocks. 
 DCs need to be as selective about globalization as AEs and reconsider their integration 
into the global economic system, in recognition that successful industrialization is 
associated neither with autarky nor with full integration, but strategic integration designed 
to use foreign finance, markets and technology in pursuit of  industrial development. This 
implies rebalancing external and domestic forces of  growth and reducing dependence 
on foreign markets and capital. The role of  the state and markets needs to be redefined, 
not only in finance but also in all key areas affecting industrialization and development, 
keeping in mind that rapid industrialization and catch-up is not possible without active 
policy.
notes
1 I am grateful to Michael Lim Mah-Hui and Richard Kozul-Wright for comments and 
suggestions. The usual caveat applies.
2 The paper, in effect, constitutes an initial contribution to the collective wisdom developed in the 
Trade and Development Report of  UNCTAD in the early 1990s about the vulnerability of  DCs 
to boom–bust cycles in capital flows. For a concise account, see UNCTAD TDR (1995, 76–77). 
3 For a more recent account, see Rey (2013).
4 IMF (2012, 1). The IMF now includes sterilized interventions among the macroeconomic 
policies that should be employed even though, as noted in the chapter, for years it maintained 
that they were ineffective.
5 These themes are further developed in a more recent paper (Akyüz 2012a), drawing also on the 
lessons from the financial crisis in the US and Europe and their adverse spillovers to DCs.
6 BIS (2013, 1) warns that the recent “strong issuance of  bonds and loans in the riskier part of  the 
spectrum [is] a phenomenon reminiscent of  the exuberance prior to the global financial crisis.” 
7 For the implications of  ultra-easy monetary policy and the problems that exit could cause for 
DCs as well as the US, see Akyüz (2013). 
8 For a brief  discussion of  the key issues involved in these areas, see Akyüz (2012b). 
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Part One




FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION:  
THE KEY ISSUES1
A. Introduction
In recent years financial policies in both industrial and developing countries have put 
increased emphasis on the market mechanism. Liberalization was partly a response to 
developments in the financial markets themselves: as these markets innovated to get 
round the restrictions placed on them, governments chose to throw in the towel. More 
importantly, however, governments embraced liberalization as a doctrine.
 In developing countries, the main impulse behind liberalization has been the belief, based 
on the notion that interventionist financial policies were one of  the main causes of  the crisis of  
the 1980s, that liberalization would help to restore growth and stability by raising savings and 
improving overall economic efficiency; greater reliance on domestic savings was necessary in 
view of  increased external financial stringency. However, these expectations have not generally 
been realized. In many developing countries, instead of  lifting the level of  domestic savings and 
investment, financial liberalization has, rather, increased financial instability. Financial activity 
has increased and financial deepening occurred, but without benefiting industry and commerce.
 In many industrial countries the financial excesses of  the 1980s account for much 
of  the sharp slowdown of  economic activity in the 1990s. Financial deregulation eased 
access to finance and allowed financial institutions to take greater risks. The private 
sector accumulated large amounts of  debt at very high interest rates in the expectation 
that economic expansion would continue to raise debt servicing capacity while asset price 
inflation would compensate for high interest rates. Thus, when the cyclical downturn came, 
borrowers and lenders found themselves overcommitted: debtors tried to sell assets and cut 
down activity in order to retire debt, and banks cut lending to restore balance sheets. Thus, 
the asset price inflation was replaced by debt deflation and credit crunch.
The recent experience with financial liberalization in both industrial and developing 
countries holds a number of  useful lessons. This chapter draws on this experience to discuss 
some crucial issues in financial reform in developing countries. The focus is on how to 
improve the contribution of  finance to growth and industrialization; developing the financial 
sector and promoting financial activity is not synonymous with economic development.
B. Interest rates and Savings
One of  the most contentious issues in financial policy is the effect of  interest rates 
on savings. There can be little doubt that short-term, temporary swings in interest 
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rates have little effect on private savings behavior since that is largely governed by 
expectations and plans regarding current and future incomes and expenditures: they 
alter the level of  savings primarily by affecting the levels of  investment and income. 
However, when there is a rise in interest rates that is expected to be permanent (for 
instance, because it is the result of  a change in the underlying philosophy in the 
determination of  interest rates), will consumer behavior remain the same, or will the 
propensity to save rise? The orthodox theory expects the latter to occur, and thus 
argues that removing “financial repression” will have a strong, positive effect on 
savings (Shaw 1973, 73).
Empirical studies of  savings behavior typically do not distinguish permanent 
from temporary changes in interest rates. Recent evidence on savings behavior in a 
number of  developing countries that changed their interest rate policy regimes shows 
no simple relation between interest rates and private savings. This is true for a wide 
range of  countries in Asia and the Middle East (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Republic of  Korea and Turkey: Cho and Khatkhate 1989; Amsden and 
Euh 1990; Lim 1991; Akyüz 1990), Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zambia: Nissanke 1990), and Latin America (Massad and Eyzaguirre 1990) that 
undertook financial liberalization, albeit to different degrees and under different 
circumstances.
But this should come as no surprise:
 • Even according to the conventional theory, the personal propensity to save from 
current income depends on the relative strength of  two forces pulling in opposite 
directions, namely the income and substitution effects. Moreover, if  current income 
falls relative to expected future income, a rise in interest rates can be associated with a 
fall in savings. This often happens when interest rate deregulation occurs during rapid 
inflation and is accompanied by a macroeconomic tightening that results in a sharp 
decline in employment and income.
 • A large swing in interest rates can lead to consumption of  wealth, especially when 
noninterest income is declining. This is true especially for small savers who can 
react to increases in interest rates by liquidating real assets and foreign exchange 
holdings in order to invest in bank deposits in an effort to maintain their standard 
of  living, consuming not only the real component of  interest income but also 
part of  its nominal component corresponding to inflation. This tendency is often 
reinforced by “money illusion” or the inability to distinguish between nominal and 
real interest incomes, something that tends to be pervasive in the early stages of  
deregulation. Thus, the initial outcome of  deregulation can be to lower household 
savings, particularly if  it is introduced at a time of  rapid inflation. For instance 
in Turkey high deposit rates in the early 1980s allowed a large number of  small 
wealth-holders to dissave.
 • The behavior of  households may be quite different from that assumed in conventional 
theory. For instance, they may be targeting a certain level of  future income or wealth. 
Higher interest rates may then lower household savings by making it possible to attain 
the target with fewer current savings. For instance, in the Republic of  Korea and Japan 
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low interest rates combined with high real estate prices have tended to raise household 
savings (Amsden and Euh 1990).
 • Financial liberalization can lower household savings by allowing easier access to credit 
and relaxing the income constraint on consumption spending. In many countries 
financial liberalization has, indeed, given rise to a massive growth in consumer loans 
(such as instalment credits for cars and other durables, credit card lending, etc.). This 
appears to have been one reason why the household savings rate declined and the 
debt/income ratio rose in the 1980s in the United States – something which is at 
the heart of  the current debt deflation process (UNCTAD TDR 1991, part 2, chaps 
1–2; 1992, part 2, chap. 2). An inverse correlation between household borrowing and 
savings ratios has also been observed in most other OECD countries since the early 
and mid-1980s (Blundell-Wignall and Browne 1991). 
 • Even if  financial liberalization and higher interest rates do not lower personal savings, 
they can reduce total private savings and aggregate domestic savings by redistributing 
income away from debtors – a category which typically includes corporations and 
the government. In many developing countries undistributed corporate profits are an 
important part of  private savings and the most important source of  business investment. 
Generally, the savings rate is higher than for households: corporate retentions are high, 
ranging between 60 to 80 percent of  after-tax profits, because ownership is usually 
concentrated in the hands of  families and there is no outside pressure to pay out 
dividends (Honohan and Atiyas 1989; Akyüz 1991). The redistribution of  income 
from corporations to households through higher interest rates can thus reduce total 
private savings even if  it raises household savings. In developing countries this effect 
can be particularly strong because firms operate with high leverage, loan maturities 
are short and corporate debt usually carries variable rates. Thus, a rise in interest rates 
not only raises the cost of  new borrowing but also the cost of  servicing existing debt. 
Evidence from the studies already mentioned suggests that in a number of  countries 
(e.g., Philippines, Turkey, Yugoslavia), sharp increases in interest rates were a major 
factor in the collapse of  corporate profits and savings that took place particularly in the 
early phases of  financial liberalization.
Such adverse effects are especially marked when interest rates are freed under rapid 
inflation. There is a widespread agreement that financial liberalization undertaken 
in an unstable environment may make things worse, and that such reforms should be 
undertaken only after macroeconomic balances are attained (World Bank 1989; Edwards 
1989). Nevertheless, many countries have resorted to liberalization as part of  shock 
therapy against stagflation.
Thus, interest rate increases are not a reliable instrument for raising domestic savings, 
but can damage macroeconomic stability and investment. The crucial question is how to 
design interest rate policies compatible with sustained stability and growth.
The historical experience of  major industrial countries holds some useful lessons. 
Until the 1980s real short-term interest rates in these countries were slightly negative 
and real long-term bond rates slightly positive; i.e., about 1 to 2 percent below and above 
inflation respectively. Until the oil shocks of  the 1970s, there was sustained growth and 
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price stability. But since the beginning of  the 1980s (for reasons to be discussed later) real 
interest rates have been, on average, more than twice their historical levels. Nevertheless, 
these countries enjoyed one of  the longest periods of  economic expansion in the postwar 
period with low inflation. This generated a widespread perception that high real interest 
rates do not impede investment and growth, but help price stability. However, the 
subsequent debt-deflation-cum-recession has clearly shown that economic expansion 
attained at very high real interest rates eventually depresses income, investment and 
growth.
C. Financial Liberalization and deepening
It is generally agreed that financial liberalization raises financial activity relative to the 
production of  goods and nonfinancial services. However, there is much less consensus on 
the causes and effects of  this “financial deepening.” According to the financial repression 
theory (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973) financial deepening represents increased 
intermediation between savers and investment because higher interest rates raise savings 
and shift them from unproductive assets toward financial assets, thereby raising the 
volume of  productive investment. 
While it is true that financial liberalization can shift existing savings toward financial 
assets, reallocation is not the only and even the most important reason for financial 
deepening. Financial liberalization can also lead to deepening by redistributing 
savings and investment among various sectors, and by creating greater opportunities 
for speculation. Since these can worsen the use of  savings, financial deepening is not 
necessarily a positive development. 
The prime role of  the financial system in the savings/investment process is to 
intermediate between deficit and surplus sectors rather than to transfer aggregate 
savings into aggregate investment. Deficit sectors (typically the corporate sector and the 
government) save as well as invest, while surplus sectors (households) invest as well as 
save. Thus, redistribution of  savings and investment among sectors can, by changing 
sectoral surpluses and deficits, result in financial deepening without any change in 
aggregate savings and investment – for instance, as already noted, when higher interest 
rates redistribute income and savings from debtors to creditors. Even when this does not 
alter the volume of  aggregate savings (i.e., lower savings of  debtors are compensated by 
higher savings of  creditors), it increases deficits and surpluses and, hence, the amount of  
financial intermediation. Indeed, financial intermediation can increase while aggregate 
savings and investment fall (Akyüz 1991). This can happen even under the orthodox 
assumptions that saving rates are positively related to the interest rate and that savings 
determine investment and growth (Molho 1986, 112). 
In such cases financial deepening is a symptom of  a deterioration of  the finances of  
the corporate and public sectors, reflecting an accumulation of  debt in order to finance 
the increased interest bill rather than new investment. Financial deepening driven by such 
Ponzi financing has been observed in a number of  countries (e.g., Turkey, Yugoslavia and 
New Zealand) where financial liberalization redistributed income in favor of  creditors 
and encouraged distress borrowing.
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Similarly financial deepening can be the result of  a redistribution of  a given volume 
of  aggregate investment, when, for instance, higher interest rates induce households 
to reduce investment in housing and shift to bank deposits. Then, the increase in the 
household surplus and in the volume of  deposits represents a decline in household 
investment, not a rise in savings. 
Financial liberalization often raises holdings of  both financial assets and liabilities by 
firms and individuals at any given level of  income, investment and savings. This tendency 
to borrow in order to purchase assets is driven by the increased scope for capital gains 
generated by financial liberalization. Liberalization increases the instability of  interest 
rates and asset prices, thereby raising prospects for quick profits through speculation on 
changes in the market valuation of  financial assets. It also allows greater freedom for 
banks and other financial institutions to lend to finance activities unrelated to production 
and investment, and to firms and individuals to issue debt in order to finance speculation. 
These can generate considerable financial activity unrelated to the real economy, and 
lead to financial deepening – as in the United States in recent years through leverage 
takeovers, mergers, acquisitions and so on (UNCTAD TDR 1992, part 2, chap. 2).
Deepening can also result from the impact of  changes in interest rates on the form 
in which savings are held. Indeed, one of  the main reasons why savings do not in 
practice strongly respond to increases in real interest rates is the existence of  a range 
of  assets with different degrees of  protection against inflation; for, returns on such 
assets also influence savings decisions. The greater the influence of  interest rates on the 
allocation of  savings among alternative assets, the smaller the influence on the volume 
of  savings.
Whether shifts of  savings into financial assets improve the use of  resources depends on 
where they come from and how efficiently the financial system is operating. Clearly, a switch 
from commodity holdings can improve the use to which savings are put. But, contrary to 
widespread perception, there is very little evidence of  extensive commodity holding in 
developing countries as a form of  savings. Such holdings entail substantial storage and 
transaction costs, making their own real rate of  return typically negative. Moreover, there 
is considerable uncertainty regarding the movement of  prices of  individual commodities 
even when the general price level is rising rapidly. These factors, together with the existence 
of  more liquid, less costly inflation hedges (such as foreign currency or gold) reduce the 
demand for commodities as a store of  value. The large commodity holdings that exist 
in African countries typically reflect the nature of  production and nonmonetization of  
the rural economy. Consequently, increases in deposit rates are often unable to induce 
liquidation of  commodity stocks (Aryeetey et al. 1990; Mwega 1990; Nissanke 1990).
An increase in domestic interest rates can induce a shift from foreign currency holdings 
to domestic assets, and repatriation of  flight capital. Many governments, however, have 
found it necessary to legalize foreign currency holdings and introduce foreign currency 
deposits for residents and to offer very high interest rates in order to attract foreign 
currency holdings to the banking system. Certainly, in both cases the portfolio shifts 
can increase the resources available for investment and deepen finance. However, as 
discussed in Section H, capital flows and dollarization resulting from such policies often 
prove troublesome for macroeconomic stability, investment and competitiveness.
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Freeing interest rates in the formal sector can also trigger a shift away from informal 
markets. However, the scope of  such shifts may be limited since the reason for informal 
markets is not always interest rate controls and credit rationing. They often provide services 
to small and medium producers who do not have access to bank credits. Since financial 
liberalization does not always improve their access to banks, informal markets continue 
to operate after the deregulation of  interest rates. As savings placed in the informal sector 
assure these producers some access to credit, they are not always willing to shift to banks 
when deposit rates are raised (Chipeta 1990; Aryeteey et al. 1990; Mwega 1990). On 
the other hand, when funds are shifted to banks, the cost of  finance for informal market 
borrowers can rise considerably. Moreover, such shifts can result in financial “shallowing” 
because informal markets provide more financial intermediation due to the absence of  
liquidity and reserve requirements (van Wijnbergen 1983; Owen and Solis-Fallas 1989). 
It can thus be concluded that financial deepening brought about by liberalization 
is not necessarily associated with a higher level and/or better use of  savings. Indeed, 
the empirical evidence does not support the claim that financial deepening is associated 
with faster growth (Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989). The degree of  financial deepening is 
therefore not a good measure of  the contribution of  finance to growth and development.
 The relevant issue in financial reform is efficiency rather than deepening. There are 
various concepts of  efficiency of  financial markets and institutions (Tobin 1984), but 
from the point of  view of  the role of  finance in economic growth and development, 




Financial markets and institutions can be said to be allocatively efficient if  they direct 
resources to their more socially productive use, i.e., if  they finance investment with the 
highest social rates of  return. This concept broadly corresponds to what Tobin (1984, 3) 
calls functional efficiency and provides a rationale for devoting resources to financial 
activity.
Allocative efficiency is closely related to the extent of  “the accuracy with which market 
valuations reflect fundamentals” (“fundamental-valuation efficiency,” Tobin 1984, 5). 
Prices of  financial assets provide market signals for resource allocation. Speculative 
bubbles in securities markets influence investment and consumption decisions as well as 
financing plans of  corporations while exchange rate misalignments cause misallocation 
of  resources between traded and nontraded goods sectors. 
There is ample evidence that in industrial countries financial liberalization has resulted 
in a considerable increase in the volatility of  interest rates, equity prices, exchange rates 
and the prices of  real estate, gold, silver and collectable assets, and caused large and 
sustained deviation of  these from their fundamental values (e.g., Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers 1990; Miller and Weller 1991; Kupiec 1991). Similarly, “(t)akeover mania, 
motivated by egregious undervaluations, is testimony to the failure of  the market on this 
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fundamental-valuation criterion efficiency” (Tobin 1984, 6). These deviations reflect the 
pervasiveness of  speculative forces: “the similarity of  patterns in a wide range of  asset 
markets suggests the possibility that they are best explicable as a consequence of  the 
speculative process itself ” (Cutler, Poterba and Summers 1990, 36).
Quite apart from the distorting effects of  speculation on asset prices and resource 
allocation, financial markets also fail to allocate resources efficiently because of  a number 
of  imperfections not attributable to government intervention. These include missing 
markets, asymmetric and incomplete information, and various externalities not mediated 
by markets (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986; Stiglitz 1989a; Datta-
Chaudhuri 1990). Such market failures are more serious in developing than in developed 
countries and tend to obstruct the learning process which plays a key role in modern 
industrialization. “Learning […] means that it will not be optimal to pursue myopic 
policies; one cannot use current comparative advantage as the only basis for judgments 
of  how to allocate resources. Moreover, it may be optimal to initially incur a loss; the 
imperfections of  capital markets thus may impose a more serious impediment on LDCs 
taking advantage of  potentials for learning” (Stiglitz 1989a, 199).
2. Successful intervention
Governments in many countries have therefore acted to influence the allocation and 
pricing of  finance as part of  their industrial policy. Indeed, almost all modern examples of  
industrialization have been accompanied by such intervention. Directed and preferential 
credits have been the most important instruments of  some successful industrializers in 
East Asia (Amsden 1989; Bradford 1986; Cho and Khatkhate 1989; Hanson and Neal 
1985; Westphal 1990). As noted by a recent report, in Japan an important instrument 
of  intervention was policy-based finance, used through the Japan Development Bank 
“to induce the private sector to achieve specified policy objectives.” It was based on the 
recognition that “if  the private financial market were perfect (in terms of  competition, 
information and freedom of  transactions) policy-based finance would be unnecessary. 
In reality, however, there are limits to the perfect fulfillment of  these conditions in the 
financial market. Thus, one can understand the significance of  policy-based finance as 
one means of  compensating for these market limitations” (Kato et al. 1993, 28).
In the Republic of  Korea “government intervention was necessary not just to steer 
credit in the right direction but to underwrite production during the learning process 
that was far more involved than what is commonly meant by ‘infant industry protection.’ 
Subsidized credit meant the difference between establishing new industries or not, rather 
than the difference between high and low profits” (Amsden and Euh 1990, 31). Thus, 
“extensive intervention by the government with South Korea’s financial system can be 
viewed as an internal capital market and, consequently, it could have led to a more efficient 
allocation of  credit than possible in a free-market financial system” (Lee 1992, 187). 
But many countries have directed credit with much less success. The differences 
between successful and unsuccessful intervention have been partly due to skill in “picking 
winners.” While it is true that governments are not necessarily better equipped to do this 
than markets, the experience strongly suggests that whether a firm (or an industry) is a 
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winner depends on how it is managed. A number of  factors seem to separate success 
from failure in this respect: 
 • The ability of  governments to prevent the interventionist finance from degenerating 
into inflationary finance, to resist excessive credit expansion and to ensure fiscal 
discipline: macroeconomic stability appears to have been a more important factor in 
growth than financial liberalization and deepening (Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989). 
 • To make provision of  support conditional upon good performance, and to see that 
government support and protection are actually used for the purposes intended rather 
than simply as a handout. 
 • To design objective, well-defined and market-based performance indicators –namely, 
competitiveness in world markets and export performance – in order to assess the 
nature and extent of  the support needed, and whether it is being used effectively 
(Amsden 1989; Westphal 1990). 
 • To attain social consensus on the purpose and modalities of  government intervention. 
As noted by a recent report this was particularly important in the success of  the policy-
based finance in Japan: “when the government does intervene in private economic 
activities, or carries out economic activities itself  in place of  private actors, it must 
not merely give some abstract reason, but rather clearly explain the concrete need for 
and obtain social agreement on those activities” (Kato et al. 1993, 28). This has been 
achieved through “extensive participation of  the private sector in the policy-formation 
process based on the public-private cooperative system,” i.e., in the advisory councils 
including “industry leaders and general citizens” as well as bureaucrats, which are still 
widely used (Kato et al. 1993, 85). 
3. Measuring efficiency
As noted above, the main impulse to financial liberalization in developing countries 
has come from the frustration with ineffective and wasteful intervention and the belief  
that liberalization would raise allocative efficiency. Thus, many countries have chosen 
to liberalize finance rather than reform their industrial policies and state intervention. 
However, this has not always resulted in a better allocation of  credits.
In the orthodox theory better allocation means a tendency toward equalization 
of  rates of  return on investment in different sectors. Similarly, a more efficient credit 
allocation is expected to reduce the variation of  the cost of  finance across borrowers 
on the assumption that profit maximization requires equalization of  marginal cost of  
borrowing and marginal rate of  return on investment (Cho 1988). 
These measures, however, are highly inappropriate. First of  all, as discussed below, 
one important determinant of  the rate of  return and cost of  capital is risk. When 
projects carry different risks, an optimal allocation must reflect these differences in 
rates of  return and borrowing costs. More important, when capital markets are short-
sighted, equalization of  profit rates typically means discriminating against those firms 
and industries with dynamic comparative advantages and learning potentials that have 
to incur initial losses. Since financial liberalization is often associated with a shortening 
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of  time horizons, a tendency toward equalization of  rates of  profit and cost of  capital 
could worsen allocation. 
Financial liberalization normally reduces or eliminates credits on preferential terms 
and hence diminishes variations in cost of  capital across sectors. Therefore, measuring 
the effect of  financial liberalization on allocative efficiency in terms of  reduced variations 
in cost of  capital is tautological. On the other hand, a successful industrial policy could 
reduce variance in borrowing cost by diminishing the number of  industries requiring 
special treatment. For instance, it has been argued that the decline in the inter-industry 
variance of  borrowing costs in the Republic of  Korea in the 1980s compared to the 
1970s reflects the success not of  financial liberalization as suggested by some authors 
(e.g., Cho 1988), but of  industrialization policies (Amsden and Euh 1990, 43–44). 
Financial liberalization in developing countries often changes significantly the 
sectoral allocation of  credit. Evidence suggests that typically the shares of  service 
sectors, consumer loans and property-related credits tend to increase at the expense 
of  industry. This may result from a reduction in directed credit allocation, which often 
favors industry and does not necessarily indicate a deterioration of  resource allocation. 
However, it is important to note that these changes are often associated with shortening 
of  maturities and declines in demand for manufacturing investment credits, when 
liberalization takes place in an unstable environment and results in very high and 
volatile interest rates.
Perhaps more important indicators of  the effects of  financial liberalization on 
allocative efficiency are the number of  nonperforming loans, loan default rates and 
bank failures. Evidence from a number of  countries (e.g., the Southern Cone countries, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Turkey and Yugoslavia) indicates that deregulation of  interest rates 
and elimination of  restrictions on financial activities have almost always been followed 
by increases in the proportion of  nonperforming loans in bank portfolios and in bank 
failures. Again, resort to liberalization to cure instability and stagnation has often played 
an important role. These, together with external shocks, had already greatly weakened 
the balance sheets of  the corporate sector and financial institutions. Deregulation of  
interest rates, often accompanied by monetary tightening, further disrupted the financial 
position of  the highly leveraged corporate sector, leading to increased loan default rates 
and eventually to bank failures.
E. Productive Efficiency and Cost of  Finance
The traditional concept of  productive efficiency refers to microeconomic efficiency of  
firms in producing goods and services with given prices for their inputs. When applied 
to the financial system, this concept would simply be translated into intermediation cost 
or interest spread. However, one must approach productive efficiency from a broader 
perspective and define it as the ability of  the financial system to provide finance at the 
lowest possible cost. This depends not only on the extent to which financial intermediaries 
minimize the cost of  intermediation between the ultimate lender and the ultimate 
borrower, but also on the ability of  the entire financial system to minimize the interest 
paid to the ultimate lender (the lender’s interest rate). 
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1. Risk, uncertainty and interest rates
The Keynesian notions of  lender’s and borrower’s risks provide an appropriate 
framework for discussing the determinants of  cost of  finance and the effects of  
financial liberalization on productive efficiency (Keynes 1936, 144). An important 
determinant of  the lender’s interest rate is the risk due to the possibility of  default 
by the borrower, i.e., the lender’s risk. First, there is the risk of  voluntary default, 
or what Keynes calls the moral risk: the lender must make an allowance for the 
possibility of  dishonesty of  the borrower. Second, involuntary default arising from 
imperfect foresight, i.e., from uncertainties over factors outside the control of  the 
borrower which affect profitability. This risk, called the borrower’s risk or the pure 
risk, is inherent in all investment decisions and cannot be eliminated. However, it 
can be reduced by the access of  the borrower to better information and more stable 
economic conditions. The pure risk is closely related to allocative efficiency. When 
finance is not efficiently allocated, the probability of  involuntary default increases. 
This raises the lender’s risk and the cost of  finance: allocative inefficiency thus 
aggravates cost inefficiency. 
The lender also runs a risk regarding the capital value of  his assets due to uncertainties 
over future interest rates and asset prices (as well as the price level). The capital-value 
uncertainty increases with the volatility of  asset prices and interest rates, as well as with 
the increased frequency of  bank failures. These raise liquidity preference and lower the 
demand for capital-uncertain assets, thereby shortening the maturities of  financial assets 
and pushing up interest rates, especially long term. The degree of  productive efficiency 
of  the financial system therefore depends in part on its ability to attain stability and 
reduce capital-value uncertainty.
The search for greater allocative efficiency through financial liberalization can greatly 
reduce the productive efficiency of  the financial system by giving rise to increased financial 
instability and raising the cost of  finance to investors. This is a systemic influence, quite 
independent of  any rise in interest rates that may result from eliminating ceilings. Indeed, 
the financial instability and bank failures stemming from financial liberalization in the 
major industrial countries, especially the United States, in the 1980s played a major role 
in considerably raising long-term interest rates and reducing their sensitivity to changes 
in short-term rates (Akyüz 1992, 59–60). 
2. Intermediation margin 
The second component of  cost of  finance, namely the intermediation margin, reflects 
the microeconomic efficiency in the use of  resources devoted to financial activity. This is 
particularly important in bank finance even though mark-ups of  intermediaries in stock 
exchanges are not negligible (Tobin 1984, 4). The spread between lending and deposit 
rates is influenced by operating expenses, legal reserve and liquidity requirements as well 
as by the pressure of  competition on profit mark-ups. Reserve and liquidity requirements 
are typically lowered as part of  financial liberalization. Similarly, operating expenses and 
profit mark-ups tend to fall as entry barriers are dismantled.
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However, financial liberalization also tends to increase the spread by raising the rate 
of  default on loans since banks often pass the cost of  bad loans onto other borrowers. 
Therefore, erroneous investment and financing decisions and allocative inefficiency can 
lead to cost inefficiency by raising not only the lender’s interest rate, but also the spread. 
The increase in the cost of  finance, in turn, can push sound borrowers into insolvency, 
thereby increasing loan default rates and pushing up the lender’s risk and the lender’s 
interest rate further. This often leads to Ponzi financing whereby banks increasingly 
lend to high-risk, speculative business at very high interest rates in order to cover high 
deposit rates and defaults. Such a process is unsustainable, but it can nevertheless cause 
considerable waste.
F. regulation of  Finance and Financial Stability
The preceding discussion has shown that stability is an essential attribute of  an efficient 
financial system. After many episodes of  turmoil in financial markets in both developing 
and developed countries, there now appears to exist a consensus on the need for prudential 
regulations in order to attain stability. But, can such regulations and supervision prevent 
financial instability when interest rates are allowed to fluctuate freely and banks are left 
free to compete for deposits by bidding up interest rates?
1. Risk taking by banks
The theory of  finance suggests that because information is imperfect and asymmetric 
(the borrower knows more about his investment than the lender) and contracts are 
incomplete (lenders cannot control all aspects of  the borrower’s behavior), banks 
implement their own quantity rationing by imposing credit ceilings, and restrict 
deposit and loan rates in order to avoid excessive risk taking (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981; Davis 1993, 13–16). Since higher interest rates tend to reduce the average 
quality of  loans through adverse selection (lending to high-risk borrowers willing to 
pay high interest rates) and moral hazard (inducing “good” borrowers to invest in 
riskier projects), the expected rate of  return net of  default will decline once the loan 
rate has reached a certain level. This implies that even in the absence of  prudential 
regulations, there will be limits to price competition and risk taking in the banking 
sector. 
However, self-restraint cannot always be relied on to prevent financial instability, 
particularly in developing countries. Banks tend to engage in speculative financing and 
excessive risk taking provided that failure does not have serious consequences for their 
shareholders and managers. This happens when they can easily acquire deposit insurance, 
enjoy implicit or explicit guarantees for bailout and have easy access to the lender-of-last-
resort facility, and when sanctions and penalties for failing bank managers are inadequate. 
This is often the case in developing countries where governments are often all too ready 
to rescue banks in trouble. The moral hazard that results is made worse by the existence 
of  deposit insurance schemes designed to give protection to depositors and attract funds 
into banks. Banks often have to pay very little for the insurance coverage while having all 
30 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
the incentives to raise deposit rates to mobilize funds to invest in high-return, high-risk, 
and often speculative projects. 
Furthermore, in developing countries large nonfinancial corporations are often able 
to exert strong influence over banks, causing bank lending to be concentrated on a small 
number of  firms, at the cost of  increasing their own vulnerability. Corporate distress 
borrowing and Ponzi financing tend to be much more common in developing countries, 
and these become particularly visible and problematic during episodes of  financial 
liberalization. The intense competition that banks in many developing countries face 
from unregulated financial markets can also lead to higher interest rates and greater risk 
taking. 
2. Prudential regulations
Evidence from both developed and developing countries shows that a judicious 
combination of  effective prudential and protective regulations is necessary to prevent 
financial instability. In many developing countries, however, regulations restricting 
excessive risk taking and/or covering such risks are absent. In some countries government 
restrictions on lending to a single firm and the acquisition of  real estate or shares in 
nonfinancial corporations are strict but not implemented. Legal provisions against bad 
assets are either absent or ignored, and capital requirements are either inadequate or 
nonexistent or unimplemented. There is a widespread noncompliance even with legal 
reserve requirements, not always because they are especially high, but because the 
monetary authorities are unable to impose sufficient penalties. 
However, prudential regulations, while necessary, may not always be sufficient to 
prevent financial instability. With the freeing of  deposit rates considerable competition 
can build up between the newly deregulated and unregulated financial sectors, giving rise 
to sharp increases in deposit rates, thereby raising the loan rates and deteriorating the 
quality of  bank assets as high-yield, high-risk lending replaces safer but lower-yielding 
portfolios. It is not always possible to check this process through prudential regulations 
on the asset side of  banks’ balance sheets. Pressures can develop to allow banks to enter 
into new lines of  business in order to restore their profitability and viability in the face of  
higher deposit cost. Such pressures will often find favor with the liberalist view underlying 
interest rate deregulation, and hence result in the relaxation of  constraints on types of  
bank lending and investment. 
The experience of  the United States in the 1980s illustrates how easily such a process 
can develop (UNCTAD TDR 1992, part 2, chap. 2). As the Fed moved away from 
targeting interest rates to monetarism in order to reduce inflation, and the Regulation Q 
ceilings on deposit rates were lifted, banks with long-term portfolios with fixed interest 
rates (particularly mutual savings banks and Savings and Loan Associations, S&Ls) 
experienced serious difficulties. Considerable pressure developed for the introduction of  
legislation to attract deposits to these institutions (e.g., raising deposit insurance limits) 
and to allow them to invest in high-yield, high-risk assets. Thus, these institutions, and 
subsequently commercial banks, increasingly financed consumer and credit card loans, 
high-yield noninvestment grade (junk) bonds, leverage buy-outs, real estate acquisition, 
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and development and construction loans. A large amount of  debt was accumulated by 
households and firms while banks acquired high-risk assets. This process ended with the 
collapse of  the S&Ls with an estimated cost of  about $200 billion, and was replaced by 
a debt-deflation process already mentioned.
Stricter capital adequacy requirements of  the type recently introduced by BIS 
(UNCTAD TDR 1992, part 2, annex 1) could have helped to slow down this process 
but would probably not have prevented it. As there was simultaneously a speculative 
bubble in the stock market, banks would have had no difficulty in raising capital at very 
favorable terms to cover their high-risk investment, but would have remained exposed 
to risks on both sides of  their balance sheets. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in 
Japan where banks can account as capital almost half  of  accrued but unrealized capital 
gains on equities and use them to offset potential loan losses. As the stock market was 
rising rapidly in the 1980s, banks counted on these gains instead of  setting aside reserves 
against potential losses on high-risk, property-related lending. The subsequent decline in 
stock prices, together with the fall in property prices, thus created difficulties for banks 
from both sides of  their balance sheets. 
There are also other instances of  boom and bust where rapid expansion of  some banks 
through high-risk, high-return lending increased their stock prices sharply and allowed 
them to raise capital at costs lower than the prudent banks. “In such cases neither public 
scrutiny of  bank balance sheets, nor capital ratios would have prevented the propagation 
of  the crisis” (Kregel 1993, 10). 
3. Interest ceilings
In short, competition among financial institutions can easily result in escalation of  
interest rates and/or excessive risk taking either because prudential capital requirements 
become ineffective or pressures build up for relaxing controls over bank asset portfolios. 
Such risks are greater in developing countries. This, together with the fact that stability 
of  interest rates and asset prices is essential for an efficient financial system, constitutes a 
strong case in favor of  controlling interest rates as well as bank lending. 
 An effective way of  doing this is to impose statutory ceilings on deposit and/or loan 
rates. Such ceilings have been widely used in industrial countries until recent years. In 
Japan, for instance, interest rate regulations played a crucial role throughout the postwar 
period and have not yet been abolished totally. Again, the recent legislation in the United 
States regarding the depository institutions (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of  1991, Jones and King 1992) stipulates mandatory restrictions on 
deposit interest rates for undercapitalized banks in the context of  capital-based policy 
of  prompt corrective action. Since undercapitalization is widespread among banks in 
developing countries, the scope for the application of  such restrictions must be much 
greater. 
Regulation of  short-term interest rates through intervention in interbank markets 
is also essential for attaining greater financial stability and preventing frequent bank 
failures, particularly when there is considerable maturity mismatching between banks’ 
assets and liabilities. Under such conditions, large swings in interest rates can create 
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serious dilemmas for banks. If  banks respond to an unexpected increase in market 
interest rates by raising deposit rates, their profits can be sharply reduced and their 
solvency threatened. If  they do not, or if  they are prevented to do so by deposit ceilings, 
they may suffer a considerable deposit drain. Banks can respond to increased swings in 
short-term rates with variable rate loans or by shortening the maturities of  their assets, 
as they have indeed done in many countries, but when done on a large enough scale 
this simply transfers the interest rate risk onto the borrower and replaces it with greater 
credit risk.
It should be kept in mind that control over interest rates through ceilings and 
intervention does not eliminate the need for certain types of  prudential regulations to 
reduce financial fragility, i.e., vulnerability to default in the corporate and household 
sectors (Minsky 1982, 1986; Davis 1993). This is particularly true in developing countries 
where the level of  economic activity is much more variable. When activity is buoyant, 
banks tend to lend increasingly against assets which carry considerable capital risk, 
including not only illiquid assets such as property but also securities; they also expand 
consumer credits and invest directly in securities and property. But when the expansion 
comes to an end and incomes and asset prices start to fall, the quality of  bank assets can 
deteriorate rapidly, and even set off  a debt-deflation process and credit crunch. Reducing 
the fragility of  the financial system thus calls for prudential regulations designed to 
prevent excessive investment and lending with considerable capital risk arising from their 
susceptibility to changes in the pace of  economic activity. 
G. Options in Financial Organizations
The discussions above suggest that the efficiency of  the financial system crucially depends 
on the way it is organized because that influences the nature and the degree of  risk, 
uncertainty and instability. On the other hand, the experience of  industrial countries 
shows that there is no single way of  organizing finance. Consequently, an important 
issue in financial reform in developing (and Eastern European) countries is what types of  
financial institutions and markets need to be promoted.
1. Bank-oriented and market-oriented finance
It is possible to distinguish between two broad types of  financial arrangements according 
to whether or not banks and capital markets serve distinct functions. In an ideal-type 
differentiated system banks act primarily within the monetary system, arranging 
payments and extending short-term commercial credits. Corporations obtain investment 
finance in the capital market by direct security issues, often via the intermediation of  
investment banks for underwriting and brokerage. Ownership of  companies is highly 
fragmented: an important part of  corporate securities is held by households and 
institutional investors in diversified portfolios. Such a segmentation is the essence of  the 
Anglo-American system which we will call, for brevity, the market-oriented system.2
In the German-type of  universal banking (the bank-oriented system), on the 
other hand, commercial banks play a much greater role at all stages in the process of  
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corporate investment. They provide investment finance and function also, like investment 
banks. They also have considerable control over firms both through their own equity 
holding and proxy votes for private investors, and by appointing representatives on the 
boards of  firms. They lend primarily to firms in which they hold equity interest. Household 
financial wealth tends to be held in banks rather than direct securities, and bank credits 
account for a larger proportion of  external financing of  corporate investment.
There are certainly a number of  variants combining elements of  both systems. In 
the United Kingdom commercial banks do not have much control over corporations, 
but there is no legal separation between commercial and investment banking. In Japan 
commercial banks hold corporate equities but are prevented from playing a major role in 
the underwriting of  corporate securities. Individual ownership of  stocks is much smaller 
than ownership by financial and nonfinancial corporations, and corporate equity is 
controlled through interlocking shareholding within industrial groups where banks play 
a central role. Banks also control other financial institutions (e.g. pension funds) that 
invest in equity. Lending by banks and insurance and pension funds usually takes place 
within the same groups and involves purchase of  company bonds as well as loans. In 
Japan bank credits have played a much more important role in financing business growth 
than in the other countries discussed here, although recently there has been a shift to 
securities markets. 
2. Efficiency of  alternative systems
In recent years many developing countries have been seeking to institute and promote 
capital markets, often as part of  the structural adjustment programs. One of  the main 
reasons for privatizing public enterprises has been precisely to promote capital markets. 
Similarly, access to equity markets has been granted to nonresidents in order to boost 
demand. 
There are a number of  arguments in favor of  developing capital markets as a way of  
overcoming the paucity of  investment finance in developing countries. The bank-oriented 
system of  investment finance has traditionally been viewed as inherently problematic 
because of  the risks associated with maturity transformation in a volatile economic 
environment. Such a system increases the vulnerability of  firms to financial shocks since 
the cost and availability of  bank credit often undergo sharp and unexpected changes. By 
contrast, capital markets are expected to provide firms with more predictable, longer-
term finance, while secondary markets in securities accord savers liquidity. It is also often 
argued that they would exert better financial discipline over firms through shareholder 
action and the threat of  being taken over by other firms.
While there are often serious problems and weaknesses in bank-oriented finance 
in developing countries, the benefits claimed for a market-oriented system are 
unsubstantiated. It is often overlooked that the financial systems in Germany and Japan 
have not only proved to be remarkably stable, but also in the major respects discussed 
in Sections D and E are more efficient than the Anglo-American system. Historically, 
financial asset prices and interest rates in Germany and Japan have been less volatile 
than in the United States, bank deposits more stable, and financial disruptions and bank 
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failures less frequent. Moreover, the cost of  finance to industry has been much lower in 
Germany and, more particularly, in Japan. Evidence suggests that high capital costs have 
contributed to declining competitiveness both in industry and international banking in 
the United States. Lower capital costs and a more predictable supply of  finance appear to 
have enabled Japanese firms to undertake longer-term projects, including investment in 
research and development, whereas United States firms have been deterred (McCauley 
and Zimmer 1989; Poterba 1991; Zimmer and McCauley 1991).3
One of  the main reasons for the greater stability and efficiency of  the financial systems 
in Germany and Japan is their ability to overcome the dilemma posed by modern capital 
markets. As noted by Keynes (1936, chap. 12), modern capital markets reconcile the 
social need for investment with the preference of  individual investors for liquidity. This 
is a necessity since “if  individual purchases of  investment were rendered illiquid, this 
might seriously impede new investment.” However, while secondary markets in securities 
accord savers liquidity, they also open up prospects for speculation whereby most of  the 
players “are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of  
the probable yield of  an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the 
conventional basis of  valuation a short time ahead of  the general public.” Thus, these 
markets tend to operate like “casinos” where players speculate on the speculations of  
other players. 
The pattern of  shareholding and ownership that characterizes the German and the 
Japanese systems has allowed them largely to overcome this dilemma. The fact that banks 
and business groups with a long-term stake in the corporations hold the controlling 
interest means not only that secondary markets tend to be less active and volatile, but 
also that the managers do not need to pay much attention to how the market values their 
assets from day to day, and can concentrate instead on the long term. This also helps 
reduce liquidity preference and short-termism on the part of  individual investors and 
portfolio managers.
The bank-oriented system can exert a different and more efficient financial discipline 
over enterprises than the market-oriented system. Banks in Germany and Japan (and 
banking groups) are often in a position to monitor the performance of  management by 
direct access to information through their close and long-term relations with firms as 
shareholders and creditors, and to intervene when needed in order to prevent failure. By 
contrast, in the Anglo-American system of  fragmented shareholding, individual investors 
have neither the means nor the incentive to monitor and control corporate management. 
In extreme cases, market discipline is exercised through hostile takeovers, but these 
are often disruptive and wasteful. More importantly, since markets tend to value the 
enterprise largely on the basis of  short-term financial performance, the takeover threat 
creates pressures and incentives for the management to think short term.
Furthermore, the internal capital market organized within banks and firms 
connected by cross shareholding also improves enterprise performance by reducing the 
borrower’s risk by permitting economies of  scale in collecting, processing, evaluating 
and disseminating information. For the same reason, there is less credit rationing in a 
bank-based system (Fama 1985; Driscoll 1991). Such a system also permits to reduce 
considerably the lender’s risk and the rate of  interest since it provides deposit holders the 
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liquidity they seek at a smaller risk of  capital uncertainty by pooling and institutionalizing 
the risk associated with individual investment projects, and by reducing erroneous 
investment decisions.
A financial system with a close interface between banks and corporations tends to 
lower the rate of  return required by investors to undertake investment. The expected 
rate of  return on investment must be high enough to cover both the borrower’s risk and 
the rate of  interest received by the lender. However, as noted above, the borrower’s risk 
is an important determinant of  the lender’s risk. The effect of  this duplication of  the 
borrower’s risk on the rate of  interest can be reduced by increasing the degree of  the 
lender’s involvement in the borrower’s investment and other managerial decisions, since 
the lender is then better able to assure himself  that pure risk is being properly weighed 
by the borrower: indeed both components of  the lender’s risk (i.e., the moral risk and the 
pure risk) would disappear if  the lender and the borrower were the same person. The 
bank-oriented system thus reduces the extent to which the borrower’s risk is duplicated in 
the lender’s risk and the interest rate, and, hence, lowers the cost of  investment.
3. Requirements for an efficient bank-oriented system
These are particularly important considerations to be taken into account in reforming 
the financial system in developing countries where the cost of  finance needs to be 
kept low and firms must be able to take the long view in order to succeed in “learning 
by doing.” However, the experience of  many developing countries shows that the 
concentration of  ownership in the hands of  inside investors and close relations between 
banks and corporations are not necessarily conducive to good enterprise performance 
and financial stability. Indeed, in many developing countries the equity control of  
corporations is in the hands of  families or business groups, and interlocking ownership 
between corporations and banks is widespread. Such arrangements have often resulted 
in corruption, collusive behavior, speculation and inefficiency. Moreover, financial 
instability and short-termism in bank and corporate behavior are common features of  
these countries because a number of  conditions essential for an efficient bank-oriented 
system are not always met. 
First of  all, for the reasons already explained, price stability is essential for a bank-
oriented system. This calls for, above all, fiscal and monetary discipline and a viable 
and relatively stable external payments position. Prudential regulations and effective 
supervision are also essential in a bank-oriented system. In particular, firms should not 
be allowed to own and control banking organizations since this will transfer the elements 
of  the safety net to them, and burden the monetary authorities with tasks they cannot 
undertake (Corrigan 1991). In the German system prudential limits on long-term lending 
and individual loans, capital adequacy requirements, and effective supervision of  banks’ 
risk exposure by an agency separate from the central bank play a central role.
One argument against market-oriented finance is that “competition in ownership is no 
substitute for competition in product markets” (Corbett and Mayer 1991, 20). This is also 
true for the bank-oriented system; namely, it does not make up for lack of  competition in 
the markets for goods and services. Thus, such a system too needs to be combined with 
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policies depending on competition as a spur to efficiency. In those developing countries 
where the bank-oriented system with widespread interlocking ownership has failed, the 
markets for goods and services were generally highly oligopolistic and protected from 
competition. By contrast, in countries where corporations were encouraged and forced 
to compete in export markets, a similar financial organization made a major contribution 
to industrialization.
Finally, new firms should have access to finance and entry into new lines of  financial 
activity should not be impeded. This calls for some competition in the banking sector. 
However, competition policies should be designed to prevent monopoly power rather than 
to allow completely free entry into the banking sector and unlimited price competition 
among banks – practices that have often led to financial instability in both developed and 
developing countries. Furthermore, specialized banks for industrial development and 
controls over credit allocation can play an important role in providing finance to new 
entrants.
4. Control and regulation of  stock markets
While reform efforts need to concentrate in these areas, it is also true that capital 
markets are a reality in a number of  countries and they also need to be improved. 
While most developing countries regulate primary issues and stipulate a number of  
conditions regarding their size, maturity and redemption and disclosure of  information 
there is very little effective control over secondary markets. Irregularities such as insider 
trading and fraud are widespread and administrative capacity to undertake effective 
supervision weak.
Stock prices in many of  the so-called emerging markets have been extremely erratic 
and subject to very large swings. By removing credit constraints financial liberalization 
has often triggered an increase in speculative activity by institutions and individuals. In 
many such countries, increased speculative activity in the secondary market caused stock 
prices to rise before 1987 even faster than in most of  the world’s major stock markets, and 
to fall, again far more than elsewhere, after October 1987 (Singh 1992). Most of  these 
markets have again shown large swings over the last few years.
Since the size of  these markets is relatively small, the direct effects of  sharp falls in 
stock prices on the economy are negligible. However, the state of  expectations in the 
equities market influences the exchange rate and capital flows since, as discussed in the 
next section, these markets are open to foreigners and/or provide alternative investment 
for holders of  foreign currency assets. Greater stability is thus essential to prevent 
destabilizing feedbacks between equity and currency markets. 
 One way of  reducing volatility is through the so-called “circuit breakers” introduced 
in the United States after the October 1987 crash (Kupiec, 1991). These consist of  
predetermined price floors: when prices fall to the floor, trading is suspended for a 
predetermined period. Such measures can be particularly helpful in reducing intra-day 
bandwagon-type declines in stock prices. Another is through the financial transactions 
tax long advocated by Keynes (1936, 160–61). Such a tax may help reduce speculative 
instability by deterring short-term trading, improve the efficiency of  the stock market 
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and lengthen the time horizon of  corporate managers (Stiglitz 1989b; Summers and 
Summers 1989).
Public or semi-public agencies with large holdings of  securities can also play an 
important role in bringing greater stability to stock prices. For instance, in Turkey 
the agency dealing with privatization has operated both as a buyer and a seller in the 
market for the shares of  privatized public companies, exerting a significant influence 
on prices, even though its objective has not been to stabilize the market. Institutional 
investors and particularly provident funds can both provide the Japanese/German-type 
of  shareholding and control over enterprises, and help to attain greater stability.
h. External Liberalization and Financial Openness
Recent years have witnessed the increased integration of  developing countries into 
the international financial system in large part due to widespread external financial 
liberalization. Most of  these countries have also liberalized imports and increasingly relied 
on exports for growth, but the degree of  internationalization of  finance has gone much 
further than trade. Indeed in many countries the share of  transactions with international 
characteristics in the financial sector is far greater than the share of  trade in GDP.
1. The concept of  financial openness
By external financial liberalization we mean policy actions that increase the degree of  
the ease with which residents can acquire assets and liabilities denominated in foreign 
currencies and nonresidents can operate in national financial markets, i.e., financial 
openness. Three broad types of  transaction can be distinguished in this respect. First, 
inward transactions: allowing residents to borrow freely in international financial 
markets, and nonresidents to invest freely in domestic financial markets. Second, 
outward transactions: allowing residents to transfer capital and to hold financial assets 
abroad, and nonresidents to issue liabilities and to borrow in domestic financial markets. 
Third, domestic transactions in foreign currencies: allowing debtor–creditor 
relations among residents in foreign currencies such as bank deposits and lending in 
foreign currencies. 
Our definition of  financial openness is wider than capital account liberalization because 
it includes financial transactions among residents denominated in foreign currencies. 
These are an important part of  banking and finance, and affect the national economy in 
much the same way as cross-border financial transactions (Bryant 1987, chap. 3).
2. The extent of  financial openness in developing countries
Widespread liberalization has occurred on all three fronts. Inward transactions are 
virtually free in a large number of  countries, particularly in Latin America where external 
borrowing by the private sector, often via the intermediation of  resident banks, is not 
subject to approval, except for capital market issues. Similarly, there are few restrictions 
on the access of  nonresident investors to domestic capital markets. The debt crisis 
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has played an important role in this respect: the “market-based menu” has generated 
new prospects for arbitrage and windfall profits and significantly raised the amount of  
equities and domestic currency debt assets held by nonresidents (UNCTAD TDR 1989, 
105–107). More recently, access of  nonresidents to national equity markets has been 
encouraged in the context of  privatization programs.
As for outward transactions, an increasing number of  developing countries have 
adopted capital account convertibility in recent years – some to an extent not found 
in most industrialized countries. Liberalization of  transactions among residents in 
foreign currency, however, has gone much further. Indeed, there has been a tendency to 
encourage residents to hold foreign exchange deposits with banks at home, increasing 
the importance of  foreign currency in the economy, i.e., dollarization. The share of  
foreign currency in total deposits in recent years reached 50 percent in a number of  
developing countries in Latin America as well as in Asia (e.g., Philippines), the Middle 
East and Europe (e.g., Turkey and Yugoslavia). This figure is well above the levels found 
in some international financial centers such as London where the share of  total bank 
claims (including interbank claims) on residents in foreign currencies barely exceeds 20 
percent (Bryant 1987, chap. 3; Akyüz 1992).
3. Nature of  capital flows
The consequences of  financial openness in developing countries have not been 
adequately treated in the literature primarily because this is a very recent phenomenon. 
Mainstream thinking is largely an extrapolation of  “open economy macroeconomics,” 
and treats the issue in the context of  “sequencing of  economic reforms.” This literature 
emerged in large part from an ex post attempt to explain why the Southern Cone 
liberalization experiment failed (Corbo et al. 1986; Corbo and de Melo 1987; Diaz-
Alejandro 1985; Dornbusch 1983; Frankel 1983; McKinnon 1982). It takes it for granted 
that external financial liberalization is desirable on efficiency grounds: it is said to have 
positive effects on the level and allocation of  investment, and these efficiency gains more 
than compensate for the loss of  policy autonomy, i.e., reduced ability of  governments 
to achieve national objectives by using the policy instruments at their disposal (Bryant 
1980, chap. 12).
According to this view, external financial liberalization may give rise to perverse results 
only if  there are problems elsewhere in the economy, e.g., budget deficits, monetary 
instability, and distortions and imperfections in goods and labor markets. On the other 
hand, since it is not possible to correct these at once, external financial liberalization 
must be properly sequenced. Although it is sometimes argued (e.g., Krueger 1984) that it 
may be difficult to control inflation without liberalizing the economy, the majority view is 
that domestic financial markets and the current account should be liberalized before the 
capital account, and that fiscal balance and monetary stability should be attained before 
any liberalization (Dornbusch 1983; Edwards 1984, 1987 and 1989; Fischer and Reisen 
1992; Frankel 1983; McKinnon 1982).
The benefits claimed for financial openness are generally based on the assumption 
that the internationalization of  finance allows savings to be pooled and allocated globally 
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through movement of  capital across countries in response to opportunities for real 
investment, thereby improving the allocation of  resources internationally and equalizing 
rates of  return on investment everywhere. Accordingly, external financial liberalization 
in developing countries is expected to give rise to capital inflows provided that it comes 
after domestic financial markets have been liberalized and interest rates raised. This is 
seen as a one-off  phenomenon of  adjustment of  domestic interest rates to world levels as 
capital scarcity is reduced through an increase in the underlying capital flows. 
However, the evidence strongly suggests that international capital flows do not in 
practice improve the international allocation of  savings. There has been no narrowing 
of  differences in rates of  return on capital investment in the major industrial countries, 
or in real long-term interest rates; nor has the link between the levels of  savings and 
investment in individual countries been considerably weakened (UNCTAD TDR 
1987; Kasman and Pigott 1988; McCauley and Zimmer 1989; Akyüz 1992). The 
main reason is that most international financial transactions are portfolio decisions, 
largely by rentiers, rather than business decisions by entrepreneurs. The bulk of  
capital movements is motivated primarily by the prospect of  short-term capital gains, 
rather than by real investment opportunities and considerations of  long-term risk 
and return. The speculative element is capable of  generating gyrations in exchange 
rates and financial asset prices by causing sudden reversals in capital flows for reasons 
unrelated to policies and/or the underlying fundamentals. Rather than penalizing 
inappropriate policies, capital flows can help to sustain them, as has been the case in 
recent years in the United States and Italy where inflows have helped to run chronic 
fiscal deficits. 
Thus, financial openness tends to create systemic problems regardless of  the order 
in which various markets are liberalized and distortions removed. The exposure to 
short-term, speculative capital flows is much greater for developing than for developed 
countries because their instability provides greater opportunities for quick, windfall 
profits on short-term capital movements while their ability to influence capital flows 
through monetary policy is much more limited. 
While internal financial liberalization strengthens the link between inflation and interest 
rates, external financial liberalization (unlike trade liberalization) weakens that between 
inflation and the exchange rate, bringing the latter under the domination of  capital flows 
instead of  trade balances and the relative purchasing power of  currencies: inflation differentials 
are more readily reflected in nominal interest rate differentials than in the movement of  the 
nominal exchange rate. Thus, although short-term capital inflows motivated by the lure 
of  quick, windfall profits are often associated with positive real interest rate differentials in 
favor of  the recipient, such a differential is neither necessary nor sufficient in all cases. Capital 
inflows usually occur in response to a nominal interest rate differential that markets do 
not expect to be fully matched by a nominal exchange rate depreciation. Such differentials 
often emerge when domestic inflation is much higher than abroad and domestic financial 
markets have been liberalized. Since in many developing countries inflation rates close to 
those prevailing in the major OECD countries are very difficult to attain, the scope for 
big arbitrage opportunities to emerge is much greater. Similarly, an expectation that equity 
prices will rise faster than domestic currency depreciation can prompt an inflow of  capital. 
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Both types of  expectation can be self-fulfilling since the inflow of  funds, if  large enough, can 
itself  maintain the value of  the currency and boost equity prices.
Such inflows are typically initially a response to a favorable shift in market 
sentiment regarding the recipient country. This shift may result from external 
causes such as a sudden rise in export prices, or from internal ones such as reduced 
inflation, better growth prospects, and greater political stability and confidence in 
the government’s policies. After the initial shift in market sentiment, a bandwagon 
develops and creates a speculative bubble where people are lending or investing 
simply because everybody else is doing so. The boom does not necessarily peter out 
smoothly: a recently liberalized, well-performing economy can suddenly find favor 
with foreign capital of  all sorts, but if  things go wrong for some reason, the capital 
can disappear just as rapidly. When the bubble bursts and the currency comes under 
pressure, even a very large positive real interest rate differential may be unable to 
check the capital outflow. 
4. Recent capital flows to Latin America
That was the story of  the liberalization episodes in the Southern Cone in Latin 
America in the 1970s, when high domestic interest rates, overvalued exchange 
rates, freedom to borrow abroad, and plentiful international liquidity combined 
to induce capital inflows. But there are strong signs that a similar process is again 
underway in a number of  Latin American countries. It is estimated that the region 
as a whole received about US$40 billion in 1991, three times the level of  1990, 
the main recipients being Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile. Not all 
the capital inflows have been for short-term uses, but much of  them do appear to 
have been, particularly in Argentina and Brazil (Griffith-Jones et al. 1992, Tables 4 
and 5; UNCTAD TDR 1992, part 2, annex 2). In the majority of  these countries 
capital inflows continued at an accelerated pace in 1992. In Chile where “the monetary 
authorities adopted a cautious approach based on the assumption that the oversupply 
of  foreign exchange was only temporary and was due to the unusually high price of  
copper and the low international interest rates” (ECLAC 1991, 41), short-term capital 
inflows slowed down considerably in 1992 thanks to various measures designed to 
reduce the arbitrage margin.
What is remarkable about recent capital inflows to Latin America is not only that the 
recipient countries are in very different positions compared to the 1970s, but that they 
also differ widely among themselves with respect to inflation, fiscal posture, and exchange 
rate and trade policies. Argentina, Chile and Mexico have liberal trade regimes whereas 
Brazil has tight controls. While Brazil has had a large fiscal deficit and very high inflation, 
others, particularly Chile and Mexico, have had balanced budgets or fiscal surpluses, 
and moderate inflation. Capital has been attracted by a combination of  currency 
appreciation and high real interest rates in Chile, Mexico and particularly Argentina (and 
also a booming stock market in the latter two), but not in Brazil where the underlying 
factor has been very high real interest rates (about 4 to 5 percent per month). Currency 
appreciation is due to exchange rate policy in Argentina (which uses the exchange rate 
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as a nominal anchor to reduce inflation), but not in Chile and Mexico where it is market 
generated. It has led to a considerable deterioration of  the trade balance, especially in 
Argentina and Mexico.
The ideal response to such capital inflows is a corresponding increase in domestic 
investment in traded goods sectors. This not only prevents a sharp appreciation 
of  the currency by raising capital goods imports, but can also enhance export 
capacity – something that may be needed especially when capital flows dry up or are 
reversed. But higher investment is not always possible when domestic interest rates are 
prohibitive and long-term investment with funds borrowed abroad at lower rates carries 
considerable exchange rate risk. In other words the high interest rates and/or currency 
appreciation that attract short-term capital also deter investment. In Latin America 
capital inflows resulted in a sharp swing in the transfer of  resources abroad by about 
4 percent of  the region’s GDP during 1990–91, but investment remained depressed: in 
Brazil and Argentina the investment ratio remained below the levels of  the 1980s when 
these countries had been making large transfers on debt servicing.
The problems of  macroeconomic management in the face of  a massive capital 
inflow are well known. Sterilizing them by issuing domestic debt can impose a serious 
burden on the public sector, particularly when the arbitrage margin is large. In 
Brazil, for instance, the cost of  carrying the extra US$5 billion of  reserves purchased 
in this way amounted to about US$2 billion during 1991–92, adding considerably 
to domestic public debt (UNCTAD TDR 1992, part 2, annex 2; Junior 1992). 
Furthermore, by increasing the stock of  government debt, sterilization itself  tends 
to raise domestic interest rates and, hence, the arbitrage margin. If, on the other 
hand, the currency is allowed to appreciate, it can undermine the competitiveness of  
the domestic industry, possibly eventually triggering a sharp reversal in short-term 
capital flows.
5. Opening stock markets to nonresidents
Instability in short-term capital flows combined with the inherent volatility of  investment 
in company equity exposes the economy to even greater risks. Since opening up 
domestic capital markets requires some form of  currency convertibility for nonresident 
equity investors, a close link can develop between stock and currency markets even in 
countries where the capital account is not fully open. This may prove to be a serious 
problem in Latin America because of  the increased presence of  nonresidents in capital 
markets. In Mexico, for instance, equity holding by nonresidents is estimated to have 
amounted to more than $25 billion, or about a quarter of  the market’s capitalization, 
in the second quarter of  1992 (Latin American Economy and Business May 1992, 4), 
compared to about 5 percent in the major capital markets such as New York and Tokyo. 
The link between these two inherently unstable markets can be further strengthened by 
dollarization of  the economy, when that occurs.
This link increases the potential for the emergence of  foreign exchange and/or stock 
market crises. Since the return on investment to the foreign investor depends largely on 
the movement of  the exchange rate, a serious shock (e.g., a terms of  trade deterioration) 
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that makes a devaluation appear inevitable can trigger both a sharp decline in equity 
prices and an outflow of  capital. Similarly, the mood in equity markets can exert a strong 
influence on the exchange rate – e.g., bullish expectations can trigger capital inflow, leading 
to appreciation. By contrast, a bearish mood in the capital market and/or massive profit 
taking in dollars by nonresidents can not only prick the speculative bubble in the stock 
market, but also lead to a currency crisis. Recent evidence suggests that chaotic feedbacks 
between financial and currency markets can easily develop: for instance, when the bubble 
burst in the Tokyo stock exchange at the beginning of  1990, there was a massive shift out 
of  yen-denominated assets, causing also considerable drops in the government bond index 
and the currency (Akyüz 1992).
6. Effects of  volatile capital flows on investment and trade
One important consequence of  sharp swings in the direction of  capital flows and 
greater instability of  exchange rates is to increase borrower’s risk. For investors in 
traded goods sectors, the real exchange rate is the single most important relative price 
affecting profits. But firms in nontraded goods sectors are also affected depending 
on the imported inputs they use. Exchange rate gyrations produce considerable 
uncertainty regarding prospective yields of  investment. By raising the average rate of  
return required by investors to undertake investment, particularly in the traded goods 
sectors, this will depress the level of  investment corresponding to any given rate of  
interest.
The influence of  the exchange rate on investment decisions increases with the share 
of  foreign trade in the economy. It is thus of  growing importance in the developing 
world because of  widespread import liberalization and emphasis on export-led growth. 
It is therefore ironic that the exchange rate is becoming increasingly determined by 
purely financial forces delinked from trade and investment. Exchange rate instability 
can thus undermine “outward oriented” strategies by depressing investment in 
exports. The evidence suggests that such adverse effects have occurred even in 
industrial countries where firms are better equipped to hedge against unexpected 
swings in exchange rates, and that exchange rate stability has been characteristic 
of  countries with sustained export growth (UNCTAD TDR 1987; UNCTAD TDR 
1989, part 1, chap. 5).
The second systemic effect of  volatile capital flows is through interest rates. As 
already noted, capital-value uncertainty and interest rates both rise as a result of  increased 
borrower’s risk as well as greater instability in interest rates and prices of  financial assets, 
including equities, associated with volatile capital flows. More important, increased 
competition between domestic currency and foreign currency assets also tends to raise 
the cost of  finance because of  the greater risk and uncertainty in developing countries. 
The fact that most developing countries are economically and politically less stable 
than developed countries, with financial and legal systems that are less able to ensure 
enforcement of  contracts, increases the hazards of  financial investment. In a financially 
closed economy the safety premium on foreign currency assets is counter-balanced by the 
high transaction costs of  shifting into them, at least for most small savers, but financial 
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openness reduces these costs considerably. Consequently, domestic assets need to carry 
much higher rates of  return than external assets. This can reduce investment and impair 
competitiveness.
7. Controlling capital flows
Complete isolation of  the financial system in a developing country from the rest of  the 
world is neither feasible nor desirable. Successful export performance requires close 
interaction of  banks at home with world financial markets in order to provide trade-
related credits and facilitate international payments. The ability to borrow in international 
capital markets allows diversification in corporate finance while foreign investment in 
capital markets can help broaden their equity base and reduce their leverage. Foreign 
banks can bring greater competition in the provision of  banking services, thereby 
reducing the intermediation margin and the cost of  finance. 
Nevertheless, most developing countries need to exercise considerable control over 
external capital flows in order to minimize their disruptive effects and gain greater 
policy autonomy to attain growth and stability. There are a number of  techniques 
to control capital flows with different degrees of  restrictions and effects that were 
widely used in industrial countries in the 1960s and 1970s (OECD 1972, 71–77, 
1981, 1982; Fleming 1973; Swidrowski 1975; Swoboda 1976). Quantitative measures 
to limit short-term capital inflows through banks include reserve requirements on 
foreign liabilities, limits on their net external or foreign currency positions, or on gross 
external or foreign currency liabilities, and minimum holding periods and blocking 
of  foreign deposits for such periods. Similarly a number of  measures may be applied 
to restrict external borrowings by nonbanks, including reserve requirements on their 
foreign liabilities, and exchange controls such as prohibition of  borrowing other than 
commercial or supplier credits received by importers, control on domestic foreign 
currency credits to domestic importers and exporters, and regulations regarding the 
timing of  export and import settlements. Of  these, limits on banks’ net external or 
foreign currency positions and exchange controls regarding nonbanks can also be 
applied to restrict outflows. Restrictions on interest payments on nonresident deposits 
and negative interest rates are also among the measures that can be used to deter 
capital inflows.
Taxes may also be used to reduce the arbitrage margin and discourage speculative 
capital flows. A tax designed to reduce interest differentials (like the interest equalization 
tax used in the United States in the past to check outflows) can also be especially effective 
in checking capital inflows in developing countries where inflation and interest rate 
differentials with developed countries tend to be large. The tax rate can be used flexibly 
according to the behavior of  capital flows and the objective pursued. Similarly Keynes’ 
proposal for a financial transactions tax may be extended to apply to international 
financial transactions in order to “throw some sand in the wheels” and “deter short-term 
financial round-trip excursions” (Tobin 1978).
Finally, various restrictions may be introduced on the access of  nonresidents to capital 
markets. One common measure is to limit foreign ownership to approved country funds 
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and allow transactions on such funds only among nonresidents in order to control the 
flow of  foreign funds in and out of  the country via capital markets. This can be combined 
with the requirement that such funds be managed by local managers who are generally 
more amenable to “moral suasion” by the authorities. 
It should be kept in mind that in several industrialized countries capital markets have 
been opened to nonresidents only very recently. In Japan, for instance, they were largely 
closed until the 1984 agreement with the United States, and even in Europe, where an 
integrated financial market is seen as an important step in the completion of  a single EEC 
market, restrictions on entry into capital markets still remain in a number of  countries 
(e.g., France and Italy). Again, the Republic of  Korea only recently opened up its capital 
market to nonresidents, but restricted foreign acquisition to 10 percent of  total equity 
capital, and to 2 percent in some strategic industries.
Some of  these techniques have recently been used in Latin America in order to 
slow down short-term capital inflows. These include reserve requirements for foreign 
currency liabilities (Chile and Mexico), compulsory liquidity requirements on the 
short-term forex liabilities of  commercial banks (Mexico), minimum holding periods 
(Chile), extension of  the fiscal stamp tax to foreign credits (Chile), restrictions on 
company borrowing abroad through stock and bond issues (Brazil), and limits on the 
dollar amounts that banks can raise in deposits abroad as a proportion of  their total 
deposits (Mexico). However, such measures have generally had only limited success. 
Governments are often very shy in applying effective controls for fear of  fending off  
genuine, long-term capital and investment. This is certainly a legitimate concern, 
particularly in Latin America, after a decade-long foreign exchange strangulation. 
However, experience shows that capital controls might have to be introduced anyway if  
the process develops into a payments crisis and capital flight. It may be easier to restrict 
short-term inflows and prevent debt accumulation early on than to check capital flight 
in a crisis.
Controls on capital flows are not always effective when there are large arbitrage 
opportunities. It is thus important to bear in mind that price stability is vital for a financially 
open economy, since high inflation and wide interest rate differentials with reserve 
currency areas often lead to large arbitrage opportunities and encourage unsustainable 
capital flows. Furthermore, exchange rate management plays an important role. Explicit 
or implicit exchange rate guarantees tend to reduce the risk involved in arbitrage and 
encourage capital flows. As noted above, this has been an important factor in attracting 
short-term capital to Argentina. In Chile, by contrast, “the monetary authorities moved 
to resist revaluation of  the peso by introducing changes to create uncertainty concerning 
yields on short-term capital flows” (ECLAC 1992, 40). These measures included the 
ending of  the practice of  advance announcement of  devaluation of  the peso, widening of  
the currency band, and linking the peso to a basket of  currencies instead of  the US dollar. 
They appear to have played an important role in slowing down short-term capital inflows 
and securing greater real exchange rate stability by introducing uncertainty regarding the 
movement of  the exchange rate. In Mexico too the authorities widened the differential 
points for the peso–US dollar exchange rate to allow larger fluctuations, although its 
effects on capital flows seem to have been limited (Banco de Mexico 1992, 144).
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Historical experience clearly shows that capital controls are no answer when the 
underlying policies are not sustainable. For instance, measures to control capital inflows 
are generally ineffective against capital flight stemming from economic and political 
instability. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that capital controls are needed 
not in order to pursue inappropriate policies and exchange rates, but to minimize the 
disruptive effects of  short-term capital flows, and gain greater policy autonomy to attain 
growth and stability.
I. Conclusions
The focus of  financial policies in developing countries should be industrialization and 
stability. A common feature of  all modern examples of  industrialization is that they have 
all succeeded in making finance serve industry and trade not the other way round. This 
has often necessitated a considerable amount of  intervention and control over financial 
activities. On the other hand, despite widespread claims for efficiency of  financial markets, 
financial liberalization in many countries in recent years has generated more costs than 
benefits. These have included persistent misalignment of  prices of  financial assets, resulting 
in inefficiencies in the allocation of  resources; sharply increased short-term volatility of  
asset prices, resulting in greater uncertainty, shorter maturities and higher interest rates; 
excessive borrowing to finance speculative asset purchases and consumption, resulting in 
unsustainable stocks of  debt, increased financial fragility and reduced household savings; 
and loss of  autonomy in pursuing interest rate and exchange rate policies in accordance 
with the needs of  trade and industry.
It is equally true that government intervention in finance has often been misguided, 
giving rise to inefficiency and waste. However, the appropriate response should be to 
reform the government and rationalize intervention rather than throw in the towel and 
simply “un-leash market forces.” The main challenge is to determine where and how 
governments should intervene and to make sure that the intervention achieves its aims. 
The discussions so far suggest the following:
 • Macroeconomic stability is of  cardinal importance for the stability and efficiency of  
the financial system since excessive volatility of  prices and economic activity tends 
to increase financial fragility, create uncertainty, raise interest rates and shorten the 
time horizon. While macroeconomic stability itself  is influenced by financial policies, 
monetary and fiscal discipline is crucial.
 • In cases where directed credits and financial subsidies are successfully used as part of  
industrial policy, winners are not picked by “bureaucrats,” but through a process based 
on a close interaction between the government and the business, and the use of  market 
signals to assess risks and opportunities. Success also depends on ensuring reciprocity 
between support and performance; use of  controls, regulations and subsidies for the 
intended purposes; and readiness to revise them as necessary. 
 • Financial policies must take account of  the dual nature of  interest rates: the return 
aspect which primarily influences the distribution of  asset holdings in different forms, 
and the cost aspect which determines the capacity of  the corporate sector to generate 
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internal funds, to undertake investment and to compete in world markets. It is important 
to bear in mind that while high interest rates are not necessary to increase savings, low 
and stable capital cost is crucially important for investment and competitiveness. 
 • There is often a need for deposit ceilings and intervention in the money market in 
order to stabilize interest rates and asset prices, and prevent excessive risk taking 
and price competition in the financial sector. Such controls should be applied with 
flexibility and discretion, taking into account macroeconomic conditions as well as the 
needs of  trade and investment. Rigid rules regarding the level of  real interest rates are 
no more sensible than those about the rate of  growth of  money supply in the conduct 
of  monetary policy.
 • Prudential regulations and a strong bank supervision are also essential to prevent 
excessive risk taking and financing of  speculative activities by banks. Measures such as 
capital requirements are not always enough to reduce fragility: it may also be necessary 
to act directly on the asset portfolios of  banks and restrict lending against or investment 
in highly capital-uncertain assets such as securities and property, and exposure 
to a single firm. Firms should not be allowed to own and control banks. Protective 
regulations such as deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities should only be 
introduced in combination with prudential regulations. 
 • Most developing countries need to concentrate their energies in strengthening their 
existing bank-based financial systems rather than pin their hope on transplanting Wall 
Street. They also need to promote long-term equity holding via institutional investors 
such as provident funds, and permit banks to hold equities within prudential limits. 
Transfer taxes and “circuit breakers” may be used to deter short-term trading and 
reduce volatility in stock markets. Easy access to stock markets and readily available 
short-term financial instruments paying market returns tend to increase financial 
instability. 
 • Particular care needs to be given to the design of  external financial policies since 
mistakes in this area tend to be very costly and difficult to reverse. Allowing residents 
uncontrolled access to international capital markets has proved damaging in many 
developing countries, and short-term speculative capital flows have proved extremely 
troublesome. Developing countries need to exercise a considerable degree of  control 
over external capital flows through taxes, quantitative restrictions and exchange 
controls in order to minimize their adverse effects on macroeconomic equilibrium, 
exchange rates and trade; to control the pace of  accumulation of  external debt; and 
to gain greater autonomy in monetary policy. Access of  nonresidents to domestic 
capital markets should be restricted since close links between the two inherently 
volatile markets can be very dangerous. It is also important to resist the temptation to 
dollarize the economy in order to keep capital at home: policies should address the 
root cause of  the problem and eliminate the reasons for extensive demand for foreign 
currency. 
 • A pragmatic not a doctrinaire approach is needed toward financial control and 
liberalization in developing countries. Restrictions on financial flows and interest 
rates may be removed over time as they fulfil their functions. Financial liberalization 
undertaken as a result of  a successfully implemented industrial policy is very different 
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from liberalization as a reaction to misguided and failed intervention. Has financial 
liberalization ever remedied stagnation and instability?
notes
1 First published as an UNCTAD discussion paper in March 1993. This chapter draws upon 
various publications by the author including: “Financial Liberalization in Developing 
Countries: A Neo-Keynesian Approach,” UNCTAD Discussion Paper 36, March 1991; 
“On Financial Openness in Developing Countries,” in International Monetary and Financial 
Issues for the 1990s, vol. 2, UNCTAD, Geneva, 1993; “Does Financial Liberalization Improve 
Trade Performance?” in Globalization, Regionalization and New Dilemmas in Trade Policy for 
Development, edited by D. Tussie and M. Agosin, Macmillan, 1993; and “Financial Policies for 
Industrialization and Development: Reflections on Financial ‘Deepening’ and ‘Efficiency,’” in 
Economic Crisis in Developing Countries, edited by M. Nissanke and A. Hewitt, London: Pinter/
St Martin’s Press, 1993. I have greatly benefited from comments and suggestions made by 
various people, including the participants of  a Financial Globalization and Systemic Risk 
workshop at the Center on International Economic Relations, University of  Campinas, Sao 
Paulo, 15–16 June 1992; the participants of  an ECLAC/UNU–WIDER/UNCTAD seminar 
on Savings and Financial Policy Issues in African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean 
Countries, ECLAC, Santiago, 5–6 October 1992, particularly Carlos Massad and Gunther 
Held; and my colleagues in UNCTAD, Shahen Abrahamian, Andrew Cornford, Detlef  Kotte 
and Cem Somel. The examination of  financial efficiency in terms of  various concepts of  risk 
in Section E owes a great deal to discussions with Jan Kregel. None of  the persons mentioned 
are, of  course, responsible for any errors.
2 The description of  various systems here draws largely on Corbett and Mayer (1991), Kregel 
(1991) and Somel (1992). For a summary account of  the structural aspects of  these systems, see 
also Davis (1993, 23–26). We do not examine here how these different systems evolved, but there 
can be little doubt that government policies and regulations played a major role.
3 In conformity with contemporary trends and in response to outside pressure, Japan has 
been undergoing a transition toward a market-based and open financial system, which is 
not easy to reconcile with the policy of  cheap finance. There have been severe fluctuations 
in share prices, interest and exchange rates, and a tendency for the cost of  finance to rise 
(Martin 1992).
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Chapter II
MANAGING FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IN 
EMERGING MARKETS: A KEYNESIAN 
PERSPECTIVE1
A. Introduction 
With widespread deregulation and rapid growth of  financial wealth, business cycles in 
both advanced economies and emerging markets are increasingly dominated by the 
financial system. 
It is true that there is not always a one-to-one correspondence between real and 
financial cycles, and recessions do not always go in tandem with financial crises. 
Nevertheless, the response of  the financial system to impulses emanating from the real 
economy has become increasingly procyclical, and this tends to reinforce expansionary 
and contractionary forces and amplify swings in investment, output and employment, 
creating new dilemmas for macroeconomic policy. 
With rapid liberalization of  the capital account, international capital flows have become 
the driving force behind financial cycles in developing countries, capable of  producing 
unsustainable expansions followed by financial crises and recessions. While country-specific 
(pull) and global (push) factors can both play important roles in determining their direction, 
size and nature, evidence shows that the most damaging episodes of  financial crises in 
emerging markets are those associated with boom–bust cycles in capital flows driven by 
special and temporary global factors beyond the control of  the recipient countries.2 
Indeed, since the early 1990s currency and balance of  payments crises have occurred 
under varying macroeconomic and financial conditions in Latin America, East Asia 
and elsewhere. They were seen not only in countries with large and widening current 
account deficits (e.g., Mexico and Thailand), but also where deficits were relatively small 
and presumed sustainable (Indonesia and Russia). A significant currency appreciation is 
often a feature of  countries experiencing currency turmoil (Mexico, Russia, Brazil and 
Turkey) but this has not always been the case – appreciations in most East Asian countries 
experiencing speculative attacks during 1997 were moderate or negligible. In some cases 
crises were associated with large budget deficits, as in Russia, Turkey and Brazil, but 
in others (Mexico and East Asia), the budget was either balanced or in surplus. Crises 
occurred not only where capital flows supported a boom in private consumption, as in 
Latin America, but also in private investment, as in East Asia. Again, in some episodes of  
crises external liabilities were largely public (Russia and Brazil) while in others they were 
private (East Asia). Finally, most countries hit by balance of  payments and financial crises 
are said to have been lacking effective regulation and supervision of  the financial system, 
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but Argentina could not avoid a payments crisis and default despite having one of  the 
best systems of  prudential regulations in the developing world and a financial system 
dominated by foreign banks. 
Recurrent financial turmoil in emerging markets under varying conditions has raised 
serious questions about the mainstream economic thinking which has traditionally attributed 
currency and balance of  payments crises to macroeconomic policy inconsistency, notably 
lack of  fiscal and monetary discipline, and regarded price stability as both necessary and 
sufficient for financial stability.3 In reality, in most countries financial boom–bust cycles, 
asset price and exchange rate gyrations, and credit surges and crunches have all occurred 
under conditions of  low and stable inflation. In more extreme cases, as in Latin America, 
where price instability has traditionally been regarded as structural and chronic, single digit 
and stable inflation rates have been attained at the expense of  increased financial fragility 
and instability through exchange-rate-based stabilization programs relying on short-term, 
unstable capital inflows.4 The failure of  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to diagnose 
the nature of  these crises and distinguish them from traditional payments difficulties caused 
by domestic demand expansion and inflation led to serious errors in policy response, 
notably in East Asia where procyclical monetary and fiscal tightening served to deepen the 
economic contraction caused by the reversal of  capital flows. 
There has been a proliferation of  ex post hypotheses and ad hoc models designed 
to explain the causes and dynamics of  these crises, incorporating various features of  
financial markets including herd behavior, collective action problem, moral hazard, 
asymmetric information and contagion. While bringing some valuable insights into 
cumulative financial processes, none of  these could provide a fully fledged macrofinancial 
theory of  instability integrating impulses emanating from both real and financial sectors. 
With its emphasis on such interactions, the Keynesian analysis of  financial instability has 
thus emerged as a strong contestant, particularly as events have increasingly reaffirmed 
its fundamental proposition that the systemic problems facing modern market economies 
are unemployment and financial instability, rather than price instability. 
This chapter examines the extent to which the Keynesian thinking could help 
understand the causes and dynamics of  crises in emerging markets and provide policy 
prescriptions for managing financial cycles without sacrificing employment and growth. 
It is concluded that at the analytical level the endogenous unstable dynamics analyzed 
by post-Keynesians, notably Hyman Minsky, goes a long way in providing a powerful 
framework for explaining the boom–bust cycles driven by international capital flows 
in emerging markets. Its main policy conclusion that financial control rather than 
macroeconomic policy holds the key to financial stability is equally valid for managing 
capital flows. There is, however, a need to develop new instruments for stabilization, 
placing greater emphasis on countercyclical financial regulations and control than has 
hitherto been the case. 
B. the Keynesian Instability hypothesis and Financial Cycles
Keynes’ analysis of  financial instability in the General Theory is all too familiar, colored 
by several metaphors such as the beauty contest, musical chairs and the game of  snap. 
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Nevertheless, in the General Theory Keynes was not very much occupied with the causes of  
financial instability but, rather, its effects on employment and income. Nor did he spend 
much time on examining the behavior of  investment, income and employment over the 
entire business cycle, concentrating, instead, on underinvestment and unemployment and 
what to do about them. Even though he insisted that his was a theory of  fluctuations in 
production and employment originating from financial markets and referred repeatedly 
to cycles, it remains true that the General Theory did not develop a fully fledged analysis 
of  boom–bust cycles of  the kind that pervades financial markets today. This we owe to 
Hyman Minsky, who analyzed and advanced financial instability as an intrinsic feature of  
market economies, following in the footsteps of  Irving Fisher and Keynes – a hypothesis 
which he called “an interpretation of  the substance of  Keynes’s ‘General Theory.’”5
The essence of  the financial instability hypothesis is the procyclical response of  
financial markets to impulses emanating from the real economy. This not only amplifies 
swings in investment, output and employment, but also generates endogenous fragility 
wherein periods of  deep recessions associated with financial crises are the outcomes 
of  financial excesses in the preceding booms. The procyclical effects of  finance on 
real economic activity derive mainly from procyclical risk assessments by lenders and 
investors: namely, risks are underestimated at times of  expansion and overestimated 
during contractions. 
Minsky (1977 and 1986, chap. VII) explains this with the proposition that stability 
(tranquility), including that of  an expansion, is destabilizing since it increases confidence, 
reduces the value placed on liquidity and raises the acceptable debt-to-equity ratios. The 
increased optimism and sense of  security generated by an economic expansion often 
results in declines in risk spreads and provisions, and improved credit ratings.6 Given the 
herd behavior intrinsic in modern financial markets and “mark-to-market” practices in 
the valuation of  assets, these tend to produce a cumulative process of  credit expansion, 
asset price bubbles and overindebtedness which, in turn, add to spending and growth. 
Asset prices at such times are driven not so much by improved prospects of  income 
streams as by expectations of  further price increases, pushing price earnings and price-to-
rent ratios to unsustainable levels. Stock and property booms give rise to credit expansion 
by raising collateral values and reducing loan loss provisions. Faster growth in lending, 
in turn, adds fuel to increases in the market valuation of  assets, making investment even 
more attractive. 
However, as balance sheets adopt smaller margins of  safety, the system develops 
endogenous fragility, and financing positions are increasingly translated from hedge to 
speculative and, eventually, to Ponzi finance.7 With a cyclical downturn in economic activity 
and/or increased cost of  borrowing, incomes on assets acquired can no longer service the 
debt incurred. Increased loan delinquency leads to a widening of  risk spreads and falling 
asset prices and collateral values, producing a credit crunch. As risks are overestimated, 
even the borrowers that normally qualify for credit become unable to borrow. This in turn 
puts further pressure on debtors, forcing them to liquidate assets, setting off  a process of  
debt deflation and deepening the contraction in economic activity.8
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis emphasizes the finance–investment link; it is 
built around “a financial theory of  investment and an investment theory of  the cycle” 
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(Minsky 1978, 31). Indeed, financial bubbles almost always give rise to excessive 
investment in certain sectors which become unviable with the return to normal conditions. 
This is true for investment not only in areas susceptible to speculative influences such as 
residential and commercial property, but also in machinery and equipment, as in Japan 
in the late 1980s, in the United States during the dot-com bubble of  the second half  of  
the 1990s, and in East Asia in the run-up to the 1997 crisis. However, with increased 
access of  households to credit, the Keynesian link between income and consumption has 
also become weaker. As a result, consumption booms produced by asset price inflation 
and credit expansion can be a driving force of  aggregate demand, reducing household 
savings and raising indebtedness in the course of  expansion. This was the case in Latin 
America in the 1990s where surges in capital inflows were generally associated with 
booms in consumption. Similarly, much of  the stimulus to growth in the United States’ 
economy since the mid-1990s came from increased consumer spending encouraged by 
speculative booms in equity and property markets, and greatly facilitated by mortgage 
equity withdrawal.9
In the traditional Keynesian analysis, no special attention is paid to the role that may 
be played by international capital flows and exchange rates in financial cycles. With rapid 
capital account liberalization, however, international capital flows have increasingly 
dominated economic cycles in emerging markets because of  extensive dollarization and 
widespread currency and maturity mismatches in balance sheets. The effect of  capital 
flows on domestic spending tends to be procyclical: surges in capital flows and currency 
appreciations lead to increases in net worth in balance sheets, encouraging spending. 
This is reinforced by the real balance effect to the extent that nominal exchange rate 
stability or appreciation helps bring down inflation. Similarly, depreciations resulting 
from sudden stops and reversals add to contractionary impulses.10 
The response of  capital flows to domestic economic conditions is also procyclical. 
Economic expansion and booms in asset markets often attract foreign investment and 
lending which can, in turn, appreciate the currency, add to asset price inflation, and 
raise aggregate demand and growth, thereby making such inflows even more attractive. 
However, this process can also increase vulnerability to exchange rate swings by generating 
unsustainable trade deficits and currency and maturity mismatches in balance sheets. 
When capital flows stop as a result of  the rapid accumulation of  risks, or a negative 
shock to growth, or a deterioration in global financial conditions with respect to liquidity 
and risk appetite, or contagion from a crisis in another developing country considered in 
the same asset class by markets, this process could be rapidly reversed, resulting in sharp 
depreciations, credit crunch, debt deflation and economic contraction. 
In a world of  unstable capital flows, every financially open economy is vulnerable to 
sharp and unexpected swings in the external value of  its currency. However, because of  
extensive dollarization and maturity mismatches in balance sheets and greater presence of  
foreigners in domestic asset markets, destabilizing feedbacks between domestic financial 
markets and capital flows are much stronger in developing than industrial countries. 
Exchange rate turbulence rarely spills over to domestic capital markets and the banking 
sector in industrial countries.11 By contrast, in emerging markets major payments and 
currency crises are seldom contained without having a significant impact on domestic 
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financial conditions and economic activity. This is a main reason why about 85 percent 
of  all defaults in developing countries during 1970–99 were linked with currency crises 
(Reinhart 2002). Credit rating agencies often fail to anticipate currency crises, but they 
are pretty good in predicting defaults – downgrades follow, rather than lead, currency 
crises. Similarly, major banking and/or asset market crises in emerging markets often 
have adverse effects on capital flows and currency markets, but this is not always the case 
in industrial countries.12 
C. Investment and Jobs over the Financial Cycle
Episodes of  exceptionally rapid economic expansion driven by financial bubbles can 
no doubt bring greater prosperity than expansions where finance plays a more passive 
and accommodative role. But they are also susceptible to producing deeper recessions 
or longer periods of  stagnation. Moreover, sharp swings in asset prices, exchange rates 
and aggregate demand cause a fundamental uncertainty regarding the return on capital, 
shorten planning horizons and promote defensive and speculative strategies in investment 
which can, in turn, exert a significant adverse influence on the pace and pattern of  
capital accumulation and result in the considerable waste of  resources.13
Tracking the behavior of  investment and employment over the entire expansion–
recession–recovery cycle dominated by the financial sector shows that losses of  
investment and employment incurred at times of  recessions are not fully recovered 
when the economy turns up from its trough, giving rise to the phenomenon of  jobless 
recovery.14 In this respect there are considerable similarities between emerging markets 
and advanced industrial countries, notably the United States where business cycles have 
been increasingly shaped by financial sector developments over the past three decades. 
In the United States the dot-com expansion in the 1990s was characterized by 
asset price inflation, overindebtedness and overinvestment in certain sectors linked to 
information and communication. The recession that followed in Spring 2001 involved 
widespread financial difficulties. The subsequent recovery was the weakest in terms 
of  investment since 1949. It was also jobless: it took 38 months for employment to 
recover whereas in a typical expansion in the period 1960–89, employment recovered 
its recessionary losses in eight months. Furthermore, there was an increased resort to 
flexible employment practices, including temporary and part-time employment and 
overtime (Schreft, Singh and Hodgson 2005). 
Many explanations have been offered, but there is an agreement that financial factors 
played a significant role in job losses over the entire cycle.15 The deflation-cum-recession 
following the dot-com bubble exposed the overindebtedness in the corporate sector, 
forcing them to focus on restoring the health of  balance sheets during the subsequent 
recovery. Increased profits were thus used either for industrial restructuring or for reducing 
debt rather than expansion of  production capacity and employment. The consequent 
downsizing and labor shedding resulted in a combination of  falling employment and 
rising labor productivity and profits.16 The industries that lost jobs during the 2001 
recession were exactly those that saw rapid expansion during the dot-com bubble 
and these went on losing jobs in the subsequent recovery (Groshen and Potter 2003). 
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The continued tight conditions in financial markets during the recovery also impaired 
the ability of  small firms to create jobs, particularly in services which typically rely on 
equity financing and venture capital rather than debt. After the dot-com bubble burst, 
such financing almost disappeared because of  heightened uncertainty, making it difficult 
for small firms to expand.17
There are often considerable uncertainties about the strength of  a recovery from 
finance-driven recessions. This discourages firms from making long-term commitments 
to employment, promoting a wait-and-see attitude in hiring more permanent workers 
(Schreft, Singh and Hodgson 2005). Indeed, under conditions of  increased uncertainty, 
even longer periods of  growth may fail to generate jobs. This is noted in the case of  
Turkey: “the growth that did occur [during 1993–2004] was relatively ‘jobless’ as the 
volatility of  the economy made employers less likely to hire new workers than to extend 
work hours of  existing employees” (WB/IEG 2006, 4). One of  the consequences of  
increased financial instability is the growing demand by firms for more flexible hiring-
and-firing practices as a buffer against large and unexpected swings in economic activity. 
Such practices could also protect firms’ profits against unexpected shifts in international 
competitiveness resulting from instability in exchange rates – a phenomenon which gains 
added importance in emerging markets. 
The expansion–recession–recovery cycles driven by international capital flows in 
emerging markets produce even greater and more durable dislocations in investment 
and employment. Not only is the composition of  investment distorted toward speculative 
activities, but its average level also falls over the entire cycle. In the four countries hit 
by the 1997 crisis in East Asia, the boom supported by capital inflows in the mid-1990s 
raised the average investment ratio by some 7 percentage points of  GDP, while during 
the crisis the average decline was more than 16 percentage points. Investment stagnated 
in the subsequent recovery with the result that there was a sharp decline in the investment 
ratio over the entire cycle (UNCTAD TDR 2000). 
In the labor market, booms generated by capital inflows often raise real wages, 
but the behavior of  employment depends on several factors.18 Employment in traded 
goods sectors tends to fall if  the currency appreciates significantly and investment and 
productivity growth is sluggish, and this may be offset only partly by expansion in 
services. Evidence shows that in almost all emerging markets real wages rose during the 
boom phase but in Latin America, where productivity lagged, there was little change 
in unemployment, while in East Asia overall unemployment fell. In all these countries 
real wages fell and unemployment rose sharply during recessions, and in many of  them 
unemployment rates exceeded the levels reached before the boom. Again in all these 
cases the subsequent recoveries were jobless; the unemployment rates remained above 
the rates attained during expansion by between 4 and 6 percentage points even after 
income losses had been fully recovered. 
d. the Policy Problem 
The task of  managing financial cycles in order to mitigate their adverse consequences 
for investment and employment is overwhelming even for major advanced countries 
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where domestic institutions are robust and financial conditions are relatively resilient 
to instability in international capital flows and exchange rates. It calls for more than 
macroeconomic fine-tuning or aggregate demand management à la Keynes. Minsky 
(1986, 287) knew this only too well when he remarked that “I feel much more comfortable 
with my diagnosis of  what ails our economy and analysis of  the causes of  our discontents 
than I do with the remedies I propose,” noting that a once-and-for-all resolution of  the 
flaws of  capitalism cannot be achieved because financial innovations introduce new 
mechanisms of  instability. 
In the Keynesian tradition not much faith is placed in monetary policy either in 
smoothing financial excesses at times of  expansion or fighting unemployment during 
recessions. Minsky (1986, 304) views it as counterproductive for the former task and 
impotent for the latter: “Monetary policy to constrain undue expansion and inflation 
operates by way of  disrupting financial markets and asset values. Monetary policy to 
induce expansion operates by interest rates and the availability of  credit, which do 
not yield increased investment if  current and anticipated profits are low.” Instead, he 
favors a system of  financial institutions designed to dampen instability, including by 
controlling the level and growth of  bank assets through instruments such as capital 
adequacy requirements (Minsky, 1986, 320–21). However, like Keynes, he also focuses 
on preventing depression-cum-recessions and recommends a “Big Bank,” a lender of  
last resort, to deal with debt deflations and credit crunches, and a “Big Government,” 
a spender of  last resort, to prevent economic contraction and unemployment. It is, 
however, recognized that “Big Bank” and “Big Government” can create moral hazard 
and this makes financial regulations all the more important. 
In practice central banks in industrial countries do not generally respond to asset 
price inflation but tend to relax policy when the bubble bursts.19 Certainly there are 
serious difficulties in identifying when asset price increases represent a bubble rather than 
improved fundamentals, but these are not insurmountable.20 As argued by Kindleberger 
(1995, 35), monetary policy authorities would need to use judgment and discretion, rather 
than “cookbook rules of  the game,” when speculation threatens substantial rises in asset 
prices and exchange rates with possible subsequent harm to the economy. However, they 
often refrain from doing that in the belief  that their task is to keep inflation under control, 
a monetary policy stance that maintains price stability would also promote financial 
stability, and financial markets do not need intervention as they regulate themselves. 
These explain why, for instance, the United States Federal Reserve refrained from acting 
during the dot-com bubble in the 1990s even when its chairman recognized that the 
United States economy was suffering from “irrational exuberance” or from using either 
monetary instruments or the regulatory authority it had been granted to stem speculative 
lending during the subprime bubble of  the 2000s, despite repeated warnings. 
In advanced countries the ability to respond to an eventual financial turmoil and 
recession by expanding liquidity and lowering policy interest rates mitigates the 
consequences of  this indifference of  monetary policy to credit and asset bubbles. The 
United States, for instance, responded to several instances of  turmoil in financial markets 
and the threat of  economic contraction by aggressive monetary easing and/or massive 
liquidity injections, including during the 1987 stock market break, the 1990–91 recession, 
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the panic in the international bond market and the Long-Term Capital Management 
debacle triggered by the Russian crisis, the bursting of  the dot-com bubble of  the 1990s, 
and now the subprime crisis. 
However, while such interventions are generally successful in averting deep and 
prolonged recessions, they often carry the risk of  sowing the seeds of  subsequent 
troubles. The response of  the Fed to the bursting of  the dot-com bubble by rapid 
liquidity expansion and historically low interest rates, as well as its reluctance to curb 
rapidly growing speculative lending, is clearly at the origin of  the current subprime 
mortgage crisis.21 Again, it is now increasingly argued that sharp cuts in policy interest 
rates and massive liquidity injection in response to the subprime crisis would only serve 
to compound the problems faced by the United States economy by preventing the much-
needed correction in asset prices.22 
Emerging markets do not generally have the option of  a countercyclical monetary 
policy response to a financial crisis and economic contraction resulting from sudden stops 
and reversals in capital flows, because they cannot easily control outflows, stabilize the 
debt contracted in foreign currencies and undo the balance of  payments constraint. In a 
credit crunch involving foreign lenders and investors, central banks cannot act as lenders 
of  last resort to stabilize the exchange rate and avoid hikes in the debt burden. Nor is there 
an international lender of  last resort to undertake this task.23 Consequently, even when the 
problem is, in essence, one of  lack of  international liquidity, the collapse of  the currency 
and hikes in interest rates could lead to the insolvency of  otherwise sound debtors. 
Even in industrial countries where balance sheets are largely insulated from the 
impact of  large currency swings, monetary easing designed to weather difficulties in 
the domestic financial system can run up against external hurdles. It could weaken the 
currency and increase inflationary pressures, particularly when there is a large current 
account deficit that needs to be financed. This is exactly the dilemma that the United 
States Fed may now start facing in designing an effective response to the subprime crisis 
and the threat of  recession – that is, its autonomy to run an independent monetary policy 
is now threatened in a big way, for the first time in the post–Bretton Woods world. 
The problem is certainly more acute in developing countries where external 
obligations are in foreign currencies. In Korea, for instance, as in Japan, corporations 
had traditionally pursued aggressive investment strategies with a high degree of  leverage, 
and the government often stood as a lender of  last resort to bail out their creditors. 
This approach was underpinned by a strong government guidance of  private investment 
to avoid moral hazard, speculation and excess capacity. However, in the 1990s when 
investment guidance was dismantled and corporations were allowed to borrow freely 
abroad, lack of  an international counterpart to the domestic lender of  last resort to 
smooth out liquidity problems drove a number of  them into serious problems, including 
bankruptcy (Akyüz 2000). 
This is why in emerging markets it is all the more important to start countercyclical policy 
during expansion and manage surges in capital inflows so as to prevent macroeconomic 
and balance sheet imbalances and exposure to a sudden stop and reversal of  international 
capital flows. Here we focus on two main areas of  response: countercyclical macroeconomic 
policy, notably monetary policy, and financial regulations, including direct (administrative) 
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or indirect (market-based) restrictions over capital flows.24 Reference will also be made to the 
role that fiscal policy may play in managing surges in capital inflows. 
E. Capital Flows and Countercyclical Monetary Policy
It has long been recognized that the capital account regime has an important bearing 
on the scope and effectiveness of  monetary and exchange rate policies. According to the 
standard economic theory, policymakers cannot simultaneously pursue an independent 
monetary policy, control the exchange rate and maintain an open capital account. All three 
are potentially feasible but only two of  them could be chosen as actual policy – hence the 
dilemma known as the impossible trinity. Once the capital account is opened, a choice has 
to be made between controlling the exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. 
Using monetary policy as a countercyclical tool to stabilize economic activity could result 
in large cyclical swings in the exchange rate and the balance of  payments. Conversely, if  
monetary policy is used to stabilize the exchange rate, it cannot act as a countercyclical 
macroeconomic tool and prevent large cyclical swings in economic activity. 
However, in most developing countries with open capital accounts, the erosion of  
monetary policy autonomy is often greater than is typically portrayed in economic theory. 
It cannot always secure financial and macroeconomic stability, whether it is geared toward 
a stable exchange rate or conducted independently as a countercyclical tool. On the one 
hand, as already noted, because of  large-scale liability dollarization, there are strong 
spillovers from exchange rates to domestic economic and financial conditions. Thus, 
using monetary policy as a domestic countercyclical tool does not guarantee stability 
when there are large swings in capital flows and exchange rates. 
On the other hand, the effect of  monetary policy on exchange rates is much more 
uncertain and unstable than is typically assumed in the theory of  impossible trinity 
because of  the volatility of  risk assessments and herd behavior. During financial turmoil, 
hikes in interest rates are often unable to check sharp currency declines, while at times 
of  favorable risk assessment a much smaller arbitrage margin can attract large inflows of  
private capital and cause significant appreciations. 
Even when the authorities are prepared to use greater judgment and discretion in 
monetary policy, they may face serious trade-offs because domestic conditions may call 
for one sort of  intervention and external conditions another. This is most clearly seen 
at times of  rapid exit of  capital when the liquidity expansion and cuts in interest rates 
needed to prevent financial meltdown and stimulate economic activity could simply 
accelerate flight from the currency. As a result, monetary authorities are often compelled 
to pursue procyclical policy in an effort to restore confidence. However, under crisis 
conditions the link assumed in the traditional theory between the interest rate and the 
exchange rate also breaks down. When the market sentiment turns sour, higher interest 
rates aiming to retain capital tend to be perceived as increased risk of  default. As a result, 
the risk-adjusted rate of  return could actually fall as interest rates are raised. This is the 
main reason why procyclical interest rate hikes implemented as part of  IMF support 
during several episodes of  financial crises were unable to prevent the collapse of  the 
currency, serving instead to deepen economic contraction. 
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Monetary policy also faces hurdles at times of  economic expansion and asset 
bubbles associated with surges in capital inflows. Tightening monetary policy in order 
to check asset price bubbles and overheating could encourage external borrowing and 
short-term arbitrage flows, while lower interest rates would discourage such flows but 
lead to domestic credit expansion and overheating. A way out could be to employ 
countercyclical monetary tightening while intervening in the foreign currency market 
to resist appreciations and sterilizing its impact on domestic liquidity by issuing 
government debt. This can succeed when capital inflows are moderate in size and 
concentrated in the market for fixed-income assets. However, under surges across 
various segments of  asset markets, sterilization could result in higher interest rates, 
attracting even more arbitrage flows. Furthermore, since interest earned on reserves is 
usually much lower than interest paid on public debt, there will be quasi-fiscal costs, 
which can be large when interest rate differentials are wide and the surge in capital 
inflows is strong.25
There are less costly methods of  sterilization such as raising noninterest-bearing 
reserve requirements of  banks. This would also increase the cost of  borrowing from 
banks, thereby checking domestic credit expansion. However, it could also encourage 
firms to go to foreign creditors. Banks may also shift business to offshore centers and lend 
through their affiliates abroad, particularly where foreign presence in the banking sector 
is important. A certain degree of  control over the banking system would thus be needed 
to prevent regulatory arbitrage and reduce the cost of  intervention. 
Countercyclical fiscal policy no doubt has a role to play in managing expansions. 
When the economy is overheating due to a boom in private spending supported by capital 
inflows, fiscal tightening would obviate the need for tighter monetary policy and higher 
interest rates and, hence, prevent encouraging further arbitrage inflows and appreciations. 
If  budget revenues and expenditure structures are appropriately designed, much of  this 
task could be done through automatic stabilizers. Furthermore, a budgetary surplus 
can also facilitate sterilization by absorbing excess liquidity without issuing government 
paper. But this would not eliminate the fiscal cost of  sterilization since the surplus could 
be used to reduce the stock of  public debt. In reality, governments in emerging markets 
often run procyclical fiscal policy, particularly in countries with chronic fiscal deficits and 
large public debt (Akyüz 2006). 
During the recent surge in capital flows several developing countries have 
intervened in currency markets to absorb excess capital inflows and avoid sharp 
appreciations. Evidence from work in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
(2005) suggests that sterilized intervention has generally been more successful in 
emerging markets than in advanced countries, particularly where the banking sector 
is closely controlled.26 In China intervention has not only been successful in stabilizing 
the exchange rate but is also less costly to the government because of  its control 
over the banking system.27 This is also true for several other countries in East Asia, 
including those hit by the 1997–98 crisis, which have returned to quasi-dollar pegs, 
stabilizing their currencies within relatively narrow margins. There have also been 
examples of  successful intervention in other parts of  the developing world where 
capital inflows were relatively small.28 
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F. reserve Accumulation as Self-Insurance
A policy of  accumulating reserves through intervention in the foreign exchange market 
at times of  strong capital inflows and using them during sudden stops and reversals 
appears to be a sensible countercyclical response to instability in international capital 
flows. When successful, interventions would prevent destabilizing currency appreciations 
and deterioration in the trade balance and, thus, lower the likelihood of  currency 
turmoil, secure insurance against speculative attacks and reduce the degree of  payments 
adjustment needed in case of  such an event. 
This strategy, however, lacks a strong rationale since it implies that a country should 
borrow only if  the funds thus acquired are not used to finance investment and imports, 
but held in short-term foreign assets. Moreover, it does not prevent currency mismatches 
and exposure in private balance sheets. Finally, even when the quasi-fiscal cost of  
interventions is reduced by control over interest rates or higher reserve requirements, 
there could be a large transfer of  resources abroad since the return on reserves is less than 
the cost of  external borrowing. 
Traditionally, reserves covering three months of  imports were considered adequate 
for addressing the liquidity problems arising from time lags between payments for 
imports and receipts from exports. The need for reserves was also expected to lessen 
as countries gained access to international financial markets and became more willing 
to respond to balance-of-payments shocks by adjustments in exchange rates. However, 
capital account liberalization in developing countries and their greater access to private 
finance has produced exactly the opposite result. Private capital flows have allowed 
running larger and more persistent current account deficits beyond the levels that 
could be attained by relying on international reserves. But this has also resulted in an 
accumulation of  large stocks of  external liabilities. As a result, debtor countries have 
become increasingly vulnerable to sudden stops and reversals in capital flows, and this 
has increased the need to accumulate reserves to safeguard against currency turmoil 
and speculative attacks. Indeed, evidence shows a strong correlation between capital 
account liberalization and reserve holding, and a growing tendency to absorb capital 
inflows into reserves rather than current payments (Aizenman and Lee 2005; and Choi, 
Sharma and Strömqvist 2007). 
After the East Asian crisis, emerging markets were strongly advised by the IMF to have 
adequate international reserves to cover their short-term debt – debt with a remaining 
maturity of  up to one year – in order to reduce their vulnerability to sudden stops in 
capital flows.29 Reserve accumulation accelerated with the strong recovery of  capital 
inflows in the early years of  the 2000s. It has gained further momentum as developing 
countries taken together started to run twin surpluses in their balance of  payments; 
that is, on both current and capital accounts.30 Since 2001 reserves have increased at an 
average rate of  $500 billion per year, exceeding $4 trillion, or 6.8 months of  imports, at 
the end of  2007.31
Of  the $3.2 trillion additional reserves accumulated after 2001, two-thirds are earned 
and one-third borrowed.32 Since in previous decades the current account of  developing 
countries was in deficit, the entire stock of  reserves held at the beginning of  this decade 
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was borrowed reserves. This means that almost half  of  the current stock of  reserves in 
developing countries – that is, some $2 trillion – are borrowed reserves. This is about 250 
percent of  their short-term debt and 65 percent of  their total debt to private creditors. 
Assuming a moderate 500 basis point margin between the borrowing rate and the return 
on reserves, the annual carry cost of  these reserves would reach some $100 billion.33 This 
constitutes a net transfer of  resources to major reserve currency countries and exceeds 
the total official development assistance to developing countries.34 
There is considerable diversity among developing countries in the sources of  reserves. 
Outside China and fuel exporters, reserves in developing countries are entirely borrowed 
since, taken together, their current account has been in deficit. In both China and fuel 
exporters, current levels of  reserves are very high, covering around thirteen and ten 
months of  imports, respectively. China enjoys twin surpluses in its balance of  payments 
and over a third of  its reserves are borrowed, although in recent years reserves have 
been coming increasingly from its current account surpluses. By contrast, reserves in fuel 
exporters are entirely generated by oil surpluses; in these countries the current account 
surplus is partly used for net investment abroad, mostly through sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs), and gross capital outflows exceed gross inflows.35 
Some other countries such as Brazil generate relatively smaller amounts of  current 
account surplus while at the same time receiving net inflows of  capital. In Brazil, 
unlike in China, however, these are accompanied by sluggish growth. Because of  a 
high degree of  vulnerability to deterioration in the market sentiment and reversal of  
capital flows, monetary and fiscal policy are both kept tight, depressing growth and 
lowering import demand. Despite a strong appreciation, slow growth and favorable 
export markets have helped generate a small current account surplus. In most other 
emerging markets reserves are fully borrowed. This includes India where the currency 
has been kept relatively stable and the current account broadly in balance. There has 
been a rapid accumulation of  reserves coming from net capital inflows, covering six 
months of  imports and exceeding short-term debt by a large margin. Finally, a few 
emerging markets, including the most vulnerable ones, do not appear to have taken 
adequate self-insurance by translating capital inflows into additional reserves. These 
include Turkey, where reserves barely match short-term external liabilities, accumulated 
primarily by the private sector in recent years in search of  cheap credit abroad, and 
Mexico, where they cover just over two months of  imports. In both countries currencies 
have appreciated significantly. In Turkey this, together with relatively strong growth 
supported by unprecedented levels of  capital inflows, has pushed the current account 
deficit to almost 8 percent of  GDP, while in Mexico the deficit has been contained due 
to slower growth and strong oil revenues.36
G. Financial regulations, Capital Controls and risk Management
There are thus limits to monetary policy in emerging markets in managing surges 
of  capital flows with a view to reducing vulnerability to sudden stops and reversals. 
While foreign exchange market interventions and reserve accumulation can succeed in 
preventing appreciations and trade deficits, these do not only entail significant costs, 
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but also fail to check the build-up of  fragility and exposure in balance sheets to external 
shocks and contagion. Under most circumstances, regulation and control of  capital 
inflows would be the only viable option to address this problem. 
In restraining the build-up of  financial fragility at times of  expansion, Minsky favors, 
as noted, controlling the level and growth of  bank assets rather than interest rate hikes. 
Conventional prudential regulations, including capital and liquidity requirements 
and provisions for nonperforming portfolios, impose a certain degree of  control over 
lending by banks while seeking to ensure their solvency. However, rather than reducing 
the cyclicality of  the financial system, in reality risk assessment methods and prudential 
rules, including Basel I and Basel II, tend to aggravate procyclical behavior. Since rules 
about provisions are often based on current rates of  loan delinquency, they result in 
inadequate provisioning and overexpansion of  credit in boom times when asset prices 
and collateral values rise and loan performance improves. When the downturn comes, 
loan delinquency rises rapidly and standard rules on provisions can lead to a credit 
crunch. Similar difficulties apply to capital charges. Banks typically lose equity when an 
economy is hit by a massive exit of  capital, hikes in interest rates, and asset price and 
currency declines. Enforcing capital charges under such conditions would only serve to 
deepen the credit crunch and recession.37 Again, in determining capital adequacy, Basel 
I assigned low risk weights to interbank claims, encouraging short-term lending. But such 
loans driven by interest arbitrage were a major factor in exposure to short-term debt in 
the East Asian crisis. There are similar procyclical provisions in Basel II.38 
It is possible to design prudential regulations in a countercyclical fashion to make them 
act as built-in stabilizers and reduce the cyclicality of  the financial system.39 Forward-
looking rules may be applied to capital requirements in order to introduce a degree of  
countercyclicality. This would mean establishing higher capital requirements at times of  
financial booms, based on an estimation of  long-term risks over the entire financial cycle, 
not just on the actual risk at a particular phase of  the cycle. Similarly, not current but 
future losses can be taken into account in making loan loss provisions, estimated on the 
basis of  long-run historical loss experience for each type of  loan – a method practised 
in Spain. Again, long-term valuation rather than mark-to-market valuation may be used 
for collaterals in mortgage lending in order to reduce the risks associated with ups and 
downs in property markets, as done in many European countries. Finally, other measures 
affecting conditions in credit and asset markets, such as margin requirements, could also 
be employed in a countercyclical manner, tightened at boom times and loosened during 
contractions. 
While appropriately designed prudential regulations could help smooth financial cycles 
and provide greater safeguards, they encounter limits in preventing financial instability and 
crises (Akyüz and Cornford 2002). This is clearly exemplified by the continued incidence 
of  instability and crises in the United States, the country with the most sophisticated 
financial system in the world and state-of-the-art prudential regulation and supervision. 
Regulatory safeguards are pretty ineffectual in the face of  macroeconomic shocks which 
can drastically alter the quality of  bank assets. Furthermore, rules on the standards for risk 
assessment, capital requirements and provisions designed to check excessive risk taking 
and provide safeguards against such risks are constantly circumvented. This is often done 
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by moving highly risky activities off  balance sheets involving financial derivative products 
(such as structured investment vehicles widely used during subprime mortgage expansion 
in the United States) and guarantees and letters of  credit that create contingent assets 
and liabilities. Until recently, this was increasingly facilitated in the United States by 
the deregulation of  banks’ activities that has the effect of  removing firewalls between 
commercial and investment banking (Kregel 2007). 
Since a large proportion of  cross-border and cross-currency operations are 
intermediated by domestic financial institutions, notably banks, prudential rules no 
doubt have implications for international capital flows. Similarly, market-based (indirect) 
measures of  control over capital flows, such as unremunerated reserve requirements, can 
be considered as part of  prudential regulations in so far as they contribute to the solvency 
of  these institutions. This means that measures to control capital flows cannot always 
be distinguished from prudential rules, and several measures that normally come under 
prudential policies can in fact be used for managing capital flows. 
This overlap is sometimes taken to an extreme position that capital account 
liberalization should not be a cause for concern if  it is accompanied by stronger and 
more comprehensive prudential regulations and effective supervision designed to 
manage risks associated with international capital flows and borrowing and lending in 
foreign currencies. Under capital account openness, prudential regulations become even 
less effective because of  increased exposure to macroeconomic and exchange rate shocks. 
Furthermore, it is not always possible to regulate and control capital flows through 
prudential measures because they are not always intermediated by the domestic financial 
system – for instance, when local firms directly borrow or invest abroad, or nonresidents 
enter domestic securities markets. Therefore, direct restrictions over foreign borrowing 
and investment, and market access would need to complement prudential regulations 
appropriately extended to address the risks associated with capital flows through the 
banking system. 
These risks could be addressed by applying more stringent rules for capital charges, loan 
loss provisions, and liquidity and reserve requirements for transactions involving foreign 
currencies. More specifically, banking regulations for the management of  risks involving 
foreign exchange positions need to address three fundamental sources of  fragility: maturity 
mismatches, currency mismatches and exchange-rate-related credit risks. 
Maturity transformation is a traditional function of  the banking system, but this 
should not be encouraged in the intermediation between international financial markets 
and domestic borrowers particularly since national monetary authorities cannot act as 
lenders of  last resort in foreign currency. Banks tend to rely on central banks for the 
provision of  international liquidity, trying to shift the cost of  carrying large stocks of  
reserves onto them. This exposes them to exchange rate and interest rate risks since in 
the event of  a sudden stop in capital inflows and inadequate central bank reserves, they 
may not be able to obtain international liquidity or do so only at very high costs. To 
reduce the liquidity risk, restrictions can be applied to maturity mismatches between 
foreign exchange assets and liabilities of  banks with a view to preventing borrowing short 
in international markets and lending long at home, through stricter liquidity and reserve 
requirements and even direct limits. 
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Similarly it is important to restrict currency mismatches between banks’ assets and 
liabilities and discourage banks from assuming the exchange rate risk. Banks with short 
foreign exchange positions (that is, where forex liabilities exceed assets) run the risk 
of  losses from depreciations while those with long positions lose from appreciations. 
Furthermore, maturity mismatches between forex assets and liabilities can lead to 
exchange rate risks even when assets are matched by liabilities in the aggregate. Currency 
mismatches can be restricted through quantitative limits on short and long positions 
(e.g., as a proportion of  equity or total portfolios) or minimum capital requirements 
on foreign exchange exposures. In most cases it may be more appropriate to prohibit 
currency mismatches altogether. 
The third important risk associated with foreign exchange borrowing and lending by 
banks is the exchange-rate-related credit risk. Banks can eliminate currency and maturity 
mismatches by lending in foreign currency, but unless their borrowers have foreign 
exchange earning capacity, this simply implies the migration of  the exchange rate risk to 
borrowers which, in turn, results in greater credit risk. This kind of  lending is particularly 
common in economies where an important part of  bank deposits is in foreign currencies. 
It also proved problematic in some countries in East Asia where banks lent heavily in 
foreign currency for investment in property as well as to firms with little foreign exchange 
earning capacity in the run-up to the 1997 crisis. Such practices could be discouraged 
by applying higher risk weights and capital charges for foreign assets and more stringent 
standards of  provision for foreign currency loans, or prohibited altogether. However, 
evidence suggests that only a few emerging markets have addressed the vulnerabilities 
arising from currency-induced credit risks even though many of  them appear to have 
taken measures to reduce exposure to foreign exchange risks (Cayazzo et al. 2006). 
Emerging markets with stronger fundamentals regarding savings and investment, and 
current account and external debt positions, appear to be more willing to introduce 
measures of  control over inflows at times of  surges, while severely indebted countries 
highly dependent on foreign capital are more inclined to allow in speculative, short-term 
capital even when the potential risks they pose are clearly visible. In fact, in most of  the 
latter countries the capital account appears to be financially more open than in those 
with stronger fundamentals.40 
Naturally, the effects of  the measures introduced depend, inter alia, on their 
nature.41 In 1994 Malaysia imposed direct restrictions on acquisitions of  short-term 
securities by nonresidents, and these were largely effective in improving the external 
debt profile, preventing asset bubbles, and allowing greater space for macroeconomic 
policy. By contrast, Chile used market-based unremunerated reserve requirements in a 
countercyclical manner, applied to all loans at times of  strong inflows in the 1990s, but 
phased out when capital dried up at the end of  the decade. This was effective in improving 
the maturity profile of  external borrowing, but not in checking aggregate capital inflows, 
appreciations and asset price bubbles. Similar measures have been introduced in 2006 
and 2007 in Thailand and Colombia, respectively.42 
Periods of  strong capital inflows also create the opportunity to strengthen controls 
over capital account measures so as to bring greater stability over the longer term. For 
instance, at the end of  2007 the Indian government adopted a proposal by the Securities 
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and Exchange Board to restrict foreign buying of  shares through offshore derivatives 
despite an adverse initial reaction from the stock market. This move was designed not 
so much to relieve the upward pressure on the rupee as to bring greater transparency by 
restricting the activities of  the hedge funds (Kansara and Kansara 2007). 
When capital inflows are excessive, it is also possible to adjust the regime on resident 
outflows to relieve the upward pressure on the currency. Chile followed this path in the 
1990s for direct investment abroad. More recently China took a decision to permit 
investment by its residents in approved overseas markets for mitigating the pressure for 
appreciation and Brazil loosened restrictions on residents’ outflows, allowing mutual 
funds to invest abroad up to 20 percent of  assets. Chile and Korea have also liberalized 
rules limiting individual or institutional investments abroad. 
Such a policy response is, in fact, an alternative to sterilized intervention, but does 
effectively nothing to prevent currency and maturity mismatches in balance sheets. 
Furthermore, liberalization of  outflows may result in increases in inflows, particularly 
through the return of  flight capital of  residents.43 Besides, once introduced for cyclical 
reasons, they cannot be easily reversed when conditions change. Therefore, greater 
attention would need to be paid to the longer-term implications of  removing restrictions 
over resident outflows at times of  temporary surges in capital inflows. 
h. Conclusions 
Real economic activity is increasingly shaped by developments in the sphere of  finance 
both in advanced economies and in emerging markets. Boom–bust cycles in asset, 
credit and foreign exchange markets have become more frequent and damaging for 
productive investment and labor. These cycles are more difficult to manage in emerging 
markets since they are increasingly linked to boom–bust cycles in international capital 
flows determined by factors beyond their control, including monetary policies and 
conditions in major advanced economies. This is particularly true for countries with 
weak fundamentals with respect to external payments and asset positions and a high 
degree of  dollarization. Since policy options during the rapid exit of  capital are highly 
limited, emerging markets cannot afford to be complacent at times of  booms in capital 
inflows and economic expansion. Rather, countercyclical policies should start in good 
times in order to reduce vulnerability to sudden stops and reversals. 
The Keynesian analysis of  financial instability provides considerable insights into 
understanding the dynamics of  financial cycles in emerging markets, notably the 
interactions among asset, credit and currency markets and their impact on private 
spending and economic activity, which hold the key to determining the vulnerabilities 
involved. Its policy conclusion that financial regulation and control, rather than 
macroeconomic policy, provides the principal tool for securing financial stability is 
equally valid for managing capital inflows in emerging markets. There is a strong case for 
prudential regulations to be appropriately extended to address specific risks associated 
with international capital flows and borrowing and lending in foreign currencies. These 
should be combined with direct controls over access of  foreign lenders and investors to 
domestic financial markets and over investment by residents abroad, and designed and 
 MANAGING FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IN EMERGING MARKETS 67
used in a countercyclical manner – a conclusion that stands in sharp contrast with official 
advice to developing countries for dealing with surges in capital inflows.44 
It should also be noted that financial regulations and direct and indirect control over 
capital flows are not foolproof. This means that monetary policy would need to be directed, 
from time to time, toward stabilization of  the exchange rate, and this task would be easier 
if  price stability is broadly assured and fiscal policy can be deployed as a countercyclical 
tool. These conditions are not always secured and there is considerable diversity among 
emerging markets in the space available for countercyclical macroeconomic policy. It is 
much more limited where there are structural savings, fiscal and foreign exchange gaps, 
high levels of  sovereign and external debt, and excessive dependence on foreign capital. 
Such countries are systemically vulnerable to the whims of  international capital flows 
and in need of  much more fundamental changes than strengthening financial regulations 
and control or countercyclical macroeconomic policy.
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usefulness of  capital controls under certain conditions, particularly controls over inflows” 
(IMF/IEO 2005, 11), the IMF continues to be ambivalent even toward market-based measures 
to stem speculative inflows, advocating instead fiscal tightening and exchange rate flexibility 
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Chapter III
FROM LIBERALIZATION TO  
INVESTMENT AND JOBS: LOST  
IN TRANSLATION1
A. Global Economic Integration and the Labor Market
There is nothing so disastrous as a rational investment policy in an irrational world. 
John Maynard Keynes 
The past two decades have seen an increased global integration of  labor markets to a 
degree unprecedented in recent history despite continued barriers to labor mobility, 
particularly for low-skilled and unskilled workers. This has been driven by a rapid 
opening to and expansion of  international trade and capital flows, and a growing 
spread of  global production networks, outsourcing and offshoring. The total number 
of  workers producing for international markets in goods alone rose from around 300 
million in 1980 to almost 800 million at the turn of  the millennium. This has been 
associated with a significant increase in the share of  developing countries in world trade 
in manufactures. Accordingly, about 90 percent of  the labor participating in world trade 
is now low-skilled and unskilled (Akyüz 2003, 100–101). Integration of  labor markets 
has also been reinforced by increased trade in services, traditionally seen as nontraded 
activities, particularly through expansion of  cross-border supply of  certain services from 
the territory of  one country to the territory of  another, and consumption and commercial 
presence abroad. Services trade has expanded not only in low-skill, low-value-added 
activities such as call centers or transaction processing, but also in high-value-added 
sectors that involve skilled labor, notably in information technology, finance and health. 
Developing countries have become suppliers of  some of  these services, including in 
high-value added sectors. 
It has been argued that China’s shift to capitalism, India’s turn from autarky and the 
collapse of  communism have added to the economically active persons in the world by 
almost 1.5 billion workers, doubling the global labor force (Freeman 2004 and 2005). As a 
consequence there has been a major shift in the global balance between labor and capital 
because the new entrants brought little useful capital with them; it is estimated that the 
global capital–labor ratio has been cut by more than 50 percent. This works against labor 
not only because labor productivity and pay tend to increase with the capital–labor ratio, 
but also because it shifts the balance of  power in markets toward capital as too many 
workers chase too few jobs or too little capital to employ them. While capital and workers 
from the new entrants are the main winners, the pressure is felt primarily by workers 
already participating in the global economy, both in developing and industrial countries.2 
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Closer integration of  developing countries with large surplus labor into the trading 
system and their greater openness to foreign firms have no doubt increased the global 
reserve army of  labor and created new opportunities for capital to find cheaper locations 
for production for world markets and to connect them within international production 
networks. Since labor cost absorbs a large proportion of  corporate revenues, wage 
differentials relative to productivity (i.e., differences in unit labor costs) is one of  the 
main factors in the decisions by transnational corporations (TNCs) for the location of  
production through foreign direct investment (FDI). This underlines the so-called process 
of  “global labor arbitrage” wherein high wage jobs in the developed world are seen to be 
eliminated in favor of  low wage jobs in the developing world (Roach 2004). 
Thus, even though labor mobility remains restricted, conditions in labor markets of  
different countries have become increasingly interdependent as many jobs have become 
highly mobile, moved from one location to another through international trade and 
investment.3 The distribution of  jobs across countries is also influenced by rapidly growing 
international financial flows through their impact on exchange rates, competitiveness 
and trade flows. Consequently, unemployment has increasingly become a global issue 
and it has become more and more difficult for any country to address its labor market 
problems independently of  what is happening elsewhere. 
It should, however, be recognized that global economic integration and interdependence 
of  labor markets have not advanced as much as it is popularly believed. The participation 
of  many countries with large amounts of  surplus labor in the expansion of  international 
production networks, international trade and investment is still limited. Furthermore, closer 
external integration has not always been accompanied by greater internal integration but 
by the emergence of  enclave economies (Wade 2003, xlviii–li). Informal labor markets 
continue to absorb rising numbers of  workers, particularly in countries which have 
experienced deindustrialization as a result of  rapid liberalization (UNCTAD TDR 2003, 
chap. 5). Despite rapid expansion of  FDI in developing countries, labor employed by TNCs 
is only a fraction of  the total work force. This is so even in China where foreign-funded 
enterprises employ around four million workers and in India where employment in the 
entire IT services is one million. More importantly, evidence shows that despite rapid 
expansion of  trade and FDI, large intercountry differences have persisted and indeed 
increased in wages in similar occupations, in a large part because of  differences in labor 
market institutions and average productivity levels (Freeman and Oostendorp 2000). 
Even though growth of  international trade and labor arbitrage has so far had 
limited impact in terms of  convergence of  incomes and wages, there is little doubt that 
differences in labor costs have become increasingly important in the determination of  
international trade and investment flows, and in the distribution of  jobs across countries, 
not only between the North and the South but also among developing countries. The 
combination of  rapid economic integration and widespread global unemployment has 
become the main source of  insecurity among workers. Growing competition among labor 
located in different countries, together with increased international mobility of  capital, 
is putting pressure on labor and creating popular backlash against economic integration 
almost everywhere, including in industrial countries. This combination has also become 
a major source of  tension in international economic relations as countries are inclined 
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to export unemployment through mercantilist, beggar-my-neighbor exchange rate, trade 
and investment policies, creating frictions in international economic relations reminiscent 
of  the difficulties that pervaded the world economy during the interwar period. It is the 
single most important reason why trade negotiations are facing increased difficulties from 
one round to the next, from one ministerial to another. It is also provoking xenophobia. 
All in all, the fate of  globalization appears to hinge very much on the resolution of  the 
problem of  global unemployment. 
The labor market problems in industrial countries cannot be traced to the expansion 
of  North–South trade, but originate primarily in macroeconomic and financial policies 
pursued after the 1970s (UNCTAD TDR 1995, part 3; Akyüz, Flassbeck and Kozul-
Wright 2002). Similarly, massive unemployment and underemployment in developing 
countries have their origins in structural weaknesses rather than in liberalization and 
integration. However, global labor arbitrage has certainly been aggravating labor market 
problems in many industrial countries, particularly for low-skilled labor. Similarly, a 
large number of  developing countries have suffered deindustrialization and serious job 
losses as a result of  the rapid liberalization of  trade and investment. Capital has become 
increasingly footloose everywhere, including within the developing world, shifting the 
location of  labor-intensive production in response to profit opportunities created by the 
emergence of  cheaper producers. 
That liberalization of  trade and investment flows causes displacements in labor 
markets should not come as a surprise. However, the key problem is that global economic 
integration is serving more to redistribute investment and jobs among countries than to 
accelerate capital accumulation and job creation. International trade has been growing 
faster than ever, capital flows, including FDI, have been booming, but global income 
growth is slower and the world economy is allocating a smaller proportion of  its income 
to fixed capital formation. This is why globalization is increasingly seen as a zero-sum 
game. This problem is due to a major shortcoming in the approach to international 
economic integration. Rather than aiming at full employment and rapid growth as a 
basis for the expansion of  international trade and investment, policy in recent years 
has emphasized liberalization and global economic integration as a remedy to high 
unemployment and sluggish growth. This stands in sharp contrast with the approach 
adopted by the architects of  the postwar economic system at the Bretton Woods and 
Havana Conferences, which saw full employment as a necessary condition for closer 
economic integration4 – an approach which produced the golden age of  capitalism 
with gradual but continuous liberalization and expansion of  trade in the context of  full 
employment and rapid growth. 
With few notable exceptions, capital accumulation and job creation have been slow 
and erratic in developed and developing countries alike, in large part because policy 
has neglected these key determinants of  social welfare. Consequently, at the level of  
existing production capacity and skill profile, the labor force cannot all be productively 
employed – that is, it is not possible to provide decent jobs for all. Even though there is 
excess capacity in some countries that could allow expansion of  employment if  adequate 
effective demand is forthcoming, the solution to unemployment lies primarily in the 
acceleration of  capital formation and improvements of  the skill profile of  labor. In this 
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process capital formation plays a key role because it also helps develop human skills by 
allowing application of  knowledge acquired in formal education, and through learning 
by doing. 
This chapter focuses on capital accumulation. The following section will review the 
experience regarding investment and growth over the past two decades. While attention 
will concentrate mainly on developing countries, features of  developed countries that 
are similar in nature will also be discussed. A main conclusion that emerges is that the 
performance of  a large number of  developing countries which have adopted a strategy of  
reigniting a dynamic process of  capital accumulation and growth through a combination 
of  rapid liberalization, increased reliance on foreign capital and reduced public 
investment and policy intervention is highly disappointing. The review of  the experience 
is followed by an examination of  the role that policies have played in accumulation and 
growth in three areas. Section C will focus on the link between investment and profits and 
discuss the experience of  late industrializers in harnessing profits through industrial-cum-
investment policies for faster accumulation. Sections D and E will examine the impact 
of  macroeconomic and financial policies respectively on accumulation, employment and 
growth. The chapter will end with a discussion on policy priorities at the national and 
international levels. 
B. Capital Formation, Growth and Employment
1. Issues at stake 
There is broad agreement that capital accumulation holds the key to economic growth 
even though there is no consensus on the precise nature of  the link between the two. 
While there is no singular relation between investment and growth, in empirical studies 
capital accumulation emerges as the single most important variable with a robust and 
independent influence on economic growth.5 This influence arises not only because 
investment, as a dynamic component of  effective demand, generates income, but also it 
expands productive capacity and carries strong complementarities with other elements 
of  growth, notably technological progress and productivity growth.6 Clearly the structure 
of  investment has an important bearing on the impact of  accumulation on growth. 
Investment in machinery and equipment, as opposed to residential and nonresidential 
construction, appears to have a close linkage with growth across all developing regions 
(De Long and Summers 1993). Since much technological change is embodied in new 
equipment, and application of  technology to production through use of  machinery and 
equipment is essential for learning by doing, the scope for productivity growth would be 
limited in the absence of  capital accumulation. 
The impact of  accumulation on labor is shaped by the extent to which growth is 
associated with increases in productivity and employment. Productivity growth is essential 
to increase labor income. In developing countries this typically takes place through the 
absorption of  surplus labor by industry. However, when productivity growth is strong 
and demand is sluggish, the impact of  growth on employment would be limited. This 
creates a potential trade-off  between employment and productivity growth. However, 
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since investment is an important component of  effective demand and there are limits to 
raising productivity by substituting capital for labor, rapid growth in productivity can be 
combined with sizeable increases in employment if  the pace of  accumulation is strong. 
The experiences of  both Japan and Korea show that there need not be a trade-
off  between employment and productivity growth. During the 1960s and early 1970s 
in Japan overall labor productivity grew at a rate of  9 percent per annum while the 
unemployment rate was around 1 percent, thanks to a very high rate of  gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) which stood at some 32 percent of  GDP.7 Productivity and wage 
growth in Korea was even more impressive during its strong drive for industrialization 
which also generated rapid increases in employment (Amsden 1989). In the 1980s it was 
argued that high unemployment in Europe compared to the United States was due to its 
faster productivity growth, but the United States was able to combine a rapid increase in 
productivity with falling unemployment in the 1990s as a result of  a strong investment 
drive and growth.8 In the past ten years productivity growth has been slower in the euro 
area where unemployment is higher than in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
How much growth is needed to make a dent in unemployment and how much 
investment is needed to generate such a growth are matters difficult to judge a 
priori because of  the complexities in the relations among accumulation, growth and 
employment. Nevertheless, on underlying trends in growth of  labor force and productivity, 
some 3 percent is generally considered as the minimum rate needed to start reducing 
unemployment in advanced industrial countries.9 In developing countries, the labor 
force has been growing at around 2 percent per annum, and it could even grow faster if  
accelerated growth increases the participation rate. Productivity growth would need to 
be at least 3 percent in order to narrow the income gap with the industrial world, and 
again with increased accumulation and capital deepening productivity could be expected 
to increase even faster. On current trends, therefore, developing countries appear to need 
an average growth rate of  at least 5 percent in order to close the productivity gap with 
the industrial world and improve conditions in the labor market by raising wages and 
reducing open and disguised unemployment. For the reasons noted, such a growth rate 
could be generated by different rates of  investment, but thresholds of  20 and 25 percent 
of  GDP are identified for low income and middle income countries respectively as the 
minimum rates of  accumulation needed (UNCTAD TDR 2001; ECLAC 2000). 
2. The record 
On these criteria the recent performance of  the world economy is poor. The period 
from 1980 to 2000 witnessed a remarkable collapse of  growth in many parts of  the 
world. In industrial countries, on average, growth of  output per worker slowed from 
an annual rate of  some 3 percent in 1960–80 to 1.5 percent during 1980–2000. The 
slowdown was similar for developing countries taken as a whole, from 2.3 percent to 0.6 
percent. Notable exceptions include China and India where growth increased by 7 and 
3.5 percentage points respectively between the two periods (Bosworth and Collins 2003, 
tables 1 and 5). 
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This performance is shaped in a large part by policies pursued in response to 
disequilibria and instability that pervaded first the developed countries then the developing 
economies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In industrial countries the wage–price 
spiral set off  by the first oil shock and accommodating macroeconomic policies resulted 
in rapid inflation. As the burden was placed largely on profits, incentives for private 
investment were reduced, resulting in stagflation. The policy response to the second oil 
price shock in 1979 was different. Aggregate demand policy no longer accommodated 
the acceleration in inflation induced by the oil price rise. “It was considered important 
not only to reduce inflation in its own right, but also to moderate growth of  labor costs 
relative to product prices, and to restore profit margins to levels sufficient to support a 
higher rate of  investment” (OECD 1982, 9). 
This medium-term financial strategy, supported also by supply-side policies including 
the liberalization of  labor, product and financial markets, was indeed successful in 
bringing inflation under control. By the end of  the 1980s the downward trend in profits 
which had set in during the 1970s was already reversed. With increased mobility of  
capital, there was a rapid upward convergence of  profits, and as of  the mid-1990s both 
capital income share and the rate of  return on capital in the business sector in the G-7 
countries reached pre-1970s levels (UNCTAD TDR 1995, part 2, chap. 3; 1997, 95–98). 
However, this did not generate the expected boom in investment. In industrial countries 
taken together, investment as a percentage of  GDP was lower in the 1990s than in the 
1980s, and this decline continued further in the new millennium (Table 3.1). Growth 
in output and employment mirrored the trends in capital accumulation. After staying 
at 4 percent, the average unemployment rate in the OECD rose to 7.5 percent in the 
1980s. Despite subsequent recovery in the United States and the United Kingdom, it 
fluctuated around an average rate of  7 percent during 1990–2004 without any long-
term tendency to decline, in large part because at some 2.6 percent average growth in 
industrial countries has remained below the 3 percent threshold needed to make a dent 
in unemployment (OECD 2005a, 237, table A). 
Policy response to the second oil shock and ongoing stagflation by industrial countries 
caused serious dislocations for developing countries. The combination of  the hike in interest 
rates and sharp declines in commodity prices brought about by the 1980–82 recession 
in major industrial countries caused acute balance of  payments problems, notably in 
commodity-dependent countries. Economic difficulties were aggravated as international 
banks behaved procyclically and cut lending to indebted countries, notably in Latin 
America, forcing many of  them to generate trade surpluses by cutting economic growth 
and imports, eventually leading to a debt crisis and a lost decade. The policy response 
to falling growth and rising unemployment and inflation was essentially the same as the 
earlier response of  industrial countries to stagflation, although it was much less orderly. 
The predominant objective was first to stabilize prices and balance of  payments through 
monetary and fiscal tightening, and secondly to undertake market-friendly reforms in wide 
areas of  policy with a view to overcoming structural difficulties that had rendered these 
countries highly vulnerable to external shocks and balance of  payment crises. Stabilization 
and structural reforms that constituted the so-called Washington Consensus were to prepare 
the ground for sustained growth based on a rapid recovery in investment. 
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However, this policy approach failed to deliver on its promises. In developing countries 
taken together investment as a proportion of  GDP was not higher in the 1990s or in 
the new millennium than the levels reached in difficult times of  the 1980s (Table 3.1). 
Average growth in the 1990s was somewhat faster than in the 1980s (3.2 compared to 
2.7 percent), since the underutilized capacity that emerged during the times of  import 
strangulation in the 1980s allowed output to rise without additional investment as 
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table 3.2: Investment and growth in developing countries
Source: World Bank (2005a).
a. Percentage of  GDP. 
b. Percentage per annum.






























Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2005 and UNCTAD FDI database.
a. Includes also newly industrialized Asian economies. 
b. Includes also countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of  Independent States. 
table 3.1: Investment and FDI flows
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table 3.3: Gross fixed capital formation, 1970–2004 (percentage of  GDP)
note: Figures for regions are weighted averages of  the values of  the countries listed, except for sub-
Saharan Africa, where the average is for all countries of  the region. 
Source: Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators and Thomson Financial Datastream.
external constraints eased up.10 There has also been an acceleration of  growth in the 
new millennium as private capital flows to emerging markets recovered sharply thanks 
to exceptionally low international interest rates and ample global liquidity. But, even an 
average growth rate of  4.5 percent attained in the past few years would not make much 
of  a dent in unemployment even if  it could be sustained. 
This broad picture conceals considerable diversity among developing countries. 
In terms of  investment and growth two regions stand out: East Asia and South Asia 
(Tables 3.2 and 3.3).11 Both regions have improved their investment performance 
since the 1980s and maintained an average growth rate above 5 percent. The 
performance of  these regions is dominated by two large economies, China and India, 
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which have adopted a measured and gradual approach to liberalization, but most of  
the remaining countries, including both the first tier newly industrializing economies 
(NIEs), notably Korea and Taiwan, and the second tier NIEs, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, have also had strong investment and growth performance. Clearly the 
sheer weight of  China and India implies that their performances matter a lot more 
than those of  the other developing countries in reducing global unemployment and 
poverty. Indeed, the income convergence that is claimed to be taking place between 
the North and the South over the past two decades is due largely to rapid growth in 
these countries.12
But there are also important differences between China and India in terms of  
accumulation and growth. In the 1990s investment in China generated a lot more growth 
than in India. During the decade the average investment rate in China was 60 percent 
higher than in India while its growth exceeded that of  India by a greater margin (10.1 
percent against 5.5 percent). This relation appears to have been reversed in the more 
recent period as China deepened its integration into the global economy at a faster pace, 
and experienced a surge in inflows of  FDI, an investment boom and rapid growth of  
exports and imports. The investment rate in China rose in the new millennium, averaging 
at some 41 percent of  GDP, while its average growth was 8.5 percent. By contrast, in 
India growth accelerated compared to the 1990s, averaging at some 7 percent between 
2000 and 2005, while its investment rate was only marginally higher, suggesting that 
since the turn of  the decade investment in India has generated more growth than in 
China. Among the factors mentioned for apparently high overall capital—output ratio 
in China compared to India are excess capacity, misallocation of  resources and a gross 
wastage of  capital (Nagaraj 2005).13 
There are only 18 developing countries with an average growth rate of  5 percent 
or more during 1990–2003 and eight of  them are in Asia (World Bank 2005a, 
table 4.1). Only two of  these, Chile and the Dominican Republic, are in Latin America. 
In that region capital accumulation fell sharply during the debt crisis of  the 1980s, but 
the recovery that began at the end of  the decade was not robust enough for it to return 
to earlier levels. After many years of  reform along the lines of  the Washington Consensus 
and a reasonable degree of  success in restoring fiscal and monetary discipline and price 
stability, the region has continued to suffer from low investment and anaemic growth, 
failing to address deep-seated structural difficulties, including massive unemployment 
and underemployment. Furthermore, the more recent period saw a weakening of  
the link between accumulation and growth despite extensive market-oriented reforms 
undertaken to improve the efficiency of  allocation and use of  resources. In the 1960s 
and 1970s both GFCF and GDP rose, on average, at similar rates, around 6 percent per 
annum. In the 1980s GFCF stagnated and there was little growth in GDP. During the 
1990s, GFCF grew on average by some 5 percent, about the same rate as in the 1960s, but 
GDP growth was slower, staying around 3 percent. This weakening investment–growth 
link is associated with a decline in the share of  investment in and imports of  machinery 
and equipment in several countries of  the region (UNCTAD TDR 2003, 80–82). 
The situation is much the same in sub-Saharan Africa. The region enjoyed relatively 
rapid accumulation and growth in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, these investment 
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booms were often followed by slumps, rather than being translated into a virtuous growth 
process. During the 1980s and 1990s, even where adjustment policies were rigorously 
implemented, they failed to establish a sustained accumulation process, with growth 
lasting as long as commodity prices and/or aid flows were favorable (Akyüz and Gore 
2001, 272). Even though in sub-Saharan Africa there were eight countries with growth 
rates of  5 percent or more during 1990–2003, GFCF in the region as a whole was below 
the 20 percent threshold, and at some 3 percent average growth was too weak to make a 
tangible improvement in the conditions of  labor. Furthermore, as in Latin America, the 
investment–growth link is weak compared to the 1970s. 
3. Public investment 
The past two decades have seen a considerable retrenchment of  the public sector in 
most countries both in the North and the South through the privatization of  state-owned 
enterprises and cuts in public investment. In the more dogmatic version of  the Washington 
Consensus the withdrawal of  the public sector has been advocated not only from industry 
and commerce, but also from public utilities on the assumption that the private sector 
would be willing and able to invest in these areas if  the investment climate was right, and 
downsizing the public sector is one way of  improving the investment climate. Thus, many 
governments simultaneously divested through privatization, stopped investing in industry 
and commerce, and started reducing investment in physical and human infrastructure to 
allow the private sector a greater role. Where governments run large deficits and debt, 
such arguments gained additional force, and invariably the burden of  fiscal adjustment 
fell on public investment. 
This approach is based on the premise that public investment would have little or 
even a negative effect on economic growth. According to this view, over the short term 
a higher level of  public investment would crowd out private spending by pushing up 
interest rates, and the impact would be felt primarily by private investment as the most 
interest-sensitive component of  private demand. Secondly, it could drive out the private 
sector by entering activities that might otherwise offer acceptable returns to private 
investors. Thirdly, the public sector tends to make bad investments because state-owned 
enterprises operate under a soft budget constraint. Finally, since, for the same reason, 
public enterprises are not run efficiently, even investment of  the same quality would 
generate higher output in the hands of  the private than in the hands of  the public sector. 
While there are widespread inefficiencies in the public sector in many countries, 
the argument that state-owned enterprises are invariably inefficient and government 
investment is unproductive cannot stand against evidence. In many developing countries 
public enterprises played a strategic role in industrialization and generated significant 
positive externalities for the private sector while in industrial countries there is ample 
evidence that government capital is productive, even more so than private capital.14 Again 
the evidence on crowding out does not lend support to any definite conclusions on the 
impact of  public investment on private investment and overall capital accumulation.15 
It is often the case that even when there is a crowding out effect, a higher level of  public 
investment is rarely associated with a lower level of  aggregate investment. It has, thus, 
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been recognized by the IMF (2004, 6) that the “possibility that a declining share of  
public investment in GDP could have adverse consequences for economic growth over 
the longer term is a legitimate concern, although the empirical evidence in this area is 
inconclusive.” 
Despite the evidence that the impact of  public investment on overall capital 
accumulation and growth is generally positive, this indiscriminate attack on public 
ownership and investment gained wide acceptance, resulting in deep cuts in public 
investment. In most OECD countries the downward trend in public investment started 
already in the 1970s, on average falling from around 4.5 percent of  GDP in the early 
1970s to 4 percent at the end of  the decade. The decline accelerated with the rise 
of  neoliberalism in the 1980s, and by the end of  the millennium the ratio of  public 
investment to GDP was as low as 3 percent for the OECD as a whole (IMF 2004). The 
decline is more marked in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom where public 
investment fell to 1.5 percent of  GDP in recent years. In the United States there was a 
recovery in the early 1980s, followed by a relatively stable rate of  around 3 percent of  
GDP. In Japan, there is no visible downward trend; on average public investment has 
been above 6 percent of  GDP over the past two decades. With the notable exceptions of  
Japan, Sweden and some smaller European countries, there have been sharp declines in 
the public net capital stock relative to GDP (Kamps 2004). 
Public investment as a proportion of  GDP is typically higher in developing than in 
developed countries. The 1960s and 1970s saw a rapid increase in public investment 
which reached 10 percent of  GDP at the end of  the 1970s in developing countries taken 
together. In some regions such as South Asia and North Africa, it was even greater than 
private investment (Everhart and Sumlinski 2001). In Latin America the decline that 
started with the debt crisis in the 1980s continued in the 1990s and public investment as 
a proportion of  GDP fell even below the levels of  some industrial countries with much 
better human and physical infrastructure (Table 3.4). In Turkey, public investment as 
a proportion of  GDP fell as the debt burden increased: during 2002–2004 it averaged 
at around 2 percent of  GDP, while interest payments from the budget stood at some 
16 percent (ISSA 2006, table 12). By contrast, in East Asia there has been no downward 
trend in public investment and currently its share in GDP is more than three times the 
average rate in the major Latin American countries and Turkey. In Africa, where data are 
limited, public investment in a selected number of  countries fell from over 12 percent in 
the late 1970s to some 7 percent in the 1980s. There was a weak recovery beginning at the 
end of  the 1980s, with public investment staying around 9 percent of  GDP throughout 
the 1990s (IMF 2004, figure 2). 
The retrenchment of  public investment outside some Asian countries has gone to 
such an extent that it has become a major concern even to the Bretton Woods Institutions 
(BWIs). In a recent report the IMF (2004, 9–10) has expressed concern that much of  the 
cuts in public investment were undertaken as part of  fiscal adjustment rather than for 
allowing greater room for private initiative, noting that such cuts in the 1980s in Latin 
America were on average more than three times the cuts in current spending, and that 
half  of  the fiscal adjustment in several countries during the 1990s reflected compression 
of  investment in infrastructure. It is noted that the decline in public investment reduced 
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long-term growth by 1.5–3 percent in Latin America. There is a sizeable infrastructure 
gap in most developing countries. Despite increased emphasis on private–public 
partnerships, the private sector has not increased infrastructure investment as hoped for. 
It is also recognized that this not only compromises the growth prospects of  these regions 
but also reduces the likelihood of  meeting MDGs. 
4. FDI and capital formation 
Another important ingredient of  the new development strategy has been increased 
reliance on FDI. In addition to the belief  that it would provide resources for development 
and balance of  payments support, FDI has been seen as a crucial factor for success in 
industrialization because of  its role in the transfer of  technology and entrepreneurial 
know-how, in linking developing countries to international production networks and 
enhancing their access to global markets for goods and finance. Many countries have 
thus removed impediments to FDI and provided foreign investors with incentives and 
security through unilateral action or bilateral investment agreements, over and above 
those enjoyed by national investors.16 
These policies, together with the increased outreach of  TNCs, have resulted in a 
rapid increase of  FDI flows to developing countries, rising from some $20 billion at the 
end of  the 1980s to $160 billion a decade later and almost $240 billion in 2005 (IMF 
2005). While in absolute terms much of  the increased FDI is concentrated in the larger 
East Asian and Latin American countries, almost all regions shared in this expansion, 
particularly when measured as a proportion of  income. In South America FDI has been 
attracted primarily by privatization of  public enterprises; on some estimates about two-
thirds of  the FDI inflows to the region were linked to privatization (UNCTAD TDR 
1999, 118–19). In several countries in Central America and East Asia, including Mexico, 
Malaysia and China, FDI has been in the form of  greenfield investment, designed to link 
these low-cost locations to international production networks for the production of  labor-
intensive manufactures for global markets. In Africa FDI has concentrated mainly in 
countries rich in natural resources, particularly fuel and minerals (UNCTAD TDR 2005). 
In East Asia efforts to promote FDI have been premised on its potential contribution 
to technology, know-how and market access rather than to balance of  payments. By 














table 3.4: Public investment (percent of  GDP)
Source: UNCTAD TDR (2003). 
a. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. 
b. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea and Thailand. 
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further, the prime objective has been the financing of  public sector and external deficits 
and debt. 
The impact of  FDI on capital accumulation and growth is highly contentious.17 Its 
contribution to balance of  payments appears to be generally negative over the long term 
even though it may provide net positive transfers in the short run before profit remittances 
pick up. This is so not only where FDI is concentrated in nontraded activities, but also 
in export-oriented sectors linked to international production networks because of  high 
import content and profit margins.18 This appears to be the case even in China and 
Malaysia, two of  the most successful countries in attracting export-oriented greenfield 
FDI (Akyüz 2005a). 
When FDI is in the form of  acquisition of  existing public or private assets, it has no 
direct contribution to domestic capital formation although changes in ownership can 
give rise to productivity gains or stimulate investment that would not have otherwise 
taken place. Privatization could also add to domestic capital accumulation if  the 
proceeds are used for investment, but not if  they are used for servicing debt. When 
FDI is in greenfield investment, its contribution to GFCF would depend on its effect on 
the behavior of  domestic investors. Research on whether FDI crowds in or crowds out 
domestic investment is not conclusive and it appears that the impact of  FDI depends 
on other variables endogenous to the growth process, including those linked to policy 
(Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan 1994; Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek 2001; 
Borensztein, de Gregorio and Lee 1998). 
That the recent surge in FDI flows has contributed not so much to an acceleration 
of  capital formation and growth as to a reallocation of  production facilities, jobs and 
ownership across different countries can be clearly seen in Table 3.1. For the world 
economy as a whole, in recent years the share of  FDI as a proportion of  GDP has almost 
tripled compared to the 1980s, but the proportion of  world GDP allocated to investment 
has fallen by 2.5 percentage points. The contrast is even sharper in developing countries 
where the increase in total FDI inflows as a proportion of  GDP is almost fivefold during 
the same period. 
There is again considerable diversity in the relation between FDI inflows and capital 
formation in developing countries. Figures in Table 3.5 show that the difference between 
East Asia and Latin America in the policy approach to FDI is also reflected by its relation 
to domestic capital formation. Both regions witnessed a significant increase in FDI 
inflows as a proportion of  GDP during the 1990s compared to the 1980s. However, in 
Latin America there was a widespread association of  increased FDI with reduced fixed 
capital formation. For the region as a whole FDI as a proportion of  GDP was higher 
in the 1990s than in the 1980s by more than 1.7 percentage points, but the share of  
GFCF in GDP was lower by some 0.6 percentage points. In all major Latin American 
economies FDI as a proportion of  GDP rose strongly while GFCF either stagnated 
or fell between the two periods. The picture is much the same when FDI inflows are 
compared with private investment alone. It is also notable that the inverse association 
between GFCF and FDI is found not only in countries where FDI has been attracted 
primarily by privatization, such as Argentina and Brazil, but also in Mexico where there 
was considerable greenfield investment stimulated by NAFTA. Again in several countries 
86 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FDI GFCF







































































































Source: UNCTAD TDR (2003).
table 3.5: Changes in FDI and gross fixed capital formation: 1990–2000 compared to 
1980–90 (percentage of  GDP)
in Africa FDI and GFCF moved in opposite directions. By contrast in none of  the rapidly 
growing East Asian NIEs was rising FDI associated with falling domestic GFCF.19 
Even in the presence of  a crowding out effect, higher FDI tends to result in increased 
GFCF since domestic investment is unlikely to fall to the same extent as FDI rises. 
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In this respect the negative association between the two in Latin America is quite 
revealing. Whatever the direct impact of  FDI on domestic capital formation may have 
been, this is a clear indication that the economic conditions that attracted foreign 
enterprises were not conducive to faster capital formation, and that the two sets of  
investment decisions can be driven by different considerations. As discussed in subsequent 
sections, in many economies experiencing strong surges in FDI but stagnant or declining 
GFCF, macroeconomic and financial policies have played an important role in creating 
conditions favorable to asset acquisition but not to fixed capital formation. 
5. Policy failure: Omission or commission? 
The evidence thus shows that investment and growth have generally been too 
weak to improve labor market conditions in most developing countries. The 
outcome of  the strategy adopted for activating a dynamic process of  capital 
accumulation, technological progress and growth based on rapid domestic and 
external liberalization, reduced public investment and policy intervention, and 
increased reliance on FDI, is disappointing. The slowdown in accumulation that 
emerged in the course of  adjustment to the debt and balance of  payments crises of  
the 1980s has become a more permanent feature of  these economies. Weak private 
investment has been associated with declines in the share of  public investment in 
GDP, and the surge in FDI encouraged by rapid opening up, privatization and special 
incentives has failed to ignite growth by accelerating capital formation. Furthermore 
the link between accumulation and growth has weakened despite measures adopted 
to improve the allocation and utilization of  resources. 
The poor outcome in terms of  investment and growth has not given rise to a 
fundamental rethinking of  Washington Consensus policies despite the rhetoric to the 
contrary. In fact, there has been a tendency to attribute failure to omissions and slippages 
in reforms rather than shortcomings in the policies recommended. Originally, it was 
expected that restoring macroeconomic stability through monetary and fiscal orthodoxy 
would prepare the ground for sustained growth based on private investment. The 
subsequent failure of  investment to recover despite the apparent success in stabilization 
and structural reform was interpreted by the World Bank (1992, 34–45) as a temporary 
“investment pause” in the “transition to a new relative price regime.” However, as 
the investment pause became a permanent feature for most economies and it became 
clear that the first generation reforms of  “getting the prices right” failed to deliver 
on their promises, attention has turned to second generation reforms emphasizing 
“getting the investment climate right” by combining macroeconomic stability with 
good governance and policies promoting greater competition. It has been argued that 
richer and faster-growing countries tend to have more competition and fewer barriers 
to entry, and promotion of  productive investment would require removing barriers to 
imports and foreign investment, and dismantling administrative obstacles to private 
business (World Bank 2003, 85–95). 
Once again this is an act of  faith. First, the relationship between economic openness 
and growth is highly controversial, both theoretically and empirically. Second, even though 
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there are still barriers to international trade and investment, there has been considerable 
liberalization in these areas. Similarly while some administrative obstacles to business 
remain, governance has improved considerably in most developing countries. Therefore, 
shortcomings in these areas cannot explain why investment and growth performance has 
failed to improve and, in fact, has in many cases worsened. More importantly, as discussed 
in the following section, it is a gross exaggeration to claim that successful examples of  
rapid accumulation and growth in East Asia relied on competitive market forces. 
C. Managing Profits and Accumulation 
Despite increased international mobility of  capital, a very large proportion of  domestic 
investment continues to be supported by domestic savings in both developed and 
developing countries.20 The conventional theory tells us that the savings propensity 
increases with income; that is, the rich save proportionately more than the poor and 
richer countries are capital abundant compared to less developed economies. In reality, 
however, some countries save and invest a lot more than the others at similar levels of  
per capita income, and more equitable income distribution is not always associated with 
lower savings and investment. 
This is certainly the case in the industrial world, as exemplified by a comparison 
between Japan and the United States.21 But perhaps it is even more so in the developing 
world. For the sample of  countries in Table 3.3 there is a very weak correlation between 
investment rates and per capita incomes.22 Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Uruguay and Venezuela with per capita incomes at least three times the levels in China, 
India and Indonesia have much lower savings and investment rates. Again in many Latin 
American countries income concentration measured as the percentage share of  the richest 
quintile of  the population in national income is much greater than the concentration 
ratio in high-saving and high-investing Korea and Indonesia (Table 3.6). Some second 
tier NIEs such as Malaysia and Thailand have concentration ratios comparable to Latin 
America, but considerably higher private investment ratios. Regression estimates show 
that no more than 36 percent of  the variations in investment rates for countries in Table 
3.6 for the period 1995–2000 can be explained by intercountry differences in per capita 
income and the concentration ratio. 
Evidence shows that after the initial stages of  development, when agricultural 
incomes provide the main source of  investment, private capital accumulation in industry 
is financed primarily by profits in the form of  corporate retentions. Indeed in the course 
of  industrial development, dynamic interactions between profits and investment, or 
the profit–investment nexus, become the main driving force whereby profits constitute 
simultaneously an incentive for investment, a source of  investment and an outcome of  
investment (Akyüz and Gore 1996). A high rate of  profit retention is usually associated 
with a high rate of  corporate investment since the decision of  corporations to save (i.e., 
to retain profits rather than distribute them as dividends) is not independent of  their 
decision on investment. 
In major industrial countries up to 95 percent of  corporate investment was financed 
by retained earnings during 1960–90, with the ratio being higher in the United States, 
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United Kingdom and France than in Japan and Italy.23 In most of  these countries the 
contribution of  gross profits to total savings and capital formation was as high as and 
even higher than household savings. Household gross savings did not significantly exceed 
household gross capital formation, and voluntary household savings were just sufficient 
to meet housing investment while mandatory savings in pension contributions, together 
with gross retained earnings, financed corporate investment. 
For the more recent period there appears to be a decline in the extent to which corporate 
profits have been channeled into investment in the major industrial countries. As already 
noted aggregate capital formation as a proportion of  GDP has been stagnant or falling in 
the G7 countries even though the rate of  return on capital has been rising since the early 
1980s. Indeed, there is a visible downward trend in the ratio of  investment to capital income 
in the business sector. As seen in Chart 3.1, during 1980–2000 this ratio moved in parallel 
with the overall business cycle, falling at times of  stagnation or recession (namely 1980–82; 
1991–92 and 2001–2002) and rising subsequently. However, each recovery appears to be 
































































































































Source: UNCTAD TDR (2003).
a. Private investment as a percentage of  GDP.
b. Income concentration; share of  the richest quintile of  the population in total income.
c.  Accumulation–concentration ratio; share of  private investment in GDP expressed as a  percentage of  
the share of  the richest quintile of  the population in total income. 
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weaker than the previous one. Thus, for the G7 countries taken together, investment is now 
generating higher returns than before while profits are generating less investment. 
Available evidence also shows that high rates of  capital accumulation in more successful 
developing countries have been associated with high rates of  corporate retention and 
investment. This is particularly true in East Asian countries including Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Thailand and China where the impressive savings–investment performance 
over the past decades compared to other developing countries owed a great deal to 
significantly higher business savings and investment rates rather than higher household 
savings, except in Malaysia and Singapore where household savings were particularly 
high due to compulsory savings schemes. During the 1980s in these countries business 
savings were in the order of  8–14 percent of  GDP, financing between 42 percent and 
65 percent of  corporate investment.24 Evidence for the more recent period also shows a 
strong relationship between a high savings rate, a high share of  manufacturing in GDP 
and a high profit share in East Asia, while in Latin America savings rates were lower than 
expected on the basis of  the share of  profits in income (Ros 2000, 79–83). 
The accumulation–concentration ratio in Table 3.6 provides a measure of  the animal 
spirit of  the entrepreneur class in countries for which data are available. It effectively 
gives the ratio of  private investment to income received by the richest quintile of  the 
population. Since private investment is undertaken primarily by the richest strata, this 
ratio is a reasonably good indicator of  the propensity of  the rich to save and invest. 
Successful East Asian countries again top the table. The ratio in Korea is more than twice 
the ratio in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Furthermore, all second tier NIEs have higher 
ratios than all Latin American and African countries. A comparison with the earlier 
Chart 3.1: Private nonresidential investment as a percentage of  capital income in the 
business sector
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figures in the last column shows that while East Asian NIEs and South Asian countries 
experienced increases in this ratio in recent years, this is not always the case for Latin 
America despite the recovery from the debt crisis of  the 1980s.25 
A strong profit–investment nexus does not emerge spontaneously from market 
forces. Market-based incentives and competition do not always translate profits into 
investment or ensure that investments generate adequate profits to justify undertaking 
them. Indeed an important element of  the successful industrialization in East Asia 
was the willingness and ability of  governments to intervene effectively to accelerate 
accumulation and growth by animating the investment–profits nexus, rather than 
relying on market forces alone. 
The kind of  measures used is studied extensively in the literature (Amsden 1989 and 
2001; Wade 2003; Chang 1994; Rodrik 1995; Akyüz and Gore 1996; and Akyüz 1999). 
They fall into two broad categories. First, a number of  fiscal instruments such as tax 
exemptions and special depreciation allowances were employed in order to raise gross 
profits and encourage their retention. Second, a range of  selective trade, financial and 
competition policies were used to increase profits over and above the levels that could 
be attained under free market conditions, provided that protection and support were 
reciprocated by faster accumulation and productivity growth. Measures were introduced 
in all these areas to coordinate investment decisions, to direct investment to sectors with 
greater potential for learning and productivity growth, to prevent investment races and 
to control external borrowing. They were supplemented by restrictions over luxury 
consumption through import control and progressive taxation, and by measures designed 
to close unproductive channels of  wealth accumulation and speculation. High retention 
ratios resulted in relatively equitable personal income distribution despite high share of  
capital income in value added, and rapid accumulation and job creation provided social 
justification for high profits.26
Such policies have not been fashionable in recent years in many parts of  the developing 
world. The scope for managing profits and accumulation is also severely restricted 
by WTO rules, conditionalities attached to multilateral lending by the BWIs, and 
liberalization of  the capital account (Chang 2005; Gallagher 2005). These, together with 
the neglect of  accumulation and employment in macroeconomic and financial policies, 
explain in a large part why investments now generate more profits than previously, but 
profits generate less investment. Inequality within developing countries, as measured by 
the Gini coefficient, increased substantially between 1980 and 2000 (Freeman 2004), 
but this has not been associated with increases in savings or investment ratios. This is 
true not only collectively but also for a large majority of  developing countries taken 
individually. For the countries in Table 3.6, there is a visible weakening of  the relation 
between income concentration and capital accumulation in recent years. The positive 
correlation observed between the two during 1980–95 disappeared altogether in the 
second half  of  the 1990s.27 This is also true for the significance of  the coefficient for the 
concentration estimated in a cross-country regression of  investment share on per capita 
income and the concentration ratio.28 Although such simple statistics have their limits in 
revealing the underlying relations, their significance lies in confirming the general trends 
discussed above. 
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Even some countries in East Asia have not been spared from the winds of  orthodoxy. 
It is true that many of  the policies designed for support and protection in the earlier stages 
of  industrialization are no longer needed because they have succeeded in meeting their 
objectives. However, in two areas the break with past practice has proved troublesome 
and made significant contributions to the East Asian financial crisis: policy guidance of  
investment and control over external borrowing. Abandoning investment coordination 
was an important reason for misallocation and overinvestment while capital account 
liberalization proved fatal when firms were allowed to raise money abroad without the 
traditional supervision and control, and became extremely vulnerable to an external debt 
run (Akyüz 2000). 
d. Macroeconomic Policy: what Policy? 
With few exceptions, macroeconomic policy has not been directed toward maintaining 
a high and stable level of  employment and rapid capital accumulation either in 
developed or in developing countries. In the developed world there have been persistent 
inconsistencies in the mix and stance of  monetary and fiscal policies both within and 
across major industrial countries, which served not only to dampen growth but also to 
generate global imbalances and instability. In many developing countries, the scope 
to use monetary and fiscal policy for macroeconomic management has largely been 
restricted by financial liberalization and increased public indebtedness. Policy stance has 
generally been procyclical, aggravating boom–bust cycles in economic activity associated 
with rapid surges and exits of  capital, thereby contributing to instability in key relative 
prices that affect investment decisions such as interest rates and exchange rates. 
1. Imbalances in the industrial world 
Fiscal policy has generally ceased to be an instrument of  macroeconomic management in 
industrial countries with the result that too much pressure has been placed on monetary 
policy for ensuring growth and stability, a task which it could not fulfil satisfactorily. In the 
United States monetary policy focused entirely on inflation in the early 1980s, combined with 
supply-side tax cuts. This combination of  tight monetary policy with fiscal laxity resulted in 
a sharp appreciation of  the dollar and provided considerable growth stimulus to Europe and 
Japan, allowing them to undertake fiscal adjustment without seriously affecting aggregate 
demand and employment. However, as the resulting United States budget and external 
deficits threatened global stability, an agreement was reached in 1985 for macroeconomic 
policy coordination to realign the dollar and reduce global imbalances without sacrificing 
growth or stability. But the United States failed to relax monetary policy and focused on 
expenditure reduction and then tax increases while Europe and Japan were unwilling to 
undertake expansionary macroeconomic policies. The result was a hard landing of  the 
dollar and the 1987 global stock market crash (UNCTAD TDR 1992, part 2, chap. 2). 
The depreciation of  the dollar and recession led to a swift payments adjustment 
in the early 1990s. As inflation came down, the Federal Reserve paid more attention 
to economic activity than in the 1980s, while fiscal tightening and growth brought a 
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rapid correction to budget deficits, producing a surplus in the second half  of  the 1990s. 
However, monetary policy neglected the conditions in financial markets, notably the 
increased fragility resulting from excessive investment in high-tech sectors, supported 
by a stock market (dot-com) bubble and highly inflated and leveraged asset prices. The 
boom was associated with large inflows of  capital into the United States, resulting again 
in a persistent appreciation of  the dollar, adding to growing trade imbalances caused 
by disparities in demand creation among the major industrial countries. However, the 
recession brought about by the bursting of  the dot-com bubble and the stock market 
collapse at the turn of  the millennium was short-lived as massive supply-side tax cuts and 
increased military spending, together with repeated cuts in interest rates, brought a swift 
recovery, before the cyclical downturn could improve the United States external balance. 
Europe and Japan both relied for growth primarily on markets abroad, notably in 
the United States, rather than expansion of  domestic demand. This, together with 
the inappropriate mix of  policies in the United States, has been a major factor in the 
emergence of  large trade imbalances, both in the 1980s and more recently. Europe 
was preoccupied throughout much of  the 1980s with inflation and in the 1990s with 
convergence to conditions deemed to be necessary for monetary union, which consisted 
of  arbitrary limits to inflation, government debt and deficits set first by the Maastricht 
Treaty and then by the Stability and Growth Pact. These arrangements in effect denied 
Europe countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy, and even introduced procyclical 
elements in the management of  public finances. Even after control over inflation was 
firmly established, the Bundesbank and subsequently the European Central Bank 
continued to adhere to monetarism; they were generally unwilling to use monetary policy 
for anything other than disinflation. All these factors constrained the willingness of  the 
private sector to expand production capacity and employment beyond the limits assumed 
by the policymakers to be compatible with stability.29
Japan enjoyed export-led growth in much of  the 1980s. Its policy response to the 
appreciation of  the yen was to relax monetary policy to allow an adjustment based on 
accelerated investment. The result was a financial bubble with a sharp escalation of  prices 
in stock and property markets and overinvestment which eventually led to a prolonged 
process of  debt deflation and three fully fledged recessions. The first came in 1991 when 
Japan moved to halt the boom in asset prices by tightening monetary policy; the second 
one was associated with the large appreciation of  the yen and the East Asian financial 
crisis in 1997–98; and the third one came at the beginning of  the new millennium. 
As deflation set in and prices started to fall, conditions reminiscent of  the Keynesian 
liquidity trap developed and the limits of  monetary policy were reached. In effect Japan 
is the only major industrial country which tried to respond to economic slowdown and 
contraction with fiscal expansion, introducing several packages throughout the 1990s in 
order to ignite recovery. However, fiscal stimulus has never been translated into sustained 
increases in private spending. As a consequence growth has been sluggish and erratic, 
and government debt and deficits have grown faster than output since the early 1990s. 
In both continental Europe and Japan consumer spending has been generally weak, 
not making a significant contribution to demand expansion. This is in large part due to 
the behavior of  wages. In the United States and the United Kingdom real wages broadly 
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kept up with productivity growth after the mid-1990s. By contrast, in Continental Europe 
and Japan they stagnated for over seven years. In France real unit labor costs were flat 
while in Germany they actually fell between 1996 and 2002. In Japan the decline in 
real unit labor costs was deeper, partly due to sharp falls in profit-related earnings such 
as bonuses. In particular while the Japanese system of  compensation based on links to 
enterprise profits has the advantage of  providing the firms with flexibility regarding costs, 
it tends to accentuate economic recessions by adding to downward pressures on demand 
(UNCTAD TDR 2002, chap. 1; 2003, chap. 1). 
Despite the aversion to Keynesian fiscal management, chronic public deficits have 
emerged and public debt has grown faster than output in both the United States and 
Europe. In the United States, Federal debt as a proportion of  GDP rose from 32 percent 
in 1980 to 63 percent at the end of  2004 due to an inappropriate mix of  monetary and 
fiscal policies that pushed up the cost of  public borrowing throughout the 1980s and to 
supply-side tax cuts. In the euro area, despite efforts to bring down public debt after the 
Maastricht Treaty of  1991, the average ratio of  public debt to GDP has remained around 
72 percent because of  high interest rates and low growth. Increased indebtedness, in 
turn, has made an important contribution to budget deficits. In the euro area, the general 
government budget has had a primary surplus since 1995, but the overall budget has 
been in deficit on account of  interest payments which averaged at close to 4 percent of  
GDP. Interest payments from the budget in the United States was also close to 4 percent 
of  GDP in the 1990s, coming down only in the new millennium as interest rates fell to 
historically low levels. 
Of  all the major industrial countries, the United States’ economy appears to have 
benefited considerably more from increased global integration, enjoying faster growth in 
output, jobs and productivity in the past two decades. However, this performance has not 
been based on a judicious combination of  monetary and fiscal policy, or an appropriate 
cross-country pattern of  domestic demand growth. As a result, it has been associated 
with large domestic and global imbalances which pose serious threats for growth and 
stability over the coming years, not only for the United States itself, but also for the rest 
of  the world, including developing countries.30 
It is generally agreed that maintaining the recent pattern of  growth in the United 
States would exacerbate trade imbalances and lead to an unsustainable process of  debt 
accumulation. Adjustment based on fiscal tightening would imply a slowdown in growth 
unless accompanied by rapid and sustained growth in exports which would require 
acceleration of  demand growth in its major trading partners. Faster growth in Europe is 
unlikely without governments ignoring the constraints placed on fiscal expansion by the 
Stability and Growth Pact or the ECB abandoning monetarism. Not much additional 
stimulus can come from Japan, where policy interest rates are effectively zero and, at some 
7 percent of  GDP, fiscal deficits are higher than even in the United States. Nor could one 
expect a swift turnaround in the savings–investment balance in the East Asian developing 
countries running trade surpluses with the United States, since they (notably China) are 
already investing at very high rates. If, on the other hand, too much pressure is put on the 
dollar for external adjustment, then the United States could face a dilemma in monetary 
policy between maintaining growth and price stability, particularly if  the decline of  the 
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dollar does not generate a swift turnaround in its trade balance. All in all, the chances of  an 
orderly adjustment to these imbalances while maintaining strong and sustained growth and 
exchange rate stability, and without frictions in international trade, appear to be quite slim. 
2. Fiscal constraints and procyclical policy in emerging markets 
Macroeconomic policy in developing countries has been circumscribed by global 
economic conditions shaped in a large part by the mix and stance of  policies in 
industrial countries. In this respect developments in financial conditions, notably with 
respect to international liquidity, risk spreads and interest rates, and capital flows have 
exerted a much greater influence on the scope and effect of  policies in the developing 
world than those in the world trade and commodity markets, except for the poorest 
countries. 
There has been considerable diversity among developing countries regarding 
overall macroeconomic conditions and the scope to use monetary and fiscal policy for 
macroeconomic management. Policy constraints have generally been tighter in most 
middle income Latin American countries with high and volatile inflation, chronic budget 
and payments deficits, and higher levels of  public debt than Asian countries with relatively 
stable prices and sustainable fiscal and external balances. In most low income countries, 
notably in sub-Saharan Africa, with moderate inflation but relatively high and volatile 
fiscal and payments deficits, the stance of  policy has generally depended on external aid 
and the conditions attached to its availability. 
Notwithstanding this diversity, evidence strongly suggests that macroeconomic 
policy in developing countries has generally been procyclical, and much more so for 
fiscal than monetary policy.31 Stabilization programs supported by the BWIs in low 
income countries facing payments difficulties have almost invariably promoted fiscal 
and monetary austerity, emphasising adjustment rather than financing regardless of  the 
origin of  budget or external deficits. Aid has been increasingly volatile, particularly since 
1990, and much more so than government revenues or GDP. It has also been procyclical, 
introducing a deflationary bias to macroeconomic adjustment. Unexpected declines in 
aid to low income countries facing payments difficulties typically necessitated sharp cuts 
in imports and economic activity as most of  these countries have had little access to 
private markets, which are, in any case, even more procyclical.32 
Following a series of  failed attempts to bring inflation down under control through 
traditional stabilization policies relying on fiscal and monetary tightening and currency 
devaluations, most high inflation countries adopted exchange-rate-based stabilization 
programs in the 1990s with the support of  the BWIs, often accompanied by rapid trade 
and financial liberalization, relying on capital inflows to finance fiscal and external deficits. 
This populist policy mix served to avoid hard policy choices and allowed price stability 
to be achieved without running into distributional conflicts. However, disinflation has 
generally been achieved at the expense of  increased financial instability, leaving many of  
these countries in conditions as fragile as those prevailing in the 1980s. 
In countries with exchange-rate-based stabilization programs, macroeconomic 
policy mix has generally been inconsistent, combining relatively tight money with 
96 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
procyclical fiscal policy.33 An examination of  the monetary conditions index, defined 
as a weighted average of  changes in real effective exchange rate and the ratio of  the 
real short-term interest rate to the trend growth rate, shows that monetary conditions 
were on average much tighter and more volatile in Latin America during the 1990s 
than in East Asia.34 In Latin America the boom phase of  the cycles generally combined 
sharp currency appreciations with high real interest rates. Declines in nominal interest 
rates lagged considerably behind inflation as tight monetary policy designed to attract 
foreign capital and high credit risks offset much of  the benefits of  lower inflation and 
exchange rate stability. When the bust came, currencies collapsed, leading to an easing 
of  the overall monetary stance, but often this was more than offset by hikes in interest 
rates, recommended by the IMF to restore confidence. Overall, monetary conditions 
in Latin America in the 1990s were too stringent and unstable to encourage growth 
based on rapid and sustained capital accumulation. In East Asia where interest rates were 
much lower because of  low and stable inflation, and currency appreciations were limited, 
boom in capital flows and economic expansion were associated with neutral monetary 
conditions while the 1997–98 crisis led to a procyclical tightening. 
Fiscal policy has been procyclical in most developing countries but above all in Latin 
America (BIS 2003; Moreno 2003; Mohanty and Scatigna 2003; Mihaljek and Tissot 
2003; Ocampo 2002; Kaminski, Reinhart and Végh 2004). In the latter region most 
countries started stabilization programs with large budget deficits and where there was 
some success in fiscal adjustment, it was based on unsustainable spending cuts rather than 
expansion of  government revenues. Surges in capital inflows thus presented an opportunity 
to raise public spending and cut taxes by facilitating government borrowing and bringing 
some additional cyclical revenues. This reinforced the expansion fuelled by increased 
capital inflows and private consumption. However, increased public debt, interest rate 
hikes, sharp declines in currencies and economic contraction necessitated a retrenchment 
of  public spending at times of  reversal of  capital flows and financial crises, thereby 
deepening deflation. In East Asia there does not appear to be a systematic procyclicality in 
fiscal policy. There was no notable fiscal expansion during the surge in capital inflows in 
the mid-1990s, but procyclical fiscal tightening added to deflationary pressures at the time 
of  the 1997–98 crisis in countries following the IMF recipe. However, this policy stance 
was reversed soon and most East Asian countries were able to respond to the weakness of  
global demand after 2000 by fiscal and monetary expansion while such policy space was 
not available to Latin America and Africa facing stringent financial conditions (UNCTAD 
TDR 2003; Moreno 2003, 5–6; Mohanty and Scatigna 2003, 38–43). 
As a result of  boom–bust cycles in international capital inflows and recurrent financial 
crises, public debt has been rising in emerging market economies both in Latin America 
and Asia since the mid-1990s. Although external sovereign debt has declined in Latin 
America and stayed relatively stable in Asia, there has been a considerable increase in 
domestic debt in both regions (IMF 2003, chap. 3). Much of  this increase is accounted 
for by interest and exchange rate movements and the assumption of  private liabilities by 
the public sector, notably through recapitalization of  insolvent banks, as well as excessive 
borrowing by some governments during surges in capital inflows. As a result the average 
public debt in emerging market economies now stands at around 70 percent of  GDP. 
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An outcome of  increased public indebtedness is to narrow the scope for discretionary 
public spending and reduce fiscal flexibility. Given that many countries with high public 
debt also face high real interest rates and have relatively low potential growth rates, they 
need to generate large amounts of  primary surplus in order to avoid debt explosion.35 
With a debt/GDP ratio of  70 percent and a potential growth rate of  4 percent, debt 
sustainability would require a primary surplus of  some 2.8 percent when the real interest 
rate is 8 percent. This figure would be doubled when the interest rate is 12 percent, and 
it would rise further to 7.2 percent when sovereign debt is 90 percent of  GDP. 
Given the political difficulties in sustaining a high rate of  primary surplus, even a 
moderately high ratio of  public debt to GDP is unlikely to remain stable over time. 
It has been argued that the threshold debt ratio above which a country becomes 
vulnerable to external shocks that may threaten sustainability is in the order of  25 
percent of  GDP even though it is generally recognized that the threshold depends on a 
host of  other factors (Moreno 2003, 2–3; Mihaljek and Tissot 2003, 16–22; IMF 2003, 
chap. 3; Goldstein 2005, 54). This is far below the debt ratios in most emerging market 
economies.36 At present such ratios appear to be sustainable because of  highly favorable 
global financial conditions including exceptionally low interest rates, and exchange 
rate appreciations. However, many of  these economies which have been enjoying a 
surge in capital inflows in recent years appear to be vulnerable to a hike in interest 
rates, a reassessment of  risks and reversal of  capital flows. Thus, fiscal and monetary 
policies in such countries could be challenged by deterioration in global financial 
conditions (Goldstein 2005, 57). A rise in interest rates due to changed perceptions of  
risk and an increase in the ratio of  public debt to GDP resulting from sharp currency 
depreciations could necessitate much higher rates of  primary surplus, thereby forcing 
the governments into excessively procyclical fiscal positions, and adding to deflationary 
forces triggered by rising interest rates. 
E. Financial Instability, Investment and Employment
1. Financial boom–bust cycles
Until recent bouts of  financial boom–bust cycles in industrial and developing countries, it 
was generally believed that price stability was both necessary and sufficient for economic 
and financial stability. However, in many countries in East Asia, as well as in the industrial 
world, asset price bubbles, excessive credit creation, and currency appreciations and 
gyrations all occurred under conditions of  price stability. In the more extreme cases, as in 
Latin America, disinflation has been achieved at the cost of  increased financial fragility 
and instability, through exchange-rate-based stabilization programs relying on unstable 
capital flows. 
Not only have financial markets become the single most important source of  
instability, but the influence of  financial developments over economic cycles has 
increased significantly. This is particularly so in the developing world where financial 
instability associated with greater mobility of  capital has been mirrored by sharp changes 
in economic activity. Both theoretical and empirical literature shows that high volatility 
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has an adverse effect on long-term economic growth and that financial liberalization 
tends to strengthen the trade-off  between growth and volatility.37 On the one hand, 
growing uncertainties created by sharp and unexpected swings in key relative prices 
such as interest rates, exchange rates and real wages, as well as increased fluctuations in 
the level of  demand, increase the risks associated with irreversible investment decisions, 
shorten planning horizons and promote defensive strategies.38 On the other hand, greater 
opportunities for quick capital gains presented by a high degree of  volatility of  asset 
prices encourage speculative behavior. These exert a significant influence on the pace 
and pattern of  capital accumulation and the conditions in the labor market. 
With rapid financial liberalization boom–bust cycles have become common features 
of  both currency and asset markets. These reflect abrupt and unexpected changes 
in markets’ assessment of  risks which cannot always be attributed to policy shifts. 
A plausible explanation is provided by the theory of  endogenous fragility developed by 
Minsky (1977), which sees financial cycles as an intrinsic feature of  market economies.39 
Booms generated by improved opportunities for profitable investment lead to an 
underestimation of  risks, overexpansion of  credits and overindebtedness. Excessive 
risk taking eventually results in a deterioration of  balance sheets and increases in 
nonperforming loans. Lenders respond by reassessing risks and sharply cutting credits, 
which in turn lead to credit crunch, debt deflation and defaults. However, while crises 
are almost always associated with a certain degree of  financial fragility, they can also 
take place in the absence of  serious economic weaknesses, because of  the so-called 
self-fulfilling prophecies resulting from the existence of  multiple equilibria and debt 
runs associated with herding behavior and collective action problems (Obstfeld 1996; 
Krugman 1996 and 1998). 
Boom–bust cycles also involve mutually reinforcing and destabilizing feedbacks 
among credit, capital and currency markets. Booms in capital markets tend to increase 
opportunities for capital gain, attracting capital flows from foreign investors or 
encouraging foreign borrowing for investment in domestic asset markets. These would, 
in turn, appreciate the currency, thereby widening profit opportunities. In the downturn, 
falling asset prices reduce the attractiveness of  domestic investment, leading to a rapid exit 
of  capital and a depreciation of  the currency. Similarly, credit cycles are often associated 
with cycles in property and equity prices. Booms in stock and property markets raise 
collateral values, which in turn encourage domestic credit expansion by loosening credit 
standards, reducing the cost of  borrowing and increasing the availability of  credit. Where 
the banking sector holds sizeable amounts of  stocks (as in Japan), stock market booms 
can expand credit by raising bank equity relative to current exposure. Faster growth in 
bank lending in turn serves to increase the market valuation of  these assets, setting off  a 
mutually reinforcing process of  credit expansion and asset price inflation. This process 
works in the opposite direction when asset prices are declining and economic conditions 
are deteriorating; falling asset prices reduce the value of  collaterals, raise the cost of  
borrowing and lead to cuts in lending and credit crunch. 
In a world of  unstable capital flows every country with an open capital account is 
vulnerable to sharp and unexpected swings in the external value of  its currency. However, 
in industrial countries currency instability rarely spills over to domestic capital and credit 
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markets. For instance during the 1992 EMS crisis there were sharp drops in the lira and 
pound sterling, but these did not provoke serious financial crises in Italy and the United 
Kingdom. Again in recent years there have been sharp swings in the dollar vis-à-vis 
other reserve currencies, but these did not generate destabilizing spillovers to domestic 
financial markets of  the countries concerned. 
By contrast, in developing countries domestic financial cycles have often been 
associated with sharp swings in external capital flows and exchange rates. It is very 
rare that currency crises in developing countries are contained without having a 
significant impact on domestic financial conditions, economic activity and living 
standards. The greater vulnerability of  domestic financial conditions in developing 
countries to currency instability is due primarily to the existence of  large stocks 
of  public and/or private debt denominated in foreign currencies; i.e. the so-called 
liability dollarization. 
While country-specific factors no doubt influence the volume and terms of  private 
capital flows, global financial conditions were the dominating factors in the two postwar 
boom–bust cycles in such flows to developing countries. The first boom started in the 
early 1970s and was driven by the rapid expansion of  international liquidity associated 
with oil surpluses, and facilitated by financial deregulation in industrialized countries 
and the rapid growth of  Eurodollar markets. Excess liquidity was recycled in the form 
of  syndicated bank credits, and this was encouraged by the BWIs fearing a collapse 
of  global demand. It ended with a debt crisis in the 1980s as a result of  the hike in 
United States interest rates, global recession and a sharp cutback in bank lending. The 
second boom came in the early 1990s, after almost ten years of  suspension in private 
lending to developing countries. It was encouraged by the success of  the Brady Plan for 
sovereign debt restructuring, liberalization and stabilization in developing countries, and 
rapid expansion of  liquidity in the United States and Japan in conditions of  economic 
slowdown. Unlike the first boom, a large proportion of  private inflows were in equity 
investment, rather than international lending, attracted by prospects of  quick capital 
gains and short-term arbitrage opportunities. It again ended with a series of  crises in 
Latin America, East Asia and elsewhere. 
These cycles were thus driven by temporary and special factors beyond the control 
of  recipient countries, including monetary and financial policies in industrial countries. 
Aggregate flows to developing countries have manifested a degree of  instability not 
justified by changes in the underlying fundamentals in the recipient countries. For 
instance in the last cycle, total annual net private capital inflows fell from more than 
$200 billion in 1996 to less than $20 billion in 2000–2001, and after the East Asian crisis 
until 2002 net international private lending to developing countries was negative. These 
swings in the volume of  private capital are also mirrored in sharp changes in their terms. 
Booms tend to be associated with the underestimation of  risks and relatively low spreads 
while crises led to overpricing of  risks, generalized increases in spreads and shortening of  
maturities (UNCTAD TDR 2003, 27; Cunningham, Dixon and Hayes 2001; Sy 2001). 
A third boom now appears to be underway, driven by a combination of  highly 
favorable conditions including historically low interest rates, abundant international 
liquidity, oil surpluses, strong commodity prices and buoyant international trade. 
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Total inflows to developing countries are currently above the peak of  the previous boom, 
and almost all emerging markets have shared in this recovery. But as noted by the IIF 
(2005a, 4), “there is a risk that the pickup in flows into some emerging market assets has 
pushed valuations to levels that are not commensurate with underlying fundamentals.” 
Thus, a combination of  tightened liquidity, rising interest rates, slowing growth and 
persistent global trade imbalances can reverse the boom, hitting particularly countries 
with weak fundamentals and incomplete self-insurance (IIF 2005b; Goldstein, 2005). 
2. Financial and investment cycles 
Almost all financial bubbles give rise to excessive investment in certain sectors which loses 
its viability with the return of  normal conditions, leading to prolonged underutilization 
and even destruction of  production capacity. Such investment is concentrated not only in 
areas susceptible to speculative influences such as housing and commercial construction, 
but can also be in machinery and equipment. This is true both for industrial and 
developing countries. However, in the latter countries the abrupt change of  economic 
regime, particularly in the sphere of  money and finance, has made it difficult for investors 
to identify underlying trends and separate them from cyclical developments. Long-term 
decisions affecting the balance sheets of  corporations through acquisition of  assets and 
assumption of  liabilities on the basis of  favorable cyclical conditions have thus resulted in 
increased financial fragility and waste of  resources. 
A notable example from recent history is the Japanese experience since the early 
1990s.40 After the Louvre Agreement in 1987, Japan relaxed monetary policy in order 
to help reduce trade imbalances with the United States and to facilitate the adjustment 
of  the industry to yen appreciation. The result was a rapid expansion of  liquidity and 
a decline in the cost of  capital almost to zero through a sharp escalation of  prices in 
the stock market. The share of  capital spending rose from 27 percent of  GDP in 1987 
to 32 percent in 1990. However, when increased concern with asset price inflation 
led to monetary tightening, the bubble burst, resulting in sharp declines in stock and 
property prices, which, in turn, threatened the solvency of  banks and highly leveraged 
corporations. This set off  a debt deflation-cum-recession process which crippled the 
economy for a decade, necessitating disinvestment and debt restructuring and raising 
unemployment to exceptionally high levels by Japanese standards. 
Expansionary phases of  business cycles in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s 
were also associated with financial excesses and investment bubbles that subsequently 
hampered the ability of  the economy to maintain steady and robust growth. The rapid 
increase in lending against real estate in the second half  of  the 1980s led to massive 
overbuilding, and when the bubble burst in the early 1990s, the outcome was a sharp 
decline in occupancy rates, increased defaults and delinquency, and drying up of  bank 
lending. The economy went into a double-dip recession as private investment dropped 
from some 17 percent of  GDP to less than 13 percent. Even more remarkable was the 
expansion in the 1990s sustained by a boom in business investment which lasted much 
longer than in other major industrial countries and in previous investment cycles in the 
United States itself. This was driven primarily by investment designed to exploit new 
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advances in information technology, and greatly facilitated by easy financial conditions, 
notably the boom in venture capital funding and the stock market bubble. These allowed 
the emergence of  many companies that would not have been created under normal 
financial conditions. Thus, a sudden reversal of  expectations about the future earning 
capacity of  these companies led to a collapse in their share prices, producing a sharp 
drop in investment spending at the turn of  the millennium. 
In developing countries boom–bust financial cycles driven by capital flows have 
almost invariably been mirrored by sharp movements in capital accumulation.41 Even 
in Latin America where surges in capital inflows were invariably associated with booms 
in consumption, investment tended to follow the boom–bust cycles in capital flows. This 
was much more evident in East Asia where surges in capital flows were more closely 
tied to private investment booms. In response to rapidly falling prices of  many of  the 
manufactures exported from East Asia, notably semiconductors, which accounted for 
more than 40 percent of  exports of  some countries in the region, in the mid-1990s many 
firms augmented investment in the hope of  increasing productivity and market shares, 
and expanded into new areas of  production, very much in the same way as the response 
of  Japanese firms to loss of  competitiveness in the late 1980s. This process was facilitated 
by easy access to cheap foreign credits. There was also a speculative surge in the property 
market supported by borrowing abroad, notably in Thailand. Some firms also invested 
heavily in other nontraded activities including infrastructure with the funds borrowed 
abroad. Excessive investment was thus a key factor in the subsequent financial difficulties 
and the sharp drop in accumulation and growth when cheap foreign capital was no 
longer available. While in the boom the investment ratio rose by 3–14 percentage points 
in the four countries most affected by the crisis; the decline was sharper during the bust, 
ranging between 15 and 18 percentage points of  GDP (UNCTAD TDR 2000, chap. 4). 
The recent investment boom in China too has certainly been supported by the surge 
in private inflows, including FDI. In 2004 fixed capital investment grew by almost 28 
percent over the previous year, reaching 44 percent of  GDP while net private capital 
inflows set a record at $101 billion.42 As noted, there is evidence of  excessive and wasteful 
investment in some sectors. It has indeed been argued that the current investment boom 
is unsustainable and will probably take several years to undo (Goldstein and Lardy 2004). 
However, while an unwinding of  the boom may generate financial difficulties in certain 
sectors, it is unlikely to be coupled with the kind of  currency and debt crises experienced 
in several other emerging markets in recent years, given China’s solid payments and 
reserve positions. 
Investment is generally the most unstable component of  aggregate demand and 
especially vulnerable to external shocks in developing countries. Evidence shows not only 
that it has been more volatile than GDP almost everywhere, but volatility has increased in 
the 1990s compared to the turbulent years of  the 1980s in both developed and developing 
countries (World Bank, 2003, 23–26). This is clearly associated with financial rather 
than trade shocks, and particularly boom–bust cycles in capital flows. Furthermore, 
both the level of  and the increase in volatility is high in low income countries where 
macroeconomic and financial conditions can be easily altered by movements of  small 
sums of  money. 
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Increased volatility of  investment resulting from financial cycles has two adverse 
consequences for capital accumulation and job creation. First, investment tends to fall 
a lot faster under financial busts than it rises during financial booms; that is, the average 
investment rate over the cycle tends to be lower. Secondly, financial booms distort the 
composition of  investment, increase its speculative components and lead to excessive 
expansion of  productive capacity in certain sectors. Clearly, these two phenomena are 
related: financial busts result not only in sharp declines in investment but also in the waste 
of  existing productive capacity which becomes unviable with changed conditions. 
3. Bubbles, crises and jobless recoveries 
Any adverse effect of  financial instability on capital accumulation and economic growth 
would no doubt be transmitted to the labor market. But boom–bust cycles also generate 
dislocations and instability in employment and wages independent of  their impact on 
capital accumulation. Booms can temporarily lift employment and wages above their 
long-term levels, while crises depress them significantly on a more durable basis. In 
particular, in recoveries from deflation-cum-recessions, both employment and wages 
tend to lag considerably behind income growth. While this is also true for industrial 
countries, the boom–bust cycles driven by capital flows in developing countries are 
particularly harmful for labor, causing large adverse shifts in unemployment, wages, 
income distribution and poverty. 
The experience of  the United States in this respect is quite revealing. As noted above, 
the periods of  expansion in the 1980s and 1990s were both characterized by excessive 
investments in certain sectors, asset price inflation and increased private indebtedness 
while the recessions that followed involved widespread financial difficulties and debt-
deflation. In both episodes recoveries from recessions were commonly described as jobless. 
In the former cycle the recovery that started in the course of  1991 was not felt in the 
labor market until well after several years of  growth. Although investment soon picked 
up, it was designed for industrial restructuring rather than capacity expansion, focusing 
on IT sectors. Income was soon restored to its prerecession peak, but employment started 
increasing only in 1993, and the unemployment rate did not return to its pre-recession 
low of  5.3 percent before 1996, after reaching 7.5 percent in 1992. Similarly wages did 
not share in the recovery of  productivity until the second half  of  the 1990s (UNCTAD 
TDR 1994, 78–84; and 1995, 62–65). 
In the second cycle the economy went through a short recession in spring 2001. The 
recovery that followed was the worst in recent United States history for employment 
creation. In terms of  investment it was also the weakest since 1949. From the end of  
the recession in the third quarter of  2001 until the end of  2003, job losses outside the 
farm sector amounted to over two million, with employment falling particularly steeply 
in overexpanded IT sectors, but GDP rising by 2–3 percent per annum. As of  the end 
of  2005, real weekly and hourly wages were still below what they were at the start of  the 
recovery in November 2001, and jobs in the private sector were up only by 0.8 percent, 
compared to an average 8.8 percent increase at the same stages of  previous business 
cycles. The combination of  falling wages and employment with surging profits not only 
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worsened income distribution but also increased poverty (Freeman and Rodgers 2005; 
UNCTAD TDR 2003, 7; Mishel and Eisenbrey 2005). 
Financial excesses at times of  expansion were an important reason for jobless 
recoveries in both cycles, but above all after the more recent downturn following one 
of  the strongest postwar expansions in the United States driven by the dot-com bubble. 
In both cases deflation-cum-recessions exposed financial fragility and overindebtedness, 
and the efforts of  corporations during recoveries focused on restoring the health of  
their balance sheets. Increased profits were used either for industrial restructuring or for 
reducing debt rather than the expansion of  production capacity and employment, and 
downsizing and labor shedding resulted in a combination of  falling employment with 
rising labor productivity and profits (UNCTAD TDR 1994, 80–84; 2003, 6–9).43 
Jobless recoveries from recessions triggered by crises are even more marked in 
emerging market economies. The impact of  financial crises on the labor market and 
social conditions lasts much longer in these economies because of  financial difficulties 
created by liability dollarization and the external constraint. Even after income recovers 
to levels prevailing before the crisis, both employment and wages tend to lag, remaining 
well below not only their precrisis (boom) levels, but also their preboom levels. 
At times of  surges in capital flows, real wages generally rise alongside the appreciation 
of  the currency, but what happens to employment depends on a host of  factors. If  the 
boom is driven by consumption and productivity, growth is sluggish, employment tends 
to fall in traded goods sectors due to loss of  competitiveness while rising in services. High 
wages and cheap imports of  capital goods, together with easy access to credit, can also 
lead to higher investment and capital deepening in an effort to restructure industry and 
raise productivity to meet foreign competition. When investment is strong and currency 
appreciation is limited, industrial employment can remain relatively stable or even rise 
despite loss of  competitiveness. Under such circumstances financial booms would be 
associated with falling unemployment rates. 
Available evidence suggests that in almost all emerging market economies which 
went through boom–bust cycles in the 1990s, real wages rose rapidly at times of  surges 
in capital inflows and financial booms, but employment changed in different ways in 
different episodes.44 In Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand where the boom was 
driven by investment, productivity growth kept up with wages. In all these countries 
except Indonesia, the unemployment rate fell during the boom and full employment 
was secured. By contrast, in Latin America productivity growth lagged behind real 
wages and the rate of  unemployment was either stable or higher at times of  the boom. 
Unemployment hit manufacturing industries particularly hard because of  loss of  
competitiveness brought about by currency appreciations. 
At times of  crisis wages fell almost everywhere. The decline was particularly sharp 
in Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey, between 11 and 25 percent per annum. In East Asia 
unemployment went up rapidly, exceeding the levels prevailing not only during the 
boom but also the preboom period. The impact in Korea and Indonesia was particularly 
strong, raising the unemployment rate to 6.5 percent. The only exception was Malaysia 
where rising unemployment mostly affected migrant workers and was reflected in the 
statistics of  their countries of  origin including Indonesia and the Philippines. In Latin 
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America, where unemployment was already on the rise, the crisis took it to exceptionally 
high levels. The Mexican crisis in 1995 led to a doubling of  open unemployment within 
a year, pushing several workers to the informal labor market. In Argentina, where the 
currency board and the fixed exchange rate were maintained despite worsening external 
conditions, unemployment shot up in the wake of  the Mexican crisis, reaching almost 
20 percent in 1995. In Brazil open unemployment rose to almost 10 percent in 1999, up 
from 6 percent in the mid-1990s. A similar increase was registered in Turkey during the 
2001 crisis. 
The pace of  recovery again differed among countries, being more robust in East 
Asia, except Indonesia, than in Latin America. At the time when GDP was restored 
to its precrisis level, real wages regained their precrisis levels only in Korea while they 
remained depressed elsewhere in the region. In Latin America, during recovery phases 
real wages were lower than the peaks reached during the booms. In all countries in both 
Latin America and East Asia, employment lagged considerably behind output growth. 
Postcrisis open unemployment rates were higher than precrisis rates by 1 percentage 
point in Brazil and Mexico, 5.5 points in Argentina and 4 percentage points in Korea and 
Indonesia. In Turkey the 2001 crisis was followed by a strong recovery driven again by a 
surge in capital inflows, leading to a rapid appreciation of  the currency and a worsening 
of  the current account. But growth averaging over 7 percent during 2002–2005 did not 
make any dent in unemployment while real wages barely recovered after a sharp decline 
during the 2001 crisis.45 The deterioration in the conditions of  labor, particularly among 
the unskilled, is a major reason why poverty levels have stayed high despite economic 
recovery not only in Turkey and Latin America, but also in East Asia. 
Thus, in emerging market economies, as in industrial countries, during recovery, 
productivity and profits tend to rise while wages and employment remain depressed compared 
to their long-term sustainable levels. Dislocations created by crises in the balance sheets 
of  banks and nonbank corporations in developing countries are much greater than those 
generated by asset price deflations in industrial countries because of  the impact of  currency 
collapses and procyclical monetary and fiscal policies. This is a major reason why recessions 
are deeper, and recoveries are slower in generating jobs. An additional factor accounting 
for the failure of  employment to follow recovery in GDP is changes in the composition of  
output. The collapse of  the currency eventually leads to a recovery in exports, particularly 
in countries with a robust industrial base. The shift in economic activity from nontradable 
services toward tradable industries lowers the employment content of  aggregate GDP since 
average productivity in industry is typically higher than that in services. 
F. Policy Priorities 
A number of  conclusions can be drawn from the recent experience of  developed 
and developing countries with respect to economic stability and growth. First, while 
macroeconomic stability may be necessary to sustain rapid accumulation and growth, it 
is certainly not sufficient. Secondly, price stability on its own cannot secure stability in key 
macroeconomic aggregates and relative prices, since it is not sufficient to secure financial 
stability. Accordingly, the source of  macroeconomic instability now is not instability 
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in product markets but asset markets, and the main challenge for policymakers is not 
inflation but unemployment and financial instability. 
At the national level a reorientation of  policy would need to focus on three 
areas in developing countries. First, fiscal policy would need to be employed in a 
countercyclical way, with a view to combining stability with a high level of  economic 
activity. Second, a whole array of  policy instruments would need to be redeployed 
in order to reduce financial instability and prevent boom–bust cycles in capital 
flows. Third, in most countries at intermediate stages of  industrialization, action 
needs to be taken at the sectoral level in order to directly influence the volume and 
composition of  investment. 
Bringing back fiscal policy as an instrument for macroeconomic management calls 
for restoring fiscal autonomy which, in turn, requires elimination of  chronic, structural 
deficits. In many cases this should be possible through a reform of  taxation and primary 
spending. However, in some countries it would be necessary to act directly on the stock 
of  public debt, notably the domestic debt, as the single most important determinant of  
fiscal sustainability. As pointed out by Keynes long ago in his analysis of  what he called 
“progressive and catastrophic inflations” in Central and Eastern Europe during the early 
1920s, there are three ways of  dealing with a debt overhang: repudiation, inflation and 
capital levy. He argued that of  these, “the capital levy […] is the rational, the deliberate 
method. But it is difficult to explain, and it provokes violent prejudice by coming into 
conflict with the deep instincts by which the love of  money protects itself. […] But if  
it has become clear that the claims of  the bond-holder are more than the taxpayer can 
support, and if  there is still time to choose between the policies of  a levy and of  further 
depreciation [inflation], the levy must surely be preferred on grounds both of  expediency 
and of  justice” (Keynes 1971, 53–55). Clearly, inflation is an even less viable option today 
given the short maturities of  debt in many countries and open capital accounts. A once-
and-for-all capital levy on the holders of  government debt (or other equivalent measures 
such as swapping old debt with new debt at a discount) may indeed be the only option to 
eliminate the debt overhang in countries facing unsustainable debt stocks. 
Using fiscal policy in the Keynesian tradition for macroeconomic management 
implies that governments should run deficits at times of  contraction but generate 
surpluses during upturns so that over the full cycle the budget should be balanced or in 
a small surplus. If  the revenue and expenditure structures are appropriately designed, 
much of  the task would be done by automatic stabilizers. But there would often be a need 
for discretionary fiscal action according to the strength of  underlying contractionary and 
expansionary impulses. It is particularly important to pursue countercyclical fiscal policy 
in the boom in order to have adequate fiscal space during contractions. This should 
be undertaken mainly by adjustments in spending on public works which is, inter alia, 
politically easier to control than current spending. There may also be adjustments on 
the revenues side including value added taxes or financial transaction taxes, which can 
also be particularly effective in checking consumption and credit booms while providing 
additional revenues.46 
In what way the budget should be balanced is a contentious matter. According to 
one view, over the cycle total expenditures including both current and capital spending 
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should be balanced by revenues from taxes and charges for public services. This implies 
that any debt incurred during recessions should be repaid by surpluses generated during 
expansions. However, there may be a sound rationale for the public sector to incur debt 
across the cycle provided that it is used to finance productive investment. An alternative 
way of  conducting fiscal policy is thus by making a distinction between current and 
capital spending and using the Golden Rule of  public finance; that is, governments 
should be able to borrow to invest, but not to finance current spending – an old idea 
which has recently been revived in the debate over fiscal constraints imposed by IMF 
conditionalities and the European Stability and Growth Pact. Such an approach would 
have the advantage of  preventing the burden of  adjustment falling disproportionately 
on public investment. It would also imply that analysis of  fiscal sustainability should not 
focus on gross public debt alone but also consider assets built up on the other side of  the 
balance sheet of  the public sector.
 In some industrial countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan fiscal policy 
is conducted on the basis of  the Golden Rule.47 A number of  reasons have been given 
against using such an approach in developing countries, including financing constraint, 
lack of  fiscal discipline and debt overhang.48 These may be valid for many countries, 
particularly in Latin America, but without resolving these problems in the first place, it 
would not be possible to use fiscal policy as an effective countercyclical device, whether 
one targets the overall fiscal balance or current balance alone. 
Just as countercyclical fiscal policy should start in the boom, prevention of  unsustainable 
booms in capital inflows and currency appreciations holds the key to greater financial 
stability in developing countries. In this respect monetary policy on its own is quite 
ineffective. Avoiding currency appreciations and overheating would require sterilization, 
but this would lead to higher interest rates and increase the international arbitrage 
opportunities. It would also entail large carry costs since interest on government paper used 
for sterilization typically exceeds the rate that could be earned on reserves. Higher reserve 
requirements for banks may be used for this purpose, but these would raise intermediation 
costs and could push the borrowers toward foreign creditors, and/or encourage foreign 
banks to seek regulatory arbitrage by lending through their affiliates abroad. 
To a certain extent traditional prudential regulations can help prevent excessive risk 
taking, credit creation and borrowing at times of  economic expansion. Rules governing 
provisions, capital requirements, collateral valuation and other measures affecting 
conditions in credit and asset markets, such as margin requirements, could be employed in 
a countercyclical manner, tightened at times of  boom and loosened during contractions.49 
However, there are limits to what such measures can do in checking excessive risk taking and 
the build-up of  fragility in developing countries particularly when arbitrage opportunities 
are large and market perceptions are highly favorable. They thus need to be supplemented 
by direct and indirect controls over capital inflows of  the kind extensively used in industrial 
countries in the postwar era until as recently as the 1980s. Taxes on capital inflows would 
be effective not only because they would reduce or eliminate arbitrage margins but also 
because they would facilitate countercyclical fiscal policy. 
None of  these may guarantee prevention of  financial crises even in economies with 
good track records in macroeconomics and development. The policy response by most 
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emerging market economies facing such situations has generally involved procyclical fiscal 
and monetary tightening designed to restore market confidence, combined with IMF 
interventions to bail out international creditors and investors. However, this often failed 
to prevent financial meltdown, and in fact deepened crises. A more viable and equitable 
alternative, which would also facilitate countercyclical macroeconomic policies, would be 
to impose temporary debt standstills and suspension of  capital account convertibility, as 
implemented successfully by Malaysia during the 1997–98 crisis.50
A third key area of  policy intervention concerns measures affecting the volume and 
composition of  investment since macroeconomic stability as such would not be enough 
to secure a rapid pace of  accumulation of  productive capital. The kind of  policies used 
for this purpose in more successful examples of  industrial development has already 
been discussed. The space to use some of  these policy measures has no doubt been 
narrowed down by global economic integration and multilateral rules and practices in 
trade and finance. Nevertheless, there is considerable space to influence the pace and 
pattern of  capital accumulation. In particular, taxes and certain financial instruments 
could still be effectively used to ensure that allocation of  profits and credits favor 
productive investment rather than luxury consumption or unproductive forms of  wealth 
accumulation. Furthermore, policies at sectoral levels may need to be so designed as to 
lessen the uncertainties associated with investment decisions. 
There can be little doubt that such policies at the national level would need to be 
supported by international policies. In this respect the task falls on multilateral financial 
arrangements and institutions, notably the IMF. So far the intensive policy surveillance 
by the Fund has not succeeded in preventing boom–bust cycles in capital flows in 
developing countries. The standard policy measures recommended by the IMF to 
prevent unsustainable surges in capital inflows and exchange rate appreciations are not 
only ineffective but they also entail large costs.51 Since there is now increased consensus 
that crisis prevention calls for the prevention of  unsustainable booms and that full capital 
account convertibility is not an appropriate objective for most developing countries, a 
major task for the Fund is to help these countries to manage capital inflows. For this 
purpose it is necessary to specify circumstances in which the IMF should actually 
recommend the imposition or strengthening of  capital controls over inflows. The IMF 
should also develop techniques and mechanisms designed to separate, to the greatest 
extent possible, capital account from current account transactions, to distinguish among 
different types of  capital flows from the point of  view of  their sustainability and economic 
impact, and to provide policy advice and technical assistance to countries at times when 
such measures are needed. 
In the same vein the IMF should stop promoting procyclical policies in countries 
facing payments difficulties as a result of  trade and financial shocks. For poorer 
developing countries facing export shortfalls, this would mean providing more current 
account financing and demanding less adjustment. Many of  these countries would also 
need considerably increased amounts of  development finance, but this task should be 
undertaken by multilateral development banks rather than the IMF. For emerging market 
economies facing rapid exit of  capital, the policy of  combining procyclical macroeconomic 
tightening with bailouts is counterproductive, not only because it deepens crises but also 
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it creates a moral hazard and leads to an inequitable distribution of  costs of  crises 
between debtors and creditors. Instead, the IMF should develop orderly debt workout 
mechanisms for crisis management and resolution, including temporary standstills and 
capital account restrictions, and provide international liquidity not to bailout creditors 
but to support imports and economic activity in the countries concerned. 
While global economic and financial conditions affecting developing countries are 
shaped primarily by policies in the major industrial countries, the IMF surveillance 
over these countries has lost its meaning with their graduation from the Fund and the 
breakdown of  the Bretton Woods arrangements for exchange rates. Initiatives taken at 
various occasions to achieve greater coordination and coherence of  macroeconomic 
policies among the United States, the European Union and Japan have not been 
successful in removing trade imbalances and bringing about a more stable system of  
payments and exchange rates. There are serious political difficulties in strengthening the 
IMF surveillance over the policies of  these countries and making the Fund a symmetrical 
organization between its creditors and debtors, because of  political leverage exercised 
by its major shareholders. Therefore, any reform seeking to secure greater international 
economic and financial stability would need to address not only the policies and 
operational modalities of  the Fund, but also the shortcomings in its governance structure. 
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46 For a discussion of  these issues see Ocampo (2002, 29–31).
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central deficits is considered as deficit financing (UNCTAD TDR 1993, 78). 
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49 For a discussion of  these measures see BIS (2001, chap. 7), Ocampo (2003), and Akyüz (2004). 
50 There is a large literature on crisis management and resolution. For an overview of  the issues 
see Akyüz (2005b). 
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Chapter IV
EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT, 
GROWTH AND STABILITY: NATIONAL  
AND REGIONAL POLICY  
OPTIONS IN ASIA1
A. Introduction
The exchange rate has become a growing focus of  attention in the recent policy debate 
in developing countries. This is due mainly to two reasons. First, with increased emphasis 
placed on export-led growth and the dismantling of  tariff  and nontariff  barriers, the role 
of  the exchange rate in growth and development has gained added importance. Drawing 
on the experience of  late industrializers in East Asia, competitive and stable exchange 
rates have come to be seen as a key ingredient of  successful industrialization. 
Second, with rapid liberalization of  the capital account in developing countries and 
the growing size and speed of  international capital flows, the impact of  exchange rate 
swings on economic activity has undergone a fundamental transformation. Currency 
movements no longer affect economic activity simply by leading to expenditure switching 
between domestic and foreign goods, as assumed in the traditional analysis. Their impact 
on the economy operates mainly through private balance sheets because of  growing 
dollarization of  assets and liabilities.2 Since dollarization is almost always associated with 
widespread currency and maturity mismatches, exchange rate swings tend to generate 
windfall losses or gains, thereby exerting significant influence on spending decisions and 
the viability of  firms and financial institutions. For this reason, swings in exchange rates 
now tend to generate much greater variations in economic activity than in the past, when 
the dollarization of  private balance sheets was limited. 
While these developments have made the management of  the exchange rate all the 
more important, they have also made its control more difficult. This is because exchange 
rates are no longer determined as a by-product of  the international flow of  goods and 
services, or trade balances, but in asset markets where expectations of  future changes and 
risk assessments play a central role. For this reason, it has now become increasingly evident 
that the management of  exchange rates would call for action to influence the demand for 
and supply of  foreign exchange as an asset, including currency market interventions as well 
as market-based and direct (administrative) regulations and control over capital flows and 
the extent of  dollarization. These measures are needed not only to stabilize the exchange 
rate but also to reduce the vulnerability of  domestic asset markets to external financial 
shocks, such as those transmitted from the current global financial turmoil, triggered by 
widespread speculative lending and investment in major international financial centers.
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These are the issues to be taken up in this chapter. The following section examines 
the link between the exchange rate and economic growth in developing countries. Since 
this operates mainly through trade, the analysis will start with a discussion of  the effects 
of  exports on capital accumulation and technical progress, followed by an analysis of  
the short- and long-term impact of  the real exchange rate on economic activity, jobs 
and capital accumulation. Limits to what the exchange rate can achieve on its own 
are discussed, and it is argued that, important as it may be, exchange rate policy is no 
substitute for trade and industrial policy. Past historical experience and more recent 
cross-country evidence on the link between the exchange rate and economic growth are 
reviewed. The main conclusion of  this section is that stable and competitively valued 
real exchange rates may be necessary, but not sufficient, for directing resources to traded 
goods sectors and reaping the dynamic benefits associated with manufacturing exports. 
However, a weak currency is not always preferable to a strong currency because of  a 
weaker currency’s ramifications for intracountry and intercountry distribution of  income. 
These imply that, in practice, considerable judgment and discretion are required for a 
judicious management of  the exchange rate. 
Section C examines the links among international capital flows, exchange rates, 
and the real economy. It is argued that the boom–bust cycles in capital flows due to 
global factors have come to dominate exchange rate movements of  most developing 
countries, capable of  generating gyrations independent of  their underlying 
fundamentals and macroeconomic conditions. Sharp devaluations caused by sudden 
stops and reversals of  capital flows are severely contractionary—not because of  supply 
rigidities emphasized by the structuralists in the 1970s and 1980s, but because of  their 
impact on credit conditions and balance sheets. More importantly, these cycles tend 
to produce durable adverse effects on jobs and investment. Not only can losses of  jobs 
and wages during crises exceed the gains that may have been reaped during boom 
periods, but recoveries from finance-driven recessions are often jobless and without 
strong increases in investment.
This is followed in Section D by an analysis of  national policy options in managing 
exchange rates. It is argued that free floating is not a viable choice for developing 
countries. But under an open capital account regime, currency stability cannot be 
guaranteed even if  monetary policy is fully assigned to this task. Monetary policy is 
often powerless in checking massive outflows triggered by sudden and widespread loss 
of  confidence. At times of  strong inflows currency market interventions and reserve 
accumulation could be reasonably effective in preventing unsustainable appreciations 
and current account positions, but they can also lead to credit, asset and investment 
bubbles. Nor can they prevent currency and maturity mismatches in private balance 
sheets. Reserves accumulated from capital flows − borrowed reserves − are highly costly 
because they are invested in low yielding foreign assets. For these reasons regulation and 
control over capital inflows need to be an integral part of  exchange rate management.
 Section E examines the post-1997 crisis experience of  Asian countries in the light 
of  the above considerations. It is shown that the region’s response to the surge in capital 
inflows after the early years of  the current decade has been to relax restrictions over 
resident outflows and to absorb excess supply of  foreign exchange by intervention and 
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reserve accumulation. While this approach has enabled countries in the region to avoid 
unsustainable currency appreciations and payments positions, it has not prevented rapid 
credit expansion or asset and investment bubbles which now render these countries 
vulnerable to shocks and contagion from the current global financial turmoil. 
Section F turns to regional cooperation for greater monetary and financial stability 
in East Asia, including exchange rate arrangements and supporting such regional 
institutions and mechanisms as a common regional capital account regime, regional 
funds, and rules and guidelines for policy coordination and adjustment. It is argued that, 
given increased regional integration and the absence of  multilateral arrangements for 
exchange rate cooperation, there is a strong economic rationale for regional monetary 
integration in Asia. Various options are discussed, drawing on the lessons from the 
European experience. The concluding section gives a summary of  the main propositions, 
including national and regional policy recommendations for managing exchange rates 
and international capital flows.
B. Exchange rate, trade and Growth
1. The export–investment nexus
The role of  the exchange rate in the process of  economic growth derives mainly from 
its impact on trade, aggregate demand, capital accumulation and productivity growth. 
However, this issue is barely addressed in the mainstream trade theory based on Ricardian 
comparative advantages, whereby cost differences that govern trade, specialization, and 
resource allocation are determined solely by differences in resource endowments or 
technology, and the impact of  the exchange rate on trade and production is ignored.3 
On the other hand, the theory of  comparative advantages focuses on the allocation of  
existing resources and the resulting one-off  static gains, leaving aside dynamic interactions 
among trade, accumulation, and productivity growth that determine the evolution of  
comparative advantages over time.4 
Nor is trade properly integrated into mainstream growth theories. Both neoclassical 
and Keynesian growth theories are designed primarily for closed economies, without 
paying attention to possible impact of  trade on key parameters determining the long-
term growth path − that is, savings, investment and technological progress. Although 
there is a host of  ad hoc models designed to show the benefits of  trade for growth, there 
is no accepted theory where growth is rigorously linked to international trade.5 
There are supply-side and demand-side linkages between trade and growth. 
Neoclassical thinking emphasizes the former. According to this view, free trade improves 
efficiency not only because of  better allocation of  resources based on comparative 
advantages (allocative efficiency) but also better use of  resources (cost or X-efficiency) 
resulting from increased competitive pressures (Bhagwati 1994). However, for such one-
off  increases in efficiency and income to lift the growth path, they would need to translate 
into a permanently higher rate of  investment. 
A more dynamic supply-side impact of  trade emphasizes technical progress and 
productivity growth. This depends not so much on import liberalization as expansion 
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in foreign markets. Since Adam Smith’s dictum that the division of  labor is limited 
by the extent of  the market, it has been recognized that exports can provide dynamic 
productivity gains by reducing the dependence of  production on a domestic market 
and helping achieve economies of  scale.6 These gains assume particular importance 
for industrialization and growth not only in small economies where the population 
size cannot accommodate optimum scale in most lines of  industry, but also for larger 
developing countries where income levels are not high enough for certain industries to 
become viable without exports. 
In its most rudimentary form, exports provide a vent for surplus for countries with 
large amounts of  underutilized land and labor, allowing them to increase production 
of  primary products for foreign markets. Further progress depends crucially on 
industrialization, except for very small economies that could attain a relatively high 
level of  income by specializing in offshore financial services and tourism or by providing 
trade-related services to a vast industrial hinterland, such as Hong Kong.7 This is true 
also for most resource-rich economies.8 There is ample evidence that rapid expansion 
of  manufacturing production and exports is a common feature of  rapidly growing 
developing countries (UNCTAD TDR 2003, chap. 5). 
With progress in industrialization, expansion in markets abroad helps firms to 
overcome high entry costs and to benefit from specialization and exploitation of  scale 
economies, which can, in turn, accelerate learning by doing and productivity growth. 
These can also generate a range of  externalities at the industry level and positive 
productivity-enhancing spillovers for the economy as a whole, including nonexport 
sectors. However, the productivity-enhancing effects of  exports are not automatic and 
depend on a number of  complementary factors, including public support (Keesing 
and Lall 1992; Lall 2004). This is the main reason why empirical evidence on the link 
between exports and productivity growth and positive spillovers from exporting is not 
conclusive.9
While recognizing that expansion to markets abroad could provide dynamic 
gains, the Keynesian and Structuralist schools emphasize the demand-side linkages 
between exports and growth, and focus on the balance of  payments constraint − issues 
that have been underplayed in the orthodox theory by virtue of  its assumptions of  
balanced trade and sustained full employment.10 Not only are exports a component 
of  aggregate demand but sustained export growth is essential for growth of  components 
of  domestic demand, since most developing countries are heavily dependent on imported 
intermediate inputs, capital goods, energy, and food for investment, production, and 
consumption. In particular, the imports of  capital goods and technology needed to 
overcome the constraint that domestic production capabilities places on accumulation, 
growth, and industrialization requires generation of  adequate foreign exchange through 
exports. 
The dependence on imported capital goods and technologies embodied therein is 
generally greater during the initial stages of  development, when such industries are 
lacking. Indeed, in the absence of  foreign borrowing, an economy without a significant 
capital goods industry cannot really save and invest without exporting. It would need to 
put aside (save) part of  its current production of  consumables for exports in order to be 
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able to expand its existing production capacity or invest in new lines of  production by 
importing the capital equipment needed.11 
Despite the hype about the benefits of  removing barriers to imports in the mainstream 
literature, the trade–growth linkages are often discussed around the so-called export-
led growth − a concept that is not always rigorously defined. Since sustained growth − 
as opposed to one-off  increases in the degree of  utilization of  existing capacity − 
depends on capital accumulation and productivity growth, the concept of  export-led 
growth should imply that growth of  exports, rather than domestic demand, is the 
principal driving force behind investment and technological progress. However, the 
empirical literature on the link between growth and exports often relies on demand-
side-growth-accounting based on ex post national income identities.12 This not only 
ignores the supply-side effects, but also the linkages between external and domestic 
components of  demand, notably manufactured exports and investment. This linkage 
can be particularly strong in economies where an important part of  manufactured 
value added finds outlet in foreign markets, as in most East Asian countries. It also 
implies that an adverse export shock could impinge on income not only by reducing the 
foreign component of  aggregate demand but through its direct impact on investment 
in traded goods sectors.13 
A virtuous interaction and cumulative causation between manufactured exports and 
investment in the growth and industrialization process involves, in effect, both supply-
side and demand-side linkages.14 Exports broaden the size of  the market and thus allow 
scale economies to be exploited. They encourage investment over and above what can 
be done on the basis of  domestic demand, and provide the foreign exchange needed for 
capital goods imports and investment. Investment, in turn, improves export potential by 
adding to productive capacity and raising industrial competitiveness through productivity 
growth. 
As demonstrated by successful late industrialization in East Asia, such a process of  
growth and industrialization is typically characterized by rising investment, exports, 
and manufacturing value added, both absolutely and as a proportion of  GDP. In the 
early stages of  East Asian industrialization, imports generally exceeded exports, and 
domestic savings fell short of  investment, necessitating external financing. But over 
time both foreign exchange and savings gaps were closed as exports and domestic 
savings began to grow faster than investment. Growing profits supported by exports 
and investment have been the main factor behind rapid growth of  savings. Thus, 
the export–investment nexus is complemented by an investment–profit nexus − a process of  
dynamic interaction between profits and investment wherein profits are simultaneously 
an incentive for investment, a source of  investment, and an outcome of  investment 
(Akyüz and Gore 1996). By contrast, most other developing countries in Latin 
America and Africa have been unable to sustain a virtuous interaction among exports, 
investment and savings. Although they experienced occasional investment booms 
supported by strong commodity export earnings and/or capital inflows, these could 
not be translated into a solid manufacturing export base and rising savings rates, with 
the result that these investment booms often came to an end when global trading and 
financial conditions deteriorated.15 
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2. Exchange rate, employment and investment
What is the role of  the exchange rate in animating and sustaining a virtuous investment–
export nexus and stimulating growth? Since the real exchange rate is the relative price 
between nontradeable and tradeable goods, changes in the real exchange rate exert a 
strong influence on the distribution of  resources between these two sectors.16 However, 
from the point of  view of  dynamic linkages between exports and economic growth, what 
matters is not the effect of  the real exchange rate on the use and allocation of  existing 
resources, but on investment decisions, accumulation, and structural change. The role 
of  the real exchange rate in the growth process runs through its effects on the relative 
profitability of  investment in sectors with significant potential for increasing returns and 
productivity growth. 
In many developing countries there are often limits to what currency changes 
can achieve in the short term in reallocating resources from nontraded goods toward 
traded goods sectors, including both exports and domestic substitutes for imports. In 
the conventional analysis these limits are formulated in terms of  demand for traded 
goods or, more specifically, the impact of  exchange rate changes on the distribution of  
aggregate spending between domestic and foreign goods − that is, expenditure switching. 
According to this analysis, a devaluation of  the exchange rate reduces the prices of  exports 
for foreign buyers and increases the prices of  imports in domestic markets, and these 
changes raise the volume of  exports and lower the volume of  imports, respectively. The 
overall effect depends on price elasticities of  demand. According to the Marshall–Lerner 
condition, if  the sum of  the elasticities of  demand for exports and imports is greater 
than unity, the trade balance will improve. It is, however, recognized that there can be a 
J-curve effect; that is, the immediate impact of  a devaluation on the trade balance can 
be adverse, because it takes time for expenditure patterns to adjust to changed relative 
prices. Thus, initially, quantity response tends to be sluggish. Over time, however, as 
export volumes increase and import volumes decline, the trade balance will improve and 
economic activity and employment will expand. 
This analysis makes no reference to supply conditions, either for exportables or for 
domestic substitutes for imports. It assumes, in effect, that supply is fully flexible. However, 
supply rigidities are an inherent feature of  many developing countries, as constantly 
pointed out by the structuralists during the 1970s and 1980s in the debate over the impact 
of  devaluations on income and employment. The structuralist theory of  contractionary 
devaluations was founded on the inelasticity of  supply in economies where exports and 
the consumption basket of  wage earners were supplied by the primary sector.17 On this 
analysis, the reduction in real wages brought about by a devaluation would reduce the 
demand for domestic manufactures, but increased domestic prices of  exportables would 
fail to raise output and employment in the primary sector because of  supply rigidities. 
The increase in exports would also be limited because of  low price elasticity of  domestic 
demand for food while imports would fall alongside declining employment in industry.18 
On the other hand, higher prices of  imports would not stimulate production of  domestic 
substitutes because of  complementarity of  imports with domestic manufactures − an 
outcome often attributed by the mainstream to import substitution industrialization. 
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In other words, devaluation would fail to switch resources from nontradeables to 
tradeables and raise production for exports and import substitution. It would reduce the 
trade gap primarily through a contraction in economic activity. 
There can be little doubt that supply rigidities can arise even in more diversified 
exporters of  manufactures. Where exports are specific to foreign markets and consumed 
little at home (such as Barbie dolls or golf  clubs), there would be a limited scope for 
switching goods from domestic absorption to exports. This is the case for many developing 
country exporters of  manufactured consumer goods closely linked to international 
production networks. There are also limits to reallocation of  resources so as to increase 
the supply of  exportables. Unlike in the neoclassical theory of  production where “factors 
of  production” can be shifted freely among different lines of  production, in reality skills, 
capital equipment, and organizational structures are often industry-specific and even 
product-specific, and cannot easily be reshuffled and deployed from one sector to another 
as the incentive structure is altered by changes in the exchange rate. Under these conditions 
the immediate impact of  devaluations on exports and import substitution would depend 
largely on spare capacity in these sectors. Resources released from nontraded sectors may 
remain unemployed, skills may be eroded, and equipment may become obsolete until 
the production capacity is restructured and expanded through investment in skills and 
equipment according to changed incentives. Indeed, one can even talk about the supply-
side J-curve effect of  devaluations, whereby quantity response is delayed because existing 
resources cannot be rapidly redeployed to traded goods sectors.
That such supply-side rigidities can create “adjustment costs” in the case of  changes 
in the incentive structure due to import liberalization is recognized in the mainstream 
literature even though they are almost never explicitly quantified and incorporated 
in estimated benefits from trade liberalization (Akyüz 2009). Like big bang trade 
liberalization, such costs tend to be much higher and more persistent when exchange 
rate changes are sharp and unexpected. 
 Whether or not devaluations are contractionary in the short term, the main conduit 
of  a shift in relative prices to resource allocation is investment. But for real exchange rates 
to have a significant influence on investment, they need to remain relatively stable and 
predictable over time. Uncertainties created by large and unexpected swings in exchange 
rates and the consequent fluctuations in demand increase the risks of  investment in 
traded goods sectors. Even when the average level of  the real exchange rate over an 
extended period is favorable to traded goods sectors, if  it is subject to gyrations, it will 
not provide a reliable basis for directing investment to export and imports substitution 
industries. In this sense the stability of  the real exchange rate may be more important for 
growth than its average level over the medium term. 
3. Limits and costs of  reliance on the exchange rate
While competitive and stable real exchange rates play an important role in growth 
and industrialization, there are some caveats that need to be kept in mind. First, there 
are limits to what the exchange rate can do on its own in promoting industrialization 
and growth. Second, a weak currency is not always beneficial to stability and growth. 
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Finally, there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between exchange rate stability 
and flexibility since under certain conditions efforts to maintain stable nominal and/or 
real exchange rates could prove to be highly damaging. 
In no area of  development policy can success be explained by the behavior of  a 
single variable, and this is certainly the case for the role of  the exchange rate in growth 
and industrialization. While it is usually very difficult to maintain rapid growth for an 
extended period under overvalued and unstable real exchange rates, a weak and stable 
currency alone is not sufficient for sustained growth. Its impact on resource allocation, 
investment, and productivity growth depends very much on how it is combined with a 
host of  other factors, including trade-related industrial policy measures, notably import 
tariffs and export subsidies. 
Like the exchange rate, tariffs and subsidies can no doubt be used to shift resources to 
tradeable goods sectors. It has long been established that if  exports are subsidized to the 
same extent as imports are taxed, the price ratio between exportables and importables 
would not be affected, but their prices will rise relative to nontradeables, having the same 
effect as real devaluations.19 As industrial policy tools, however, tariffs and subsidies are 
useful only when they differentiate among different categories of  imports and exports, 
respectively, and this is how they were used by successful late industrializers in East Asia. 
While the exchange rate could be used to protect import competing and export 
industries, it would do so uniformly.20 However, in the course of  industrialization the 
effective use of  tariffs for infant industry protection would require the coexistence of  
low and high tariffs. Since at any point in time different industries would need different 
degrees of  infant industry protection, an effective system of  tariffs tends to be highly 
dispersed rather than uniform. Furthermore, over time tariffs need to be raised on some 
products but lowered on others, and dispersion may be rising or falling according to 
the stage of  industrial development reached (Akyüz 2009). Much the same is true for 
subsidies; a country should not need to subsidize exports of  products in which it has static 
comparative advantages, but would need to do so for industries that are yet to achieve 
maturity and benefit from scale economies. 
These considerations suggest that, important as it may be in the allocation of  
resources between traded and nontraded goods industries and in reaping the dynamic 
benefits of  exporting, the exchange rate policy is no substitute for trade and industrial 
policy interventions. However, since these instruments are no longer available to most 
developing countries because of  their commitments in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), it is now absolutely essential to sustain stable and competitive real exchange rates 
in order to avoid payments crises and interruption to growth and development.21 
The concept of  equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) is the standard reference in 
judging whether a currency is misaligned vis-à-vis underlying fundamentals. It is the 
rate that simultaneously secures internal and external equilibrium. Internal equilibrium 
refers to full employment or the attainment of  potential output. External equilibrium 
is used synonymously with external sustainability and means that the intertemporal 
budget constraint for the economy is met.22 Defined in this way, ERER depends on a 
host of  factors, both external and internal, including technology and productivity, tariffs 
and subsidies, capital account regimes, interest rates, and world prices for traded goods. 
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There are several and repeated attempts in the literature to operationalize this theoretical 
concept and to measure the extent to which currencies are misaligned. However, since 
there are considerable uncertainties over how the key determinants of  the ERER would 
move over time, such measures are not always a reliable guide to policymaking. 
It has been argued that neutrality of  incentives between traded and nontraded goods 
sectors, as advocated in the mainstream literature, would not be sufficient to secure their 
balanced growth because traded goods sectors suffer disproportionately from institutional 
and market failures that pervade poor countries (Rodrik 2008). According to this view, the 
costs entailed by these failures need to be compensated by sustained real exchange rate 
depreciations to increase the relative profitability of  investment in traded goods sectors.23 
However, since in principle the ERER should allow for any distortions that impinge on 
productivity and costs in traded and nontraded goods sectors, this argument boils down 
to the proposition that the impact of  institutional and market failures on costs in the 
traded goods sectors is not properly accounted for in measured/estimated ERERs.24
While overvaluation is generally considered as undesirable on the grounds of  its 
negative consequences for trade, industrialization and growth, there is much less emphasis 
on the problems that could be posed by a policy of  weak currency. Two types of  difficulties 
are often mentioned, one internal, another external, and these will be discussed in some 
detail in the subsequent sections. On the internal side, currency interventions needed at 
times of  large current account surpluses and/or capital inflows to prevent appreciations 
entail costs because reserves are invested in low yielding foreign assets. Moreover, since 
it is not always possible to achieve full sterilization (that is, to offset the impact of  the 
currency intervention on the monetary base), such a policy could also lead to domestic 
credit expansion, creating inflationary pressures in asset and/or products markets.25 
Externally, a policy of  cheap currency could create frictions with trading partners and 
trigger competitive devaluations or hostile trade actions.
Perhaps more important from the viewpoint of  social welfare is the impact of  an 
aggressive export push through an undervalued currency on income distribution 
within and across countries. This raises the old issues of  fallacy of  composition and 
immiserizing growth, which have been largely sidelined in the more recent discussion 
of  the link between growth and the real exchange rate. Given labor productivity, real 
devaluations imply declines in real wages. To put it differently, for a nominal depreciation 
to produce a decline in the real exchange rate, nominal wages should lag behind traded 
goods prices. If  dollar prices of  exports remain unchanged, profit margins in export 
sectors will increase − that is, real devaluations would redistribute income from wages to 
profits (Diaz-Alejandro 1963). Of  course, if  productivity increases over time, a weaker 
currency can be associated with rising real wages, as often happened in East Asia. But 
to the extent that real devaluations result in lower export prices in dollars, part of  the 
productivity gains would be captured by consumers abroad at the expense of  wages. 
With dollar prices of  imports remaining unchanged, this would also be reflected in a 
decline in net barter terms of  trade. 
This outcome depends crucially on whether or not developing country exporters 
are “price takers” in world markets for manufactures. It is generally recognized that 
a small economy may be able to increase its exports of  manufactures without putting 
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any significant downward pressure on world (dollar) prices, but this would not be true 
for developing countries as a whole or for large economies such as China. However, 
even a small economy may need to lower the dollar prices of  its exports if  it supplies 
nonstandard, differentiated products − which is more often the case in manufactures 
than in commodity exports. In such cases the benefits of  any increased volume of  exports 
may be more than offset by losses due to lower export prices, giving rise to immiserizing 
growth (Bhagwati 1958). Even when rising quantities more than offset the impact of  the 
decline in prices on export earnings, and the purchasing power of  exports (income terms 
of  trade) improves, falling export prices and net barter terms of  trade can still entail 
resource losses. Evidence suggests that the purchasing power of  manufacturing exports 
of  developing countries have been rising rapidly, but prices of  their manufactured exports 
have been weakening vis-à-vis those exported by advanced industrialized countries.26 
This is also true for China, the most prominent developing economy pursuing an 
aggressive export-led growth policy based on cheap labor and cheap currency.27 An 
important part of  the benefits of  productivity growth in China is shared between profit 
earners, including transnational companies, and Western consumers, even though 
absolute living conditions of  workers have been improving rapidly. Since the early years 
of  the decade labor productivity in the manufacturing industry has grown by some 20 
percent per annum, while nominal wage increases have been under 15 percent and 
real wage increases even lower. The share of  labor cost in total gross output in mining, 
manufacturing, and utilities fell from 11.5 percent in 2002 to 7.1 percent in 2006; for the 
economy as a whole, the share of  wages in GDP fell to about 40 percent after fluctuating 
between 50 and 55 percent in the 1990s. While average labor productivity in China is 
just under 20 percent of  that in the United States, the Chinese manufacturing hourly 
wage rate is about 3 percent of  that in the United States. At the same level of  average 
industrial productivity and income, Japanese and Korean wages in dollar terms were 
much higher than those in China today.28 
The extent to which Chinese productivity growth has been passed onto Western 
consumers in the form of  lower export prices rather than to workers in the form of  higher 
wages is not very clear and further research is needed. However, there is no doubt that 
the United States consumers are one of  the main beneficiaries of  productivity growth in 
Asian exporters of  manufactures. For instance, prices of  products imported from the first 
tier NIEs (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) fell by 2.4 percent per year from 
1993 to 2006, compared with a 0.3 percent rise in average prices of  total non-oil imports 
into the United States (Amiti and Stiroh 2007). Available statistics for more recent years 
show a similar trend for prices of  imports from China, which registered a decline of  
3 percent between 2003 and 2006. There was some increase in prices of  products 
imported from China after 2006; but much of  this was due, in the case of  industrial 
supplies, to increases of  prices that China paid for commodity inputs and, in the case of  
consumer and capital goods, to the sharp appreciation of  the renminbi against the dollar, 
rather than domestic wage pressures (Amiti and Davis 2009). 
The decline in the share of  wages in China is mirrored by the decline in the share of  
consumption in GDP. During 2002–2007, the average growth rate of  consumer spending 
was around 8 percent per annum, while gross fixed capital formation grew at a rate of  
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15 percent and exports 25 percent. Consequently, the share of  consumption fell below 
40 percent of  GDP − almost half  of  the figure in the United States, and considerably 
less than the share of  investment. The imbalance between the two key components of  
domestic demand has meant increased dependence of  Chinese industry on foreign 
markets (Akyüz 2008a). 
This experience stands in sharp contrast to that of  late industrializers in Asia, 
particularly Japan and Korea, where wages and household consumption grew in tandem 
with productivity and underpinned the expansion of  capacity by providing a growing 
internal market. There is the risk that a cheap currency, cheap labor policy can weaken 
the efforts for upgrading and productivity growth while increasing the dependence of  
growth on expansion in foreign markets. This is indeed one of  the conclusions reached 
by the Commission on Growth and Development (CGD):
As with other forms of  export promotion, exchange rate policies can outlive their 
usefulness. If  the currency is suppressed by too much or for too long, it will distort 
the evolution of  the economy by removing the natural market pressure for change. 
The cheap currency will tend to lock activity into labor-intensive export sectors, 
reduce the return to upgrading skills, and eventually harm productivity as a result. 
Like other industrial policies, a keenly priced currency is supposed to solve a specific, 
transitory problem. Eventually, as an economy grows more prosperous, domestic 
demand should and usually does play an increasingly important role in generating 
and sustaining growth. Exchange rate policy should not stand in the way of  this 
natural evolution (CGD 2008, 51). 
 Late industrializers in East Asia did not rely on cheap currency for industrial development. 
By contrast, they occasionally tolerated moderate appreciations which, in some instances, 
provided incentives for upgrading and productivity growth. In Taiwan, for instance, the 
real exchange rate was allowed to appreciate almost continuously after the late 1960s. 
This, together with the rise in real wages, put considerable pressure on business to remain 
competitive in international markets, forcing them to achieve productivity gains that 
made it possible for the economy to continue to be one of  the fastest growing in the 
world (Jenkins and Kuo 1997). 
Finally, a rigid, immovable exchange rate can be as damaging as a highly volatile 
currency. Recurrent currency and balance of  payments crises in emerging markets since 
the mid-1990s show that, under capital account liberalization, efforts to maintain a fixed 
nominal exchange rate can be disastrous even where monetary and fiscal disciplines are 
secured − often a recipe for boom–bust cycles in capital flows and exchange rates with 
serious repercussions for the real economy. There is now a growing consensus that a 
reasonable degree of  flexibility is needed in order to prevent such gyrations. 
This consensus also extends to the real exchange rate in view of  increased susceptibility 
of  developing countries to external trade and financial shocks as a result of  their greater 
openness. Clearly a permanent shift in the variables affecting the ERER, including terms 
of  trade and international interest rates, would call for an adjustment in the real exchange 
rate in order to avoid unsustainable current account positions. Similarly, temporary trade 
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and financial shocks may call for changes in the real exchange rate in order to prevent 
the burden of  adjustment from falling on domestic absorption, economic activity, and 
employment. 
4. Cross-country evidence
Historically, real exchange rates have been more competitive and stable in late 
industrializers in East Asia than in most other developing countries, including those in 
South Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is an important, though not the only, reason 
why Asian NIEs were more successful in agricultural transformation in their initial stages 
of  development and, subsequently, in building dynamic and competitive manufacturing 
industries. In Africa, where real exchange rates were relatively stable (Table 4.1), persistent 
overvaluation appears to have been a deliberate policy for extracting resources from 
agriculture, whereas in Latin America the extreme degree of  instability is a reflection of  
the inability of  countries to maintain competitive rates despite occasional devaluations in 
response to recurrent payments crises.
In most developing countries in the early stages of  industrialization the evolution 
of  exports and capital accumulation depends crucially on the performance of  the 
agricultural sector. A major difficulty facing policymakers at this stage is how to 
sustain agricultural growth while extracting a surplus from agriculture for industrial 
development. In this respect the contrast between East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa 
is quite striking. Evidence shows that in both regions agriculture was taxed in the 
early stages of  industrialization through pricing policies. Comparative analysis of  
the ratio of  producer prices to border prices show that the implicit rate of  taxation 
was not always higher in Africa, but the overall rate of  taxation was much higher 
because exchange rate policies were not favorable to export crops. Rather, they 
were designed primarily for providing cheap imports to heavily protected industries 
(UNCTAD TDR 1998, part 2, chap. 3; and Boratav 2001). However, the Asian 
success in agricultural development depended not only on favorable exchange rates 
for agricultural producers but also on complementary policies, including investment 
in agricultural infrastructure and provision of  various productivity-enhancing services 
(Karshenas 2001). 
In Latin America the dominant approach to exchange rate policy during the 1960s 
and 1970s was to maintain fixed nominal exchange rates (often vis-à-vis the dollar), 
sometimes for as long as ten years or even more, against a background of  relatively rapid 
inflation, followed by sharp devaluations as real appreciations led to balance of  payments 
crises. Real devaluations following nominal adjustments could not be sustained because 
inflation often continued unabated and even accelerated after currency adjustments. 
Many of  these adjustments were stepwise, but even where devaluations were followed 
by crawling pegs whereby the peg was shifted over time, subsequent nominal 
adjustments were not sufficient to maintain real exchange rates at levels favorable to 
traded goods sectors. In other words, devaluations were not effective in bringing about 
real exchange rate adjustments needed to reduce structural external deficits and avoid 
recurrent payments crises.29 
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While nominal pegs were also used in some Asian countries such as Korea − which 
maintained a regime of  de facto dollar peg until the end of  the 1970s − in such cases 
not only were real appreciations generally more moderate but devaluations were not 
followed by rapid erosion of  the real exchange rate.30 Most Asian countries avoided 
gyrations in nominal and real exchange rates − until they liberalized the capital account 
in the 1990s and left their currencies to the whims of  international capital flows.31 Large 
devaluations, such as that in 1980 in Korea, were responses to external trade shocks, 
notably a sharp deterioration in the terms of  trade, rather than to the erosion of  the real 
exchange rate through rapid inflation. They were followed by a regime of  crawling pegs, 
preventing appreciation of  the real exchange rate. The Asian countries, too, no doubt 
experienced occasional misalignments and appreciations, but various other measures, 
including industry policy instruments, were used to maintain export momentum and 
avoid recurrent payments crises.
Recent studies on cross-country regressions to account for growth differences have 
increasingly included the level and volatility of  the real exchange rate among the 
explanatory variables.32 Evidence based on such regressions for Latin America suggests 
that overvaluations tend to slow growth of  industrial employment and output. According 
to a cross-country study of  18 Latin American and Caribbean countries for 1970–96, 
trade liberalizations had a small negative effect on employment growth, but the impact 
was greatly amplified by the appreciation of  the real exchange rate, underlying the 
importance of  proper exchange rate management at times of  trade reforms (Marquez 
and Pagés 1998). 
As already noted, most studies trying to estimate the impact of  exchange rate 
misalignments on growth use purchasing power parity (PPP) measures, often adjusted 
for the Balassa–Samuelson effect. Studies by Cavallo, Cottani and Kahn (1990) and by 
Dollar (1992) on developing countries report inverse correlations between real exchange 
rate overvaluations and economic growth. Similar results are found by Gala (2007) for 58 
developing countries for the period 1960–99. Razin and Collins (1999) lump together a 
large number of  developing and developed countries and find that overvaluations harm 
growth, but this is not the case for undervaluation. Hausman, Pritchett, and Rodrik 
Asia  Latin America Africa
Singapore 6.32 Colombia 11.87 Zambia 16.48
Malaysia 7.59 Mexico 13.21 Ethiopia 14.84
Korea 8.80 Paraguay 16.50 Tunisia 11.18
Thailand 8.14 Bolivia 18.35 South Africa 10.79 
Philippines 14.62 Peru 21.51 Mauritius 8.00
India 18.09 Brazil 22.44 Kenya 7.86
Pakistan 27.53 Chile 28.29
table 4.1: Stability of  the real exchange ratea (quarterly data 1965–85)
Source: Edwards (1989).
a. Measured by the coefficient of  variation of  quarterly changes in the multilateral real exchange rate 
index.
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(2004) and Rodrik (2008) find that growth accelerations are usually associated with real 
depreciations.33 
By contrast, a study of  60 countries over the period 1965–2003 finds that both 
real overvaluations and undervaluations hinder growth, although in the former case 
the effect is stronger (Aguirre and Calderón 2005). Moreover, the effect is nonlinear: 
growth declines are larger, the larger the size of  the misalignments. Thus, while small 
to moderate undervaluations enhance growth, large undervaluations hurt growth. 
Furthermore, in this study the impact of  a movement of  the real exchange rate would 
depend on the underlying circumstances. An increase in the real exchange rate at a 
time of  significant and sustained improvements in terms of  trade implies, in effect, a 
movement toward the ERER. The study shows that exchange rate changes in response to 
shifts in key determinants of  the ERER help promote growth. Most other studies on the 
effect of  exchange rate variability on employment, investment and growth focus on the 
observed behavior of  the real exchange rate without considering whether its movements 
are warranted by shifts in the underlying fundamentals.34 Results are mixed, varying 
according to country samples, measures of  volatility and the specifications used. 
It is sometimes argued that, while provoking instability, financial and currency markets 
also provide the means to hedge against instability so as to minimize its impact on the 
real economy. According to the findings of  a cross-country study of  83 countries over 
the period 1960–2000, in countries with relatively low levels of  financial development, 
exchange rate volatility generally reduces growth, whereas in financially advanced 
countries there is no significant effect (Aghion et al. 2006). 
It is true that in developing countries the absence or underdevelopment of  relevant 
derivatives markets limits the ability of  individual agents to hedge against instability.35 
But it is not evident that in a country with liability dollarization it would be possible for 
the agents to hedge collectively, since this would require, in effect, pushing the currency 
risk abroad.36 Moreover, quite apart from transaction costs, there are limits to hedging: 
“while forward contracts and currency options have proved to be effective means of  
reducing risk in managing financial portfolios, they cannot cushion companies engaged 
in international trade against the risk of  exchange rate fluctuations” and “even the most 
sophisticated hedges are no substitute for stable exchange rates.”37 There is evidence that 
forwards, swaps and options markets often develop faster when the currency is allowed to 
fluctuate. However, this is not only because these markets provide hedges against volatility, 
but also because currency volatility creates profit opportunities. In other words, it is not 
only that volatility is conducive to the development of  hedging markets and instruments 
but the development of  these markets and instruments can breed in greater volatility.38
The obvious conclusion from this maze of  empirical work and theoretical considerations 
is that the influence of  the exchange rate on growth is circumscribed by the overall 
economic environment and that there is no symmetry between the economic impact of  
overvaluation and undervaluation, and of  gyrations and stability. First, there is no single 
and sure way of  determining whether a currency is properly aligned with the underlying 
economic fundamentals, that is, to what extent it is overvalued or undervalued. This is 
largely because what constitutes the equilibrium exchange rates depends, inter alia, on 
long-term, sustained capital inflows, and passing a judgment on the latter has become 
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almost an impossible undertaking. Second, while it may be very difficult to sustain rapid 
growth under sustained appreciations, whether or not depreciations would accelerate 
growth depends on a host of  other factors. Finally, an economy is unlikely to maintain 
rapid growth for an extended period under highly unstable real exchange rates, but a 
stable currency may not necessarily promote growth; it may even hinder it when shifts in 
underlying fundamentals call for currency adjustments. 
These considerations suggest that in practice a judicious management of  the exchange 
rate would call for considerable judgment and discretion. Attention would need to be 
paid not only to the trade and growth performance of  the economy and the evolution 
of  its current account position but also to financial vulnerabilities that may result from 
capital flows and currency movements − an issue to be taken up presently. 
C. Capital Flows, Exchange rates and the real Economy
1. Boom–bust cycles in capital flows and exchange rate gyrations
A common feature of  the cross-country studies on the link between the exchange rate 
and economic growth is that they do not specify the forces driving the currency and 
the nature and causes of  instability. Many of  them lump together earlier episodes of  
appreciation and instability caused by domestic policy inconsistencies with those arising 
from boom–bust cycles in capital flows driven by global forces in the more recent 
periods. These episodes differ not only with respect to the causes of  appreciations and 
instability but also their impact on employment, investment and growth and, hence, the 
appropriate policy response. Indeed, the failure of  the IMF to diagnose the nature of  
these crises and distinguish them from traditional currency appreciations and payments 
difficulties caused by domestic demand expansion and inflation led to serious errors in 
policy response, notably in East Asia where procyclical monetary and fiscal tightening 
adopted in response to the 1997 crisis served to deepen the economic contraction caused 
by the reversal of  capital flows.
Exchange rate misalignments and instability caused by boom–bust cycles in private 
capital flows is not a recent phenomenon. Perhaps the first most significant postwar 
episode was the experience of  the Southern Cone countries in Latin America, notably 
Chile, during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The combination of  financial liberalization, 
tight monetary policy and fixed nominal exchange rates attracted large amounts of  
foreign capital to the region, leading to debt accumulation by the private sector and a 
consumption boom. Massive inflows of  capital allowed the currencies to appreciate in 
real terms despite mounting trade deficits. The experiment ended with a currency and 
financial crisis, bringing down many banks and causing a sharp contraction in economic 
activity (Diaz-Alejandro 1985). 
With rapid liberalization of  the capital account in the 1990s, international private 
capital flows have become the driving force behind business cycles and exchange rates in 
many developing countries, capable of  producing unsustainable economic expansions and 
currency appreciations followed by financial crises and recessions. While country-specific 
(pull) and global (push) factors both play important roles in determining the direction, 
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size, and nature of  capital flows, evidence shows that the most damaging episodes of  such 
crises are those associated with boom–bust cycles in capital flows driven by global factors 
beyond the control of  the recipient countries.39 
Indeed, since the early 1990s currency and balance of  payments crises have occurred 
under varying macroeconomic and financial conditions in Latin America, East Asia, and 
elsewhere (UNCTAD TDR 1995, chap. 2; 1997, chap. 3; 1999, chap. 3; and 2003, chap. 4). 
They were seen not only in countries with large and widening current account deficits 
(e.g., Mexico and Thailand), but also where deficits were relatively small and presumed 
sustainable (Indonesia and Russia). A significant currency appreciation is often a feature 
of  countries experiencing currency turmoil (Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Turkey), but this 
has not always been the case; appreciations in most East Asian countries hit by the 1997 
crisis were moderate or negligible. In some cases crises were associated with large budget 
deficits, as in Brazil, Russia and Turkey, but in others (Mexico and East Asia) the budget 
was either balanced or in surplus. Crises occurred not only where capital flows supported 
a boom in private consumption, as in Latin America, but also in private investment, as in 
East Asia. Again, in some episodes of  crises external liabilities were largely public (Brazil 
and Russia) while in others they were private (East Asia). Finally, most countries hit by 
balance of  payments and financial crises are said to have been lacking effective regulation 
and supervision of  the financial system, but Argentina could not avoid a currency 
and payments crisis and default despite having one of  the best systems of  prudential 
regulations in the developing world and a financial system dominated by foreign banks.
Recurrent currency and financial crises under varying macroeconomic conditions 
have raised serious questions about the mainstream thinking that currency and balance of  
payments crises result primarily from macroeconomic policy inconsistencies, notably lack 
of  fiscal and monetary discipline, and that price stability is both necessary and sufficient 
for financial and exchange rate stability. In reality, in most countries financial boom–bust 
cycles, asset price and exchange rate gyrations, and credit surges and crunches, have all 
occurred under conditions of  low and stable inflation − the most recent example being 
the global financial crisis triggered by the subprime debacle.40 In the more extreme cases, 
as in Latin America, where price instability has traditionally been regarded as structural 
and chronic, single digit and stable inflation rates have been attained at the expense 
of  increased financial fragility and instability through exchange-rate-based stabilization 
programs relying on short-term, unstable capital inflows.
The pattern of  exchange rate movements over the boom–bust cycles in capital flows is 
well known. If  the currency is allowed to float freely, both nominal and real exchange rates 
would appreciate when capital inflows exceed the current account deficit; but the deficit 
itself  would be widened by real exchange rate appreciations, requiring growing amounts 
of  inflows to finance it. Under a nominal peg currency, market interventions would be 
necessary when inflows exceed the current account deficit. Still, the real exchange rate 
could appreciate depending on the rate of  inflation. Here, too, real appreciations could 
widen the current account deficit so that increased amounts of  capital inflows would be 
needed to support a nominal peg. This was the case in exchange-rate-based stabilization 
programs implemented in Latin America and Europe in the 1990s. In East Asia, too, in 
the run-up to the 1997 crisis nominal exchange rates were broadly stable, but this had 
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nothing to do with disinflation; rather, it reflected the long-standing emphasis on stable 
exchange rates in export-led industrialization and growth. Moreover, central banks in 
Asian countries hit by the 1997 crisis had occasionally intervened in order to prevent 
appreciation.41 
With a sharp reversal of  capital flows, nominal rates tend to collapse, overshooting 
their longer-term levels. Thus, over the boom–bust cycle, nominal rates first appreciate 
or remain relatively stable during the surge in capital flows depending on the regime 
adopted, resulting in moderate-to-sharp real appreciations. The rapid exit of  capital 
then leads to a collapse in the nominal rate. Even though this often leads to an increase in 
inflation, currency-cum-financial crises generally result in large real devaluations.42 This 
is often followed by a recovery in the nominal exchange rate − a correction to downward 
overshooting seen at times of  capital flight − but real exchange rates remain below the 
levels attained during the surge in capital flows. This pattern is observed even where the 
sudden stop or reversal of  capital flows do not trigger a balance of  payments crisis, as 
was the case in Singapore and Taiwan during the 1997 crisis and, as discussed below, in 
the current episode of  sharp declines in capital flows triggered by the subprime crisis. 
2. Wages, employment and investment over the cycle
In almost all emerging market economies that experienced boom–bust cycles in capital 
flows in the 1990s, real wages rose rapidly at times of  surges in capital inflows, but 
employment behaved differently in different countries.43 Where the boom was driven by 
investment, unemployment fell during the expansion phase. This was the case in all the 
countries hit by the 1997 Asian crisis except Indonesia. By contrast, in Latin America, 
where booms were driven by consumption, unemployment was either stable or higher 
despite expansion of  employment in services sectors, because of  loss of  competitiveness 
and jobs in industry. 
During a surge in capital inflows, high real wages and cheap imports of  capital goods, 
together with easy access to credit, tend to encourage investment and lead to capital 
deepening in an effort to restructure industry and raise productivity to meet foreign 
competition. This happened even in Latin America, where booms were driven primarily 
by private consumption. Investment growth was much stronger in East Asia, where firms 
augmented investment in the hope of  increasing productivity and market shares, and 
expanded into new areas of  production in response to rapidly falling prices of  many 
of  the electronic products exported, notably semiconductors. Again, most episodes of  
strong capital inflows produce booms in property markets and increased investment in 
residential and commercial construction.
Currency and maturity mismatches in balance sheets create serious problems for firms 
and financial institutions at times of  rapid exit of  capital and the collapse of  the currency. 
These set off  a process of  debt deflation whereby attempts to escape from the squeeze on 
balance sheets of  rising domestic cash needs to service foreign debt simply increase their 
financial difficulties by driving down exchange rates and asset values even further. Credit 
is cut as collateral values fall and banks try to consolidate their balance sheets (UNCTAD 
TDR 1998, chap. 3; and Krugman 1999). Credit conditions are often aggravated by 
134 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
monetary tightening and interest rate hikes aiming to check capital flight, producing sharp 
declines in employment and real wages alongside a deep contraction in output. 
The decline in real wages was particularly steep in Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey at 
times of  crises − between 11 and 25 percent per annum. In East Asia unemployment 
went up rapidly, particularly in Korea and Indonesia (Table 4.2). In Latin America, 
where booms failed to produce a significant growth in jobs, the subsequent crises took 
unemployment to exceptionally high levels: in Mexico open unemployment doubled 
within a year; in Argentina, where the currency board and the fixed exchange rate were 
maintained despite worsening external conditions, unemployment shot up in the wake 
of  the Mexican crisis, reaching almost 20 percent in 1995; in Brazil open unemployment 
rose from 6 percent in the mid-1990s to almost 10 percent in 1999. A similar increase was 
registered in Turkey during the 2001 crisis.
Almost all episodes of  crisis-induced currency declines in emerging markets 
produced sharp declines in output, reviving the debate over if  and why devaluations are 
contractionary. Even in countries with highly diversified production and exports such as 
Korea, real depreciations were not immediately translated into larger export volumes. 
One possible reason given is contagion: that is, if  currencies of  all countries competing 
in the same export markets fall, none of  them would gain competitive advantage.44 
However, this is not very plausible since most Asian countries hit by the crisis achieved 
rapid export growth subsequently. A much more important factor in delaying the 
response of  exports to real depreciations was credit crunch; that is, with the breakdown 
of  the credit system, firms became unable to raise operating capital needed to increase 
production and exports. Indeed, in Asia currency declines appear to have inflicted less 
damage on firms than cutbacks in domestic credit lines and rise in interest rates because 
many firms with large foreign debt were export-oriented.
During crises not only do exports fail to rise quickly in response to the decline 
in the currency but domestic demand shrinks because of  the impact of  the collapse 
of  the currency on private balance sheets. Indeed, there is now a growing agreement 
that the balance sheet impact of  currency declines, rather than supply-side rigidities or 
demand inelasticities, is the main reason why crisis-induced devaluations in emerging 
markets are contractionary (Krugman, 1999; Frankel, 2005). There is also some support 
from empirical studies, including a study of  nine Latin American countries by Galindo, 
1994–96 1998–99 2003 2007
Indonesia 4.0a 6.0 9.7 9.1 
Korea 2.1 6.6 3.6 3.2
Malaysia 2.8b 3.3 3.6 3.3
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Izquierdo, and Montero (2006), that finds that real exchange rate depreciations can 
have a positive impact on employment growth, but this effect is reversed as liability 
dollarization increases.45 
In expansion–recession–recovery cycles in emerging markets governed by international 
capital flows, losses of  real wages, employment and investment incurred at times of  
downturn are not fully recovered when the economy regains its precrisis level of  GDP. In 
Asia during the recovery phase, real wages regained their precrisis levels only in Korea 
while they remained depressed elsewhere in the region. In Latin America, real wages 
were all lower than the peaks reached before the crises. More importantly, everywhere 
employment lagged considerably behind output growth, giving rise to the phenomenon 
of  jobless recovery. Post-crisis open unemployment rates were higher than precrisis rates 
by 1.0 percentage point in Brazil and Mexico, 5.5 points in Argentina, and 4 points in 
Korea and Indonesia. In Turkey growth averaging over 7 percent for four years after the 
2001 crisis did not make any dent in unemployment, and real wages barely recovered. 
The deterioration in the conditions of  labor, particularly among the unskilled, is a 
major reason why poverty levels in most of  these countries stayed high despite economic 
recovery. In all four Asian countries hit by the 1997 crisis, unemployment levels in 2007 
stood above those observed before the crisis, particularly in Indonesia. Much the same is 
true for investment: investment rates in all Asian countries hit by the 1997 crisis are still 
below their precrisis levels (Table 4.3).
Recoveries from economic downturns caused by the bursting of  financial bubbles 
have also been weak in job creation and investment in some advanced countries. 
This was the case in the United States’ recovery from the recession caused by the 
bursting of  the dot-com bubble in 2001. Several explanations have been offered 
for this phenomenon (Akyüz 2008b, 184–86), but there is a growing consensus that 
the damage inflicted by financial crises on industry tends to be much deeper and 
longer lasting than difficulties resulting from economic contractions that occur in 
the context of  traditional business cycles wherein finance takes a more passive and 
accommodative role. 
d. Managing Capital Flows and Exchange rates
1. Policy trade-offs and exchange rate regimes
According to conventional economic theory, it is not possible simultaneously to pursue 
an independent monetary policy, control the exchange rate and maintain an open capital 
account. All three are potentially feasible, but only two of  them could be chosen as actual 
policy – thus, the dilemma known as impossible trinity or trilemma. Once the capital 
account is opened, a choice has to be made between controlling the exchange rate and 
preserving an independent monetary policy. Using monetary policy as a countercyclical 
tool to stabilize economic activity could result in large cyclical swings in the exchange 
rate and the balance of  payments. Conversely, if  monetary policy is used to stabilize the 
exchange rate, it cannot act as a countercyclical macroeconomic tool and prevent large 
cyclical swings in economic activity.
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The orthodoxy takes financial openness for granted and argues that only one of  the 
two corner solutions is feasible. At the one corner lies independent floating whereby 
the currency is left to market forces without intervention. At the other corner there are 
the so-called hard pegs based on legally mandated, credible commitments to a fixed 
exchange rate by locking into a reserve currency through currency boards or adopting 
a reserve currency as a national currency (full dollarization) or by joining a monetary 
union − arrangements that would effectively eliminate monetary policy autonomy, and 
even the central bank as it is traditionally known with the function of  lender of  last resort. 
This trilemma, however, is not absolute. In principle it is possible to choose from a 
variety of  intermediate exchange rate regimes and secure a reasonable degree of  currency 
stability by judiciously combining different degrees of  monetary policy independence, 
financial integration, and currency market interventions.46 Even under floating rates it 
may be possible for a central bank without an explicit exchange rate target to retain 
a relatively high degree of  monetary policy autonomy and, at the same time, try to 
influence the exchange rate by currency market interventions in order to curb excessive 
volatility. 
Intermediate regimes between corner or bipolar solutions include soft pegs, defined 
as “exchange rates that are currently fixed in value (or a narrow range of  values) to 
some other currency or basket of  currencies, with some commitment by the authorities 
to defend the peg, but with the value likely to change if  the exchange rate comes under 
significant pressure” (Fischer 2001, 3). They also include crawling pegs, where the peg is 
shifted over time; fixed exchange rate bands, where the currency is allowed to float within 
a specified range; or crawling bands, where the band itself  is allowed to move over time.47 
Among examples of  intermediate regimes are the Bretton Woods system of  adjustable 
pegs, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of  the European Monetary System (EMS), 
the fixed nominal pegs used in exchange rate based stabilization programs in Latin 
America to pin down inflation expectations, and the regime known as BBC − a basket 
parity, a band and a crawl of  the exchange rate − successfully implemented by Singapore 
and adopted in different versions by some other countries, including, since 2005, China 
and Malaysia.48 The BBC regime combines flexibility with stability; it allows the currency 
table 4.3:  Precrisis and postcrisis investment in Asia (percentage of GDP)
1994–97 2003–2007







Source: ADB Asian Development Outlook (April 2000 and April 2008).
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to fluctuate within a relatively narrow range and for the central parity to be shifted in 
response to changes in the underlying fundamentals and to large and durable shocks.
These intermediate regimes call for the use of  monetary policy, currency market 
interventions, and rules over capital flows in appropriate combinations. Otherwise, 
instability and crises can be unavoidable. For instance, the Bretton Woods system of  
adjustable pegs operated under widespread controls over international capital movements 
but broke down with increased mobility of  capital, which resulted from and exposed 
the inconsistencies between the pattern of  exchange rates and domestic policy stances. 
Similarly, adjustable pegs in the ERM worked successfully under conditions of  free capital 
movements as long as macroeconomic fundamentals were consistent with exchange rate 
targets, but broke down during 1992–93 when high inflation countries such as Italy and 
the United Kingdom failed to make the necessary currency and/or policy adjustments 
(Akyüz and Flassbeck 2002). Again, the combination of  soft pegs, free capital flows, and 
high inflation and interest rates proved to be damaging in countries pursuing exchange-
rate-based stabilization programs, creating not only currency gyrations but also costly 
financial crises. 
After recurrent crises in emerging markets with soft pegs in the 1990s, developing 
countries were advised to go for corner solutions. However, with the collapse of  the 
Argentine currency board (convertibility), hard pegs fell from favor. The orthodox policy 
advice has increasingly emphasized assigning monetary policy to the task of  inflation 
control (inflation targeting) and leaving the currency to float under a reasonably open 
capital account.
The problems with corner solutions are well established.49 It is now widely 
recognized that hard pegs are not a viable option for a large majority of  developing 
countries. Free floating, on the other hand, does not prevent boom–bust cycles in 
capital flows, unsustainable current account positions, and currency gyrations since 
exchange rate uncertainty cannot always curb herd behavior in financial markets. 
Experience shows that crises are as likely to occur under floating rates as under soft 
pegs. The latest example is Iceland − an economy practising inflation targeting and 
independent floating. It saw its currency strengthen during the surge in capital inflows 
after 2002; and its current account deficit grow to reach 18 percent of  GDP in 2008, 
when its currency and economy collapsed with the global turmoil triggered by the 
subprime crisis (Table 4.4).
Most emerging-market economies with independent floating currency regimes have 
been affected more severely by the current global instability than those with intermediate 
regimes of  managed floating. In independent floaters, exchange rates appreciated 
sharply during the surge in capital inflows, and many of  these countries ran large 
and growing current account deficits despite a favorable global trading environment 
(Table 4.4). With the deepening of  the subprime crisis and reversal of  capital flows after 
mid-2008, currencies in all these countries fell sharply from their peaks. In countries 
with managed floating, appreciations during the earlier boom were moderate and most 
of  these countries succeeded in generating sizeable current account surpluses in the 
preceding expansion. Even though they too have been hit by the global crisis, declines in 
their currencies have been moderate compared to independent floaters. 
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Nominal Real Ca/GDP
Boom Bust Boom Bust 2008
Independent Floating
Brazil 81.8 –24.3 44.0 –21.9 –1.8
Chile 29.0 –20.1 28.8 –15.8 –1.1
Mexico –4.6 –24.1 0.5 –20.0 –1.4
Korea 15.7 –34.6 18.7 –33.5 –1.3
Iceland 6.7 –47.3 18.2 –38.3 –18.2
Poland 29.3 –21.6 29.3 –21.7 –4.7
SAR 6.5 –27.2 14.9 –20.1 –8.0
Turkey 9.6 –18.1 40.2 –7.1 –6.5
Managed Floating
Argentinaa –16.4 –6.2 2.6 –2.3 0.8
China 9.8 0.3 12.4 1.3 9.5
India 2.7 –14.0 16.8 –11.2 –2.8
Malaysia 1.3 –5.9 1.2 –4.1 14.8
Singapore 7.5 –2.2 3.2 0.8 19.1
Thailand 12.9 –4.6 20.3 –7.4 3.1
table 4.4: Effective exchange rates and current accounts in emerging markets (percentage 
change)
Source: Exchange rate regimes from IMF (2008) based on members’ actual, de facto arrangements. 
Effective exchange rates from BIS; current account balances from IMF WEO (October 2008). 
Boom: January 2003 to peak 2007/2008.
Bust: Peak 2007/2008 to end of  January 2009.
a. Classified as managed peg in IMF (2005) but fixed peg in IMF (2008).
There is ample evidence against the bipolar view that with increased financial 
integration countries will move to the polar extremes of  free float or hard pegs. It is 
true that with financial development and openness countries tend to move away from 
rigid exchange rate regimes, but instead of  adopting free floating they seem to prefer 
intermediate regimes. A large majority of  developing countries were using intermediate 
regimes until the second half  of  the 1990s. Moreover, many countries that claimed 
to have allowed their exchange rates to float were actually managing them by using 
interest rates and currency market interventions because of  “fear of  floating” (Calvo 
and Rheinhart 2002). Following recurrent emerging market crises in the 1990s, there 
was a shift toward independent floating. After recovery, however, many countries shifted 
back toward intermediate regimes: “The persistent popularity of  intermediate regimes 
[…] suggests that such regimes may provide important advantages. Indeed, the absence 
of  a general bipolar tendency may be indicative of  the possibility that intermediate 
 EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT, GROWTH AND STABILITY 139
regimes are able to capture some of  the benefits of  both extremes while avoiding many 
of  the costs.”50
2. Capital flows, monetary policy and the exchange rate
A key question for countries adopting intermediate regimes is, therefore, how best to 
combine monetary policy action, currency market interventions, and regulation of  capital 
flows in order to sustain stable and competitive exchange rates without giving up the 
objectives of  price stability, full employment and rapid growth. This is not an easy task, 
since for developing countries global financial integration brings much greater erosion of  
monetary independence than is typically portrayed in economic theory. Monetary policy 
cannot always secure financial and macroeconomic stability whether it is geared toward 
a stable exchange rate or conducted independently as a countercyclical tool to pursue 
domestic objectives. 
Because of  exchange rate pass-through and extensive liability dollarization, there are 
strong spillovers from exchange rates to domestic economic and financial conditions. 
Thus, using monetary policy as a domestic countercyclical tool, with the benign neglect 
of  external conditions, does not guarantee price and financial stability when there 
are large swings in capital flows and exchange rates. On the other hand, the effect 
of  monetary policy on exchange rates is much more uncertain and unstable than is 
typically assumed in the theory of  the impossible trinity because of  the volatility of  
risk assessments and herd behavior. During financial turmoil hikes in interest rates are 
often unable to check currency collapses, while at times of  favorable risk assessment a 
much smaller arbitrage margin can attract large inflows of  private capital and cause 
significant appreciations. 
Even when authorities are prepared to use greater discretion in monetary policy, 
they may face serious trade-offs because domestic conditions may call for one sort of  
intervention and external conditions another. This is most clearly seen at times of  rapid 
exit of  capital when liquidity expansion and cuts in interest rates needed to prevent 
financial meltdown and stimulate economic activity could simply accelerate flight 
from the currency. As a result, monetary authorities are often compelled to pursue a 
procyclical policy in an effort to restore confidence. However, this is rarely effective 
since, under crisis conditions, the link assumed in the conventional theory between the 
interest rate and the exchange rate also breaks down. When market sentiment turns 
sour, higher interest rates aiming to retain capital tend to be perceived as increased risk 
of  default. As a result, the risk-adjusted rate of  return could actually fall as interest rates 
are raised. This is the main reason why procyclical interest rate hikes implemented 
as part of  IMF support during several episodes of  financial crises were unable to 
prevent the collapse of  the currency, instead serving to deepen economic contraction. 
Under such conditions, unilateral temporary debt standstills and exchange restrictions 
present themselves as the only viable options to prevent financial meltdown and a deep 
recession. 
Monetary policy also faces hurdles at times of  economic expansion associated with 
surges in capital inflows, asset bubbles and currency appreciations. Tightening to check 
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overheating could encourage external borrowing and short-term arbitrage flows. Lower 
interest rates could discourage such flows, but they fuel domestic credit expansion and 
overheating. 
Countercyclical fiscal policy can no doubt help manage expansions. When the 
economy is overheating due to a boom in private spending supported by capital inflows, 
fiscal tightening would obviate the need for tighter monetary policy and higher interest 
rates and, hence, prevent further arbitrage inflows and appreciations. If  budget revenues 
and expenditure structures are appropriately designed, this task could partly be done by 
automatic stabilizers. However, most developing countries lack either the policy space 
or the political will needed for the kind of  fiscal tightening necessary to check strong 
economic expansions supported by a surge in capital flows. In reality, governments in 
many emerging markets tend to run procyclical fiscal policy, notably those with chronic 
fiscal deficits and large public debt (Akyüz 2006). 
3. Currency market interventions and reserves
i. Interventions and sterilization
A policy of  resisting appreciations and accumulating reserves through interventions 
in currency markets at times of  strong capital inflows and economic expansion and 
using such reserves to prevent sharp depreciations during sudden stops and reversals 
appears to be a sensible countercyclical response to instability in international capital 
flows. However, this is not always neutral in its consequences for monetary policy. If  
interventions are not fully sterilized, they would result in credit expansion, thereby 
generating inflationary pressures in asset and/or product markets. If  they are sterilized 
by issuing government debt, they could lead to higher interest rates, which could, in 
turn, attract more arbitrage capital.
Whether or not interventions in emerging markets are successful in stabilizing 
exchange rates and preventing credit expansion and inflation is highly contentious. 
Examining several episodes of  surges in capital inflows since the early 1990s, the 
IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2007, 122–24) concludes that sterilized 
intervention is likely to be ineffective and inflationary when the influx of  capital is 
persistent: “a policy of  resistance to exchange rate pressures does not seem to be 
associated with lower real appreciation while countercyclical fiscal policies have 
had the desired effect” and “the policy of  sterilized intervention […] often tends 
to be associated with higher inflation.” By contrast, work done in the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) suggests that sterilized intervention has generally been 
more successful in emerging markets than in advanced countries, particularly where 
the banking sector is closely scrutinized.51 Evidence from Asian emerging markets 
discussed below suggests that currency market interventions have been quite effective 
in checking appreciations in the recent surge in capital flows, but they have been only 
partially successful in sterilization.
The impact of  sterilization on interest rates and arbitrage capital depends on the 
size and composition of  capital flows. When capital inflows are moderate in size and 
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concentrated in the market for fixed income assets, sterilization by issuing government debt 
would not raise the interest rate. However, when they are broad based and concentrated 
in direct and portfolio equity, as in most emerging markets in recent years, sterilizing 
them by issuing government debt can raise the interest rate and attract arbitrage flows, 
particularly when inflows are large compared to the size of  the debt market.52 
Sterilization by issuing government (or central bank) debt is also costly because interest 
earned on reserves is usually much lower than interest paid on such debt. This fiscal − 
or quasi-fiscal − cost of  reserves has two components: in part due to the difference 
between external borrowing rate and the rate earned on reserves, which constitutes a net 
transfer of  resources abroad, and in part due to the difference between the interest rate 
on government debt and the external borrowing rate, which is an internal transfer to the 
private sector.53
Sterilization by raising non-interest-bearing reserve requirements of  banks could 
address some of  these problems; it could help reduce the fiscal cost of  intervention and 
check credit expansion. However, by increasing the cost of  credit, it could also encourage 
firms to go to foreign creditors. Banks may also shift business to offshore centers and lend 
through their affiliates abroad, particularly where foreign presence in the banking sector 
is important. A relatively tight supervision over the banking system would be needed to 
impose high reserve requirements and prevent regulatory arbitrage.
ii. Reserve accumulation as self-insurance
Traditionally, reserves covering three months of  imports were considered adequate 
for addressing the liquidity problems arising from time lags between payments for 
imports and receipts from exports. The need for reserves was also expected to lessen 
as countries gained access to international financial markets and became more 
willing to respond to balance of  payments shocks by adjustments in exchange rates. 
However, capital account liberalization in developing countries and their greater 
access to private finance has produced exactly the opposite result. Private capital flows 
have allowed running larger and more persistent current account deficits beyond the 
levels that could be attained by relying on international reserves or borrowing from 
the IMF. But this has also resulted in an accumulation of  large stocks of  external 
liabilities. Consequently, debtor countries have become increasingly vulnerable 
to sudden stops and reversals in capital flows, and this has increased the need to 
accumulate reserves to safeguard against currency turmoil and speculative attacks. 
Indeed, evidence shows a strong correlation between capital account liberalization 
and reserve holding, and a growing tendency to absorb capital inflows into reserves 
rather than using them for current payments (Aizenman and Lee 2005; Choi, Sharma 
and Strömqvist 2007).
Vulnerability to a sudden stop and reversal of  capital flows is often assessed on the 
basis of  short-term external liabilities in relation to reserves. Foreign investment in 
equity and local currency debt is not considered a serious potential threat to stability 
because the exchange rate risk is assumed by investors. Indeed, according to the so-called 
Greenspan–Guidotti rule formulated after the Asian crisis, in order to avoid a liquidity 
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crisis, international reserves in emerging markets should meet short-term external 
foreign currency denominated liabilities, defined as debt with a remaining maturity of  
up to one year.54 
A problem with such rules is that vulnerability is not restricted to short-term foreign 
currency debt; what matters in this respect is liquidity of  liabilities, including those 
denominated in domestic currencies. A move by nonresidents from domestic equity and 
bond markets could create significant turbulence in currency and asset markets with 
broader macroeconomic consequences, even though losses from asset price declines and 
currency collapses fall on foreign investors. This potential source of  instability naturally 
depends on the relative importance of  foreign participation in local financial markets. 
The degree of  vulnerability in this sense can be measured in terms of  stock of  foreign 
portfolio investment as a percentage of  reserves. 
iii. Cost of  reserve holding
Even when the fiscal cost of  interventions is reduced by control over interest rates or 
higher reserve requirements, there could be a large transfer of  resources abroad since the 
return earned on international reserves is less than the cost of  foreign capital, including 
the cost of  foreign borrowing and the foregone return on assets sold. In fact, it is more 
so for equity flows for the acquisition of  ownership rights of  existing assets, since rates 
earned by transnational companies exceed the cost of  international borrowing by a very 
large margin (UNCTAD TDR 1999, chap. 5). 
Reserve accumulation in developing countries accelerated after the Asian crisis, 
particularly with the strong recovery of  capital inflows in the early years of  the 2000s. It 
has gained further momentum as developing countries taken together started to run twin 
surpluses in their balance of  payments, that is, on both current and capital accounts.55 
Since 2001 reserves have increased at an average rate of  $600 billion per year, exceeding 
$5.5 trillion, or 7 months of  imports, at the end of  2008.56 
Of  the $4.6 trillion additional reserves accumulated by developing countries after 
2001, less than two-thirds were earned from current account surpluses. The rest was 
accumulated from capital inflows; that is, they are “borrowed” in the sense that they 
accompany increased claims by nonresidents in one form or another, including direct 
and portfolio equity investment, which entail outward income transfers. Other than 
China and Fuel Exporters, reserves in developing countries are entirely borrowed since, 
taken together, their current account has been in deficit. 
Since in previous decades the current account of  developing countries was in deficit, 
the entire stock of  reserves held at the beginning of  this decade was borrowed reserves. 
This means that almost half  of  the current stock of  reserves in developing countries − 
that is, some $2.6 trillion − are borrowed reserves. This is more than twice their short-
term debt and over 65 percent of  their total debt to private creditors. Assuming a 
moderate 500 basis points margin between the borrowing rate and return on reserves, 
the annual carry cost of  these reserves would reach some $130 billion.57 This constitutes 
a net transfer of  resources to major reserve currency countries and exceeds total official 
development assistance to developing countries.58
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4. Regulation and control of  capital flows
While interventions in currency markets and reserve accumulation can prevent unsustainable 
currency appreciations and current account positions and provide self-insurance against 
sudden stops and reversals, it is not necessarily the best way to deal with volatile capital flows. 
In fact, this strategy lacks a strong rationale since it implies that a country should borrow 
only if  the funds thus acquired are not used to finance investment and imports, but held in 
short-term, low yielding foreign assets, resulting in large fiscal and social costs.
Furthermore, currency market interventions are not neutral in their impact on 
domestic monetary conditions. Failure to sterilize them fully would lead to domestic 
credit expansion, fuelling inflation in asset and/or product markets while debt financed 
sterilization can attract further destabilizing capital flows. Finally, such a strategy does 
not prevent currency and maturity mismatches in private balance sheets, or increased 
presence of  foreigners in domestic financial markets, which often increases vulnerability 
to external shocks and contagion. Thus, regulation and control over capital flows would 
often be necessary to address the problems caused by volatile capital flows and the costs 
and difficulties encountered in dealing with them through monetary policy actions 
and/or currency market interventions.
There are several ways of  influencing unstable capital flows, including market-based 
and administrative measures, widely used in industrial countries before the breakdown 
of  the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and in many European countries until 
the late 1980s.59 Since a large proportion of  cross-border and cross-currency operations 
are intermediated by domestic financial institutions, notably banks, prudential rules 
such as capital and liquidity requirements and provisions for nonperforming portfolios 
no doubt have implications for international capital flows. Similarly, market-based 
(indirect) measures of  control over capital flows, such as unremunerated reserve 
requirements used in Chile and elsewhere, can be considered as part of  prudential 
regulations insofar as they contribute to the solvency of  these institutions. This means 
that measures to control capital flows cannot always be distinguished from prudential 
rules, and several measures that normally come under prudential policies can in fact be 
used for managing capital flows. 
The risks associated with capital flows through the banking system could be addressed 
by applying more stringent rules for capital charges, loan loss provisions and liquidity 
and reserve requirements for transactions involving foreign currencies. In this respect, 
banking regulations need to address three fundamental sources of  fragility: maturity 
mismatches, currency mismatches and exchange-rate-related credit risks. 
Maturity transformation is a traditional function of  the banking system, but this 
should not be encouraged in the intermediation between international financial markets 
and domestic borrowers, particularly since national monetary authorities cannot act as 
lenders of  last resort in foreign currency. Banks tend to rely on central banks for the 
provision of  international liquidity, trying to shift the cost of  carrying a large stock of  
reserves onto them. This exposes them to exchange rate and interest rate risks since, 
in the event of  a sudden stop in capital inflows and inadequate central bank reserves, 
they may not have access to international liquidity or can do so only at very high costs. 
144 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
To reduce the liquidity risk, restrictions can be applied to maturity mismatches between 
foreign exchange assets and liabilities of  banks with a view to preventing borrowing short 
in international markets and lending long at home, through stricter liquidity and reserve 
requirements and even direct limits.
Similarly, it is important to restrict currency mismatches between bank assets and 
liabilities and to discourage banks from assuming the exchange rate risk. Banks with 
short foreign exchange positions (that is, where forex liabilities exceed assets) run the 
risk of  losses from depreciations while those with long positions lose from appreciations. 
Furthermore, maturity mismatches between forex assets and liabilities imply exposure to 
exchange rate risks even when assets are matched by liabilities in the aggregate. Currency 
mismatches can be restricted through quantitative limits on short and long positions 
(e.g., as a proportion of  equity or total portfolios) or high capital charges on foreign 
exchange exposures. In most cases it may be more appropriate to prohibit currency 
mismatches altogether.
The third important risk associated with foreign exchange borrowing and lending 
by banks is the exchange-rate-related credit risk. Banks can eliminate currency and 
maturity mismatches by lending in foreign currency, but unless their borrowers have 
foreign exchange earning capacity, this simply implies migration of  the exchange rate 
risk which, in turn, results in greater credit risk. This kind of  lending is particularly 
common in economies where an important part of  bank deposits are in foreign 
currencies. It also proved problematic in some countries in East Asia in the run-up to 
the 1997 crisis, where banks lent heavily in foreign currency for investment in property 
as well as to firms with little foreign exchange earning capacity. Such practices could 
be discouraged by applying higher risk weights and capital charges for foreign assets 
and more stringent standards of  provision for foreign currency loans, or by prohibiting 
altogether. However, evidence suggests that only a few emerging markets have 
addressed the vulnerabilities arising from currency-induced credits risks even though 
many of  them appear to have taken measures to reduce exposure to foreign exchange 
risks (Cayazzo et al. 2006). 
External financial fragility can no doubt be contained if  prudential regulations could 
be appropriately extended to address specific risks associated with capital flows. Contrary 
to a widely held view, however, this does not imply that capital account liberalization 
should not be a cause for concern if  it is accompanied by more comprehensive prudential 
regulations and supervision. First of  all, conventional risk assessment methods and 
prudential rules tend to aggravate the cyclicality of  the financial system. They need 
to be designed in a countercyclical fashion, tightened particularly at times of  strong 
surges in capital inflows.60 Second, regulatory safeguards are pretty ineffectual in the 
face of  macroeconomic shocks that can drastically alter the quality of  bank assets, and 
this is more so when the capital account is open. Finally, capital flows are not always 
intermediated by the domestic financial system. Indeed, the proportion of  bank-related 
capital flows has been falling rapidly in recent years, with portfolio and direct equity flows 
now accounting for a large proportion of  total inflows.61 Therefore, direct restrictions 
over foreign borrowing and investment as well as market access may have to play a key 
role in managing the risks associated with capital flows.
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When capital inflows are excessive, liberalization of  resident outflows is sometimes 
seen as an option to relieve the upward pressure on the currency. This is, in fact, 
an alternative to sterilized intervention and it avoids the cost of  carrying large 
stocks of  international reserves. But, like interventions, it effectively does nothing to 
prevent currency and maturity mismatches in private balance sheets, or instability 
and vulnerability to shocks associated with greater presence of  foreigners in domestic 
asset markets. It may encourage inflows, particularly the return of  flight capital of  
residents (Reinhart and Reinhart 1998). In countries with weak property rights, it 
could also facilitate asset stripping and money laundering (Yu 2009). Its rationale 
as a longer-term strategy for closer integration of  developing countries into global 
financial markets is highly contentious. As a countercyclical measure, it can be even 
more problematic: once introduced for cyclical reasons, it may not be easily rolled 
back when conditions change. Thus, unlike official reserves, these do not provide self-
insurance against payments and currency instability and may even aggravate them 
when market sentiments change. 
E. recent Experience in Asia
Capital account and exchange rate policies in many Asian countries in recent years 
have been shaped by a determination never to allow a repeat of  the 1997 crisis. 
A key lesson drawn from that experience is that if  capital inflows are allowed to 
create large currency and maturity mismatches in private sector balance sheets 
and unsustainable bubbles in asset markets under conditions of  weak payments 
and reserve positions, there is not much that governments can do at times of  a 
sudden stop and reversal of  these flows. There is, thus, an increased awareness that 
vulnerability to financial contagion and shocks depends in large part on how capital 
inflows are managed.
After a brief  interruption, capital flows to emerging markets recovered strongly 
in the earlier years of  this decade, and Asia has been among the main recipients. 
These flows were greatly influenced by the very same factors that led to a surge in 
speculative lending in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world − 
notably, ample global liquidity resulting from a policy of  easy money and search for 
yield. Rather than applying tighter countercyclical restrictions over capital inflows, 
most Asian countries chose to relax restrictions over resident outflows and to absorb 
excess supply of  foreign exchange in reserves while building strong payments positions 
by maintaining competitive exchange rates. In this way they have successfully avoided 
unsustainable currency appreciations and payments positions, and accumulated more 
than adequate international reserves to counter any potential current and capital 
account shocks without recourse to the IMF. However, they have not always been able 
to prevent capital inflows from generating asset, credit and investment bubbles and 
reduce the vulnerability of  domestic financial markets to adverse shocks and contagion 
from financial instability abroad. These policies are now exposing them to certain risks 
due to spillovers from the global financial turbulence, but not always of  the kind that 
hit the region in the 1990s.
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1. The surge in capital inflows
After falling to some $100 billion at the beginning of  the millennium, private flows to 
emerging markets picked up rapidly, reaching an estimated level of  $929 billion in 2007 
before falling drastically to an estimated $465 billion in 2008 (Table 4.5).62 Recovery in 
capital flows to Asia was also strong, exceeding $300 billion at their peak in 2007. In gross 
terms capital inflows to Asia as a proportion of  GDP have been close to historical highs, 
but in net terms they have been around the long-term average because of  increased 
resident outflows (IMF REOAP April 2007; IIF, October 2007). 
During 2003–2007, about 60 percent of  private capital inflows to Asia were in equity 
investment, of  which two-thirds were in direct equity and one-third in portfolio equity.63 
Equity flows were particularly strong in China where a relatively large proportion of  
financial inflows appear to have been motivated by expectations of  appreciation of  the 
yuan (Setser 2008; Yu 2008). Some of  these are reported to have entered the country 
through over-invoicing of  exports. According to some estimates, the so-called “hot 
money” amounted to $5–10 billion a month during 2007 (Anderlini 2007). 
India also received large amounts of  equity capital, but much of  this was in portfolio 
equity rather than foreign direct investment (FDI). This is also true for Malaysia where 
cumulative equity portfolio inflows during 2002–2007 were nine times cumulative inflows 
of  FDI (Khor 2009). Hedge funds from the United States and the United Kingdom have 
been very active in equity markets in the region, with assets managed by them being 
estimated to have grown sevenfold between 2001 and 2007. 
Following the cutback after the 1997 crisis, international bank lending in Asia started 
to exceed repayments in the early years of  this decade. There was a visible growth in 
syndicated loans privately placed by corporations in several countries. Private financial 
and nonfinancial corporations also engaged in carry-trade-style short-term external 
borrowing in India, Korea and the Philippines, particularly through low-interest yen-
linked loans. Highly leveraged hedge funds are also known to have been very active in 
carry trades in Asia. While restrictions on foreign entry to domestic bond markets were 
generally maintained, in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia there have been 
marked increases in foreign holding of  local-currency debt instruments. In the region 
as a whole, local claims of  foreign banks, including local bond holdings, as a percentage 
Total Asia
2004 2007 2008e 2004 2007 2008e
Capital Flows 348.8 928.6 465.8 165.6 314.8  96.2
Current Account 150.2 434.0 387.4 115.2 420.2 386.4
Reserve Increases 398.2 948.7 444.3 296.1 587.8 373.1
table 4.5: Private capital flows, current account balances, and changes in reserves in 
emerging markets (billions of  US dollars)
Source: IIF (January 2006; October 2007; January 2009). 
e. estimate.
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of  all foreign banks’ claims, more than doubled since the beginning of  the decade, 
suggesting a growing preference for international banks to lend in local currencies at 
higher rates. 
2. Policy response: Currency market interventions  
and reserve accumulation
As noted above, after the Asian crisis several countries in the region moved toward more 
flexible exchange rate arrangements. But they have followed various shades of  managed 
floating rather than leaving their currencies entirely to the whims of  international 
capital flows. In order to build a strong payments position, most countries in the region 
successfully intervened heavily in foreign exchange markets to prevent appreciations. 
Asian developing countries taken together had a current account surplus of  7 percent 
of  GDP in 2007 and over 5 percent in 2008, up from 1.5 percent in 2001. Although this is 
largely due to China’s strong export performance, a number of  other countries have also 
been enjoying surpluses, in some cases in double digit figures, as a percentage of  GDP. India 
has been running current account deficits, but at moderate levels. Among large countries, 
only in Pakistan and Vietnam have deficits reached high levels: 8.7 and 11.7 percent of  
GDP in 2008, respectively. Most Asian currencies were kept relatively stable in real terms, 
despite excess supply of  foreign exchange generated by capital inflows and current account 
surpluses, thanks to extensive interventions in currency markets (Table 4.4).
To keep liquidity expansion and inflation under control, governments tried to sterilize 
interventions by issuing debt and raising reserve requirements in the banking system. In 
China, government control over the financial system allowed it to keep the fiscal cost 
of  intervention down. Reserve requirements of  banks were continuously raised from 
7 percent in 2003 to 17.5 percent in 2008, and banks have come to hold over 80 percent 
of  central bank securities issued for that purpose, with their share in total bank assets 
exceeding 20 percent (Yu 2008; BIS 2009, box D4). In India the cash reserve ratio was 
also increased in several steps to reach 7.5 percent in 2008, but because of  higher interest 
rates the cost of  intervention is reported to have reached 2 percent of  GDP in 2007 − 
more than half  of  the central government deficits.64
As in some mature economies, monetary policy in many countries in Asia has been 
expansionary and real interest rates have been considerably lower than those in other 
regions. After 2003 private credit growth in real terms reached nearly 9 percent per 
annum in China and 5 percent in many other East Asian countries.65 The surge in capital 
flows was an important reason for the rapid expansion of  liquidity since interventions in 
foreign exchange markets could not always be fully sterilized. 
As of  the end of  2008 total reserves in developing Asia (excluding NIEs) exceeded 
$2.2 trillion, and 86 percent of  this figure was generated after 2001 (Table 4.6).66 Asian 
reserves now account for more than half  of  total reserves of  the developing world. The 
twin surpluses that the region as a whole has been running on its balance of  payments 
have been fully converted into reserves. Of  the $2.4 trillion reserves accumulated after 
2001, 60 percent is earned and the rest is borrowed. However, excluding China, almost 
three-quarters of  Asian reserves in recent years were from capital inflows. In countries 
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running current account deficits, such as India, Pakistan, and Vietnam, reserves are 100 
percent borrowed.
Asian reserves exceed the level needed to prevent a currency and balance of  payments 
crisis under the Greenspan–Guidotti rule noted above. They are several times the total 
short-term external debt of  the region, which stood at around $400 billion at the end 
of  2008, and more than twice the total external debt of  some $1,160 billion. They now 
cover more than nine months of  imports. However, in many countries reserves are not 
large in comparison with the stock of  foreign portfolio investment. In 2008 the ratio of  
the latter to total reserves was greater than unity in Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines 
and exceeded 80 percent in Singapore and Malaysia (ESCAP 2008). About half  of  the 
total stock of  reserves in Asia is borrowed. This is a little more than the existing stock of  
external debt of  the region. Again assuming a 500 basis point spread, this would give an 
annual carry cost of  some $60 billion for the region as a whole − that is, this is how much 
the region as a whole could save per year by paying up its external debt by drawing on 
reserves.67 
3. Policy response: liberalization of  resident outflows
Many Asian emerging markets have been incurring high reserve costs and facing 
macroeconomic policy dilemmas mainly because they have chosen to keep their economies 
open to the surge in capital inflows rather than imposing tighter countercyclical measures 
of  control. Capital accounts in the region are more open today than they were during 
the 1997 crisis.68 In China, for instance, one of  the countries with the tightest restrictions, 
calculations based on an IMF formula are said to show that 80 percent of  the capital 























table 4.6: Current account and reservesa (billions of  US dollars)
Source: IMF WEO (October 2008). 
a. 2008 figures are estimates.
b. Cumulative current account balance over 2002–2008.
c. Difference between increases in reserves and cumulative current account balance over 2002–2008.
d. Months of  imports covered by reserves.
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In several cases the opening to inflows has been selective, such as raising the limits on 
the QFII (qualified foreign institutional investors) in China. Some countries, including 
India, have liberalized sectoral caps on FDI. Foreign banks have generally been allowed 
greater freedom to operate, with many domestic borrowers receiving funding from such 
banks directly from abroad or through their local offices. 
There have been, to be sure, some efforts to curb excessive inflows in order to ease the 
upward pressure on currencies. In 2006 China extended to foreign banks the restriction 
over borrowing abroad to fund domestic dollar assets. In 2007 its foreign exchange 
regulators took action against ten international banks for breaching capital account 
regulations by “assisting speculative foreign capital to enter the country disguised as trade 
and investment” (Anderlini 2007). Exporters have been required to park their export 
revenues in temporary accounts in order to enable officials to check and verify that 
invoices are backed by genuine trade transactions. 
In December 2006 Thailand imposed a 30 percent unremunerated reserve 
requirement on capital inflows held less than one year, including investment in portfolio 
equity, in order to halt continued appreciation of  the currency. This provoked a strong 
reaction from the stock market, forcing the government to exempt investment in stocks 
from the requirements. The remaining restrictions were removed in March 2008. With 
a continued surge in capital inflows, India reversed the liberalization of  the limits on 
external commercial borrowing, tightening them in 2007. Similarly, Korea restricted 
external funding of  domestic lending by foreign banks and reintroduced limits on lending 
in foreign currency to domestic firms. 
However, the main response to the surge in capital inflows has been to liberalize 
outward investment by residents. This is partly motivated by a desire to allow 
national firms to expand abroad and become important players in world markets. 
This has particularly been the case in China and India. However, while in China 
assets acquired abroad are financed from trade surpluses, in India these are, in effect, 
funded by capital inflows. As remarked by an observer, “the global flood of  money 
(and attendant hubris) has enabled Indian companies like Tata to buy themselves a 
place on the world stage rather than earning it through export success or technological 
advance” (Bowring 2008a). 
There has also been considerable liberalization of  portfolio outflows. China took a 
decision to permit investment by its residents in approved overseas markets and raised 
the limits on corporate and individual purchases of  foreign currency for mitigating the 
pressure for appreciation through the so-called QDII (qualified domestic institutional 
investor) scheme. The share of  portfolio investment in the total international assets 
of  China in 2006 was three times that of  FDI abroad. In Malaysia, where limits 
on foreign assets held by some institutional investors were increased significantly, 
cumulative portfolio outflows during 2004–2007 were slightly below cumulative 
portfolio inflows and nine times direct investment abroad. In 2007 there was a net 
outflow of  capital (excluding reserve accumulation), which absorbed as much as 
half  of  the current account surplus (Khor 2009). India, Korea and Thailand have 
all liberalized rules limiting portfolio investment abroad, and Thailand abolished the 
surrender requirement for exporters. 
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4. Credit, asset and investment bubbles
Recent capital inflows have resulted in a rapid increase in foreign presence in Asian 
equity markets. Figures for net equity inflows understate this because, as noted, there has 
also been a rapid increase in resident outflows. Nonresident holding of  Korean equities 
reached almost half  of  market capitalization (McCauley 2008). In China foreign share 
as a percentage of  market capitalization rose from 2.5 percent in 2001 to 23.2 percent 
in 2006, and in India from 6.6 percent to 10 percent in the same period (BIS 2009, table 
E1). The share of  foreigner transactions in 2005 in average daily turnover was around 
20 percent in Korea, 30 percent in Thailand and 70 percent in Taiwan (Chai-Anant and 
Ho 2008).
There is also strong evidence that foreign investors tend to move in and out of  some 
of  the different Asian markets simultaneously. The IMF Global Financial Stability 
Report (IMF GFSR, October 2007) finds evidence on herd behavior among institutional 
investors. BIS (2009, 69) notes that increased market liquidity resulting from greater 
participation of  foreigners in equity markets tends to reduce day-to-day volatility, but 
also argues that “even highly liquid markets do not insulate EME [emerging market 
economy] equity markets from a global retrenchment in risk appetite or a withdrawal of  
foreign investors.”
Large investment by foreigners in equity markets, together with the consequent 
expansion of  liquidity associated with the surge in capital inflows, have both been the 
cause and effect of  sharp increases in stock prices in several Asian markets.70 This is also 
suggested by a strong correlation between changes in net portfolio equity flows and stock 
prices in Asia − much stronger than that observed in Latin America (IIF October 2007, 
chart 13). For the region as a whole equity prices tripled between 2002 and 2008, with 
increases exceeding 500 percent in China and India. The price−earnings ratios also 
rose rapidly, resulting in a sharp drop in equity costs.71 That such increases more likely 
reflected bubbles than improvements in underlining fundamentals was cautioned by the 
Institute of  International Finance (IIF March 2005, 4): “there is a risk that the pickup 
in flows into some emerging market assets has pushed valuations to levels that are not 
commensurate with underlying fundamentals.” 
The two largest countries, China and India, that saw the strongest surge in capital 
inflows and stock markets also experienced a boom in property markets. During 
2002–2006 residential property prices rose in real terms by over 8 percent per annum in 
China and 10 percent in India, and the price-to-rent ratio rose by more than 20 percent.72 
There was also acceleration of  property price increases in Korea (15 percent), Singapore 
and Vietnam during 2006–2007. While these were not as dramatic as increases in the 
United States − where the price-to-rent ratio rose by 30 percent over the same period − 
there are large pockets in China, India, Korea and the Philippines where increases 
were comparable and even greater.73 Housing loans expanded faster than other types 
of  lending and have been a major factor in sharp increases in household indebtedness. 
In Korea where bank lending to households grew rapidly after 2005, household debt 
reached 140 percent of  disposable income − above the level of  household indebtedness 
in the United States (ADB 2007).
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Such booms in equity and property markets are often a potential source of  
macroeconomic instability. There is evidence, not only from industrial countries but also 
from a number of  Asian emerging markets, including Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, that asset booms 
(defined as periods in which asset prices exceed their trend by more than 10 percent) 
significantly raise the probability of  output being eventually pushed below its potential 
level, and the price level above its trend (Gochoco-Bautista 2008). 
In China and India ample liquidity, low equity costs and low loan rates together 
have also created an investment boom, which may not be sustained with the return of  
normal financial conditions. In China where the share of  investment in GDP reached 46 
percent, the increase appears to have been associated with considerable excess capacity 
and wastage of  capital.74 Similarly, in India growth in investment has been faster than 
GDP by more than 5 percentage points per annum, with the investment ratio rising to 
over 30 percent of  GDP from less than 24 percent in the early years of  the decade.
5. Shocks and contagion from the global financial crisis
As a result of  closer global financial integration, notably the increased presence of  
foreigners in domestic financial markets and liberalization of  resident investment abroad, 
Asia has become highly susceptible to external financial influences. The region has 
indeed been receiving severe shocks and contagion from the global financial turbulence 
triggered by the subprime debacle through various channels, and facing the risk of  asset 
deflation, a high degree of  currency instability, and a sharp economic slowdown.
The increased holding of  foreign assets has no doubt resulted in greater exposure to 
instability in their market valuations as well as exchange rate swings. Asian economies 
do not have large direct exposure to securitized assets linked to subprime lending, 
even though some losses have been reported in the region.75 However, they appear to 
have invested large amounts in debt issued by United States Government–sponsored 
enterprises, including mortgage firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with combined 
liabilities of  around $5.5 trillion. Holding by central banks outside the United States of  
such debt is estimated to be in the order of  $1 trillion, and large amounts are also known 
to be held in private portfolios. China’s holding of  US agency debt is estimated to be 
at least 10 percent of  its GDP, mostly in Fannie and Freddie assets (Pesek 2008). Had 
the United States government not bailed out these institutions, losses would have been 
severe. Moreover, should the dollar come under pressure, countries with a large stock of  
dollar reserves stand to incur considerable exchange rate losses. 
There is considerable variation among Asian emerging markets in their vulnerability 
to sharp swings in the risk appetite and capital flows. Capital flows to emerging markets, 
including bank-related flows, initially kept up after the outbreak of  the subprime crisis, 
but with the deepening of  the credit crunch there is now a sharp decline that is more 
marked in Asia than in other regions (Table 4.5). FDI remained relatively resilient, but 
with the widespread credit crunch in the United States and Europe there has been a sharp 
drop in commercial bank credits, from $156 billion to an estimated $30 billion, and this is 
expected to turn negative in 2009. Net portfolio equity flows to Asia, including outflows 
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by residents, were already negative in 2007, and they are expected to have become even 
bigger in 2008, reaching $55 billion.76 Redemption by highly-leveraged hedge funds from 
the United States and the United Kingdom is an important factor. These institutions, 
which had been very active in Asian equity markets in earlier years, are now hard hit by 
the crisis, and deleveraging by them appears to be a main reason for the exit of  equity 
portfolio investment not only from Asia but also from emerging markets as a whole.77 
With the rapid exit of  foreign capital and global retrenchment of  risk appetite, asset 
bubbles in Asia have come to an end. Equity markets lost almost half  of  their values in 2008 
in China and India. Booms in property markets too are now bust. In China house prices 
declined in December 2008 for the first time since the government started releasing the 
data in 2005, and urban fixed asset investment has been falling since September 2008. The 
government is now taking measures to revive the property market.78 In Korea the slump 
that started in 2008 is now threatening to set off  a process of  debt deflation, reminiscent of  
the 1997 crisis when housing prices fell by some 13 percent (Citigroup 2009). 
This cycle in Asian asset markets has many features reminiscent of  the cycle in the 1990s, 
but is different in an important respect. In the current cycle asset deflation is not associated 
with currency crises and interest rate hikes, but severe trade shocks. The combination of  
asset deflation with sharp drops in exports and consequent retrenchment in investment 
can no doubt wreak havoc in the real economy.79 This explains why in Asia “the slump in 
industrial production has been more significant and more rapid than in 1997–98.”80 
It is important to avoid destabilizing feedbacks between the real and financial sectors, 
particularly in China because of  its wider regional ramifications. A sharp drop in growth 
can threaten the solvency of  the banking system given the high degree of  leverage of  
many firms, which can in turn lower growth further.81 Whether or not the massive fiscal 
package introduced by the government would prevent such an outcome remains to be 
seen. In any event, the challenge faced by China is not only to overcome the deflationary 
impulses from the global financial crisis but to shift to a growth trajectory led by the 
expansion of  domestic consumption. 
Because of  the sharp slowdown in total capital flows and reversal of  portfolio flows, 
several currencies that had faced strong upward pressure against the dollar and the yuan 
after 2003, particularly the Indian rupee, Korean won and Thai baht, have been falling 
sharply against both currencies since summer 2008 (Table 4.7). Given strong deflationary 
impulses from the crisis, this may be viewed as a welcome development; and unlike in 
1997, governments now seem to be wary of  throwing all their reserves into stabilizing their 
currencies. However, in some of  these countries, notably India and Korea, reserves have 
declined rapidly as a result of  exit of  capital and growing current account deficits.82 
F. regional Monetary Cooperation for Stability
1. Global instability and the search for regional solutions
The main objective of  the planners of  the postwar economic architecture was to avoid 
the repetition of  the breakdown of  international trade and payments that had devastated 
the world economy during the interwar years. Exchange rate stability was believed to 
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hold the key to the realization of  this objective. This was most emphatically expressed 
by Keynes (1980, 5) during the Bretton Woods negotiations: “Tariffs and currency 
depreciations are in many alternatives. Without currency agreements you have no firm 
ground on which to discuss tariffs […] It is very difficult while you have monetary chaos 
to have order of  any kind in other directions.” The Bretton Woods architecture was 
based on three legs: multilateral discipline over exchange rate policies, restrictions over 
destabilizing capital flows, and provision of  adequate international liquidity to countries 
facing temporary payments imbalances. 
The convertibility of  the dollar vis-à-vis gold at a fixed rate was designed to exert 
multilateral discipline over policies of  the main reserve currency country, the United 
States. Other countries undertook obligation to maintain their exchange rates within 
a narrow range of  their par values and were allowed to change their par values under 
fundamental disequilibrium only with the consent of  the Fund. Restriction over short-
term capital flows, which had proved highly destabilizing during the interwar years, 
was seen as a key to stability of  exchange rates. The IMF was to provide short-term 
financing to countries facing temporary shortfalls in international liquidity in order to 
avoid destabilizing currency adjustments, retrenchment in domestic absorption, and 
contraction in economic activity. 
All three building blocks of  the Bretton Woods system disappeared in the early 1970s 
with the default of  the United States on gold convertibility and adoption of  floating with 
incongruous commitments to exchange rate stability. Free movement of  capital became 
the norm. And the IMF started to impose exactly the kind of  procyclical policies that the 
postwar planners wanted to avoid in countries facing temporary payments difficulties.
Europe sought to maintain a certain degree of  multilateral discipline over exchange 
rate policies among the countries in the region, having suffered most from political 
Dollar rates Yuan rates
Boom Bust Boom Bust
Chinese Yuan 9.3 10.7 − −
Indian Rupee 19.2 −16.6 9.0 −26.2
Indonesian Rupiah −2.7 −20.0 −1.0  −27.7
Malaysian Ringgit 10.0 −4.5 0.6  −13.8
Philippine Peso 7.9 −3.0 7.9 −12.4
Singapore Dollar 14.7 0.3 4.9 −9.5
S. Korean Won 28.8 −33.5 7.8 −40.0
Taiwan Dollar 5.9 −2.7 −3.2 −12.1
Thai Baht 43.4 −14.3 30.9 −22.6
table 4.7: Exchange rate swings in Asia during subprime bubble and bust (percentage 
change in nominal bilateral rates)
Source: OANDA
Boom: From January 2003 to July 2007.
Bust: From August 2007 to February 2009.
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fallouts from instability and the collapse of  world trade and payments in the interwar 
years. It agreed to float against the dollar but decided to try to stabilize intraregional 
exchange rates, since a move to free floating among the European countries would pose 
a serious threat of  instability and disruption to intraregional trade, given a high degree 
of  regional integration. Initial efforts to stabilize intra-European exchange rates through 
ad hoc arrangements led to the creation of  the European Monetary System (EMS) in 
1979, which culminated in the European Monetary Union (EMU) three decades later.83
Instability among reserve currencies after the breakdown of  the Bretton Woods system 
had a relatively limited impact on developing countries that were pursuing intermediate 
exchange rate regimes under relatively tight control over capital flows. But shortcomings 
of  the third leg of  the Bretton Woods arrangements − the provision of  adequate 
international liquidity by the IMF − became highly visible with the increased volatility 
of  the global economic environment, particularly in the early 1980s when a combination 
of  hikes in interest rates and recession in industrial countries produced severe payments 
difficulties in several indebted countries, culminating in a debt crisis in Latin America. 
These shortcomings became even more visible with the 1997 Asian crisis. Realizing 
that developing countries could no longer rely on international financial institutions 
to address their liquidity problems during such times, an attempt was made to bring a 
regional solution by establishing an Asian Monetary Fund. After this was abandoned 
because of  opposition from the United States and the IMF, the “ASEAN+3” (the ten 
members of  the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan and Korea) 
went ahead with swap arrangements with the so-called Chiang Mai initiative, building 
on the existing ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) established in 1977.84 However, the 
initiative was largely symbolic, since the swap lines agreed would have been inadequate 
in the face of  a strong region-wide attack on currencies. Thus, countries went for a more 
reliable solution by accumulating large stocks of  international reserves. 
Again, with the spread of  shocks and contagion from the global financial crisis in 
2008, ASEAN+3 decided to establish an $80 billion fund to safeguard regional stability, 
replacing the existing bilateral currency swaps under the Chiang Mai Initiative with a 
reserve pooling mechanism (called the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization) and 
coming closer to a regional monetary fund. Subsequently, the amount was raised in 
February 2009 to $120 billion as pressure mounted on currencies and reserves of  several 
countries, to be accompanied by an independent regional surveillance mechanism to 
help determine the conditions for activation of  and access to the Fund.85 There have 
also been further bilateral swap agreements among some countries in the region, e.g., 
between China and Korea, Japan and Indonesia, and Korea and Japan. 
These initiatives no doubt reflect a shared concern over currency instability, against 
a background of  rapidly deepening regional integration through trade and investment. 
However, the region lacks effective arrangements for the coordination of  exchange rate 
policies. It is true that recent sharp swings in intraregional exchange rates (Table 4.7) 
have been greatly influenced by differences in capital flows, current account balances, 
and macroeconomic conditions in different countries. Nevertheless, their origin also lies 
in differences in currency regimes pursued by the countries in the region, which now span 
the entire spectrum between the two corners, compared to widespread de facto dollar 
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pegs before the crisis. At one corner there are economies with independent floating − 
Japan, Korea and the Philippines; at another there is Hong Kong with a currency board. 
The intermediate regimes adopted in the region also show significant variations, with 
China and Malaysia using very tightly managed pegs against Thailand’s and Singapore’s 
more flexible regimes.86
The coexistence of  a variety of  regimes in East Asia implies that the intraregional 
exchange rates tend to manifest a high degree of  instability in periods of  large swings in 
the dollar. Lack of  regional cooperation in exchange rate policies is of  particular concern 
in the current juncture not only because the ongoing instability evokes the memories 
of  contagion that led to a severe crisis about a decade ago but also because contraction 
in export markets often raises the temptation of  beggar-my-neighbor exchange rate 
adjustments. 
2. Rationale for exchange rate cooperation in East Asia
Significant changes in policy and institutions often follow severe economic shocks and 
disruptions. The Bretton Woods system was established after the world went through 
one of  the bloodiest armed conflicts in the history of  mankind following the breakdown 
of  international trade and payments in the interwar period. The European process of  
monetary integration was triggered by the collapse of  the Bretton Woods system, and the 
Asian monetary cooperation was sparked off  by the 1997 crisis. Now, the global spread 
of  financial crisis is giving rise to several initiatives for tighter regulation of  international 
financial markets. Likewise, current difficulties provide considerable food for thought for 
deeper monetary integration in East Asia, including a common currency regime and, 
eventually, a monetary union. 
It is generally recognized that Asia lacks a culture of  regionalism, that is, the political 
will and regional institutions needed for such a drastic change. To date regional economic 
integration in Asia has been driven by markets, notably by transnational corporations, 
rather than by governments. By contrast, the European integration was a politically driven 
process based on postwar transnational reconciliation in Franco-German relations, and 
on a shared vision by political left and right alike that regional political stability depended 
crucially on economic integration and stability. Such a reconciliation is lacking in East 
Asia where some countries have still failed to come to terms with their past. This is no 
doubt a major impediment to regional monetary integration even though there appears 
to be a strong economic rationale for it. Nevertheless, exploring various options can still 
help prepare the ground for the time when political realities become favorable, even 
though at present such efforts may appear to be no more than academic exercises. After 
all, history teaches that big changes almost always look implausible until they happen.87 
East Asia has been undergoing rapid economic integration associated with fast 
and broad-based growth. Intraregional trade among ASEAN+3 has been growing 
faster than trade with the rest of  the world.88 Intraregional exchange rates no doubt 
play an increasingly important role in determining the division of  labor in the region. 
Maintaining stable and properly aligned currencies is essential for this process to be 
driven by underlying economic fundamentals, and for preventing financial instability and 
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trade tensions in the region. It is quite unlikely that these objectives could be achieved 
with each country acting alone. They require closer monetary and financial cooperation 
to underpin the ongoing regional economic integration. 
The main benefit of  a regional monetary integration comes from greater currency, 
payments and financial stability. This depends, of  course, on how integration is 
designed, including supporting institutions and mechanisms. The European experience 
in this respect is quite encouraging. Despite the temporary setbacks in 1992–93 and 
shortcomings in the design of  policies and institutional arrangements (to be discussed 
below), the EMS was very successful in securing stability in intraregional exchange 
rates, containing financial contagion, and dealing with fluctuations vis-à-vis the dollar 
and the yen. The main beneficiaries were smaller economies. Although they had lost 
monetary policy autonomy vis-à-vis Germany as the anchor currency country, they 
gained considerable strength vis-à-vis international financial markets. Besides, none of  
these countries, including Greece, Ireland and Portugal, had to go to the IMF after the 
establishment of  the EMS in 1979, even though economically they were less advanced 
than Korea when it had to resort to IMF support in 1997. In the absence of  the EMS, 
open and smaller European countries would have had little option but to peg their 
currencies to the deutschmark and follow German monetary policy without enjoying the 
protection and support provided by the EMS. 
The cost of  giving up autonomy in exchange rate policy depends on the difficulties 
this would cause in maintaining stable and high levels of  employment and economic 
activity. This issue is often examined in terms of  whether the countries concerned could 
form an optimal currency area (OCA). According to the OCA theory, a monetary union 
would bring benefits if  the economies concerned are sufficiently closely integrated, the 
shocks they are expected to receive are symmetrical, and their labor markets are flexible 
enough to absorb such shocks without causing unemployment. 
Several studies examined empirically whether East Asia (ASEAN and/or ASEAN+3) 
adequately meets the conditions for a monetary union so as to generate benefits to all its 
potential members, often taking the European Union as a reference point. As in most 
empirical studies of  this kind, the findings are inconclusive. According to some, Asia is too 
diverse to meet the criteria for an OCA: intraregional trade and financial integration are 
limited, and regional shocks are not always symmetrical. According to others, however, 
it comes very close to meeting OCA conditions: income gaps of  Asian countries have 
been closing not only with the rest of  the world but also with each other, business cycles 
are closely correlated, and the shocks they receive are sufficiently symmetrical because of  
similarities in their trade patterns and integration into the global financial system. 
A study by Goto and Hamada (1994) found that in some areas East Asia was more 
closely integrated than Europe. Similarly, an analysis conducted at the beginning of  
this decade showed that, in terms of  various economic criteria, the region was no less 
ready for a regional monetary arrangement than Europe was before the EMU (Kawai 
and Takagi 2000). Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1999) came to the conclusion that East 
Asian countries satisfied the standard OCA conditions almost as well as Europe and 
that a common currency peg would be particularly beneficial for smaller and more open 
economies, while pointing out that because of  the lack of  an institutional framework 
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such an arrangement would be risky. A subsequent study by Kawai and Motonishi 
(2005) reached a similar conclusion. According to Bayoumi and Mauro (1999) and 
Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro (2000), ASEAN is less suited for a regional currency 
arrangement than Europe was before the Maastricht Treaty, although the difference is 
not large. Plummer and Wignaraja (2007) argue, on the basis of  increased correlation 
of  business cycles, that the economic potential for monetary integration is strong, while 
Zhang, Sato, and McAleer (2004) maintain that labor markets in East Asia are no less 
flexible than in Europe. By contrast, Nicolas (1999) contends that similarity in ASEAN 
countries are exaggerated because of  high levels of  aggregation, and Chow and Kim 
(2003) and Kim (2007) find that macroeconomic shocks are quite asymmetric and 
heterogeneous not only in East Asia but also within ASEAN. More recently, Shirono 
(2008) has followed a different approach, focusing on the trade aspects of  monetary 
integration, and found that a currency union could double bilateral trade in the region 
and bring welfare benefits, particularly if  Japan were included. 
 While the OCA theory provides insight into understanding the factors affecting the 
costs and benefits of  a monetary integration, it cannot be relied on to draw practical 
guidelines to decisions over monetary union. First, it pays little attention to costs of  
potential conflicts that may arise from beggar-my-neighbor trade, FDI, and exchange 
rate policies. Second, the theory does not provide thresholds on the degree of  integration, 
symmetry in shocks, or labor market flexibility by which to judge whether conditions for 
the OCA are reasonably met. There are indeed studies that show that neither Europe nor 
the United States forms an OCA, with the costs of  using a single currency exceeding the 
benefits in both cases; and that for Germany it would not be economically advantageous 
to join a monetary union (Ghosh and Wolf  1994). 
More importantly, the theory of  OCA ignores that trade patterns and income levels 
are endogenous; that is, joining a monetary union is likely to move countries closer to 
each other and hence to the conditions for an OCA. This has clearly been the case 
in Europe where considerable convergence of  income and macroeconomic conditions 
occurred throughout the process of  integration culminating in the EMU.89 However, 
it is also important to recognize that endogenous convergence depends very much on 
institutional and behavioral changes that would be required to manage integration and 
to compensate for the loss of  the exchange rate instrument − issues to which the theory 
of  OCA pays little attention (Buiter 1995). 
Intraregional trade was no doubt much higher in Europe than it is in East Asia today, 
reaching almost 70 percent of  total trade of  the former, compared to less than 50 percent 
in the latter. But in East Asia, too, it is likely to reach similar magnitudes if  recent trends 
are maintained, and if  initiatives such as the ASEAN Economic Community can be put 
into practice and extended to include China and Korea. Besides, intraregional trade 
and monetary integration can constitute mutually reinforcing processes in East Asia in 
the same way as they have in Europe: stable exchange rates help to expand trade and 
deepen regional economic integration, which can, in turn, achieve greater convergence 
to conditions needed to increase the benefits from common currency arrangements.
The contagion which spread the currency attacks during the 1997 crisis from Thailand 
to several other countries was partly caused by the belief  that regional integration was 
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deep enough to trigger competitive devaluations. In reality there is both competition and 
complementarity in East Asian trade. An important part of  trade among the countries 
of  the region is complementary intra-industry trade in intermediate goods linked to 
international production networks, with China at the center.90 In these networks based on 
vertical intra-industry trade specialization, China imports components and parts (mostly 
from the NIEs) and capital goods (mainly from Japan and Korea) as inputs into consumer 
goods exported largely to industrial countries, but also partly to other developing 
countries, including in the region.91 Clearly, this is different from western-European-type 
intra-industry trade, where countries both import and export final products produced 
by the same industries and compete in these markets. In vertical production networks 
competition is largely among countries supplying intermediate goods (e.g., computer 
chips) rather than in markets for final consumer products. 
Although intra-industry trade in final consumables has also been developing rapidly 
in East Asia, the increase in intraregional trade over the past decade is largely due to the 
growth of  trade between China and other East Asian countries within industry-specific 
production networks, mirroring the rapid growth of  Chinese exports to the United States 
and the European Union. Thus, trade shocks from advanced economies tend to generate 
symmetrical effects across the region. Because of  a high degree of  import content of  
Chinese assembly industries, a one dollar decline in China’s exports to the United States 
and Europe tends to reduce its imports from the rest of  East Asia by more than a one 
dollar decline in its domestic consumption. This is clearly seen in the current crisis, during 
which declines in China’s exports to the United States and Europe are mirrored by sharp 
contractions in its imports from the region and intraregional trade, with all major Asian 
economies experiencing double digit drops in exports. 
Competition among East Asian countries in the United States and European markets 
for final products appears to be more intense than competition in intraregional trade 
in these products. Not only did the countries hit by the 1997 crisis export to the same 
destinations but they also exported the same products. Their exports to the United 
States were concentrated in two groups, namely, (i) semiconductors and capital goods 
industries, and (ii) apparel, footwear and household goods (Kochhar, Loungani and 
Stone 1998, 18–19). Competition among Asian producers in third markets has certainly 
intensified since the 1997 crisis with growing penetration of  China in the United States 
and European markets in areas of  export interest to other Asian NIEs. 
In finance, Asian regional integration is much more limited than in trade (MAS 
2007, chap. 5; Kawai 2007). In fact Asia is integrated more closely with global financial 
markets than regionally. A very large proportion of  portfolio investment in Asia comes 
from the United States and Europe, which also constitute the main destinations for Asian 
portfolio investment abroad. This provides a strong rationale for closer regional monetary 
cooperation because it implies, in effect, that Asian emerging markets are exposed to 
similar external financial shocks and contagion, and require similar policy responses. 
As already discussed, this has indeed been the case in the current global turmoil where 
such shocks have caused sharp declines in asset markets across the region. Such common 
financial shocks and contagion are generally neglected in the literature on OCA, which 
tends to focus on real supply and demand shocks.
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3. Options for regional currency arrangements
As noted above, the main objective of  European monetary cooperation after the collapse 
of  the Bretton Woods system was to secure intraregional stability while floating collectively 
vis-à-vis the dollar and other reserve currencies. After the initial and barely successful 
experiments with “snake” and “snake in the tunnel,” parity grids were established for 
each member currency vis-à-vis all other ERM currencies in two tier bands of  ± 2.25 
percent, with the Italian lira enjoying a wider band of  ± 6 percent, widened further to 
±15 percent when it came under attack in the early 1990s.92 The ERM was anchored 
to the deutschmark not only because it was the main reserve currency in the region but 
also because Germany was a large economy with a good track record in price stability. 
France was also big but not stable, while Holland was stable but not big enough (Bofinger 
and Flassbeck 2000). Joint intervention and unlimited short-term bilateral credits to 
weak currency countries were the main instruments for maintaining currencies in parity 
grids. Parity adjustments were allowed to prevent build-up of  fundamental disequilibria, 
at least until the 1987 Basel–Nyborg agreement, which sought to avoid further parity 
changes by liberalizing intramarginal interventions in order to strengthen the credibility 
of  the EMS.93 
Could and should East Asia try to replicate the European experience by aiming 
at intraregional stability while adopting a benign neglect toward the values of  their 
currencies vis-à-vis the rest of  the world? Or should they go for a common mechanism 
designed to attain both internal and external stability, with provisions for appropriate 
adjustments if  and when needed? What are the options in common exchange rate 
arrangements?
Replicating the ERM in East Asia can pose serious problems. First of  all, there 
would be practical difficulties in pegging bilaterally and floating collectively without an 
independently floating reserve currency as an anchor. The yen is the only such currency 
at present, but there are political impediments to forming intraregional currency 
arrangements around the yen. More importantly, floating collectively − with or without 
an anchor reserve currency − would mean a significant degree of  instability vis-à-vis 
third currencies. This would not have mattered much if  East Asian developing countries 
traded mainly with each other and/or competed among themselves in third markets. 
But for the region as a whole and for most countries, the share of  non–East Asian 
trade as a proportion of  GDP is still very high and competition from third countries 
is quite intense. This means that fluctuations vis-à-vis third currencies could generate 
considerable swings in economic activity and undermine export-led growth strategies.94 
Adopting managed floating vis-à-vis the rest of  the world would also be difficult without 
an internal reserve currency as an anchor. Thus, an AMS modelled on the EMS, with 
or without management of  external parities, may have to wait until the Chinese yuan 
becomes a fully convertible world currency.
If  the main objective is simply to maintain a stable pattern of  intraregional exchange 
rates, a solution would be to move collectively to the other corner and fix all regional 
currencies to a reserve currency, notably the dollar.95 This was advocated by McKinnon 
(2001) for most East Asian countries on grounds that soon after the 1997 crisis they had 
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all gone back to some form of  de facto dollar peg, but lack of  any formal agreement left 
the door open to beggar-my-neighbor exchange rate policies, instability and contagion. 
By this view, such threats could be avoided by a collective formal dollar peg, which would 
also insulate the intraregional exchange rates against fluctuations in the dollar. In order 
to avoid instability, it is argued, it would be necessary to strengthen prudential regulations 
limiting banks’ foreign exchange exposures.
As noted above, since the beginning of  the decade, Asian developing countries have 
moved away from dollar pegs toward intermediate regimes of  managed floating. Indeed, 
as indicated by wildly disparate fluctuations of  regional currencies against the dollar since 
2003 (Table 4.7), the region is not a de facto dollar block. Returning to the dollar peg 
could defeat the central objective of  improving the ability of  the countries to collectively 
manage their exchange rates in the service of  stability and growth. Unilateral pegging to 
the dollar is not the same thing as going into a monetary union with the United States, 
since it would not entail any commitment on the part of  the latter country in the conduct 
of  its monetary and exchange rate policies, or for financial support. The consequences of  
loss of  monetary autonomy could be particularly severe given that the United States and 
East Asia do not come close to forming an OCA. Moreover, fixing to the dollar would 
not eliminate instability vis-à-vis third currencies and, hence, of  effective exchange rates. 
Nor can the vulnerability of  such a regime to instability and crises be easily eliminated 
through standard prudential regulations for reasons discussed in Section D, above. Such 
a solution may be appropriate for countries looking for a credible external anchor to 
stabilize the domestic price level, but not for East Asia, where the record in monetary and 
fiscal discipline is as good as, and even better than, the United States.96
An alternative proposal is to collectively target a basket of  three reserve currencies, 
rather than the dollar alone, with a common set of  weights determined on the basis of  
regional trade shares.97 Each country would announce a central parity vis-à-vis the basket 
and commit to keep it within a unilaterally chosen band. There would be no restrictions 
over the choice of  the exchange rate regime by individual countries; that is, each country 
would be free to choose its own regime with respect to the common basket, including 
hard pegs and managed floating, provided that its exchange rate action is disciplined by 
the central basket rate. Thus, Hong Kong could stick to its currency board, except that 
it would now fix its currency to the common basket rather than the dollar, and China, 
Malaysia and Singapore could all continue with their own variants of  the BBC regime 
provided that they were willing to have their intervention disciplined by the central 
basket rate.98 A restoration clause is proposed whereby countries would be allowed to 
temporarily suspend the peg when confronted with a massive speculative attack, with 
a credible commitment to return to the original parity as soon as practical. However, 
central parity and the band would also be allowed to crawl in response to changes in 
economic fundamentals and large and durable shocks. 
Here, too, as in the dollar peg, changes among reserve currencies would not affect 
intraregional exchange rates: in other words, if  each economy stabilizes its currency 
vis-à-vis a common basket of  reserve currencies, they would also stabilize against each 
other. Moreover, the common basket peg would have the advantage of  securing greater 
stability of  effective exchange rates. However, these can still show considerable instability 
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since weights used in the common basket would diverge from the optimal weights in 
unilateral country baskets. The compromise needed regarding the weights to be used 
in the common basket may face political hurdles when the trade of  countries with the 
three reserve currency countries differs widely. However, instability in effective exchange 
rates caused by pegging to a common basket (rather than their own optimal baskets) is 
expected to diminish over time as countries move closer to each other and, hence, toward 
the conditions for an OCA.
The proposed system is more flexible and less formal than the EMS. It does not call 
for a drastic change in the existing exchange rate regimes except for changing the target 
currency to a basket of  three reserve currencies with common weights. Moreover, its 
implementation would not depend on the existence of  an anchor reserve currency in the 
region. An argument advanced against a common East Asian basket system is that, in the 
absence of  support by the three reserve currency countries, it would not be able to stand 
a determined speculation even under the Chiang Mai Initiative.99 However, this would 
not be a problem if  East Asia could collectively maintain a current account surplus and 
large amounts of  reserves, and establish adequate intraregional credit lines. 
The major problem, however, is that such an informal and flexible arrangement would 
not secure adequate discipline and commitment. Here, unlike in the EMS, central parities 
and bands would be unilaterally determined. Since any band width with a central parity 
in the common basket is permissible, there can be considerable intraregional instability 
unrelated to shifts among the reserve currencies. Although changes in exchange rates 
unwarranted by changes in the basket currencies can be challenged by other members, 
this might not be very effective if  there is no commitment to defend a particular rate.100 
On the other hand, despite the restoration rule, the proposed arrangement would not 
have effective safeguards against arbitrary changes in the central parity and even bands, 
and would not eliminate the scope for beggar-my-neighbor parity adjustments. Thus, it 
can only be an initial step until there is an economic and political convergence toward 
conditions needed for a formal and more tightly regulated system.101 
Given the difficulties posed by soft regimes, and the lack of  political will and solidarity 
to put in place more robust institutions and currency arrangements, it is sometimes 
suggested that Asia should make an even slower start by replicating the European 
Currency Unit (ECU) rather than the EMS by establishing an Asian Currency Unit 
(ACU) and promoting its use as a parallel currency alongside national currencies.102 This 
is also seen as fitting better to the Asian approach to integration as a market-based rather 
than politically driven process. However, the ECU never played an important role in the 
European monetary integration. The use of  an ACU alongside national currencies would 
lead to currency mismatches, and these could be quite damaging when intraregional 
exchange rates are highly unstable. This could in fact deter its widespread use in the 
absence of  mechanisms to stabilize intraregional exchange rates. More importantly, the 
success of  the ACU would depend in large part on strong government support, giving 
it legal tender status by using it in bond issues, settlements among central banks, and 
even pricing of  public services. Thus, successful development of  an ACU is politically 
no less untenable than effective intraregional currency arrangements.103 One may then 
try to go all the way to introduce arrangements that would secure a reasonable degree 
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of  extraregional and intraregional exchange rate stability, instead of  selecting a half-way 
house that would turn out to be neither one thing nor the other.
 4. Supporting mechanisms: Lessons from Europe
A regional arrangement designed to maintain stable intraregional and effective exchange 
rates needs to be supported by several mechanisms and institutions. The list of  areas 
of  cooperation needed is quite long, and includes macroeconomic policy coordination, 
market regulation and surveillance, but here attention is focused on two areas that hold 
the key for the viability of  any arrangement for collective management of  exchange rates: 
i) the management of  capital flows, and ii) intraregional lending and policy adjustment. 
In both respects, the European experience holds a number of  useful lessons, by both its 
successes and its shortcomings. 
i. A regional capital account regime
Regional currency arrangements require a common set of  principles regarding rules to 
be applied to international capital flows. This was indeed the case in Europe. The Treaty 
of  Rome stipulated gradual removal of  restrictions among the member states, but it also 
permitted the introduction of  controls in response to disturbances in the functioning 
of  financial markets due to international capital movements, and authorized the use of  
protective measures by countries experiencing balance of  payments difficulties. Until 
1988 when the council adopted a new directive calling for the liberalization of  capital 
movements within the community by 1990, the EEC regime for capital movements was 
governed by guidelines established by various directives issued from the early 1960s 
onwards. These divided capital flows into four different categories, with different rules for 
liberalization and regulation to be applied to each. They provided considerable leeway 
for restricting capital movements, particularly toward third parties. In fact, governments 
were required to have available and be able to use certain policy instruments for the 
control of  international capital movements and for the sterilization of  their impact 
on domestic liquidity, and to have rules governing investment in money markets by 
nonresidents, loans and credits unrelated to current transactions, net external positions 
of  credit institutions, and reserve requirements for holdings by nonresidents. 
In effect, until liberalization in the late 1980s, the EMS operated under capital 
controls. The 1988 directive prohibited restrictions among member countries and 
recommended that they should endeavour to attain the same degree of  liberalization of  
capital movements with third countries. But recognizing that short-term international 
capital movements were capable of  seriously disrupting the conduct of  monetary and 
exchange rate policies even when there was no appreciable divergence among countries 
in economic fundamentals, the directive retained provisos concerning control over such 
capital movements during periods of  financial strain. This was subject to authorization 
by the commission, but the right to unilateral action was recognized in urgent cases. It 
was indeed exercised during the 1992–93 turmoil by a number of  countries, including 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
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It is often argued that the main reason for the acceleration of  the process of  integration 
in Europe in the early 1990s toward full monetary union was because volatile capital 
flows made it very difficult to maintain parities (e.g., Park and Wyplosz 2007). Since 
this is not yet an option in Asia, any regional arrangement to stabilize intraregional and 
extraregional parities should be built on a common and effective capital account regime 
in the region. 
Even though the overall trend in East Asia has been toward greater capital account 
openness, there is still considerable disparity among countries regarding the regimes 
for nonresident and resident flows. Harmonization of  these should seek considerable 
tightening of  rules and regulations to be applied to capital flows with third countries, 
along the lines discussed in Section D, above. By contrast, the East Asian countries, 
notably the ASEAN 5 countries plus China and Korea, can afford a greater degree of  
capital account openness among themselves than was the case in Europe during the 
first decade of  the EMS. In this respect China could play a special role by making the 
yuan fully convertible within the region and hence promoting it as a regional reserve 
currency. The recent move by China to allow the yuan to be used as settlement currency 
with neighboring countries (including ASEAN and Russia), partly triggered by problems 
caused by dollar instability for China’s exporters, and a number of  bilateral swaps 
that China’s Central Bank has signed with countries inside and outside the region are 
important steps in the internationalization of  the yuan (Asia News 2009). Such moves 
could be supplemented by opening Chinese financial markets to residents in other 
member countries, including those with weaker savings and payments positions, to tap 
its high savings through the so-called Panda bonds − a step that could also help develop 
regional bond markets for closer financial integration and reduce the dollar-denominated 
external claims of  China.104
ii. Intraregional lending and policy adjustment
Maintaining currencies within agreed bands would call for, inter alia, occasional 
interventions in foreign exchange markets in both directions. Countries would be 
constrained in doing this when markets push down a currency toward the lower edge of  
the band. In the case where currencies are pegged to a common basket of  three reserve 
currencies, intervention and stabilization would require adequate holding of  or access to 
these currencies. 
The EMS did not incorporate a regional fund to support countries having to intervene 
to keep their currencies within the grids. Rather, it relied on bilateral lending and borrowing 
between strong currency countries (often Germany) and weak currency countries. There 
were two types of  intervention: intramarginal and marginal. Intramarginal interventions 
were carried out, often in dollars, by the country concerned at its own discretion, when its 
currency was within intervention points. But interventions had to be done jointly by both 
weak and strong currency countries when a currency reached its bilateral intervention 
points, or by the strong currency country making available unlimited amounts of  a very 
short-term financing (VSTF) to the weak currency country.105 Lending and intervention 
by a strong currency country were formally equivalent since reserves used in interventions 
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were added to VSTF claims on the weak currency country, and such claims had to be 
settled within 45 days. In the case of  extension, the amount available was limited. 
This VSTF did not have sufficient flexibility to provide breathing space for a country 
suffering from contagion. This was the case of  France during the 1992–93 turmoil when 
its macroeconomic fundamentals did not justify the attack on its currency alongside the 
lira and pound sterling; indeed, tight German monetary policy was a main factor in 
the speculative attack on the French franc. Provisions for suspension of  asset settlement 
obligations for countries satisfying certain macroeconomic criteria linked to payments 
and fiscal positions and inflation would have certainly facilitated the stabilization of  the 
French franc and prevented interest rate hikes and loss of  jobs and incomes (UNCTAD 
TDR 1993, part 2, chap. 1). By contrast, the system left considerable discretion to strong 
currency countries to opt out of  their obligations to provide unlimited VSTF. This is 
what Germany eventually did in 1992 for fear of  inflationary consequences of  its lending 
to countries under distress, thereby deepening the crisis. 
The EMS lacked symmetry in policy formulation and distribution of  the burden of  
macroeconomic adjustment between weak and strong currency countries. In fact, there 
were no clear guidelines for their respective responsibilities for policy adjustment in the 
face of  market pressures on parities. Hegemony by Germany was not always balanced 
by its responsibilities vis-à-vis other members. Its policies did not always pay enough 
attention to the overall macroeconomic conditions of  the region and their possible 
adverse impact on other members. This, together with lack of  effective intraregional 
financing and lender-of-last-resort facilities, often pushed the burden onto weak currency 
countries. This was the price paid for the stabilization influence that Germany provided 
to countries lacking a similar degree of  fiscal and monetary discipline and credibility. 
Moreover, German monetary policy had a deflationary bias, and was mainly responsible 
for sluggish growth and persistently high unemployment in the region as a whole − an 
approach now inherited by the European Central Bank. 
Multilateralization of  regional credit lines would be necessary to avoid asymmetry. In 
this respect the move from Chiang Mai bilateral credit lines toward a regional monetary 
fund is a positive step in Asia. Furthermore, possible arrangements for guidelines for 
policy adjustment and conditions of  access to an Asian fund should pay attention to 
shortcomings of  the EMS as well as IMF lending practices to emerging markets in order 
to avoid deflationary and procyclical biases. 
This brings us to a final point about relative positions and responsibilities of  members 
of  a possible AMS among the developing countries of  the region. It is sometimes argued 
that China is far too big for other developing countries to join in partnership − far bigger 
than Germany was relative to other European countries. This means that the terms 
of  any agreement for regional monetary integration could be dictated by the needs of  
the Chinese economy, which may not always coincide with those of  smaller and more 
advanced countries in the region. 
That China is likely to be more dominant than Germany ever was in Europe in 
shaping policies and practices in an AMS is probably correct. But this is a matter of  
relative economic power, not existence or otherwise of  formal agreements for monetary 
integration. China will wield considerable influence on policies in the region with or 
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without an AMS. Under current trends, it can soon consolidate its global position as 
an industrial powerhouse by becoming a major actor in the global financial system by 
moving to full convertibility and independent floating, making the yuan challenge the US 
dollar as the international reserve currency − possibly sooner than Chinese politicians 
are willing to accept and most observers expect.106 This is likely to go through two stages: 
increasing the use of  the yuan first in pricing and settlement of  trade and financial 
transactions, and second in denomination of  financial assets for lending and investment. 
As noted, China has already taken steps in both directions. 
As the yuan becomes an international reserve currency, smaller and open Asian 
economies with close trade and investment links to China would not have much autonomy 
in monetary and exchange rate policies, but would have to follow it in very much the 
same way as the Swiss policy mimicked that of  the Bundesbank and is now doing so 
with the ECB. For smaller and open East Asian economies, entering into monetary 
cooperation with China now under carefully defined and properly balanced reciprocal 
responsibilities could bring them more benefits than unilaterally pegging to the yuan 
and following China’s monetary policy. In this bargain they are in a better position than 
were weak currency countries of  Europe in that most of  them have a good record of  
monetary and fiscal discipline and do not depend on the stabilizing influence of  another 
central bank.
G. Conclusions
With the increased integration of  developing countries into the global trading system and 
international production networks, the exchange rate has gained additional importance 
in growth and development. The need to maintain stable and competitive exchange 
rates is further enhanced by loss of  space in trade and industrial policies as a result of  
multilateral commitments in the WTO. However, the ability of  developing countries to 
achieve this has been greatly compromised by their closer integration into international 
financial markets and increased openness to inherently unstable capital flows. 
Maintaining stable and competitive exchange rates in most developing countries 
depends, inter alia, on how boom–bust cycles in capital flows are managed. An effective 
management should start in good times since options are quite limited under sudden 
stops and reversals. Failure to prevent surges in capital inflows and unsustainable currency 
appreciations do not simply lead to instability in exchange rates and balance of  payments 
but also to virulent financial and economic crises with durable and severe consequences 
for jobs, incomes and investment. However, the task has become particularly daunting 
since the most damaging swings in capital flows are caused by global factors beyond 
the control of  developing countries, notably by macroeconomic and financial conditions 
in major industrial countries, and there are no effective multilateral arrangements to 
discipline either policies in countries with disproportionately large impacts on global 
financial conditions or financial markets.
Management of  exchange rates under the free flow of  capital faces serious dilemmas − 
even beyond those predicted by the conventional impossible trinity. Monetary policy on 
its own is often quite powerless to influence capital flows so as to stabilize the exchange 
166 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
rate even when all available instruments are used, particularly at times of  sudden shifts in 
market sentiments. Currency market interventions designed to absorb a surge in capital 
inflows to avoid appreciations and to build self-defense against sudden stops and reversals 
by accumulating reserves are second best policies because they are costly and their impact 
on domestic liquidity cannot always be fully neutralized. Nor can they prevent asset 
market bubbles and currency and maturity mismatches in private balance sheets. 
Under most circumstances regulation and control over capital flows would be 
necessary to prevent build-up of  fragility. Standard prudential rules regarding capital 
charges, loan loss provisions and reserve and liquidity requirements can be extended and 
applied more rigorously and in a countercyclical fashion to foreign currency positions 
and transactions in the financial system with a view to reducing maturity and currency 
mismatches and exchange-rate-related credit risks. While useful and necessary, in 
most developing countries such measures would not be sufficient to prevent build-up 
of  external fragility since not all foreign investment and borrowing are intermediated 
by financial institutions. Direct tools may need to be applied to prevent currency and 
maturity mismatches in private sector balance sheets. Easing or removing restrictions on 
resident outflows at a time of  a surge in inflows to relieve the pressure on the currency 
carries the risk of  opening the way to one-way traffic. 
Monetary policy would be quite ineffective at times of  rapid exit of  capital resulting 
from a sudden change of  market sentiment for reasons beyond the control of  the 
country concerned, such as the shocks and contagion caused by the current global 
financial turmoil triggered by widespread speculative lending and investment in major 
international financial centers. Attempts to stem outflows by interest rate hikes and fiscal 
retrenchment simply add to deflationary and destabilizing impulses. In the absence of  
voluntary agreements by international creditors and investors to roll over their claims, 
unilateral temporary debt standstills and exchange restrictions may be the only viable 
option to check financial meltdown and economic contraction. 
For most developing countries intermediate exchange rate regimes, and particularly 
the BBC regime, provide the most viable option for combining a relatively high degree 
of  stability with the flexibility needed for occasional adjustments in order to maintain 
competitive exchange rates. A successful pursuit of  such a regime calls for a judicious 
combination of  monetary policy adjustments, currency market interventions, and 
control over capital flows. Indeed, well aware of  the risks of  leaving the exchange rate to 
the whims of  cross-border capital flows, most Asian developing countries have opted for 
intermediate regimes in an effort to combine stability with flexibility against the orthodox 
advice to float independently and spare monetary policy for inflation targeting. They 
have been successful in maintaining relatively stable and competitive exchange rates and 
strong payments positions, even though lack of  adequate control over capital inflows 
exposed their asset markets to adverse shifts in global financial conditions. By contrast, 
countries that chose free floating have been hit harder by the current international financial 
turmoil both because of  unsustainable appreciations and current account deficits, and 
the bursting of  asset bubbles resulting from the earlier surge in capital inflows. 
In the absence of  effective global arrangements to secure international monetary 
stability and difficulties in finding unilateral solutions, regional mechanisms present 
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themselves as viable alternatives. This is particularly true for countries with close trade 
and investment links as in East Asia. Despite large stocks of  international reserves 
and strong payments positions, intraregional and extraregional exchange rates have 
been highly unstable in the region. This carries not only the risk of  contagion but 
also the seeds of  conflicts, particularly when global markets are shrinking. There is a 
strong economic case for establishing common currency arrangements with supporting 
institutions and mechanisms, including rules for policy coordination and adjustment, 
guidelines for capital account policies, and regional funds and lender-of-last-resort 
facilities. What is missing is not the need or the scope but the political will and 
solidarity. Perhaps current difficulties will provide an occasion for a common reflection 
for change before ever-growing international monetary and financial instability inflicts 
irreparable damages. 
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years. Since the IIF gives equity flows on a net–net basis (that is, net outflows of  equity by 
residents are deducted from net inflows by nonresidents) and debt flows on gross basis, the 
share of  net inflows from banks in total net inflows from nonresidents is even lower. 
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(2006, 43), and IMF WEO (October 2007, 5). 
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172 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
69 See Yu (2008 and 2009). It has been argued that China’s capital controls remained substantially 
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McCauley 2007).
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72 For an analysis of  developments in Asian housing markets, see IMF REOAP (April 
2007), which somewhat underplays the extent of  the bubble and the risks involved, but 
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India, and Korea. 
73 Korean and United States data from OECD (2007, annex table 60). For others, see BIS 
(2007, 50).
74 On the excess capacity, waste and sustainability of  the investment boom in China, see BIS 
(2007), Goldstein and Lardy (2004), Nagaraj (2005), and Branstetter and Lardy (2006). 
75 The Bank of  China is reported to have lost some $2 billion on its holdings of  collateralized 
securities, including those backed by US mortgages (Pearlstein 2008). Standard Chartered, in 
which Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, Temasek, owns a 19 percent stake, is reported to 
have been walking away from its $7.5 billion special investment vehicles (SIVs) sold in Asia 
and the Middle East (Bowring 2008b).
76 Net portfolio investment outflows in 2008 from emerging markets as a whole are estimated 
to have been $89 billion (IIF January 2009). It appears that all the money that came into 
emerging markets funds in 2007 came out again in 2008.
77 Wall Street Journal, 17 October 2008. The tendency of  investors to liquidate their holdings in 
emerging markets in order to cover mounting losses and margin calls means that, as suggested 
by McCauley (2008, 1), emerging markets are providing “liquidity under stressed conditions 
to portfolios managed in the major markets.”
78 See Xinhuanet (2009a) and Forbes (2008). In earlier years, concerned with the growing speculative 
spree, China had adopted measures to stem increases in property prices (ESCAP 2007, 10).
79 On some accounts, on its own the bursting of  asset bubbles in China would lower growth only 
by a couple of  percentage points (Chancellor 2008). 
80 IIF (January 2009, 11). According to preliminary estimates, as of  January 2009 some Asian 
countries, notably Korea and Singapore, experienced severe contraction in output during 
the last quarter of  2008. In China, where manufacturing output also dropped and loss of  
employment reached some 20 million, more recent indicators seem to be more encouraging 
(Xinhuanet 2009b). 
81 BIS (2007, 56) notes that in China the bulk of  recorded profits are earned by relatively few 
enterprises while the rest have high leverage, so that if  growth slows significantly a substantial 
proportion of  bank loans can become nonperforming. 
82 For the behavior of  reserves in India and Korea during 2008, see Obstfeld, Shambaugh and 
Taylor (2009). 
83 The first major political initiative for a European monetary union was taken in 1969 with the 
Werner Report, which proposed: for the first stage, a reduction of  the fluctuation margins 
between the currencies of  the members of  the European Community (EC); for the second 
stage, complete freedom of  capital movements; and for the final stage, an irrevocable fixing 
of  exchange rates. For a critical account of  the EMS and its applicability to other regions, see 
Bofinger and Flassbeck (2000) and UNCTAD TDR (2007). 
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84 For ASA and Chiang Mai, see Henning (2002). These are not the first initiatives for regional 
monetary cooperation among developing countries. The Andean Reserve Fund and the 
Arab Monetary Fund were among the earlier examples, both going back to 1976 (Akyüz and 
Flassbeck 2002 and UNCTAD TDR 2007, chap. 5). 
85 Thailand proposed to go even further, using 10 percent of  reserves of  ASEAN+3 to 
establish a reserve fund of  some $350 billion (Kate and Adam 2008). For more recent 
developments regarding the Chiang Mai Initiative, see Henning (2009). 
86 This classification is from IMF (2008) based on members’ actual, de facto arrangements as 
identified by IMF staff, not officially announced arrangements.
87 This was expressed with some foresight by Rogoff  (1999, 28) during the debate on the reform 
of  the international financial architecture after the Asian crisis: “It is easy to fall into the trap 
of  thinking that big institutional changes are unrealistic or infeasible […] Not so long ago, the 
prospects for a single European currency seemed no more likely than those for the breakup of  
the Soviet empire or the reunification of  Germany. Perhaps large institutional changes only 
seem impossible until they happen – at which point they seem foreordained. Even if  none of  
the large-scale plans is feasible in the present world political environment, after another crisis 
or two, the impossible may start seeming realistic.”
88 For the evolution of  East Asian trade in comparison with other blocks, see MAS (2007, 
chap. 5).
89 The pioneering study in this area is Frankel and Rose (1996), which empirically shows, using 
the intensity of  intra-union trade and correlation of  business cycles, that countries are more 
likely to satisfy the criteria for entry into a currency union after taking steps toward economic 
integration than before. The OCA indices developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
also show considerable convergence in Europe toward criteria for monetary union after 1987.
90 For the nature and extent of  intraregional trade in East Asia, see MAS (2007, chap. 5) 
and Shafaeddin (2008, section 5). For variations among countries’ participation, see Rana 
(2006, table 1). 
91 According to an estimate based on 1995 input–output tables, only 20 percent of  non-Japan 
intra-Asian exports in 2002 were for domestic demand − including consumption and capital 
formation − and the rest were in intermediate goods. Half  of  the latter was used in production 
for domestic markets and half  for exports; see MAS (2003). Since 1995 there has been a rapid 
expansion of  industry-specific production networks, notably in electronics. Therefore, more 
up-to-date input–output tables are likely to show a higher share of  intermediate imports in 
production for exports. The same study also finds that about 68 percent of  China’s imports 
from East Asia are used, directly or indirectly, for domestic demand in China, including 
investment. However, no account is taken that an important part of  investment in Chinese 
manufacturing is directly linked to exports. 
92 After the suspension of  gold convertibility by the United States, the 1971 Smithsonian 
agreement established a 4.5 percent margin (the tunnel) for other currencies against the dollar 
(that is, ± 2.25 percent relative to the central rate). This effectively meant that European 
currencies could move by up to 9 percent against each other. Soon after the European 
Community established the snake, that is, bilateral margins of  2.5 percent, which effectively 
limited such movements among members of  the EC to 4.5 percent. The snake in the tunnel 
came to an end in 1973 when the dollar started to float freely. 
93 This, in effect, helped create one-way bets against fundamentally misaligned lira and pound 
sterling, leading to the 1992–93 turmoil (Akyüz and Flassbeck 2002). 
94 Park and Wyplosz (2007, 14), who otherwise favor the replication of  the EMS by establishing 
an Asian Monetary System (AMS) in the way suggested by Wyplosz (2004) over other regional 
alternatives, recognize that should a significant number of  Asian countries adopt the European 
strategy, “they would be unlikely to sustain the export-led strategy. Either the exchange rates 
would jointly float, both up and down, or, given the economic weight of  the AMS countries, 
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attempts to manage the external parities would quickly meet strong resistance from the G7 
and the IMF. This would likely signal the end of  the export-led strategy for the region.” 
 95 According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002) dollar pegging is a rational response to the problem 
of  original sin, that is, the inability of  developing countries to borrow in their own currencies. 
This is not relevant for most East Asian countries, which do not need to borrow in any 
currency. It has also become less relevant in Latin America where domestic currency debt 
held by nonresidents has been increasing rapidly, with international investors assuming the 
exchange rate risk in return for high yields. Some countries have also been able to issue local-
currency-denominated global bonds at rates below those in domestic markets to benefit from 
lower jurisdiction spreads (Akyüz 2007).
 96 These considerations are equally and even more valid for establishing a yen block in East Asia 
(Kwan 1998), which would face, in addition, political difficulties. 
 97 For the original proposal, see Williamson (1999). See also Kawai and Takagi (2000), Ogawa 
and Ito (2000), and Williamson (2000 and 2005). A similar proposal was made by the staff  of  
the French and Japanese Ministries of  Finance in a joint paper: a “possible solution for many 
emerging market economies could be a managed floating exchange-rate regime whereby the 
currency moves within a given implicit or explicit band with its center targeted to a basket 
of  currencies” and “a group of  countries with close trade and financial links should adopt 
a mechanism that automatically moves the region’s exchange rates in the same direction by 
similar percentages” (MOF Japan 2001, 3–4). 
 98 However, both Williamson (2000) and Kawai and Takagi (2000) consider a BBC regime 
combining a band and crawl with the basket as the norm for most countries. 
 99 See Park and Wyplosz (2007, 13), which reiterates that an AMS modelled on the EMS would be 
as effective as pegging to a common basket in stabilizing the regional bilateral exchange rates.
100 If, as Williamson (2005, 11) points out, a country accepts only an obligation not to intervene in 
a way that would tend to push the market rate away from the reference rate, but no obligation 
to defend a particular rate, it can adopt a behavior of  benign neglect when markets push the 
rate away from the central parity, and this could generate considerable instability when the 
band is very wide. 
101 For instance, Kawai (2007) sees a common basket system as a step toward a more rigid 
intraregional exchange rate stabilization scheme such as an Asian snake or an Asian ERM. 
102 This idea of  ACU was pioneered by the Asian Development Bank. Eichengreen (2007) gives 
support to it as a parallel currency, while recognizing some of  the difficulties noted below.
103 Whether an ACU should be introduced and used alongside a common basket is contentious. 
According to Williamson (2005, 1) there is nothing to preclude the introduction and use of  an 
ACU in the common basket system, but Eichengreen (2007) sees a major contradiction since 
a common basket in three reserve currencies would encourage use of  these outside currencies 
in the region instead of  the ACU.
104 The ADB and the World Bank IFC issued Panda bonds in 2005. China has recently given 
permission to two foreign banks to issue yuan-denominated bonds in Hong Kong for sale to 
overseas investors (Areddy 2009). Currently there are suggestions in China that the United 
States government and the World Bank consider issuing yuan-denominated bonds in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai markets. This would mean China lending foreigners in its own currency 
rather than in dollars, passing the exchange rate risk onto borrowers. 
105 With the 1987 Basel–Nyborg agreement the VSTF was extended to intramarginal 
interventions. 
106 Empirical evidence indicates that the renminbi has been exerting significant impact on the 
exchange rates of  the Asian currencies. It is also estimated, on the basis of  a reserve currency 
model and counterfactual simulations, that the renminbi’s potential as a reserve currency 
would be comparable to that of  the Japanese yen and the British pound if  it were to become 
fully convertible today (Chen, Peng and Shu 2009).
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Chapter V
REFORMING THE IMF: BACK  
TO THE DRAWING BOARD1
A. Introduction 
The best reformers the world has ever seen are those who commence on themselves. 
George Bernard Shaw 
There have been widespread misgivings about international economic cooperation in 
recent years even as the need for global collective action has grown because of  recurrent 
financial crises in emerging markets, the increased gap between the rich and the poor, and 
the persistence of  extreme poverty in many countries in the developing world. Perhaps 
more than any other international organization the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has been the focus of  these misgivings. 
Several observers including former treasury secretaries of  the United States, a Nobel 
Prize–winning economist and many NGOs have called for its abolition on the grounds 
that it is no longer needed, or that its interventions in emerging market crises are not only 
wasteful but also harmful for international economic stability, or that its programs in the 
Third World serve to aggravate rather than alleviate poverty.2 Others want the IMF to be 
merged into the World Bank because they see them as doing pretty much the same thing 
with the same clientele.3 
Many who still wish to keep the IMF as an independent institution with a distinct 
mission call for reform of  both what it has been doing and how it has been doing it.4 All 
these groups include individuals across a wide spectrum of  political opinion, ranging 
from conservative free marketers to antiglobalisers. 
The principal rationale for global collective action in financial matters and for 
institutions needed to facilitate such action is market failure. More specifically, international 
financial markets fail to provide adequate liquidity and development financing for a 
large number of  countries, and they are the main source of  global economic instability. 
These have repercussions not only for the countries directly concerned but also for the 
international community as a whole because of  the existence of  international externalities. 
Furthermore, due to cross-border interdependence, the pursuit of  national interests by 
individual countries in macroeconomic and financial policies can result in negative global 
externalities, and preventing conflicts and collective damage calls for a certain degree of  
multilateral discipline over national policymaking as well as economic cooperation.5 
Such concerns in fact provided the original rationale for the creation of  the IMF 
and the World Bank with a clear division of  labor between the two. However, these 
institutions have gone through considerable transformation in response to changes that 
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have taken place in the world economic and political landscape in the past 60 years. In 
particular, the IMF is no longer performing the functions it was originally designed for, 
namely, securing multilateral discipline in exchange rate policies and providing liquidity 
for current account financing. Rather, it has been focusing on development finance and 
policy and poverty alleviation in poor countries, and the management and resolution of  
capital account crises in emerging markets. 
This chapter argues that there is no sound rationale for the Fund to be involved in 
development matters, including long-term lending. This is also true for several areas of  
policy closely connected to development, most notably trade policy which is a matter for 
multilateral negotiations elsewhere in the global system. On the other hand, while the 
management and resolution of  financial crises in emerging markets constitute a key area 
of  interest to the IMF in the context of  its broader objective of  securing international 
monetary and financial stability, there is little rationale for financial bailout operations 
that have so far been the main instrument of  the Fund’s interventions in such crises. The 
original considerations that precluded IMF lending to finance capital outflows continue 
to be equally valid today since such operations do not correct but aggravate market 
failures. There are other institutions and mechanisms that can serve better the objectives 
that may be sought by such lending. 
By contrast the IMF should pay much greater attention to two areas in which its 
existence carries a stronger rationale, namely, short-term, countercyclical current account 
financing and effective surveillance over national macroeconomic and financial policies, 
particularly of  countries which have a disproportionately large impact on international 
monetary and financial stability. In other words, a genuine reform of  the Fund would 
require as much a redirection of  its activities as improvements in its policies and 
operational modalities. However, none of  these would be possible without addressing 
shortcomings in its governance structure. 
The purpose of  this chapter is not to provide a blueprint for the reform of  the IMF, 
but to discuss and elaborate a number of  broad issues that would need to be taken into 
account in any serious attempt to make the Fund a genuinely multilateral institution with 
equal rights and obligations for all its members, in practice as well as in theory. The next 
section will give a brief  description of  the original rationale for the Fund, its evolution 
over the past sixty years and current focus. This is followed by a discussion of  what the 
IMF is but should not be doing; that is, development policy and financing, and trade 
policy. Section E makes a critical assessment of  the Fund’s role in crisis management 
and resolution while Section F turns to issues related to the reform of  its lending policy 
and resources. This is followed by a section on the Fund’s surveillance function. Section 
H focuses on governance issues, notably the prerequisites for a genuinely symmetrical 
and multilateral financial institution. The chapter ends with a summary of  the main 
proposals.
B. the Original rationale and the Postwar Evolution of  the IMF
The main objective pursued by the architects of  the postwar economic system with 
the creation of  the IMF was to avoid the recurrence of  a number of  difficulties that 
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had led to the breakdown of  international trade and payments in the interwar period. 
These difficulties arose in large part because of  the lack of  multilateral arrangements 
to facilitate an orderly payments adjustment in countries facing large external debt 
and deficits. Under conditions of  excessively volatile short-term capital flows and in 
the absence of  any obligation on the side of  the surplus countries to share the burden 
of  adjustment, deficit countries had been forced to undertake deflationary measures, 
or resort to trade and exchange restrictions and competitive devaluations in order to 
protect economic activity and employment, thereby generating negative externalities and 
frictions in international economic relations. 
Arrangements for multilateral discipline over exchange rate policies, provision of  
adequate international liquidity, and restrictions over destabilizing capital flows were 
thus seen as essential for international monetary stability and the prevention of  tensions 
and disruptions in international trade and payments. The IMF was designed to ensure 
an orderly system of  international payments at stable but multilaterally negotiated, 
adjustable exchange rates under conditions of  strictly limited international capital flows. 
A key task of  the Fund was to provide international liquidity in order to avoid 
deflationary and destabilizing adjustments and trade and exchange restrictions in 
countries facing temporary balance of  payments deficits. Although the responsibility for 
addressing the problems associated with fluctuations in export earnings of  developing 
countries effectively fell under the IMF’s role for the provision of  liquidity, the Fund was 
created primarily for securing the stability of  external payments and exchange rates of  
the major industrial countries, rather than for the stabilization of  balance of  payments 
of  developing countries. 
There was a certain degree of  creative ambiguity in the way the Fund’s articles were 
drafted in order to reach consensus. This was the case for exchange rate arrangements 
which sought to reconcile multilateral discipline with national autonomy. Countries 
undertook obligations to maintain their exchange rates within a narrow range of  their par 
values and were allowed to change their par values under fundamental disequilibrium, 
but the latter was never defined in the Articles of  Agreement. An unauthorized change 
in par value was not a violation of  the articles, but would enable the Fund to withhold 
the member’s access to its resources and even to force the member to withdraw 
(Dam 1982, 90–93). 
This was also the case with arrangements regarding the modalities for the provision 
of  liquidity, one of  the most controversial issues during the negotiations. Keynes strongly 
argued that members should have unconditional access to the Fund within the limits of  
their quotas and that “it would be very unwise to try to make an untried institution too 
grandmotherly” (IMF 1969, vol. 1, 72). However, the United States resisted unconditional 
drawings on the grounds that it would be the only source of  net credit in the immediate 
postwar era since the dollar was then the only convertible currency. The compromise 
agreed to in Article V entitling members “to purchase the currencies of  other members 
from the Fund,” together with the absence of  the language of  credit from the articles, had 
the connotation that members would have the right to determine how much they would 
draw within the limits of  their quotas, treating their subscriptions as their own reserves 
(Dam 1982, 106; and Dell 1981, 4–5). Most countries believed that this formulation gave 
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members unconditional drawing rights, though there was considerable room for other 
interpretation. 
Access to the Fund was restricted to current account financing. The Fund was 
prohibited to lend to meet sustained outflow of  capital and empowered to compel a 
member to exercise capital controls as a condition for access to its resources. In effect, 
these arrangements discouraged reliance on private flows for balance of  payment 
financing. During the negotiations for the Bank there was considerable debate on 
whether the task could be effectively performed by private lenders, but this was not the 
case for IMF financing. Although there were some instances of  currency stabilization in 
the interwar years supported by officially arranged private lending (Oliver 1975, 12–15), 
it was almost taken for granted that commercial banks could not be relied on for such 
a task, particularly given the high degree of  volatility of  short-term capital flows during 
interwar years and procyclical behavior of  private lending. 
The members’ contributions to the Fund, their drawing rights and voting rights were 
all linked to a single concept of  quotas, determined through a highly politicized exercise 
so as to give an effective veto power to the United States over key decisions.6 This has been 
an important factor in the evolution of  the Fund over subsequent years, particularly with 
respect to conditions governing the members’ drawings and the operational procedures 
followed.7 
The process of  legitimizing and ratcheting conditionality started soon after the 
Bretton Woods Conference. A key decision in 1952 formally adopted conditionality 
and introduced standby arrangements as the central operational modality (IMF 1969, 
vol. 3, 228–30). This was followed by a 1956 decision on the phased drawings in order 
to better enforce conditionality with loans disbursed in tranches, contingent on the 
satisfactory achievement of  agreed targets, and the proliferation of  performance criteria.8 
Although the board decided in 1968 to limit the number of  performance criteria after 
developing countries argued that the minimum conditionality applied to the drawing 
by the United Kingdom in 1967 should become the norm, in practice there was no 
easing of  conditionality, particularly after it was given legal sanction in 1969 through an 
amendment of  the articles.9 
As a result of  these changes, automatic drawing has been confined to the reserve 
tranche with higher tranches bringing tighter conditionality. Thus, the Fund has moved 
away from provision of  liquidity; that is, finance available on short notice and virtually 
unconditionally, toward finance supplied on the basis of  negotiated conditions and made 
available through successive tranches.10 And since the IMF quotas have considerably 
lagged behind the growth of  world trade, countries’ access to balance of  payments 
financing has come increasingly under IMF policy oversight. 
But perhaps one of  the biggest divergences from the Bretton Woods objectives has 
been in the content of  conditionality rather than the principle. Through conditionality 
the Fund has effectively sought to impose exactly the kind of  policies that the postwar 
planners wanted to avoid in countries facing payments difficulties – austerity and 
destabilizing currency adjustments. Austerity has been promoted not only when balance 
of  payments difficulties were due to excessive domestic spending or distortions in the 
price structure, but also when they resulted from external disturbances such as adverse 
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terms of  trade movements, hikes in international interest rates or trade measures 
introduced by another country. Furthermore, the distinction between temporary and 
structural disequilibria has become blurred, often implying that a developing country 
should interpret every positive shock as temporary and thus refrain from using it as an 
opportunity for expansion, and every negative shock as permanent, thus adjusting to it 
by cutting growth and/or altering the domestic price structure. 
The evolution of  IMF conditionality has been shaped by shifts in economic and 
political conditions and interests of  its major shareholders. Initially the United States 
had insisted on some form of  conditionality to stem excessive reliance on dollar 
credits. Subsequently, it used conditionality to pursue its national interests. Europe, 
notably the United Kingdom, initially resisted conditionality because of  its need 
to draw on the Fund’s resources. Subsequently, when they no longer relied on the 
Fund, conditionality ceased to be a problem for the European countries, including 
for the smaller ones which took refuge in the European Monetary System, losing 
monetary autonomy vis-à-vis Germany but gaining considerable protection from 
Fund conditionality.11
A major transformation of  the Fund took place with the breakdown of  the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate system brought about in large part by inconsistencies of  policies 
among major industrial countries and rapid growth of  international financial markets 
and capital movements. While floating was adopted with the understanding that its 
stability depended upon orderly underlying conditions, the obligations undertaken by 
countries were, as pointed out by Triffin (1976, 47–48), “so general and obvious as to 
appear rather superfluous” and the system “essentially proposed to legalise […] the 
widespread and illegal repudiation of  Bretton Woods commitments, without putting any 
other binding commitments in their place.” This in effect meant that currency stability 
ceased to be a key objective of  international economic cooperation. It also meant that 
there would no longer be any mechanism to ensure effective multilateral discipline over 
the policies of  non-borrowing members of  the IMF. 
In its operations in developing countries the focus of  the Fund was initially on short-
term current account financing. The Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) introduced in 
the early 1960s as a result of  a UN initiative enabled countries facing temporary shortfalls in 
primary export earnings to draw on the Fund beyond their normal drawing rights without 
the performance criteria normally required for upper credit tranches (Dam 1982, 127–28). 
However, automaticity was effectively removed by a subsequent decision of  the Fund (Dell 
1985, 245), and the “reforms” introduced in 2000 tightened further the circumstances for 
unconditional access to CFF (IMF 2004b, 10). 
A number of  other similar ad hoc facilities have also been discontinued, including the 
buffer stock financing facility introduced in the late 1960s. This is also true for the two 
oil facilities of  the 1970s which constituted exceptional steps in IMF lending practices 
as they had been introduced as deliberate countercyclical devices to prevent oil price 
hikes from triggering a global recession.12 They also allowed the kind of  automaticity of  
drawings advocated by Keynes during the Bretton Woods negotiations (Dell 1986, 1207). 
The breakdown of  the Bretton Woods exchange rate system together with the 
graduation of  the European countries from the Fund pushed it closer to development issues. 
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In this respect the creation of  the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974 marks 
a turning point. It was established as a nonconcessional lending facility to address 
persistent and structural balance of  payments problems.13 This was followed by the 
Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, 
which provided concessional lending to low income countries for structural change. As 
a result of  increased emphasis on poverty reduction, the latter was replaced in 1999 
by a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), a concessional window for low 
income countries. 
In perhaps an even more important shift, the Fund has become a crisis lender and 
manager for emerging markets. This role effectively started with the outbreak of  the debt 
crisis in the 1980s when many developing countries borrowed heavily from multilateral 
sources to finance debt servicing to private creditors (Sachs 1998, 53). And with the 
recurrent financial crises in emerging markets in the 1990s, crisis lending has become the 
dominant financial activity of  the Fund. The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) was 
created in response to the deepening of  the East Asian crisis in December 1997 in order 
to provide financing above normal access limits to countries experiencing exceptional 
payments difficulties, notably in servicing their external debt to private creditors and 
maintaining capital account convertibility, under a highly conditional standby or 
extended arrangement. 
Thus sixty years after its inception, the IMF is now quite a different institution 
from the one created by the architects of  the postwar international economic system. 
It “has adjusted to the changing economic conditions by sponsoring amendments to 
its Charter, by liberal interpretations of  the Charter’s provisions, and in some cases by 
ignoring limitations imposed by the Charter.”14 It is now deeply involved in development 
issues, providing long-term financing on concessional terms as well as assistance on 
HIPC: currently the number of  low income countries which are covered under financial 
arrangements for PRGF and HIPC assistance exceeds the number of  countries with 
standby arrangements by a factor of  four (IMF 2005a). 
It started out as an institution designed to promote global growth and stability through 
multilateral discipline over exchange rate policies, control over capital flows and provision 
of  liquidity for current account financing. It has ended up focusing on the management 
and resolution of  capital account crises in emerging markets associated with excessive 
instability of  capital flows and exchange rates, allocating a large proportion of  its lending 
for financing capital outflows: during the financial year ending on 30 April 2004, over 
85 percent of  total purchases and loans were accounted for by crisis lending to Argentina, 
Brazil and Turkey (IMF 2004a, table 2.6). 
More importantly, originally all members of  the Fund had equal de jure and de 
facto obligations for maintaining stable exchange rates and orderly macroeconomic 
conditions. With the breakdown of  the Bretton Woods exchange rate arrangements, the 
establishment of  universal convertibility of  the currencies of  major industrial countries, 
and the emergence of  international financial markets as a main source of  liquidity for 
advanced economies, the Fund’s policy oversight has been confined primarily to its 
poorest members who need to draw on its resources because of  their lack of  access to 
private sources of  finance. 
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C. Mission Creep into development Finance and Policy
Much of  the recent debate on the role of  the IMF in development has focused on three 
issues. First, there has been widespread criticism of  rapid deregulation and liberalization 
promoted by the Fund in developing countries because of  their adverse repercussions 
for economic growth and poverty. Second, the conditions attached to Fund lending have 
been under constant fire on the grounds that, inter alia, they interfere with the proper 
jurisdiction of  a sovereign government and leave little room for manoeuvre to national 
policymakers. Finally, there is a broad consensus that financing provided in support of  
such programs, including in the form of  debt relief, is highly inadequate. 
There has been less emphasis on whether the Fund should really be involved in 
development finance and policy, and poverty alleviation, particularly given that there are 
other multilateral institutions exclusively focusing on these issues, including multilateral 
development banks and various UN technical assistance agencies. Nevertheless, there 
are some notable exceptions. For instance the Meltzer Commission (2000) unanimously 
recommended that the IMF should restrict its financing to provision of  liquidity, 
and stop lending to countries for long-term development assistance and structural 
transformation. Accordingly, the PRGF should be eliminated and long-term institutional 
assistance to foster development and encourage sound economic policies should be the 
exclusive responsibility of  the World Bank and regional development banks. Similarly, 
according to the former World Bank chief  economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002, 232) “a broad 
consensus – outside the IMF – has developed that the IMF should limit itself  to its core 
area, managing crises; that it should no longer be involved (outside crises) in development 
or the economies of  transition.” 
There are indeed no compelling reasons why the IMF should deal with structural 
problems in developing countries. As noted, the Fund moved toward developing 
countries in large part because it was no longer needed by industrial countries as a 
source of  liquidity and it lost leverage over exchange rate and macroeconomic policies 
of  these countries. Sticking to its original mandate for facilitating payments adjustment 
through provision of  liquidity to meet temporary current account deficits would not have 
generated much business for the Fund in developing countries given that their balance 
of  payments difficulties were structural and durable, rather than cyclical and temporary. 
This, together with the expansion of  IMF membership in Africa, was the main reason why 
the Fund introduced long-term facilities and concessional lending. In doing so, however, 
it has gone right into the domain of  development since overcoming structural payments 
deficits calls for reducing both savings and foreign exchange gaps, including chronic 
public sector deficits, which, in turn, depends on structural and institutional changes and 
economic growth, rather than demand management. But these are exactly the kind of  
issues dealt with by multilateral development banks, and involve action in wide areas of  
policy including agriculture, industry, trade, investment, technology, finance, the labor 
market and the public sector.15 
That external disequilibrium in developing countries is structural does not justify the 
Fund going into long-term balance of  payments support because this is exactly what the 
World Bank has been doing since the early 1980s when it shifted its lending from project 
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financing to structural adjustment and development policy loans which now constitute 
about half  of  total Bank lending. Furthermore, the Bank is doing this for all developing 
countries while such long-term balance of  payments support in the Fund is limited to 
low income countries eligible to PRGF. This is an ad hoc arrangement without a sound 
rationale, since there are many middle income countries with chronic payments deficits 
and excessive dependence on foreign capital, notably in Latin America, in need of  long-
term support to strengthen domestic savings and export capacity. This inconsistency 
should be addressed not by bringing them under the IMF, but taking the others out to 
the Bank. 
As part of  its work on development and poverty alleviation, the Fund’s programs and 
structural conditionality have addressed almost all areas of  development policy. This is 
problematic for several reasons. First of  all it is not clear that the Fund has the necessary 
competence and experience in such complex issues. Certainly, the kind of  expertise in 
development policy resulting from research and practical experience, and access to a 
significant amount of  information on institutions and policy environment expected from 
the Bank do not define the existing capabilities of  the Fund.16 Nor are they needed for 
the Fund to function effectively in its areas of  core competence. Furthermore, there 
are serious risks in entrusting development matters to an organization preoccupied with 
short-term financial outcomes and susceptible to strong influences from sudden shifts in 
market sentiments about the economies of  its borrowers. Finally, there is no doubt that 
what the IMF does or should be doing for promoting monetary and financial stability 
has consequences for poverty and development, but this does not provide a rationale for 
the Fund to work in these areas. Such interdependencies exist in many areas of  policy 
affecting poverty and development, including trade, labor, health, environment and 
security, both at the national and international level. What is needed is close cooperation 
and coordination with the institutions specialized in these matters with a view to attaining 
coherence and consistency, not duplication. 
The Bank and the Fund have taken great pains to show that they are closely coordinating 
in order to minimize overlap and duplication (IMF/WB 2004), but in reality much of  what 
is being done in development by the Fund could easily be transferred to the Bank. This 
overlap has in fact given rise to calls to merge the Fund with the World Bank, including 
by George Shultz (1998), former secretary of  the treasury and secretary of  state of  the 
United States, arguing that their activities are becoming increasingly duplicative even 
though basically uncoordinated.17 More recently a former German executive director for 
the World Bank Group and executive secretary of  the Development Committee (Fischer 
2004) argued that while complete fusion of  the BWIs under a new charter would be the 
optimal solution, politically and practically a more feasible step would be to combine 
the administration and the boards of  the two institutions, and to reshape the single 
board in such a way as to give greater voice to developing countries. This would reduce 
extensive duplication at the administrative level, bring greater consistency in policy 
advice and alleviate the pressure on poor countries with limited administrative capacities 
in coordinating measures promoted by the Fund and the Bank in overlapping areas of  
policy. According to one estimate a combined administration with a single board would 
reduce the personnel and other costs in the administrative budget by at least 25 percent 
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(Burnham 1999) – costs which are now effectively paid by debtor developing countries 
through charges and commission.
While it is often argued that the Fund and the Bank should be merged because they 
are effectively doing the same thing, what is argued here is that they should remain 
separate institutions doing different things. In fact there are many areas in which their 
activities do not and should not overlap. Crisis management and resolution, surveillance 
over macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, and provision of  international liquidity 
are areas where the Fund should have a distinct role and competence. By contrast, the 
Fund should transfer development-related activities and facilities to the Bank. This would 
not lead to a significant retrenchment of  Fund lending; at the end of  2004 outstanding 
PRGF credits were less than SDR 7,000 billion or 10 percent of  total outstanding credits 
(IMF 2004a, table 2.8). Nor would it entail a major expansion in outstanding IDA credits 
which currently are around $90 billion. The legal difficulties that might be involved in 
transferring the resources currently located in the Fund could be overcome once the 
principle is accepted (Ahluwalia 1999, 22). 
In a recent statement the managing director has argued in favor of  deepening the 
Fund’s work on low income countries and expressed his disagreement with the view 
that the “Fund ought to get out of  the business of  supporting low income countries” 
on the grounds that they “need macroeconomic policy advice from the Fund and they 
often need financial support from us” (De Rato 2005, 4). However, the issue is not about 
whether or not the Fund should be involved in policy design in and provision of  finance 
to low income countries, but the context in which such activities should be undertaken. 
As discussed in subsequent sections, a major task of  the Fund should be to provide 
countercyclical current account financing to low income countries facing excessive 
instability in export earnings. Again, macroeconomic conditions that may need to be 
attached to short-term lending and Article IV consultations would give the Fund ample 
opportunity to provide macroeconomic policy advice to low income countries. None of  
these would require the Fund to be involved in development matters. 
d. trespassing in trade Policy 
The Fund, as a monetary institution, was not to be involved in trade issues even though 
its articles, in effect, authorized, through the scarce currency clause, trade measures 
against surplus countries unwilling to undertake expansionary measures by allowing 
discriminatory exchange restrictions (Dam 1982, 233). In the event, however, the Fund 
has gone in the opposite direction, putting pressure on deficit developing countries to 
undertake payments adjustment despite mounting protectionism in industrial countries 
against their exports, forcing them to resort to import compression and sacrifice growth 
(Akyüz and Dell 1987, 54). 
More importantly, as the Fund became deeply involved in development issues, 
it increasingly saw trade liberalization as an important component of  structural 
adjustment to trade imbalances. As noted in a report by a group of  independent 
experts, IMF surveillance has expanded into trade liberalization, partly as a result of  
pressure from the United States as part of  conditions for its agreement to quota increases 
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(IMF/GIE 1999, 61). Trade liberalization has also been promoted in certain emerging 
market economies in response to surges in capital inflows as a way of  absorbing excess 
reserves and preventing currency appreciation (IMF/IEO 2005, 8–9, 59, table 3.2). 
Although greater openness to foreign competition has also been one of  the pillars 
of  the adjustment programs supported by the Bank, the Fund is known to have played 
a more important role in this area. Low income countries and LDCs working under 
Fund programs have been encouraged and even compelled to undertake unilateral trade 
liberalization, putting them at a disadvantage in multilateral trade negotiations. Indeed 
the consequences of  unilateral trade liberalization by developing countries outside the 
WTO framework are often discussed in relation to Fund programs (see, e.g., WTO 
2004a, section II.A). 
An implication of  unilateral liberalization is that the industrial countries would 
not need to lower their tariffs in areas of  export interest to developing countries in 
order to secure better access to the markets of  these countries in the WTO where trade 
concessions are based on some form of  reciprocity. Liberalization without improved 
market access in the North creates the risk of  deterioration in their trade balances, 
hence leading either to a tighter external constraint and income losses, or to increased 
external debt. Indeed there is an asymmetry in the multilateral consequences of  
trade policy actions taken by developing countries in the context of  Fund-supported 
programs. A country liberalising unilaterally acquires no automatic rights in the WTO 
vis-à-vis other countries, but it could become liable if  it needs to take measures in breach 
of  its obligations in the WTO.18
Although this is generally recognized to be a problem and discussed during the 
Uruguay Round, no mechanism has so far been introduced in the WTO for crediting 
developing countries for their unilateral liberalization in the context of  Fund-supported 
programs. Furthermore, arguments are advanced that this should not affect the position 
of  developing countries regarding their obligations in the WTO since what matters there 
is not applied but bound tariffs. However, for a number of  reasons, including pressures 
from financial markets and major trading partners, developing countries find it difficult 
to raise their tariffs once they are lowered. 
More importantly, applied tariffs are now providing a benchmark in binding 
and reducing tariffs in the current negotiations on industrial tariffs in the WTO. For 
instance, paragraph five of  Annex B of  the so-called July package which provides a 
framework for these negotiations based on proposals made by industrial countries 
takes the applied rates as the basis for commencing reductions for unbound tariffs in 
developing countries (WTO, 2004b). It also proposes to give credit for autonomous 
liberalization by developing countries provided that the tariff  lines were bound on an 
MFN basis. However, it is not clear that a line-by-line commitment is necessarily in 
the best interest of  these countries, or that the kind of  unilateral liberalization agreed 
under IMF pressure would be consistent with their bargaining positions in multilateral 
negotiations (Akyüz 2005b). 
Despite the difficulties confronting developing countries in trade negotiations, the 
Fund staff  have been advancing arguments in favor of  unilateral liberalization in these 
countries that go even beyond the positions advocated by major developed countries in 
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the current negotiations on industrial tariffs. For instance a recent Fund paper argues 
that Africa’s interest in the Doha Round would best be served by its own liberalization, 
and that African countries, including the LDCs, should bind and reduce all tariffs, 
even though the July package exempts LDCs from tariff  reductions and recognizes 
the need for less than full reciprocity.19 The first deputy managing director of  the IMF 
has encouraged developing countries to undertake unilateral liberalization on several 
occasions, arguing that “countries that press ahead with unilateral liberalization 
will enjoy enormous benefits and they will not be penalized by further multilateral 
liberalization – quite the opposite. Countries that open up unilaterally help themselves” 
(Krueger 2005, 5). 
The Fund has recently introduced a Trade Integration Mechanism to mitigate concerns 
among some developing countries that their balance of  payments position could suffer as 
a result of  multilateral liberalization in the current round of  negotiations, insisting that 
such shortfalls would be small and temporary (IMF 2005b), despite mounting evidence 
that rapid liberalization in poor countries can raise imports much faster than exports and 
that the external financing needed can add significantly to the debt burden.20 
The Fund staff  have been advocating binding tariffs closer to their applied levels 
on grounds that this would increase trade by reducing uncertainty of  trade policy and 
hence transaction costs (see, e.g., Yang 2005, 9). This may well be the case, but it is 
not a matter that should be of  primary concern to the Fund. The international trading 
system no doubt needs greater predictability and stability, but discretion over tariffs by 
developing country governments is not the most serious source of  disruption. As the 
recent experience regarding the movement of  the dollar shows once again, exchange 
rate instability and misalignments are an equal and even more important source of  
uncertainty and friction in the international trading system. 
This was recognized by the architects of  the postwar international economic system, 
including Lord Keynes: “Tariffs and currency depreciations are in many alternatives. 
Without currency agreements you have no firm ground on which to discuss tariffs […] 
It is very difficult while you have monetary chaos to have order of  any kind in other 
directions.”21 It is thus advisable for the Fund to focus on its core responsibility of  ensuring 
stability and better alignment of  exchange rates, rather than narrowing the policy space 
for developing countries in matters related to trade and pushing trade liberalization as if  
a consistent international monetary order existed. 
As the Fund transfers its work on development to the Bank, it should also stop being 
involved in trade policy issues or undertake activities that interfere with multilateral 
trade negotiations. Its relation to the WTO should be confined to areas explicitly stated 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), notably in Article XV on 
exchange arrangements. These include consultations and supplying information on 
monetary reserves, balance of  payments and foreign exchange arrangements in order 
to help in matters such as the determination of  whether balance of  payments and 
reserve conditions of  countries would entitle them to apply the provisions of  Articles XII 
and XVIIIB of  GATT and Article XII of  GATS in order to avoid sacrificing growth and 
development as a result of  temporary payments difficulties (see Das 1999, chap. 3.3; and 
Akyüz 2002, 124–25). 
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E. Crisis Management and resolution: Bailouts or workouts?
There is a consensus that crises in emerging markets will continue to occur because of  
financial market failures as well as shortcomings in national policies and international 
surveillance mechanisms. There is also a wide agreement that the IMF should be 
involved in the management and resolution of  such crises in order to limit the damage to 
the economies concerned, prevent contagion and reduce systemic risks. However, there 
is considerable controversy over how the Fund should intervene. 
Until recently the Fund’s intervention in financial crises in emerging markets involved 
ad hoc financial bailout operations designed to keep countries current on their debt 
payments to private creditors, to maintain capital account convertibility and to prevent 
default. IMF rescue packages amounted to several times the accepted quota limits (an 
annual limit of  100 percent of  a member’s quota and a cumulative limit of  300 percent), 
and were in certain instances combined with funds from development banks and bilateral 
contributions from major industrial countries. 
IMF rescue packages for six emerging markets (Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, 
Russia and Brazil) between 1995 and 1998 reached $231 billion, of  which 44 percent 
came from bilateral donors, 38 percent from the IMF, and the rest from development 
banks (Ahluwalia 1999, 55, table 1). From 1995 until the end of  2003 IMF exceptional 
financing for 9 emerging markets (the above six plus Argentina, Turkey and Uruguay) 
amounted to SDR 174 billion, with an average of  637 percent of  quota (IMF 2005c, table 
10). Such lending is the main source of  income for the Fund to support its operational 
expenses, which stood at some SDR 1.5 billion at the end of  FY2004. Thus, ironically, in 
the absence of  financial crises and bailout operations in emerging markets, the Fund can 
cease to be a financially viable institution. 
Crisis lending was combined with monetary and fiscal tightening in order to 
restore confidence, but this often failed to prevent sharp drops in the currency and 
hikes in interest rates, thereby deepening debt deflation, credit crunch and economic 
contraction. Such interventions took place not only when the country concerned was 
facing a liquidity problem, as in Korea, but also when there were signs of  a problem 
of  insolvency. Originally rescue packages involved short-term, temporary financing but 
more recently the Fund has provided medium-term financing, including to governments 
facing domestic debt problems such as in Turkey (Akyüz and Boratav 2003). 
In addition to the SRF noted above, the Contingency Credit Line (CCL) was created 
in Spring 1999 in order to provide a precautionary line of  defense in the form of  short-
term financing which would be available to meet future balance of  payments problems 
arising from contagion.22 Countries would prequalify for the CCL if  they complied 
with conditions related to macroeconomic and external financial indicators and 
with international standards in areas such as transparency and banking supervision. 
However, this facility discontinued in November 2003 as countries avoided recourse to 
it owing to fears that it would give the wrong signal and impair their access to financial 
markets.23
There have also been suggestions to turn the Fund into an international lender of  
last resort with a view to helping prevent crises (Fischer 1999). It is argued that if  the 
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IMF stands ready to provide liquidity to countries with sound policies, they would be 
protected from contagion and financial panic so that a lender of  last resort facility would 
have a preventive role. Clearly, such a step would involve a fundamental departure 
from the underlying premises of  the Bretton Woods system. The report of  the Meltzer 
Commission (2000) virtually proposes the elimination of  all other forms of  IMF lending, 
including those for current account financing which should, in their view, be provided 
by private markets.24 Such a shift in IMF lending would imply that only a small number 
of  more prosperous emerging economies would be eligible for IMF financing (Summers 
2000, 14). More importantly there are difficulties in transforming the IMF into a genuine 
international lender of  last resort, and proposed arrangements could compound rather 
than resolve certain problems encountered in IMF bailouts. 
The effective functioning of  such a lender would require discretion to create its own 
liquidity in order to be able to provide an unlimited amount of  financing. This problem 
could, in principle, be resolved by assigning a new role to the SDR, which could also help 
promote it as a true fiduciary asset.25 Proposals have indeed been made to allow the Fund 
to issue reversible SDRs to itself  for use in lender-of-last-resort operations, that is to say 
the allocated SDRs would be repurchased when the crisis was over.26
However, the real problem relates to the terms of  access to such a facility. Genuine 
lender-of-last-resort financing (namely lending in unlimited amounts and without 
conditions except for penalty rates) would need to be accompanied by tightened global 
supervision of  debtor countries to ensure their solvency, and this would encounter not 
only technical but also political difficulties. Pre-qualification, that is allowing countries 
meeting certain ex ante conditions to be eligible to lender-of-last-resort financing, as 
in the case of  ill-fated CCL, involves several problems. First, the IMF would have to 
act like a credit rating agency. Second, it would be necessary to constantly monitor 
the fulfilment of  the terms of  the financing to ensure that the pressures on the capital 
account of  a qualifying country have resulted from a sudden loss of  confidence amongst 
investors triggered largely by external factors rather than macroeconomic and financial 
mismanagement. In these respects difficulties are likely to emerge in relations between 
the Fund and the member concerned. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with rescue packages is that they tend to aggravate 
market failures and financial instability by creating moral hazard. This is more of  
a problem on the side of  creditors than debtors since access to lender of  last resort 
financing does not come free or prevent fully the adverse repercussions of  financial 
panics and runs for debtor countries. The main difficulty is that bailouts undermine 
market discipline and encourage imprudent lending since private creditors are not made 
to bear the consequences of  the risks they take.27 A dose of  constructive ambiguity by 
allowing lender discretion might help in reducing moral hazard, but at the expense of  
undermining the objective sought by establishing such a facility. 
There has been growing agreement that orderly debt workout procedures drawing 
on certain principles of  national bankruptcy laws, notably Chapters 9 and 11 of  the 
United States law provide a viable alternative to official bailout operations.28 These 
should be designed to meet two interrelated objectives. On the one hand, they should 
help prevent financial meltdown and economic crises in developing countries facing 
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difficulties in servicing their external obligations – a situation which often results in a 
loss of  confidence of  markets, collapse of  currencies and hikes in interest rates, inflicting 
serious damage on both public and private balance sheets and leading to large losses in 
output and employment and sharp increases in poverty, all of  these being part of  actual 
experience in East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere during the past ten years. On the 
other hand, they should provide mechanisms to facilitate an equitable restructuring of  
debt which can no longer be serviced according to the original provisions of  contracts. 
Attaining these two objectives does not require fully fledged international bankruptcy 
procedures but the application of  a few key principles:29 
 • A temporary debt standstill, whether debt is owed by public or private sector, and 
whether debt servicing difficulties are due to solvency or liquidity problems – a 
distinction which is not always clear-cut. The decision for a standstill should be taken 
unilaterally by the debtor country and sanctioned by an independent panel rather 
than by the IMF because the countries affected are among the shareholders of  the 
Fund which is itself  also a creditor. This sanction would provide an automatic stay on 
creditor litigation. Such a procedure would be similar to WTO safeguard provisions 
allowing countries to take emergency actions to suspend their obligations when faced 
with balance of  payments difficulties (Akyüz 2002, 124–25). Standstills would need 
to be accompanied by exchange controls, including suspension of  convertibility for 
foreign currency deposits and other foreign exchange assets domestically held by 
residents. 
 • Provision of  debtor-in-possession financing automatically granting seniority status to 
debt contracted after the imposition of  the standstill. IMF should lend into arrears for 
financing imports and other vital current account transactions. 
 • Debt restructuring including rollovers and write-offs, based on negotiations between 
the debtor and creditors, and facilitated by the introduction of  automatic rollover and 
collective action clauses (CACs) in debt contracts. The IMF should not be involved in 
the negotiations between sovereign debtors and private creditors. 
These principles still leave open several issues of  detail, but they nonetheless could 
serve as the basis for a coherent and comprehensive approach to crisis intervention and 
resolution. The Fund appeared to be moving in this direction at the end of  the last decade 
with rising opposition to bailout operations from European and other governments and 
the increased frequency of  crises in emerging markets. The IMF Board first recognized 
that “in extreme circumstances, if  it is not possible to reach agreement on a voluntary 
standstill, members may find it necessary, as a last resort, to impose one unilaterally,” 
and that since “there could be a risk that this action would trigger capital outflows 
[…] a member would need to consider whether it might be necessary to resort to the 
introduction of  a more comprehensive exchange or capital controls.”30
Although the board was unwilling to provide statutory protection to debtors in the 
form of  a stay on litigation, preferring instead “signalling the Fund’s acceptance of  a 
standstill imposed by a member […] through a decision […] to lend into arrears to 
private creditors,” the Fund secretariat moved toward establishing a formal mechanism 
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for sovereign debt restructuring to “allow a country to come to the Fund and request a 
temporary standstill on the repayment of  its debts, during which time it would negotiate 
a rescheduling with its creditors, given the Fund’s consent to that line of  attack. During 
this limited period, probably some months in duration, the country would have to 
provide assurances to its creditors that money was not fleeing the country, which would 
presumably mean the imposition of  exchange controls for a temporary period of  time.” 
(Krueger 2001, 7) 
However, the provision for statutory protection to debtors in the form of  a stay on 
litigation is not included in the proposal for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM) prepared by the Fund management because of  the opposition from financial 
markets and the United States government. The proposed mechanism also provides 
considerable leverage to creditors in seeking their permission in granting seniority to new 
debt needed to prevent disruption to economic activity. It gives considerable power to the 
Fund vis-à-vis the proposed Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum in determining 
debt sustainability.31
The SDRM proposal contains innovative mechanisms to facilitate sovereign bond 
restructuring for countries whose debt is deemed unsustainable in bringing debtors 
and bondholders together whether or not bond contracts contain CACs, in securing 
greater transparency, and in providing a mechanism for dispute resolution. It could thus 
constitute an important step in the move toward generalized CACs in international 
bonds. However, it only addresses part of  the problem associated with financial crises. 
First, it would not apply to countries with sustainable debt but facing liquidity shortages. 
Secondly, it focuses exclusively on international bonds as a source of  financial fragility 
even though vulnerabilities associated with international bank debt, currency risks 
assumed by the domestic banking system, and public domestic debt played key roles 
in most recent crises in emerging markets. In the presence of  such vulnerabilities bond 
clauses alone cannot stem currency attacks or prevent financial turmoil. While the SDRM 
includes a provision to discourage litigation by bondholders (through the application of  
the so-called hotchpot rule), such a rule cannot address the problem of  how to stop 
financial meltdown, since in a country whose debt is judged unsustainable, currency runs 
could take place whether or not bondholders opt for litigation. 
More importantly, the SDRM proposal does not fundamentally address the problems 
associated with IMF bailouts. It is based on the premise that countries facing liquidity 
problems would continue to receive IMF support and the SDRM will apply only to those 
with unsustainable debt. As part of  its promotion of  the SDRM the IMF has argued 
that unsustainable debt situations are rare. That means in most cases business as usual. 
In any case, it can reasonably be expected that countries with unsustainable debt would 
generally be unwilling to declare themselves insolvent and activate the SDRM. Instead, 
they would be inclined to ask the Fund to provide financing. 
But in most cases it would be difficult for the Fund to decline such requests on 
the grounds that the country is facing a solvency problem. Here lies the rationale for 
limits on IMF crisis lending whether the problem is one of  liquidity or insolvency: 
with strict access limits creditors cannot count on an IMF bailout, and debtors 
will be less averse to activating the SDRM and standstills when faced with serious 
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difficulties in meeting their external obligations and maintaining convertibility. This 
means that to encourage countries to move quickly to debt restructuring, the SDRM 
should be combined with limits on crisis lending. But this could be problematic 
unless private sector involvement is secured through a statutory standstill and stay 
on litigation. 
Even this watered-down version of  the SDRM proposal could not elicit adequate 
political support and has, at the time of  writing, been put on the backburner. Indeed, 
the impetus for reform has generally been lost since the turn of  the millennium 
because of  widespread complacency associated with the recovery of  capital flows to 
emerging markets. This recovery has been driven by a combination of  highly favorable 
conditions including historically low interest rates, high levels of  liquidity, strong 
commodity prices and buoyant international trade. Private capital flows to emerging 
markets appear to be in the boom phase of  their third postwar cycle: the first began 
in the 1970s and ended with the debt crisis in the early 1980s, and the second began 
in the early 1990s and ended with the East Asian and Russian crises.32 Total inflows in 
the current boom appear to have exceeded the peak observed in the previous boom, 
and almost all emerging markets have shared in this recovery. However, as noted by 
the Institute of  International Finance, the system is becoming more fragile once 
again: “there is a risk that the pickup in flows into some emerging market assets has 
pushed valuations to levels that are not commensurate with underlying fundamentals” 
(IIF 2005a, 4). Thus, a combination of  tightened liquidity, rising interest rates, slowing 
growth and global trade imbalances can reverse the boom, hitting particularly countries 
with weak fundamentals and incomplete self-insurance (IIF 2005b; Goldstein 2005b).33 
Under these conditions if  the recent consensus against large-scale bailout operations is 
adhered to, countries that may be facing rapid exit of  capital and unsustainable debt 
burdens could be forced to undertake action for unilateral standstill, creating considerable 
uncertainties and confusion in the international financial system. If  not, we will be back 
to square one. 
F. restructuring IMF Lending and Supplementing resources
The arguments developed above imply that the Fund should return to its original 
mandate for the provision of  short-term current account financing and should no longer 
be engaged in the development finance or financial bailout operations. This means 
abolishing the facilities designed for these purposes including the EFF, SRF and PRGF. 
Despite the rapid development and integration of  international banking and credit 
markets, there is still a strong rationale for the Fund to have a role in providing liquidity 
because of  the procyclical behavior of  financial markets and increased volatility of  the 
global economic environment. Such financing should be made available in order to 
support economic activity, employment and trade when countries face sharp declines or 
reversals of  private capital flows, or temporary shortfalls in external payments as a result 
of  trade shocks which cannot be met by private financing. In both cases access to credit 
tranches through standby agreements should be the main instrument for the provision 
of  liquidity. Greater delineation of  Bank–Fund activities requires that such financing 
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should be the sole responsibility of  the Fund, and the Bank should stay out of  provision 
of  short-term finance.34
While it has to be recognized that money is fungible and in practice it is not always 
possible to identify the need catered for by a particular loan, it is important to ensure 
that IMF lending to counter volatility in private capital flows should aim at maintaining 
imports and the level of  economic activity rather than debt repayment to private 
creditors and capital account convertibility. Such lending should be available to countries 
facing cutback in credit lines due to contagion as well as those facing currency and debt 
crises. To ensure that such lending does not amount to bailouts for private creditors, there 
should be strict limits to IMF crisis lending since otherwise it would be difficult to ensure 
private sector involvement. 
This approach of  constraining IMF lending to encourage private sector involvement 
in the resolution of  international financial crises has been supported by some G-7 
countries including Canada and England.35 It has also been supported in a report to the 
Council on Foreign Relations which argued that the IMF should adhere consistently 
to normal access limits and that only “in the unusual case in which there appears to 
be a systemic crisis (that is a multicountry crisis where failure to intervene threatens 
the performance of  the world economy and where there is widespread failure in the 
ability of  private capital markets to distinguish creditworthy from less creditworthy 
borrowers), the IMF would return to its ‘systemic’ backup facilities” (CFRTF 1999, 63). 
However, exceptions to normal access limits could leave considerable room for large-
scale bailout operations and excessive IMF discretion in assessing the conditions under 
which exceptional access in capital account crises are to be granted.36 It would also 
allow room for considerable political leverage in IMF lending decisions by its major 
shareholders, as was seen in the differential treatment of  Argentina and Turkey after 
the attacks of  September 2001. Requiring supermajority for access to exceptional 
finance, as recommended by CFRTF (1999, 63) and Goldstein (2005a, 299–300) would 
certainly be an important step, but it may not always prevent large-scale bailouts driven 
by political motivations. In any case, the Fund should provide liquidity to countries 
facing cutback in private lending in order to support production, employment and 
trade, and should not be expected to help float imprudent international investors and 
lenders – a task that should fall on national authorities in creditor countries. On the 
other hand, the problem of  inadequacy of  normal lending limits for current account 
financing should be addressed by reforming quotas and access policy, not by making 
exceptions to access limits. 
Exceptional current account financing may be needed in times of  a contraction in 
world trade and growth, and/or sharp declines in capital flows to developing countries, 
as was the case in the early 1980s and after the East Asian and Russian crises. The Fund’s 
regular resources may not be adequate for dealing with such cases because they are not 
large or flexible enough. This can be handled by a global countercyclical facility based 
on reversible SDR allocations, which could be triggered by a decision of  the board on 
the basis of  certain predetermined criteria regarding global trade and output and private 
capital flows to developing countries. Again countries could be permitted to have access 
to such a facility on a temporary basis within predetermined limits. 
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Fund lending in response to trade shocks is needed when financial markets are not 
willing to provide countercyclical finance. As noted the CFF was established in 1963 
as an additional low-conditionality facility to help developing countries experiencing 
temporary shortfalls in export earnings due to external shocks in order to avoid undue 
retrenchment. Modifications made over the years have tightened conditions attached 
to the CFF, and the facility has not been used since the last review in 2000 despite two 
recognized temporary shocks including the attacks of  September 2001 which affected 
earnings from tourism in the Caribbean region (IMF 2004b). A major problem is that 
in order to have low conditionality financing under CFF (the so-called standalone CFF 
purchases) a country would need to have a viable payments position except for the effects 
of  the shocks, but such a country would normally have access to alternative sources 
of  finance. On the other hand, countries with structurally weak payments usually have 
other forms of  high-conditionality Fund financing including the PRGF or emergency 
assistance (IMF 2004b). Under current arrangements the facility serves no useful 
purpose and many executive directors called for its discontinuation during the recent 
review, arguing that the CFF is not an attractive option for low income countries given its 
nonconcessional nature (IMF 2004c). 
It is generally recognized that IMF quotas have considerably lagged behind the 
growth of  global output and trade. According to one estimate, in 2000 they stood at 
4 percent of  world imports compared to 58 percent in 1944 (Buira 2003b, 9). It is, 
however, often argued that this does not imply that the size of  the Fund would need to 
be raised considerably in order to keep up with growth in world trade because closely 
integrated and rapidly expanding financial markets now provide alternative sources of  
liquidity, and the move to floating together with the universal convertibility of  several 
currencies have reduced the need for international reserves. While this may well be so for 
more advanced countries, many developing countries continue to depend on multilateral 
financing since market liquidity tends to disappear at the time when it is most needed. 
These countries are also more vulnerable to external shocks, be it in trade or finance. 
An across the board increase in the size of  the Fund may not address the problems 
faced by many developing countries because of  the small size of  their quotas. It is known 
that the current distribution of  quotas does not reflect the relative size of  the economies 
of  the countries member to the IMF, and a redistribution of  quotas based on actual 
shares of  countries in aggregate world output would raise the proportion of  IMF quotas 
allocated to developing countries, particularly if  incomes are valued at purchasing power 
parities (PPP) rather than market exchange rates (Buira 2003b). However, this would only 
address a small part of  the problem: according to the IMF World Economic Outlook, 
the share of  advanced countries in aggregate GDP at PPP is close to 58 percent while 
their share in IMF quotas is just over 60 percent. For developing countries these numbers 
stand at around 38 and 30 percent respectively. Moreover, a redistribution of  quotas 
would not produce a tangible increase in the share of  low income developing countries 
which do not have adequate access to international financial markets. 
One way to tackle the problem would be to adopt differential treatment of  poorer 
countries in the determination of  their drawing rights. Under existing arrangements 
quotas determine simultaneously countries’ contributions to the Fund, voting rights and 
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drawing rights. But this is not the best possible arrangement and the use of  a single 
quota to serve three purposes was rightly criticized as “both illogical and unnecessary” 
(Mikesell 1994, 37). Putting a large wedge between countries’ contributions and voting 
rights by subjecting them to totally different rules may be problematic, but there is no 
reason why drawing rights should not be based on different quotas from contributions.37 
After all nonreciprocity between rights and obligations for poorer countries has been 
an agreed principle in multilateral arrangements in other spheres of  economic activity, 
notably trade, and such an approach would also be consistent with concessionality 
applied to lending to such countries by the Bretton Woods Institutions. This may be 
arranged by setting different access limits to different groups of  countries according to 
their vulnerability to external shocks and access to financial markets, which in effect 
implies that, under current arrangements, countries would have different quotas for 
their contributions and drawing rights. Income shares can be taken as the basis for 
contributions while export earning volatility and access to private finance could be used 
as criteria for determining drawing limits. Such a needs-based approach to access to IMF 
resources would make even greater sense if, as proposed in Section I, the IMF ceases to 
be funded by its members, relying instead on SDRs for the resources needed. 
An overall expansion of  Fund quotas, together with its redistribution in favor of  
developing countries, would increase unconditional access through reserve tranche 
purchases. However, automatic access would also be expanded beyond the reserve 
tranche for the poorer countries if  quotas for drawings are differentiated from those for 
contributions. On the other hand, once the Fund stops dealing with development and 
poverty, structural conditionality should no longer be applied for access to upper credit 
tranches. Conditionality would then be restricted to fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies – the Fund’s core areas of  competence. 
Increased resources at the IMF should be expected to help strike a better balance 
between financing and macroeconomic adjustment. In any case, the kind of  conditions 
to be attached to lending should depend on the nature of  payment imbalances. If  the 
shortfall is due to temporary trade and financial shocks, then it is important to ensure 
that the Fund do not act procyclically and impose policy tightening. In such cases the 
balance between policy adjustment and financing should be tilted toward the latter. 
If  expansionary macroeconomic policies and excessive domestic absorption are at the 
root of  the problem, then financing would need to be accompanied by realignment 
of  monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. However, if  it turns out that payments 
equilibrium can only be sustained at permanently depressed rates of  economic growth, 
this is a matter that should be addressed by multilateral development banks through 
provision of  development finance and promotion of  structural policies, including 
in areas affecting government revenues and spending, rather than by IMF lending or 
macroeconomic policy prescriptions for demand management. 
An issue here is whether it would be possible to distinguish between temporary and 
permanent shocks or between structural and cyclical deficits (see, e.g., IMF 2004b, 10). 
There are no doubt difficulties in making judgments in these areas, which call for 
prudence. However, such judgments are also necessary under current arrangements in 
order to strike a balance between adjustment and financing, and between structural and 
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macroeconomic conditionality. Moreover, the Fund is engaged in making judgments 
in areas that involve even higher degrees of  uncertainty such as debt sustainability 
and prospects of  the country regaining access to private finance as part of  the criteria 
to be met for exceptional access in capital account crises (IMF 2005c, 4). Placing 
macroeconomic and structural aspects of  payments adjustment in different institutions is 
no more problematic than combining them under the same roof. It would also have the 
additional advantage of  reducing the imbalance between adjustment and financing since 
structural adjustment needs to be supported by a lot more financing than macroeconomic 
adjustment, and the IMF programs tend to rely heavily on macroeconomic tightening to 
reduce payments imbalances even when they are structural in nature. 
G. Ineffectiveness and Asymmetry of  Fund Surveillance
The architects of  the Bretton Woods system recognized the role of  surveillance over 
national policies for international economic stability. But it was only after the collapse of  
the fixed exchange rate system and the expansion of  capital markets that IMF surveillance 
gained critical importance. With the second amendment of  the Articles of  Agreement the 
Fund was charged with exercising firm surveillance over members’ policies at the same 
time as members were allowed the right to choose their own exchange rate arrangements. 
Its objective, as formally adopted, was limited to surveillance over exchange rate policies, 
focusing primarily on the sustainability of  exchange rates and external payments 
positions, and on the appropriateness of  the associated economic policies, particularly 
monetary and fiscal policies, of  individual countries. However, its scope and coverage 
have expanded over time into structural policies, the financial sector and a number of  
other areas (IMF/GIE 1999, 21; Mohammed 2000). The guidelines established in 1977 
made an explicit reference to the obligations of  members to avoid manipulating exchange 
rates or the international monetary system to gain an unfair competitive advantage over 
other members.38 In the 1980s the major members of  the Fund came to favor a broader 
interpretation and recognized that “to be effective surveillance over exchange rates must 
concern itself  with the assessment of  all the policies that affect trade, capital movements, 
external adjustment, and the effective functioning of  the international monetary system.”39 
After a series of  emerging market crises the Interim Committee agreed in April 1998 
that the Fund should intensify its surveillance of  financial sector issues and capital flows, 
giving particular attention to policy interdependence and risks of  contagion, and ensure 
that it is fully aware of  market views and perspectives.40 Various codes and standards 
established on the basis of  benchmarks appropriate to major industrial countries for 
macroeconomic policy, institutional and market structure, and financial regulation and 
supervision have become important components of  the surveillance process (Cornford 
2002, 31–33). 
However, the Fund’s intensive bilateral surveillance of  developing countries’ policies 
has not been effective in crisis prevention in large part because it has failed to diagnose 
and act on the root causes of  the problem. Indeed, according to an independent 
assessment of  Fund surveillance, policymakers interviewed had important reservations 
regarding the quality of  the Fund’s analysis of  capital account issues (IMF/GIE 1999, 13). 
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Experience since the early 1990s shows that preventing unsustainable surges in private 
capital inflows, currency appreciations and trade deficits holds the key to preventing 
financial crises in emerging markets. However, as recognized by the IMF’s Independent 
Evaluation Office (IEO), there is a consensus that none of  the standard policy measures 
recommended by the Fund for this purpose, including countercyclical monetary and 
fiscal policy and exchange rate flexibility, is a panacea, and each involves significant costs 
or otherwise brings about other policy dilemmas (IMF/IEO 2005, 60). Sterilization 
through issuing government paper, raising reserve requirements or generating fiscal 
surpluses runs up against a host of  problems. While fixed or adjustable peg regimes tend 
to encourage short-term inflows by reducing perceived currency risks, the floating regime, 
which has come to be favored by the Fund after recurrent crises in emerging markets, 
does not provide a viable alternative. As shown by the post–Bretton Woods experience 
of  advanced industrial countries and the more recent experience of  several emerging 
market economies, floating does not prevent excessive inflows of  capital, misalignments 
in exchange rates and unsustainable trade deficits; nor does it always secure an orderly 
currency and payments adjustment.41 Similarly, prudential regulations can help contain 
the damage caused by a rapid exit of  capital, but they are not always effective in checking 
the build-up of  external fragility even when countercyclical adjustments are made to 
rules governing loan loss provisions, capital requirements, collateral valuation and other 
measures affecting conditions in credit and asset markets in order to limit the cyclicality 
of  the financial system. 
All these imply that direct measures of  control over capital inflows that go beyond 
prudential regulations may become necessary to prevent build-up of  financial fragility 
and vulnerability to external shocks.42 Developing country governments have generally 
been unwilling to slow down excessive capital inflows, using, instead, the opportunity to 
pursue procyclical fiscal policies. Taiwan is a notable exception with effective restrictions 
over arbitrage flows which protected the economy from the East Asian crisis in 
1997–98.43 Again Chile and Colombia employed unremunerated reserve requirements in 
a countercyclical manner, imposed at times of  strong inflows in the 1990s and phased out 
when capital dried up at the end of  the decade. This was a price-based, nondiscriminative 
measure which effectively taxed arbitrage inflows with the implicit tax rate varying 
inversely with maturity. These measures were effective in improving the maturity profile 
of  external borrowing but not in checking aggregate capital inflows. The Fund has 
been ambivalent even toward these market-based measures, questioning their rationale 
and effectiveness (IMF/IEO 2005, 46, box 2.3). This is largely because, as noted in an 
independent report on surveillance, the Fund has generally been optimistic regarding 
the sustainability of  capital inflows to emerging markets (IMF/GIE 1999, 44, box 3.2). 
It has been averse to temporary control measures even when there were clear signs that 
surges in short-term capital inflows were leading to persistent currency appreciations and 
growing trade deficits, advocating, instead, fiscal tightening and greater exchange rate 
flexibility (IMF/IEO 2005, 8–9, 59, table 3.2). 
The Fund has little leverage over policies in emerging market economies enjoying 
surges in capital flows, since they rarely need the Fund at such times of  bliss. It cannot 
act as a rating agency and issue strong public warnings about the sustainability of  
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economic conditions in its member countries because of  their possible adverse financial 
consequences. But it is also notable that the Fund refrains from requesting policy changes 
and effective capital account measures to slow down speculative capital inflows, check 
sharp currency appreciations and growing current account deficits even in countries with 
standby agreements. This was certainly the case in the 1990s when it supported exchange-
based stabilization programs relying on short-term capital inflows. More recently Turkey 
has also been going through a similar process of  continued appreciation and growing 
current account deficits under a floating regime, brought about, in large part, by a surge 
in arbitrage flows encouraged by high interest rates. Although its external conditions 
appear to be highly fragile and unsustainable, the Fund has done little to check this 
process; it has actually given a further momentum by constantly praising the policies 
pursued under its supervision.44 Ironically, the Fund also seems to be aware of  the risks 
and vulnerabilities created by the current boom in capital inflows to emerging markets; 
as noted, it has been simulating scenarios for a group of  “21 vulnerable emerging market 
countries” to predict the financial gap that could emerge in the event of  “financial 
drought and poor economic conditions” (IMF 2005c, 8).
According to the recent report by the IEO “the IMF has learned over time on capital 
account issues” and “the new paradigm […] acknowledges the usefulness of  capital 
controls under certain conditions, particularly controls over inflows,” but this not yet 
reflected in policy advice because of  “the lack of  a clear position by the institution” 
(IMF/IEO, 2005, 11). The report goes on to make recommendations to bring about 
greater clarity in policy advice and the role of  capital account issues in IMF surveillance, 
but it is not clear if  these would lead to the kind of  fundamental changes needed in the 
Fund’s approach to capital account regimes. 
The articles allow the Fund to request members to exercise control on capital outflows 
and recognize the right of  members to regulate international capital flows. The 1977 
surveillance decision mentions, among the developments that might indicate the need 
for discussion with a member, the behavior of  the exchange rate that appears to be 
unrelated to underlying economic and financial conditions including factors affecting 
competitiveness and long-term capital movements while the 1995 amendment explicitly 
refers to “unsustainable flows of  private capital” as an event triggering such discussion. 
In other words surveillance should include sustainability of  a country’s external balance 
sheet and hence effective management of  external liabilities.45
However, none of  these give the Fund clear and effective jurisdiction over capital 
account issues or allow it to include capital account measures as conditionality in its 
financial arrangements with a member (IMF/IEO 2005, 50). Despite that the Fund 
has played an important role in promoting capital account liberalization in developing 
countries. After many years of  turmoil in emerging markets, the issue now faced is how to 
include capital account measures in the arsenal of  policy tools for effective management 
of  international capital flows. As already argued, restrictions over capital outflows should 
become legitimate tools of  policy in the context of  orderly debt workout procedures at 
times of  rapid exit of  capital. In the same vein, guidelines for IMF surveillance should 
specify circumstances in which the Fund should actually recommend the imposition or 
strengthening of  capital controls over inflows, and the Fund should be able to request 
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exercise of  control over inflows as well as outflows. It should also develop new techniques 
and mechanisms designed to separate, to the extent possible, capital account from current 
account transactions, to distinguish among different types of  capital flows from the point 
of  view of  their sustainability and economic impact, and to provide policy advice and 
technical assistance to countries at times when such measures are needed. 
How far should IMF surveillance cover subjects such as financial regulation and 
standards for financial reporting and accounting? This is clearly a delicate question 
involving not only technical competence but also powers and responsibilities in areas 
where there already exist other multilateral bodies. It is much more important for the 
Fund to focus on the analysis of  capital flows including their nature and sustainability 
with a view to reducing the likelihood of  crises than on the observance of  international 
standards in developing countries in order to limit the damage that may be caused by 
their reversals, leaving these matters to institutions with the necessary expertise. This was 
indeed one of  the recommendations of  the report by independent experts on surveillance 
(IMF/IGE 1999, 15). 
The failure of  IMF surveillance in preventing international financial crises also 
reflects the unbalanced nature of  the procedures which give too little recognition to 
shortcomings in the institutions and policies in major industrial countries with large 
impact on global economic conditions. For its borrowers the policy advice given by the 
IMF in Article IV consultations often provide the framework for the conditionality to 
be attached to any future Fund program (IMF/GIE 1999, 20), while its surveillance of  
the policies of  the most important players in the global system has lost any real meaning 
with the graduation of  the industrial countries from the Fund and the breakdown of  
the Bretton Woods arrangements for exchange rates. This asymmetry in surveillance 
between the creditors and debtors of  the Fund has increased further after recurrent 
emerging market crises throughout the 1990s. Standards and codes have been designed 
primarily to discipline debtor developing countries on the presumption that the cause 
of  crises rests primarily with policy and institutional weaknesses in these countries. By 
contrast very little attention has been given to the role played by policies and institutions 
in major industrial countries in triggering international financial crises. For instance while 
it is widely recognized that noncompliance with standards and codes is a global problem, 
the incentive structure for compliance is highly ineffectual for the developed country 
members of  the Fund (Schneider and Silva 2002, 4). Again, the Fund has paid very little 
attention to how instability of  capital flows on the supply side could be reduced through 
regulatory measures targeted at institutional investors in major industrial countries 
(IMF/IEO 2005, 7), or how transparency could be increased for institutions engaged in 
destabilizing financial transactions such as the hedge funds. 
IMF multilateral surveillance has not paid adequate attention to systemic interrelation 
among countries – an area of  improvement identified by a former managing director.46 
More importantly, the modalities of  IMF surveillance do not include ways of  responding 
to and dealing with unidirectional impulses emanating from changes in the monetary and 
exchange rate policies of  the United States and a few other G-7 countries. Indeed, boom–
bust cycles in capital flows to developing countries and major international financial 
crises are typically connected to large shifts in macroeconomic and financial conditions 
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in the major industrial countries. The sharp rise in the United States interest rates and 
the appreciation of  the dollar was a main factor in the debt crisis of  the 1980s. Likewise, 
the boom–bust cycle of  capital flows in the 1990s which devastated many countries in 
Latin America and East Asia were strongly influenced by shifts in monetary conditions in 
the United States and the exchange rates among the major reserve currencies (UNCTAD 
TDR 1998, part 2, chap. 4; and 2003, chap. 2). Again much of  the current surge in 
capital flows to emerging markets is driven by financial market conditions in industrial 
countries, including historically low interest rates and ample liquidity, rather than by 
fundamentals in recipient countries, and a reversal of  these conditions could trigger 
serious instability in several emerging markets. 
It has often been argued that the problems regarding the quality, effectiveness and 
even-handedness of  surveillance could be addressed by overhauling and downsizing the 
board to make it more representative and effective, and giving greater independence 
to executive directors vis-à-vis their capitals and to the IMF secretariat vis-à-vis its 
governing bodies.47 This view has been taken further by a senior British Treasury official 
who argued in favor of  a formal separation of  surveillance from decisions about program 
lending and the use of  IMF resources so as to establish the Fund as independent from 
political influence in its surveillance of  economies as an independent central bank is in 
the operation of  monetary policy (Balls 2003). It is argued that the current structure 
of  the IMF treats program design as an extension of  surveillance, but the lack of  a 
clear distinction between lending and surveillance activities creates the wrong incentives 
and diminishes the effectiveness of  surveillance. Moreover, there is currently no formal 
regular mechanism for assessing whether the Fund is providing objective, rigorous 
and consistent standards of  surveillance across all member countries – program and 
nonprogram countries. While responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of  the Fund’s 
activities, executive directors also have responsibilities to their authorities. This creates 
a conflict of  interest where executive directors tend to collude in surveillance in defense 
of  the countries they represent, turning peer pressure into peer protection. Surveillance 
should thus rest with authorities who are independent of  their governments and who 
are not involved in lending decisions, making it impartial, legitimate, authoritative, 
transparent and accountable. This would also have the advantage of  protecting the 
board and IMF management from being dragged into decisions, which – on the basis of  
objective evidence – they would not want to take or publicly justify. 
Such a step could indeed help improve the quality of  surveillance for both program 
and nonprogram countries in identifying risks and fragilities and the policy measures 
needed. However, it is not clear if  it could really secure evenhandedness between 
program and nonprogram countries. For program countries, it would not be possible 
to delink lending decisions from surveillance. Indeed, if  the proposed arrangements are 
to improve the quality, authority and credibility, results of  surveillance should provide 
a sound and legitimate basis for lending decisions by the board. But for nonprogram 
countries there would be no such mechanism to encourage governments to heed the 
policy advice emerging from the surveillance process. Publication of  surveillance 
reports and a wider debate over policy could help prevent build-up of  fragilities and 
vulnerabilities by providing signals to market participants and creating public pressure 
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on governments in need of  corrective action, but even an independent body responsible 
for surveillance cannot be expected to issue public warnings since they can become 
self-fulfilling prophecies. For G-1 or G-3 countries whose policies set the terms and 
conditions in global financial markets, even such warnings may be of  little use in 
encouraging policy reorientation or coordination. 
Therefore, while independent surveillance may improve its quality, credibility and 
impact for nonprogram countries, it cannot be relied on for bringing greater symmetry 
between creditor and debtor countries. Such a step may need to be supplemented by 
reforms in many areas of  governance to be taken up in the following section. However, 
given the limits on improving significantly the leverage of  the Fund over nonborrowing 
countries, evenhandedness may only be possible by minimising conditionality for 
program countries and increasing the degree of  automaticity of  their access to the Fund 
in the ways discussed above. 
h. Governance: Making the Fund a Genuinely Multilateral Institution
The debate over governance of  the IMF has focused mainly on issues raised by exercise 
of  power by its major shareholders, particularly the United States. The most frequently 
debated areas of  reform include the procedures for the choice of  the managing director 
and, more importantly, the distribution of  voting rights. Shortcomings in transparency 
and accountability are also closely related to “democratic deficit” within the governance 
structure of  the Fund resulting from the quota regime. 
The postwar bargain struck between the United States and Western Europe for the 
distribution of  the heads of  the Bretton Woods institutions between the two shores of  
the Atlantic has survived widespread public criticism and initiatives taken by developing 
countries. The latest selection of  the managing director was again business as usual 
despite the apparent consensus reached during the previous round by the board that 
the decision for selection would be based on a wide and open discussion involving all 
members of  the Fund.48
There is a consensus among independent observers that the present distribution 
of  voting rights lacks legitimacy not only because it does not meet the minimum 
standards for equity due to erosion of  “basic votes,” but also because it no longer 
reflects the relative economic importance of  the members of  the Fund.49 The existing 
distribution of  voting rights, together with the special majority requirements for 
key decisions, effectively gives a veto power to the United States in matters such as 
adjustment of  quotas, the sale of  IMF gold reserves, balance of  payments assistance 
to developing countries, and allocation of  SDRs. Such a degree of  control by the 
United States may have had some rationale during the immediate postwar years when 
it was the single most important creditor to the rest of  the world and effectively the 
only creditor of  the Fund. However, now not only is the United States the single 
largest debtor country in the world, but it is only one of  the 45 creditor countries at 
the IMF.50 
In theory the Fund appears to be a consensus builder since decisions by the board 
are taken without formal voting.51 But there has been hardly any consensus on proposals 
208 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
for change favored by developing countries in areas such as quotas, voting rights or SDR 
allocation. In reality the consensual process of  decision making on the executive board 
does not constitute a democratizing feature of  Fund governance, but a way of  exerting 
pressure on dissenting countries to go along with its major shareholders. The influence of  
developing countries is further weakened by the practice of  arriving at decisions through 
consensus among executive directors, rather than direct exercise of  voting rights by 
each and every member, since many developing countries are represented by executive 
directors from industrial countries.52
The procedures followed for the preparation and approval of  country programs also 
diminish the impact of  developing countries. Typically agreement is reached between the 
country concerned and the Fund staff  before a program is presented to the board, and it 
is not always clear to what extent the agreement reached reflects what the country really 
wants to do as opposed to what it has been compelled to accept. This tends to discourage 
developing country executive directors to oppose potentially damaging stabilization and 
adjustment programs even though in theory they have collectively the required number 
of  votes to block them. Clearly an alternative procedure allowing the country concerned 
to make a presentation to the board about its policy intentions and to back it up, when 
needed, with expert witnesses before entering into any discussion with the management 
could provide for a broader debate over country programs and greater say for developing 
countries in the board. 
The current distribution of  voting rights and the manner in which they are exercised 
effectively enable the major industrial countries to use the Fund as a multilateral seal 
of  approval to legitimize decisions already taken elsewhere by this small number 
of  countries. Lack of  broad participation in the decision making process is also a 
main reason why the Fund does not meet the minimum standards of  transparency 
or accountability. There is an increased agreement that despite certain measures 
recently taken, lack of  transparency goes well beyond that justified by the confidential 
nature of  the issues dealt with by the Fund. The record on accountability is even less 
encouraging: the Fund is protected against bearing the consequences of  the decisions 
taken, and the burden of  inappropriate policy choices invariably falls on countries 
following its advice. 
The proposals for reform for reducing the democratic deficit fall into two categories. 
First, changes could be made to special majority requirements in order to remove the 
veto power of  the Fund’s major shareholders over key decisions. Second, and more 
importantly, voting rights could be reallocated so as to increase the voice of  developing 
countries. This could be done by increasing the share of  the basic votes in total voting 
rights and/or by reallocating quotas on the basis of  PPP. The main loser would be the 
European Union, which collectively holds almost twice as many votes as the United 
States, far above the level justified by the share of  the region in the world economy. 
According to a proposal for restoring basic votes to its original share of  around 11 percent 
of  total votes and allocating quota-based votes on the basis of  PPP, the share of  industrial 
countries would fall from over 62 percent to 51 percent while that of  developing countries 
would rise from around 30 percent to 42 percent (Kelkar, Yadav and Chaudhry 2004, 
appendix 1). 
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There can be little doubt that a reform along these lines would constitute an important 
step in improving the Fund’s governance. It would rectify anomalies such as Canada 
holding the same number of  votes as China or smaller European countries including 
Belgium and the Netherlands holding more votes than India, Brazil or Mexico, making 
the Fund look a more participatory and democratic institution. Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
to make a significant impact on the political leverage of  its major shareholders or reduce 
the imbalance between its creditor and debtors. 
The problems of  governance and lack of  uniformity of  treatment across members 
cannot be resolved as long as Fund resources depend on the discretion of  a small number 
of  its shareholders. Reserve currency countries are the principal creditors to the Fund 
and their quota subscription payments provide the only usable international assets since 
there is no demand for national currencies paid in by developing countries. Moreover, 
the Fund borrows not from international financial markets, but from a minority of  its 
members under two standing arrangements, GAB and NAB. It is true that the distinction 
between creditor and debtor countries is not the same as that between industrial and 
developing countries, and at the end of  2004 of  the 45 creditor countries to the Fund 
nine were developing countries. However, unlike industrial countries, developing 
countries’ net financial position in the Fund has been highly volatile. Almost all of  the 
44 countries which have switched, at least once, over 1980–2004 between being net 
financial contributors to the Fund and being debtors, and back, are developing countries 
(Boughton 2005, 4). With increased frequency of  financial crises in emerging markets, 
this classification, like international credit ratings, has become highly unstable. For 
instance Korea, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand now are among the creditors of  the 
IMF while they were heavily indebted a few years ago. Again there is no guarantee that 
countries such as Chile and China which have been IMF creditors for some time will 
remain so in the years ahead.53
In trade, bilateralism is often seen as a threat to multilateralism because of  the 
preferential treatment it accords to some countries at the expense of  the others 
in violation of  the MFN principle, and the role played by political considerations in 
bilateral and regional trade arrangements. In the sphere of  finance, by contrast, bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements are often seen as complementary. As already noted, in 
several instances the Fund’s interventions in emerging market crises were combined with 
bilateral contributions from major industrial countries, notably but not solely the United 
States, particularly where political, economic and military interests were involved. Again, 
official debt reduction initiatives combine bilateral and multilateral debt, as in HIPC, 
and bilateral lenders often insist that any talks in the Paris club should be preceded by a 
formal IMF program. Since bilateral lending is driven largely by political considerations 
(Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999; Kapur and Webb 1994; and Rodrik 1995) and bilateral 
debt negotiations rarely satisfy uniformity of  treatment of  debtors, such arrangements 
serve to subvert the governance of  the Fund further, thereby enhancing the scope to 
make it an instrument for major industrial countries to pursue their national interests.
 A reform that would translate the Fund into a truly multilateral institution responsible 
for international monetary and financial stability with equal rights and obligations of  
all its members, de facto as well as de jure, would call for, inter alia, an international 
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agreement on sources of  finance that do not depend on the discretion of  a handful 
of  countries as well as a clear separation of  multilateral financial arrangements from 
bilateral creditor–debtor relations. The potential sources of  genuinely multilateral finance 
are twofold. First, an agreement could be reached on international taxes, including the 
currency transaction tax (the so-called Tobin tax), environmental taxes and various other 
taxes such as those on arms trade, to be applied by all parties to the agreement on the 
transactions and activities concerned (Atkinson 2003; Wahl 2005). A common feature 
of  these is that they are all sin taxes which would provide revenues while discouraging 
certain global public bads such as currency speculation, environmental damage or 
armed conflict and violence. However, these sources of  revenue are more appropriate 
for development grants to poorest countries or for the provision of  global public goods 
rather than provision of  liquidity for temporary payments imbalances. 
A more appropriate source of  funding for the provision of  international liquidity is the 
SDR. Under present arrangements the IMF may allocate SDRs to members in proportion 
to their quotas, but not to itself. Members obtain or use SDRs through voluntary exchanges 
or by the Fund designating members with strong external positions to purchase SDRs 
from members with weak external position. When members’ holdings rise above or fall 
below their allocation they earn or pay interest respectively. These arrangements would 
need to be changed to allow the SDR to replace quotas and GAB and NAB as the source 
of  funding for the IMF. The Fund should be allowed to issue SDR to itself  up to a certain 
limit which should increase over time with growth in world trade. The SDR could become 
a universally accepted means of  payments, held privately as well as by public institutions. 
Countries’ access would be subject to predetermined limits which should also grow over 
time with world trade. The demand for SDRs can be expected to be inversely related 
to buoyancy in global trade and production and the availability of  private financing for 
external payments. Thus, it would help counter deflationary forces in the world economy 
and provide an offset to fluctuations in private balance of  payments financing. 
Several issues of  detail would still need to be worked out, but once an agreement is 
reached to replace traditional sources of  funding with the SDR, the IMF could in fact be 
translated into a technocratic institution of  the kind advocated by Keynes during the Bretton 
Woods negotiations.54 Its funding would no longer be subjected to arduous and politically 
charged negotiations dominated by major industrial countries. The case for creating SDRs 
to provide funding for the IMF for current account financing is much stronger than the case 
for using them to back up financial bailouts associated with a potential lender of  last resort 
function advocated by some observers (Fischer 1999) in so far as it could help improve 
the governance of  the Fund and reduce the imbalance between its creditors and debtors. 
Such a step, if  supplemented by the kind of  reforms regarding its mandate, operational 
modalities and governance structure discussed earlier, would give the Fund a chance to 
operate as an institution for all countries, rather than as an instrument of  some. 
I. Summary and Conclusions 
A genuine reform of  the international financial system generally and the Fund particularly 
depends on developing countries forming a coherent view on a broad range of  issues 
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which, in turn, calls for greater understanding of  various options as well as extensive 
deliberations and consultations. This chapter aims at contributing to this process. 
A main conclusion that emerges from the discussions above is that the original 
rationale of  the Fund, namely to safeguard international monetary and financial stability, 
is now even stronger than in the immediate postwar era given the size and speed of  
international capital flows and their capacity to inflict damage on the real economy. Thus 
the Fund needs to go back to its core objectives and focus on preventing market and 
policy failures in order to attain greater international economic stability and facilitate 
expansion of  employment, trade and income. Realization of  this objective calls for 
reforms on several fronts: 
 • The Fund needs a greater focus. It should stay out of  development finance and policy 
and poverty alleviation. This is an unjustified diversion and an area that belongs 
to multilateral development banks. All facilities created for this purpose should be 
transferred to the World Bank as the Fund terminates its activities in development and 
long-term lending. 
 • A major task of  the Fund is to promote a stable system of  exchange rates and payments 
to ensure a predictable trading environment. In this task the Fund should focus on 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies and stay away from trade policies. The 
attempts by the Fund to promote unilateral liberalization in developing countries 
drawing on its resources undermine the bargaining power of  these countries in 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
 • Crisis management and resolution is an increasingly important area of  responsibility 
of  the Fund. However, the Fund should not be allowed to bail out lenders and investors 
since such operations prevent market discipline and create lenders’ moral hazard. 
Accordingly, there should be strict limits to the Fund’s crisis lending. Instead, the Fund 
should help develop orderly workout mechanisms for sovereign debt both to prevent 
financial meltdown and to restructure debt which cannot be serviced according to its 
original terms and conditions. Temporary debt standstills and exchange restrictions 
should thus become legitimate ingredients of  multilateral financial arrangements. 
 • The Fund should focus on lending to finance temporary current account imbalances 
resulting from external trade and financial shocks as well as from domestic policy 
imbalances. There should be greater automaticity in meeting payments imbalances 
resulting from external shocks and less emphasis on policy adjustment. Conditionality 
should not be extended to structural issues but confined to macroeconomic and 
exchange rate policies. 
 • The Fund’s resources need to be increased to keep up with growth in international 
trade. Access of  countries to Fund resources should be based on the principle of  need, 
not on countries’ contribution to the Fund or their relative importance in the world 
economy. 
 • Fund surveillance has been ineffective in preventing emerging market crises. While 
the primary responsibility for avoiding crises lies with individual countries’ own policy 
choices, the Fund has contributed to increased vulnerability and fragility of  emerging 
markets by promoting premature capital account liberalization and failing to alert 
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countries against unsustainable surges in capital inflows, currency appreciations and 
current account imbalances. Progress on this front depends on a fundamental change 
in the approach of  the Fund to capital market issues. The Fund should improve its 
ability to identify risks and fragilities, and develop policy tools to prevent unsustainable 
capital flows to emerging markets, including direct and indirect control mechanisms, 
and provide policy advice. 
 • The Fund surveillance has also been unable to prevent destabilizing impulses originating 
from persistent trade imbalances and exchange rate misalignments in major industrial 
countries. This too is partly due to the poor quality of  policy analysis and assessment 
of  market conditions. Separating surveillance from lending decisions and assigning 
it to an authority independent of  the board could improve its quality, legitimacy and 
impact. However, such a reform alone is unlikely to increase significantly the leverage 
of  the Fund over nonprogram countries and eliminate the imbalance between the 
Fund’s debtors and creditors. 
 • Any reform designed to bring greater authority and legitimacy would need to address 
shortcomings in the Fund’s governance in several areas including the selection of  its 
head, the distribution of  voting rights, transparency and accountability. However the 
Fund is unlikely to become a genuinely multilateral institution with equal rights and 
obligations for all its members, in practice as well as in theory, as long as it depends 
for resources on a handful of  industrial countries and its financial activities are 
intimately linked to bilateral debtor–creditor relations between donor and recipients. 
These problems could be overcome if  the IMF ceases to be an institution funded by its 
members, and relies on SDRs for the resources needed. 
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THE CURRENT GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
TURMOIL AND ASIAN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES1
A. Introduction
After almost six years of  exceptional performance, the world economy has now entered a 
period of  uncertainty due to a financial turmoil triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis 
in the United States. World economic growth and stability in the next few years will depend 
crucially on the impact of  the crisis on the United States economy and its global spillovers. 
The resilience of  emerging markets to direct and indirect shocks from the crisis will no 
doubt play an important role, since much of  global growth in recent years has been due to 
expansion in these economies, notably in Asia. The extent to which growth and stability 
in Asian emerging markets can be decoupled crucially depends on prevailing domestic 
economic conditions as well as the policy response to possible shocks from the crisis. 
This chapter takes up these issues. The following section posits the main theme of  
the paper that current difficulties in the United States economy and vulnerabilities in 
emerging markets are not unrelated to financial excesses that made a major contribution 
to global expansion in the past six years, including credit, asset and investment bubbles 
triggered by rapid expansion of  global liquidity. 
Section C takes up the causes, nature and the severity of  the crisis in the United 
States, and the policy response already underway with a view to assessing their possible 
effects on growth and external adjustment. The role that regulatory shortcomings have 
played in the subprime crisis is examined in some detail because it provides useful lessons 
for emerging markets where such shortcomings are often seen as the root cause of  crises.
This is followed in Section D by a discussion of  key aspects of  prevailing economic 
conditions in major Asian developing economies affecting their vulnerability to financial 
shocks from the crisis, examining the extent to which they have been successful in 
managing the surge in capital inflows and preventing the emergence of  fragility and 
imbalances, drawing on the lessons from the 1997 crisis. Greater attention is paid to 
China and India since these two countries together account for about four-fifths of  the 
total output and two-thirds of  the total trade of  developing countries in the region, and 
China has strong intraregional trade and financial linkages in East and Southeast Asia. 
Section E looks at possible trade and financial effects of  the crisis on Asian developing 
economies; makes an assessment of  mainstream projections and scenarios; and discusses 
policy challenges and options. It is argued that the larger economies of  the region, 
China and India, have fragility and imbalances which could be laid bare by shocks from 
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the subprime crisis. However, in general, countries with strong fiscal and balance of  
payments positions, including China and several East and Southeast Asian countries, 
have adequate policy space to respond positively to shocks from the crisis. But others, 
including India, may face difficulties if  the crisis leads to a reversal of  direction of  capital 
flows − an outcome which is not likely but which cannot be ruled out. There is a need to 
secure intraregional consistency in policy response, notably with respect to expansionary 
macroeconomic policies and currency adjustments. Consideration could also be given to 
establishing mechanisms for regional exchange rate cooperation on a more durable basis. 
B. the role of  Finance in the recent Global Expansion
To many observers the sudden turnaround in world economic prospects has come as a 
surprise in view of  the strength and persistence of  economic growth and stability since 
the early years of  the decade. From 2002 until the end of  2007 world economic growth 
averaged 4.5 percent per annum compared to 3 percent in the 1990s. Growth has been 
particularly strong and broad-based in the developing world, reaching some 7.5 percent, 
twice the rate of  the 1990s. Real commodity prices rose to levels not seen since the 
1970s and developing countries as a whole started to run trade surpluses with advanced 
countries thanks to the strong export performance of  China and trade surpluses of  fuel 
exporters. After a short interruption in the early years of  the millennium, private capital 
flows to developing countries recovered strongly and spreads on emerging market debt 
fell to historical lows. Price stability in the developing world has been unprecedented for 
many decades, with single digit inflation rates being the rule rather than the exception. 
There has been no major exchange rate and financial turmoil in the developing world, 
including in emerging markets with large and widening current account deficits. 
Current economic difficulties and vulnerabilities, however, are not unrelated to forces 
driving this expansion. As a result of  continued deregulation of  financial markets and 
further opening of  national borders to international capital flows, economic activity in 
both advanced and developing countries has come to be increasingly shaped by financial 
factors. The procyclical behavior of  financial markets tends to reinforce expansionary 
and contractionary forces, amplifying the swings in investment, output and employment.2 
Risks are often underestimated at times of  expansion, giving rise to a rapid credit 
growth, asset price inflation, overindebtedness and excessive spending, and adding to 
growth momentum. However, these also produce financial fragility which is exposed 
with a cyclical downturn in economic activity and/or increased cost of  borrowing when 
incomes can no longer service the debt incurred, giving rise to defaults, credit crunch, 
asset price deflation and economic contraction − the kind of  difficulties that the United 
States economy is now facing. 
From the early years of  the decade the world economy went through a period of  easy 
money as policy interest rates in major industrial countries, notably the United States and 
Japan, were brought down to historically low levels and international liquidity expanded 
rapidly.3 These, together with stagnant equity prices in most mature markets, led to a 
search-for-yield by creditors and investors. In the United States ample liquidity and 
low interest rates, together with regulatory shortcomings, resulted in a rapid growth of  
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speculative lending and a bubble in the property markets, providing a major stimulus to 
growth, but also sowing the seeds of  current difficulties. Low interest rates in some other 
advanced countries, notably in Japan, encouraged cross-currency flows toward countries 
with higher interest rates, including in the form of  highly leveraged carry trades. The very 
same factors have played a major role in the strong recovery of  capital flows to emerging 
markets, contributing to currency appreciations, asset bubbles and credit expansion, and 
stimulating spending and growth in the recipient countries. The credit crunch unleashed 
by the bursting of  the subprime bubble and its global spillovers now threatens to reverse 
this process and produce a sharp slowdown in global growth. 
C. Expansion and Crisis in the united States
1. The subprime boom and bust
Since the 1980s the United States economy has been increasingly driven by financial 
boom–bust cycles. Economic expansions are generally accentuated by credit and asset 
bubbles which eventually lead to credit crunch and debt deflation, and threaten to push 
the economy into a deep and long recession. Monetary policy largely ignores financial 
excesses at times of  expansion, but tends to be deployed rapidly when the bubbles burst, 
and in doing so prepares the ground for the next bubble. 
The United States economy had entered the 1990s with a recession deepened by a 
banking and real estate crisis produced by a combination of  financial deregulation and 
deposit insurance in the previous decade. The response was a sharp reduction in policy 
interest rates to allow debtors to refinance debt at substantially lower rates and banks to 
build up capital by riding the yield curve − that is, by borrowing short term and investing 
in higher-yielding medium-term government securities.4 This, together with advances in 
information technology, created the dot-com bubble in the second half  of  the 1990s. The 
Fed refrained from applying the brakes even though its chairman recognized that the 
United States economy was suffering from “irrational exuberance” as the stock market, 
led by the information sector, was booming. But when the bubble burst in the early 2000s, 
it came to the rescue, bringing policy interest rates to historical lows and expanding 
liquidity rapidly for fear of  a credit crunch and asset deflation throwing the economy 
into a deep recession.
This, together with the continued deregulation of  the financial system, resulted in 
another bubble, this time in the real estate market supported by subprime mortgage 
lending. Despite warnings, the Fed ignored the bubble and refrained from using monetary 
instruments and the regulatory authority it had been granted to stem speculative lending.5 
But, again, it has responded rapidly to the subprime crisis by large cuts in interest rates 
and massive expansion of  liquidity, raising concerns that the United States economy may 
be poised to go through yet another boom–bust cycle.
A brief  examination of  the role that regulatory shortcomings have played in these 
boom–bust cycles helps reveal the nature and origin of  the present crisis and produce 
valuable policy lessons. During the past few decades the banking industry in the 
United States and most other advanced countries has been losing its relative position 
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in the financial sector as deposits became a less important source of  funds for financial 
intermediaries. Furthermore, the margin between credit and deposit rates has been falling 
because of  growing competition from nonbank financial intermediaries. In the United 
States the pressure on bank profits intensified during the 1980s with the removal of  
control over deposit rates, losing the banks the cost advantage at a time when accelerated 
growth of  markets for commercial papers and junk bonds and increased securitization of  
assets put pressure on lending rates.6 
The response was twofold. First, banks increasingly went into new, riskier areas of  
lending, notably for commercial and residential property and leveraged takeovers and 
buyouts. Second, they expanded their fee-based, off-balance-sheet activities in the capital 
market through subsidiaries and affiliates. Simultaneously, securities firms and insurance 
companies started engaging in traditional banking activities through various affiliates 
and these nonbank lenders have become increasingly important in the credit market, 
without, however, having access to insured deposits or being subject to conventional 
prudential restraints. These developments have strengthened the link between credit and 
asset markets whereby credit expansion has increasingly resulted in asset bubbles which 
have, in turn, provided the basis on which credit could grow thanks to the practice of  
mark-to-market valuation of  assets. 
Regulatory policies have not been adapted to this new financial environment even 
though there was considerable awareness of  the risks involved.7 Rather, the authorities 
submitted to pressures for further deregulation. Until recently, in the United States 
the banks’ off-balance-sheet activities in nontraditional areas through affiliates and 
subsidiaries were subject to specific limits. In 1999, however, new legislation effectively 
demolished the firewalls between commercial banking and investment banking by 
allowing the former to expand into capital market activities and the latter to enter more 
deeply into the territory of  traditional commercial banking − a step which has played a 
major role in the subprime boom–bust cycle.8 
The new legislation allowed the banks to join mortgage companies and rapidly 
expand high-risk mortgage lending as well as credit card and car loans, and move them 
off  their balance sheets through securitization. In search for yield in conditions of  
exceptionally low interest rates, many banks enticed households into taking up so-called 
“teaser loans” in very much the same way they had done in Asia in the run-up to the 
1997 crisis; that is, loans for which a borrower is qualified “based on an artificially low initial 
interest rate, even though he or she doesn’t have sufficient income to make the monthly payments when 
the interest rate is reset in two years” (Pearlstein 2007). They then put these into packages 
of  mortgage-backed securities as collateralized debt obligations and sold in the capital 
market with the help of  credit rating agencies, thereby eschewing capital charges while 
earning handsome fees and commissions. The special investment vehicles (SIVs) created 
for this purpose have acquired large amounts of  securitized higher-yielding long-term 
loans with funds raised by issuing short-term commercial paper, often with the support 
of  their sponsoring banks.9
 As banks’ profits from these nontraditional activities were boosted, there were strong 
incentives to expand such loans. This sustained the growth in demand for housing 
which, in turn, kept prices rising, thereby validating the underlying credit expansion. 
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It also provided a strong stimulus to investment in housing construction which 
became a main driving force of  expansion: during 2002–2006 real residential private 
investment increased by almost one-third while nonresidential fixed capital formation 
rose by a mere 4 percent (OECD 2007, annex tables 6–7). However, as the housing 
market was satiated, prices levelled off  and policy interest rates were raised, there was 
a sharp increase in foreclosures in the course of  2006, leading to declines in house 
prices, bursting the bubble.10 The market for mortgage-based securities has totally 
seized up, as has the market for commercial paper issued by SIVs to fund securitized 
loans. Many of  these securities have now been downgraded from triple-A ratings to 
the class of  junk bonds. 
High-risk financial operations concerning subprime lending, securitization and 
investment are not confined to the United States. Many of  the banks involved are global 
banks operating in several mature and emerging markets. Banks in major European 
countries have been involved directly or indirectly by issuing or holding securitized 
subprime assets and running or sponsoring SIVs. The United Kingdom experienced a 
similar subprime bubble leading to serious difficulties in certain financial institutions of  
which Northern Rock is the most prominent. Several German and Swiss banks have also 
seen their solvency threatened because of  large losses on subprime operations. Losses 
from the crisis are now generally recognized to be at least $1 trillion. 
The mortgage-based securities have been marketed globally, in both mature and 
emerging economies, acquired by hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, 
foundations, nonfinancial firms and individuals so that the impact is felt more generally, 
across several sectors and even in countries which were not among the originators of  
such lending.11 An important part of  them was guaranteed by bond insurers, the so-called 
monolines, which joined the spree to benefit from the housing boom − something that 
is particularly revealing about the opaque nature of  the operations, since bond insurers 
are expected to be in a better position to assess the risks involved. These insurers lack the 
necessary capital to cover the losses on defaulted securities and they have now started 
losing their credit ratings, with attendant consequences for bond ratings and values in 
other segments of  the market.12 
2. The policy response and prospects 
The subprime bubble has left the United States economy with excessive residential 
investment which cannot be put into full use without significant declines in house 
prices. The household sector has ended up with debt in excess of  equity represented 
by such investment. An important part of  portfolios of  banks and their affiliates is not 
performing. Bond insurers are faced with massive obligations they can no longer fulfil. 
And many investors across the world have found themselves holding worthless mortgage-
based securities and commercial paper. 
There is considerable uncertainty over whether the United States economy will 
succumb to this debt crisis brought on by years of  profligate lending or be able to restore 
growth after a brief  interruption. The evolution of  economic activity will no doubt 
depend on the impact of  the crisis on private spending. This will, in turn, depend on the 
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ability and willingness of  banks to provide adequate financing on appropriate terms and 
conditions, and of  households and firms to expand consumption and investment. 
In recognition of  these two aspects of  the problem, policymakers in the United 
States have responded to mitigate the difficulties in the financial system by large cuts in 
interest rates and provision of  ample liquidity, and to support aggregate spending and 
incomes through a fiscal package.13 Monetary easing is certainly helpful, but cannot 
fully resolve the difficulties the United States financial system is currently facing since 
this is, in essence, a solvency crisis. Lower policy rates and ample liquidity can help 
banks to gradually build up capital by riding the yield curve, but they cannot address the 
immediate problem of  depleted capital. Beyond the arbitrage between the Fed and the 
Treasury, banks’ ability to build up capital rapidly by investing in higher-yielding private 
securities is limited because, on current regulatory practices, this would necessitate spare 
capital in the first place. 
The bailout provided by the “Big Bank” is thus incomplete even though the Fed has 
now gone further, accepting mortgage-based securities as collateral and lending directly 
to major investment banks. A more effective solution would be outright nationalization 
of  nonperforming private debt.14 This is what many governments in emerging markets 
hit by financial crises in recent years were forced to do, including in Asia where such 
operations added considerably to public debt.15 However, such a solution would not 
only create moral hazard, but also sustain misalignments in asset prices, postponing the 
problems, possibly to come back with greater force.16
An alternative solution would be fire-sale foreign direct investment (FDI), as 
practised during the Asian crisis when collapse of  currencies and asset prices 
created ample opportunities for foreigners to grab assets at drastically reduced prices 
(Krugman 1998). Many of  the troubled banks have indeed been seeking injection of  
new capital from abroad, mostly from sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in emerging 
markets, including China, Singapore and fuel exporters in the Gulf. So far the 
amount raised seems to be in the order of  $40 billion, well below the capital losses 
(Gieve 2008). Misgivings about investment by SWFs from emerging markets, often 
considered as cross-border nationalization, have been put aside for the time being, 
but there are reasons for SWFs to become more cautious not only because the shares 
acquired do not always allow control and voting rights, but also because of  large losses 
on their investments.17 
The ability of  the United States to continue lowering policy interest rates is 
circumscribed by the willingness of  the rest of  the world to absorb the excess liquidity 
since the dollar is an international currency. Continued depreciation of  the dollar vis-à- 
vis the euro would hurt fragile growth in Europe while sharp declines against Asian 
currencies can generate strong inflationary pressures in the United States, creating 
serious dilemmas for monetary policy. A rise in long-term rates on expectations of  higher 
inflation would not help growth even if  it could support banks by steepening the yield 
curve. A “Goldilocks” scenario wherein the United States could raise its net exports to 
Asia without importing inflation is unrealistic. For the first time in the postwar era the 
United States may be seriously challenged in its ability to conduct independent monetary 
policy to the neglect of  its external ramifications.
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While loss of  bank capital is likely to sustain tight credit conditions, even availability 
of  credit at drastically reduced rates might not give a sufficient boost to household 
spending to reignite the economy, given the excessive levels of  debt inherited from the 
two successive bubbles since the early 1990s. The debt accumulation has gone hand in 
hand with the expansion of  private consumption ahead of  disposable income, resulting 
in a drastic decline in household savings. While household savings reached 7.7 percent 
of  disposable income in the early 1990s, they dropped to some 2 percent at the end 
of  the decade and continued to fall in the new millennium during the housing bubble, 
disappearing altogether in the past two years. The household debt/income ratio now 
stands at around 140 percent compared to less than 90 percent in the early 1990s. There 
has been a rapid growth in mortgage debt since the beginning of  the 2000s, which now 
exceeds disposable income (Table 6.1). 
There is strong evidence that asset bubbles have played a major role in the decline 
of  household savings and increased indebtedness. The dot-com bubble of  the 1990s 
generated a strong wealth effect on private consumption because of  increased household 
stock holding and greater access to credit. During the past two decades there has been 
a rapid increase in the share of  households in stocks owned directly or through mutual 
funds, which has now reached 50 percent. On the other hand, financial deregulation has 
improved the access of  households to credit, loosening the traditional budget (liquidity) 
constraint on consumption spending.18 These account for the finding that the acceleration 
in the decline in the personal savings rate in the United States after 1994 was due to 
an increase in the propensity to consume of  families whose portfolios benefited most 
from exceptional capital gains from the dot-com bubble (Maki and Palumbo 2001). This 
process was sustained by capital gains from rising house prices in the 2000s, as households 
increasingly extracted equity from the value of  their houses to finance consumption. The 
mark-to-market practice greatly facilitated this process as rising market values provided 
the collateral needed for credit expansion. 
With the decline in house prices many households now face negative equity and banks 
inadequate collateral for their outstanding claims. While household debt was around 
1992 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Savings 7.7 4.0 4.3 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.1 0.5 0.4 0.7
Liabilities 87.2 95.0 97.1 102.7 112.1 120.2 126.8 134.4 138.1 …
Mortgages 62.3 63.8 64.9 68.5 78.4 85.7 92.2 100.2 103.1 …
Debt as percentage 
of  net worth
18.1 17.9 16.7 17.9 22.6 22.3 22.9 23.6 23.9 …
Memo item: CAa –0.8 –1.6 –2.5 –4.3 –4.4 –4.8 –5.5 –6.1 –6.2 –5.6
table 6.1: United States household savings and indebtedness (percentage of  disposable 
income)
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (December 2005; December 2007).
a. Current account balance as percent of  GDP.
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18 percent of  household net worth in the early 1990s, this went up to 24 percent in 2006. 
It is expected to increase further as household net worth falls as a result of  continued 
declines in house prices as well as in stocks, which appear to be strongly correlated with 
the housing market.19 According to the flow-of-funds figures released by the Fed in March 
2008, the net worth of  American households dropped during the last quarter of  2007 for 
the first time since 2002. 
The decline in savings and increased indebtedness of  households is mirrored by growing 
external deficits of  the United States. While the current account was almost balanced in the 
early 1990s, it is now in deficit by over 6 percent of  GDP, reflecting a greater savings gap. 
Since about 70 percent of  the GDP is due to consumer spending, the deterioration in the 
current account is almost fully accounted for by the decline in personal savings.20 In other 
words, asset bubbles have made a significant contribution to the widening of  the national 
savings gap and the external deficit in the United States since the early 1990s. Consequently, 
any adjustment in household savings and indebtedness necessitated by the current process 
of  asset deflation will have significant implications for the United States’ external balances.
A sizeable decline in consumer spending now appears inevitable, leading to a sharp drop 
in growth. The fiscal package of  some $170 billion introduced looks too small compared 
to the scale of  the problem. Two-thirds of  this stimulus is in tax rebates to consumers. It is 
difficult to predict how much of  these would be translated into consumer spending rather 
than used for debt payments, but the amount to be spent is unlikely to exceed half  of  the 
total package. This would not make up for the decline in consumer spending that would 
result from the drop in house prices, which could lead to a loss of  wealth as much as $6 
trillion. Even on conservative estimates relating wealth to consumption, this could reduce 
consumer spending by $200–400 billion (Roubini 2008; Weisbrot 2008).
Not only would the crisis produce a large cut in household consumption, but any 
subsequent recovery may also see a reduced propensity to consume since balance sheet 
restructuring is a protracted process. In fact, United States recessions and recoveries 
following asset-bubble-driven expansions in the early 1990s and 2000s were generally 
associated with very weak spending in sectors with debt overhang. This was particularly 
the case during the recovery from the recession triggered by the dot-com bubble. Not 
only did nonresidential private investment drop considerably during the brief  recession 
in 2001, but the recovery that followed was the weakest in terms of  investment since 
1949. The corporations which had overborrowed during the dot-com bubble were highly 
exposed to asset price declines during the recession. Efforts were directed in the subsequent 
recovery toward restoring the health of  balance sheets. Thus, increased incomes were 
used for reducing debt rather than expansion of  production capacity and employment. 
Industries that attracted too much investment during the boom were “paying it back” by 
reducing their workforce and structurally declining (Groshen and Potter 2003).
Certainly it is not possible to extrapolate linearly from corporate behavior to households 
in adjustment to overindebtedness. But it would not be unreasonable to expect that this 
crisis could well produce the much-awaited retrenchment in private consumption, a 
sustained upward shift in the household savings rate and a durable adjustment in the 
United States external deficits beyond what may be expected from a slowing economy. 
This adjustment could be a protracted process, resulting in erratic and slow growth, as in 
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Japan during the 1990s. The corollary is that the rest of  the world would need to rely less 
on the United States’ market for growth. Thus, the crisis is likely to bring a fundamental 
adjustment to global imbalances, but the key question is how orderly and rapid that 
would be.
d. Capital Flows and Vulnerability in Asia
1. Lessons from the 1997 crisis
There can be little doubt that the vulnerability of  Asian developing countries to the 
current financial turmoil depends crucially on their prevailing macroeconomic and 
financial conditions. Experience from recurrent crises in emerging markets shows that 
these conditions are strongly influenced by international capital flows. Accordingly, the 
likelihood of  contagion is closely related to how well the recent surge in capital inflows 
has been managed in the region. In this respect it is possible to draw on the lessons from 
the 1997 Asian crisis, focusing on four main areas of  vulnerability associated with surges 
in capital inflows:21 
 • Currency and maturity mismatches in private balance sheets and exposure to exchange 
rate risks
 • Rapid credit expansion, asset bubbles and excessive investment in property and other 
sectors
 • Unsustainable currency appreciations and external deficits 
 • Lack of  self-insurance against a sudden stop and reversal of  capital flows, and excessive 
reliance on IMF help and policy advice
These lessons should generally be incontrovertible, at least among the policymakers in 
the region, but opinions may differ considerably about the ways and means of  putting 
them into practice. In what follows, an assessment will be made as to whether the Asian 
developing countries have appropriately drawn on these in managing the recent surge in 
capital flows. The conclusion reached is that while most Asian countries have successfully 
avoided unsustainable currency appreciations and payments positions, and accumulated 
more than adequate international reserves to counter any potential current and capital 
account shocks without recourse to multilateral financial institutions, they have not always 
been able to prevent capital inflows from generating asset, credit and investment bubbles or 
maturity and currency mismatches in private balance sheets. This is in large part because 
they have been unwilling to impose sufficiently tight controls over capital inflows, even 
when they posed dilemmas in macroeconomic policy and generated fragility. These now 
expose them to certain risks, but not of  the kind that devastated the region in the 1990s. 
2. Capital flows
The search for yield triggered by ample liquidity and low interest rates has also played 
a central role in the recovery of  capital flows to emerging markets, creating pressures 
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on exchange rates and generating credit and asset bubbles. After falling to some $100 
billion at the beginning of  the millennium, private flows picked up rapidly, reaching 
an estimated level of  $620 billion in 2007 (Table 6.2).22 This has been accompanied 
by a rapid narrowing of  spreads on emerging market debt. The average spread, which 
had reached 1,400 basis points after the Russian crisis and fluctuated between 600 and 
1,000 basis points during the early years of  the millennium, fell constantly from mid-
2002 onwards, reaching 200 basis points in the first half  of  2007 before starting to edge 
up with the deepening of  the subprime crisis (World Bank 2007; IMF 2007a). That 
improvements in underlying economic fundamentals in the recipient countries are not 
always the main reason for this unprecedented decline in spreads is also recognized by 
the IMF:
Very recent empirical work, including some undertaken by IMF staff  for this report, 
appears to reinforce the widespread market view that liquidity and an increase in 
risk appetite have become relatively more significant influences on spreads than 
fundamentals in the emerging market debt rally that began in late 2002. Models 
based purely on fundamentals have found that recent emerging market bond spreads 
are generally tighter than can be justified by the models. (IMF 2004, 66)
Because of  strong and favorable global push factors concerning liquidity and risk, recovery 
in capital flows has been broad-based, widely shared by all regions. But country-specific 
conditions (the pull factors) explain why inflows have been stronger in certain parts of  
the developing world than in others.23 The pull factors have not always been linked to 
economic fundamentals such as growth and price stability, and external payments, debt 
or reserve positions. In fact international financial markets have made little differentiation 
among countries with respect to many of  these factors, focusing instead on opportunities 
for short-term capital gains and arbitrage profits.
There have been considerable amounts of  footloose capital motivated by speculative 
gains in all parts of  the developing world, although the exact form it has taken has varied 
among countries depending on their individual circumstances. Such flows fall basically 
into three categories. First, capital attracted by carry trade profits due to large interest 
rate differentials with industrial countries, notably Japan, of  which highly leveraged 
hedge funds have been among the main beneficiaries.24 Second, capital inflows seeking 
gains from prospective currency appreciations in countries with undervalued exchange 
rates and large current account surpluses, notably China. Third, investment in asset 
markets, which have been a common feature of  capital flows to emerging markets in 
different regions.
It is notable that during 2004–2007 emerging markets in Central and Eastern Europe 
received as much foreign private capital as those in Asia even though their total income 
is one-fifth of  the total income of  Asia, and their average growth has been much lower. 
The combination of  high interest rates with independent floating has resulted in growing 
current account deficits which reached, on average, 7 percent of  GDP in 2007.25 High 
interest rates in some larger economies in Europe and Latin America (e.g., Turkey and 
Brazil) attracted large amounts of  capital linked to carry trade. There have also been 
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Private Capital Flows Current Account 
Balance
Reserve Increases
2004 2005 2006 2007e 2004 2005 2006 2007e 2004 2005 2006 2007e
Emerging  
markets
348.8 519.6 572.8 620.3 150.2 274.1 380.2 419.5 398.2 442.2 554.0 756.2
Asia 165.6 220.5 260.5 208.3 115.2 181.0 290.1 423.2 296.1 270.6 34.1 487.9
Latin  
America
41.8 70.0 52.6 106.0 22.3 41.1 51.6 26.5 22.5 29.7 50.3 95.2




10.4 25.0 25.8 29.8 6.9 4.0 5.5 6.4 18.7 25.5 33.7 35.3
table 6.2: Private capital flows, current account balances and changes in reserves in 
emerging markets (billions of  US dollars)
Source: IIF (September 2006; October 2007; March 2008).
e. estimate.
considerable intraregional carry trade activities in these regions where funds borrowed in 
low interest currencies have been invested in the same region in higher interest currencies, 
thereby providing some protection against intraregional contagion. High local interest 
rates have also attracted international investors to domestically issued local currency 
debt, as these investors have become more willing to assume the exchange rate risk in 
return for much higher yields.26 
 In gross terms capital inflows to Asia, as a proportion of  GDP, have been close 
to historical highs, but in net terms they have been around the long-term average 
because of  increased resident outflows (IMF 2007b; and IIF October 2007). Since 
2003, about 60 percent of  private capital inflows to the Asian countries in Table 6.2 
have been in equity investment, compared to less than 40 percent in other emerging 
markets. Of  these, two-thirds have been in direct equity and one-third in portfolio 
equity.27 Equity flows have been particularly strong in China and, more recently, 
India. But in the latter country much of  these are in portfolio equity rather than 
FDI. Hedge funds from the United States and the United Kingdom have been very 
active in equity markets, with assets managed by them being estimated to have grown 
sevenfold between 2001 and 2007. 
Following the cutback in bank lending after the 1997 crisis, international bank 
inflows to Asia started to exceed repayments in the early years of  the decade. The 
share of  net international bank lending has been slightly over one-quarter of  the total 
private inflows to Asia, and the remainder are other types of  debt flows including 
bonds and carry-trade-related inflows, including those involving arbitrage among 
regional currencies. Sovereign bond issues have been relatively small in Asia because 
of  strong fiscal and public debt positions. However, there has been a visible growth in 
syndicated loans privately placed by corporations in several countries. In many cases 
bank inflows have been encouraged by prospects of  gains from currency appreciations. 
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However, private financial and nonfinancial corporations have also engaged in “carry-
trade-style” short-term external borrowing in India, Korea and the Philippines, 
particularly through low interest yen-linked loans. Highly leveraged hedge funds are 
also known to be very active in carry trades in Asia. A relatively high volume of  carry 
trade appears to be a reason why the category “other investment” accounts for a high 
share of  total capital inflows to the region. While restrictions on foreign participation 
in domestic bond markets have generally been maintained, in Malaysia and Indonesia 
there have been marked increases in foreign holding of  local currency debt instruments. 
In the region as a whole local claims of  foreign banks, including local bond holdings, 
as a percentage of  all foreign banks’ claims, more than doubled since the beginning 
of  the decade, suggesting a growing preference for international banks to lend in local 
currencies at higher rates. 
3. Credit, asset and investment bubbles
The composition of  capital inflows to Asian emerging markets is generally considered 
to be more favorable than other emerging markets because of  a high share of  equity 
flows. Foreign investment in equity and local currency debt is not considered as a serious 
potential threat to stability because the exchange rate risk is assumed by investors. 
Vulnerability to a sudden stop and reversal of  capital flows is often assessed on the basis 
of  short-term external liabilities in relation to reserves. Indeed, according to the so-called 
Guidotti–Greenspan rule formulated after the Asian crisis, in order to avoid a liquidity 
crisis international reserves in emerging markets should meet short-term external 
liabilities, defined as debt with a remaining maturity of  up to one year.28
However, what matters for vulnerability to instability in capital flows is not 
simply currency denomination and maturity but also liquidity of  liabilities. A run by 
nonresidents away from domestic equity and bond markets could create significant 
turbulence in currency and asset markets with broader macroeconomic consequences, 
even though declines in asset prices could mitigate the pressure on the exchange rate, 
and losses from asset price declines and currency collapses fall on foreign investors. 
This potential source of  instability naturally depends on the relative importance of  
foreign participation in local financial markets. Extensive foreign participation not only 
increases market volatility, but also raises exposure to adverse spillovers and contagion 
from financial instability abroad. That such exposure has been on the rise is suggested 
by increased correlation between global and emerging market equity returns since 
2004.29 
Recent capital inflows have resulted in a rapid increase in foreign presence in Asian 
equity markets. Figures for net equity inflows understate this because, as noted, there has 
also been a rapid increase in resident outflows. Available evidence shows that nonresident 
holding of  Korean equities reached almost one-half  of  market capitalization (McCauley 
2008). According to a recent study on foreign net purchases and net sales of  equities in 
Asian markets, the share of  foreigner transactions in 2005 in average daily turnover was 
around 20 percent in Korea, 30 percent in Thailand and 75 percent in Taiwan (China) 
while in total holdings by foreigners accounted for between 20 and 30 percent in India, 
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Korea and Thailand and as high as 70 percent in Taiwan (China). There is also strong 
evidence that the entry and exit of  foreigners to Asian equity markets are subject to a 
bandwagon effect − that is, foreign investors tend to move in and out of  several Asian 
markets simultaneously − suggesting strong contagious influences across the region. 
Although equity inflows into this group of  countries appear to have been driven not so 
much by gains from anticipated currency appreciations as by local market returns, they 
have put a strong upward pressure on exchange rates.30
A relatively large proportion of  financial inflows to China appears to have been 
motivated by expectations of  appreciation of  the yuan (Setser 2008; Yu 2008). These 
have gone partly in equity and property markets, benefiting also from local price booms. 
Part of  these are reported to have entered the country as investment or through trade, 
including overinvoicing of  exports. According to some market participants, the so-called 
“hot money” amounted to $5–10 billion a month during 2007. The Chinese foreign 
exchange regulators felt obliged to take action against ten international banks for 
breaching capital account regulations by “assisting speculative foreign capital to enter 
the country disguised as trade and investment” (Anderlini 2007). 
Large capital inflows to equity markets − together with the consequent expansion of  
liquidity − have both been the cause and effect of  sharp increases in stock prices in several 
Asian markets. There is in fact a strong correlation between changes in net portfolio equity 
flows and stock prices in Asia − much stronger than that observed in Latin America.31 For 
the region as a whole the equity market index tripled between 2002 and mid-2007, with 
increases exceeding 400 percent in China and India. The price–earnings ratios have also 
risen rapidly, resulting in a sharp drop in equity costs.32 That such increases more likely 
reflect asset price bubbles than improvements in underlying fundamentals was actually 
cautioned a couple of  years ago by the Institute of  International Finance (IIF March 
2005, 4): “there is a risk that the pickup in flows into some emerging market assets has 
pushed valuations to levels that are not commensurate with underlying fundamentals.” It 
is notable that since then until mid-2007 the Asian markets rose by another 50 percent. 
China increased the stamp duty on stock market transactions in order to restrain the 
bubble, only to reverse it after the recent decline due to the fallout from the subprime 
crisis.
The two largest countries, China and India, which have seen the strongest surge 
in capital inflows and largest increases in stock markets and, to a lesser extent, Korea, 
have also experienced a boom in property markets. During 2002–2006 in real terms 
residential property prices rose by over 8 percent per annum in China and 10 percent in 
India.33 In these countries the price-to-rent ratio rose by more than 20 percent during the 
same period while Korea saw an increase of  more than 15 percent. The last couple of  
years have also seen acceleration of  property price increases in Singapore and Vietnam. 
While these have not been as dramatic as increases in the United States − where the 
price-to-rent ratio rose by 30 percent over the same period − there are large pockets in 
China, India, Korea and the Philippines where increases have been comparable and even 
greater.34 Concerned by the growing speculative spree, China has adopted a number of  
measures to stem increases in property prices, including higher interest rates and larger 
down-payments on both residential and commercial property loans (ESCAP 2007, 10).
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In some cases house prices have also outstripped strong growth in incomes. Housing 
loans have expanded faster than other types of  lending and have been a major factor 
in sharp increases in household indebtedness. In Korea, for instance, bank lending to 
households has been growing rapidly since 2005, and household debt has reached 140 
percent of  disposable income − above the level of  household indebtedness in the United 
States (ADB 2007). While detailed data are limited, there are indications that speculative 
purchases motivated by strong prices as well as foreign demand for commercial space 
have made an important contribution to the boom in property markets in India and 
China.
Recent booms in housing and equity markets in Asia are a source of  concern because 
of  their potential adverse macroeconomic consequences. There is evidence, not only 
from industrial countries, but also from a number of  Asian emerging markets, including 
Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, that such booms (defined as periods in which asset prices exceed their trend 
by more than 10 percent) significantly raise the probability of  output being eventually 
pushed below its potential level and the price level above its trend (Gochoco-Bautista 
2008). This implies that monetary and capital account policies should not neglect 
developments in asset markets since their longer-term consequences may undermine 
price stability and growth.
Rapid domestic credit expansion and low interest rates have played an important 
role in bubbles in equity and property markets in Asia. As in some mature economies, 
monetary policy has been highly expansionary and real interest rates have been 
considerably lower than those in other regions. However, the surge in capital flows 
is part of  the reason for rapid expansion of  liquidity since interventions in foreign 
exchange markets (discussed below) could not be fully sterilized. After 2003 private 
credit growth in real terms reached nearly 9 percent per annum in China and 5 percent 
in other countries.35 Ample liquidity, low equity costs and loan rates together have made 
a strong impact on investment spending, occasionally pushing it to levels that may not 
be sustained over the longer term. 
This is particularly the case in China and, to a lesser extent, India− investment 
rates in most other Asian countries did not fully regain their precrisis levels.36 In 
China gross fixed capital formation has been growing 4–5 percentage points faster 
than real income, with the share of  investment in GDP now reaching 46 percent. 
This increase appears to have been associated with considerable excess capacity and 
wastage of  capital. Although 40 percent of  China’s state-owned industrial enterprises 
are reported to have been running losses and facing declining rates of  return on 
capital, easy access to credit has been encouraging overinvestment (BIS 2007a, 56). 
In the event of  a sharp upward adjustment in the exchange rate and a slowdown in 
exports, the capacity built in some industries may become unviable.37 Similarly, in 
India growth in investment has been faster than GDP by more than 5 percentage 
points per annum with the investment ratio rising to over 30 percent of  GDP from 
less than 24 percent in the early years of  the decade. This has been greatly facilitated 
by capital inflows, credit and asset bubbles, and may not be sustained with the return 
of  normal financial conditions.
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4. Current account balances, exchange rates and reserves
While major Asian emerging markets have not been able to prevent capital inflows from 
leading to asset and investment bubbles, they have been more successful in managing their 
impact on exchange rates and the current account. Developing countries of  the region 
taken together had a current account surplus of  more than 7 percent of  GDP in 2007, up 
from 1.5 percent in 2001. This is largely due to China’s strong export performance, but a 
number of  other countries have also been enjoying surpluses, including Malaysia and, to 
a lesser extent, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Among the newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs), Singapore continues to run a massive current account surplus while 
in Korea the current account has been broadly in balance. Current account deficits have 
been increasing in India, Pakistan and Vietnam in the past few years, but only in Pakistan 
has it been approaching the danger zone, expected to reach some 5 percent of  GDP 
at the end of  2007. However, these trends reflect not so much the effects of  currency 
appreciations as acceleration of  growth from the first half  of  the decade.
Since the Asian crisis, several countries in the region have moved toward more 
flexible exchange rate arrangements. But they have followed various shades of  managed 
floating rather than leaving their currencies entirely to the whims of  international 
capital flows. Most countries have strived to absorb excess supply of  foreign exchange 
generated by strong capital inflows and/or current account surpluses in reserves 
through interventions in foreign exchange markets, rather than allowing them to push 
up currencies to unsustainable levels and undermine their trade performance. To keep 
liquidity expansion and inflation under control, attempts have been made to sterilize 
such interventions, mainly by issuing government and/or central bank debt and by 
raising reserve requirements in the banking system.
Currency market interventions are generally believed to be ineffective in mature 
economies. The IMF has also drawn a similar conclusion from its research on developing 
countries; that is, sterilized intervention in emerging markets is likely to be ineffective 
when the influx of  capital is persistent, and tends to be associated with higher inflation 
(IMF 2007c, 122–24). By contrast, recent work in the BIS (2005) shows that sterilized 
interventions in Asia have been reasonably effective in influencing the exchange rate 
without leading to loss of  control over inflation.38 There have been relatively sizeable 
appreciations in some countries, but these are moderate in comparison with those in 
other emerging markets where independent floating is practised. Moreover, appreciations 
in Asia have occurred under much more favorable current account positions and faster 
economic growth.39
The monetary impact of  interventions has not been fully offset, particularly in China 
where large trade surpluses added to the glut of  foreign exchange generated by the surge 
in capital flows. However, despite rapid expansion of  liquidity generated by interventions 
and loose monetary conditions, inflation has been kept under control, though only in 
product markets, not in asset markets. 
In China, government control over the financial system has allowed it to keep the 
fiscal cost of  intervention down.40 Reserve requirements of  banks were constantly 
raised from 7 percent in 2003 to 15 percent in 2008, and banks have come to hold over 
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80 percent of  central bank securities issued for that purpose, with their share in total 
bank assets exceeding 20 percent (Yu 2008). In India the cash reserve ratio was also 
increased in several steps, from 4.75 percent in 2003 to 7.5 percent in 2008, but because 
of  higher interest rates, the cost of  intervention reached 2 percent of  GDP in 2007 − 
more than half  of  the central government deficits.41
As of  the end of  2007, total reserves in developing Asia (excluding NIEs) exceeded 
$2 trillion and over 80 percent of  these were generated after 2001 (Table 6.3). Asian 
reserves now account for more than half  of  total reserves of  the developing world. The 
twin surpluses that the region as a whole has been running on its balance of  payments 
(that is, on both current and capital accounts) have been fully converted into reserves.42 
Of  the $1.7 trillion reserves accumulated after 2001, almost two-thirds are earned and 
one-third “borrowed”.43 Unlike other regions, therefore, reserve increases in Asia have 
come mainly from current account surpluses rather than capital inflows (Table 6.2).44 
Moreover, these reserves are earned in the context of  rapid growth, rather than by 
sacrificing growth.45 However, excluding China, two-thirds of  Asian reserves in recent 
years are also from capital inflows. In India and other Asian countries with current 
account deficits, reserves are 100 percent “borrowed.” 
On the Greenspan–Guidotti rule noted above, Asian reserves are excessive. They are 
several times the total short-term external debt of  the region, which stood at less than 
$300 billion at the end of  2007, and more than twice the total external debt of  some 
$950 billion.46 They now cover close to nine months of  imports, much higher than the 
three months of  imports traditionally considered as adequate for addressing the liquidity 
problems arising from time lags between payments for imports and receipts from exports. 
A policy of  accumulating reserves at times of  strong capital inflows and using them 
during sudden stops and reversals appears to be a sensible countercyclical response to 
instability in international capital flows. By intervening in the foreign exchange market 
and accumulating reserves, a country facing a surge in capital flows can both reduce 
its external vulnerability by preventing appreciations and trade deficits, and secure self-
insurance against possible speculative attacks. In other words, if  inflows are believed to 
be temporary, it would be rational to resist an inward transfer by allowing the domestic 
consumption and/or investment to increase and the current account to run into deficits 
through faster growth and appreciations.47
However, such a strategy lacks a strong rationale because it implies that a country 
would borrow even if  the funds thus acquired are not used to finance investment and 
imports, but held in short-term foreign assets. This is all the more so because reserves 
accumulated out of  capital inflows are highly costly − that is, the return earned on 
reserves is less than the cost of  foreign capital, including the cost of  foreign borrowing 
and the foregone return on assets sold. In fact it is more so for portfolio equity and 
particularly FDI flows for acquisition of  ownership rights of  existing assets where rates 
earned by transnational companies exceed the cost of  international borrowing by a very 
large margin (UNCTAD TDR 1999, chap. 5). 
In previous decades the current account in Asia was generally in deficit so that a very 
large proportion of  reserves held at the beginning of  this decade was “borrowed” rather 
than earned reserves. If  this is added to reserves accumulated from capital inflows since 
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2001, about half  of  the total stock of  reserves in Asia now would be “borrowed” reserves. 
This is approximately equal to the existing stock of  external debt of  the region. Assuming 
a moderate 500 basis points margin between the interest cost on debt and the return on 
reserves, this would give an annual carry cost of  $50 billion for the region as a whole.48 
This is how much the region as a whole could save per year by paying up its external debt 
by drawing on reserves.49 The carry cost of  reserves accumulated from debt creating and 
portfolio equity inflows since the beginning of  the decade alone can be estimated to be 
as much as half  of  this amount. It would be much higher if  FDI inflows for acquisitions 
are included. Furthermore, in view of  the ongoing downward pressure on the dollar, 
countries with a large stock of  dollar reserves stand to incur considerable losses. 
The high carry cost of  reserves in excess of  possible liquidity needs, together with 
the risk of  exchange-rate-related losses, raise the question of  alternative investments 
in higher-yielding foreign securities, primarily through SWFs, as done by several fuel 
exporters. Like China, fuel exporters as a group also generate large current account 
surpluses, but unlike China, they run deficits in their capital accounts. About one-third 
of  oil surpluses generated since 2002 have been used for investment abroad and two-
thirds for reserve accumulation. In several of  them investment is undertaken mainly 
by SWFs. According to some estimates, total assets of  SWFs in fuel exporters exceed 
$1.5 trillion (IMF 2007e, annex 1.2; Truman 2007b). These funds come out of  government 
earnings from oil exports rather than from reserves purchased from the private sector. In 
Asia, with the notable exception of  Singapore, SWFs are relatively small. At some $200 
billion, the assets of  the recently established China Investment Cooperation (CIC) are 
only a fraction of  the total reserves of  the country, and only a small part of  these appear 
to have been used for investment abroad. 
As noted above, SWFs have recently been acquiring high-risk equity in Western banks 























table 6.3: Current account and reserves (billions of  US dollars)
Source: IMF (2007b).
a. Cumulative current account balance over 2002–2007.
b. Difference between increases in reserves and cumulative current account balance over 2002–2007.
c. Months of  imports covered by reserves.
240 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
However, given the deep suspicion and misgivings about SWFs in some advanced 
countries, massive amounts of  Asian reserves cannot be expected to be quickly translated 
into investment in more lucrative, less risky assets in these countries. An alternative would 
be to recycle them in the region for, inter alia, infrastructure projects in low income 
countries in need of  development finance. This may best be achieved through a genuinely 
regional development bank, established among the developing countries of  the region 
along the lines of  the recent Banco del Sur in Latin America.
5. Capital account measures
Many Asian emerging markets are incurring high reserve costs and facing macroeconomic 
policy dilemmas mainly because they have chosen to keep their economies open to 
the surge in capital inflows, rather than imposing tighter countercyclical measures of  
control.50 Indeed, capital accounts in the region are more open today than they were 
during the Asian crisis.51 In China, for instance, one of  the countries with the tightest 
restrictions, calculations based on an IMF formula are said to show that 80 percent of  
the capital account has been liberalized (Yu 2008). 
In several cases the opening to inflows has been selective, such as raising the limits 
on the QFII (qualified foreign institutional investors) in China. Countries such as India 
have liberalized sectoral caps on FDI. Foreign banks have generally been allowed greater 
freedom to operate with many domestic borrowers receiving funding from such banks 
directly from abroad or through their local offices. However, there have been some efforts 
to bring greater transparency to capital inflows. For instance, in 2007 India adopted a 
proposal by the Securities and Exchange Board to restrict the foreign buying of  shares 
through offshore derivatives despite an adverse initial reaction from the stock market− a 
move that was designed not so much to relieve the upward pressure on the rupee as to 
bring greater transparency by restricting the activities of  hedge funds. 
Efforts have no doubt been made to curb excessive inflows in order to ease the upward 
pressure on their currencies. In 2006 China extended to foreign banks the restriction over 
borrowing abroad to fund domestic dollar assets. At the end of  2006 Korea raised banks’ 
reserve requirements from 5 percent to 7 percent in order to support the dollar vis-à-vis 
the won. Around the same time Thailand imposed a 30 percent reserve requirement 
on capital inflows held less than one year, including portfolio equity flows, in order to 
check continued appreciation of  the currency. This provoked a strong reaction from 
the stock market, forcing the government to exempt investment in stocks from reserve 
requirements. The remaining restrictions were removed in March 2008. With continued 
surge in capital inflows, India reversed the liberalization of  the limits on external 
commercial borrowing, tightening them in 2007. Similarly, Korea restricted external 
funding of  domestic lending by foreign banks and reintroduced limits on lending in 
foreign currency to domestic firms. 
However, the main response to the surge in capital inflows has been to liberalize 
outward investment by residents. This is partly motivated by a desire to allow national 
firms to expand abroad and become important players in world markets. This has 
particularly been the case in China and India. However, while in China assets acquired 
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abroad are financed from trade surpluses, in India these are funded by capital inflows, 
in much the same way as Korean chaebols did in the run-up to the 1997 crisis.52 As 
remarked by an observer, “the global flood of  money (and attendant hubris) has enabled 
Indian companies like Tata to buy themselves a place on the world stage rather than 
earning it through export success or technological advance” (Bowring 2008a). 
There has also been considerable liberalization of  portfolio outflows. For instance 
China took a decision to permit investment by its residents in approved overseas markets 
and raised the limits on corporate and individual purchases of  foreign currency for 
mitigating the pressure for appreciation through the so-called QDII (qualified domestic 
institutional investor) scheme. The share of  portfolio investment in the total international 
assets of  China in 2006 was three times that of  FDI abroad; the former increased from 
under 10 percent in 2004 to about 15 percent in 2006 while the share of  FDI fell to about 
5 percent in the latter year (Hang Seng Bank 2008). 
Korea has also liberalized rules limiting individual or institutional investment 
abroad, and even provided incentives for residents to invest in foreign securities and 
real estate assets. Thailand raised the limits on and extended the duration of  deposits 
that could be held abroad by resident corporations, removed restrictions over foreign 
currency accounts in local banks by residents, allowed investment by local funds abroad, 
and abolished the surrender requirement for Thai exporters. The Philippines allowed 
residents to invest abroad without approval and raised the limits over such investment. 
India liberalized resident outflows, giving greater freedom for portfolio investment 
abroad and Malaysia increased the limit on foreign assets held by some institutional 
investors and investment trusts.
Capital account opening for residents as a response to a surge in inflows is clearly 
an alternative to sterilized intervention and has the advantage of  avoiding carry costs 
for reserves. But, like interventions, it does effectively nothing to prevent currency and 
maturity mismatches in balance sheets, or instability and vulnerability to shocks associated 
with greater presence of  foreigners in domestic asset markets. Its rationale as a longer-
term strategy for closer integration with global financial markets is highly contentious. 
As a countercyclical measure, it can be even more problematic − once introduced for 
cyclical reasons, it may not be easily rolled back when conditions change. Besides in 
countries such as China where property rights are not clearly defined, liberalization of  
resident outflows could encourage asset stripping and money laundering (Yu 2008). 
E. External Shocks and Policy Options in Asia
1. Growth prospects: projections and beyond
Asia is now facing external shocks triggered by the subprime crisis, coming on top 
of  stagflationary pressures exerted by the upward trend in oil prices. However, there 
is a certain degree of  compensation among the effects of  these shocks. Unlike in 
the 1970s when oil price hikes resulted from supply shocks, the recent trend has 
been driven by growing demand in the face of  a slow and limited supply response, 
declines in production in maturing fields and bottlenecks in refinery capacity.53 
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The weakness of  the dollar has been a contributing factor since it means lower prices in 
currencies strengthening against the dollar and greater demand. There is also a strong 
speculative element, resulting in sharp increases in relatively short periods of  time, 
as declines in property and equity prices tend to divert excess liquidity to commodity 
markets. However, to the extent that global growth slows down due to the subprime 
crisis, the demand pressure on oil prices could ease considerably even though a sharp 
reversal of  the ongoing trend is quite unlikely. Furthermore, an upward adjustment 
in Asian currencies would relieve inflationary effects of  higher international prices of  
food and oil. 
Earlier projections for growth in 2008 in Asia and elsewhere of  some of  the more 
influential international and regional institutions made in the second half  of  2007 
appeared to assume that the subprime crisis would only cause a hiccup in global 
economic activity, just as it was initially believed to be the case during the Asian crisis 
in 1997. But even the most recent projections do not show a sharp deviation from the 
trend of  rapid and broad-based growth that has been underway since the early years 
of  the decade (Table 6.4).54 For global growth, the drop projected in 2008 from 2007 
lies between 0.3 and 0.8 percentage points. For the United States, the IMF and ADB 
project a 0.7 percentage point fall between 2007 and 2008, but the IIF sees no change. In 
these projections developing Asia is not expected to lose much momentum, with growth 
slowing down by no more than 1 percentage point.
Perhaps more important are the revisions made to growth projections for 2008 after 
the financial difficulties became more visible in the course of  last autumn. Compared 
to projections made in July 2007, current projections for 2008 by the IMF show a 1.1 
percentage point loss of  growth for the world economy as a whole; 1.3 points for the 
United States; and 0.5 points for Asian developing countries.55 Similarly, in March 2008 
the ADB reduced its outlook for growth in the United States to 1.5 percent and in Asia 
to 7.6 percent from the earlier (September 2007) figures of  2.6 percent and 8.2 percent, 
respectively (ADB 2007). 
These projections are subject to usual caveats and generally accompanied by 
warnings that risks are downside. Nevertheless, only the UN (2008) projections explore, 
under a “pessimistic scenario,” what might happen if  such risks were to materialize. 
The United States would go into a recession and growth in Asia and the world economy 
as a whole would both be more than halved. This scenario assumes a sharp decline in 
house prices in the United States and a hard landing of  the dollar, leading to increases 
in dollar interest rates. Nevertheless, the United States recession would be quite mild 
compared to those in 1982 and 1991 when output contracted by three percent and 
one percent respectively. It is very much like the brief  contraction in 2001, presumably 
reflecting counteracting influences from declines in house prices and sharp devaluation 
of  the dollar on aggregate demand. Recession and the decline of  the dollar would result 
in sharp cuts in imports in the United States, affecting major exporters. The dollar 
decline would also result in losses on dollar assets in countries with large holdings. 
This appears to be the main financial impact: no explicit reference is made to possible 
consequences of  the crisis for asset prices and investment in emerging markets, or the 
policy response.56
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2. Financial contagion and shocks
Asian economies do not appear to have large direct exposure to securitized assets linked 
to subprime lending, even though some losses have been reported in the region. The 
impact of  the financial turmoil is likely to be transmitted through changes in the risk 
appetite and capital flows, in conditions of  bubbles in domestic credit and asset markets 
in the larger economies of  the region. The question of  the sustainability of  these bubbles 
had been raised before the subprime turmoil, and they have now become even more 
fragile. 
There is considerable uncertainty about the impact of  the crisis on asset markets 
and capital flows in emerging markets as financial markets have shown signs of  both 
decoupling and recoupling in recent months (BIS 2007b). However, large drops in 
western equity markets caused by occasional bad news about financial losses have often 
been mirrored by similar changes in Asian markets. Should such difficulties continue 
unabated, the likelihood of  a sharp and durable correction in Asian markets is quite 
high. By itself  this may not lower growth by more than a couple of  percentage points in 
China and India, and should not pose a serious problem since the recent pace of  growth 
in these countries is generally viewed as unsustainable.57 However, if  combined with a 
sudden stop and reversal of  capital flows and/or contraction of  export markets, the 
impact on growth can be much more serious. 
It is generally expected that bank-related flows would decline in view of  the losses 
many international banks are now incurring. According to the most recent projections by 
the IIF (2008), total private flows to emerging markets would be broadly the same in 2008 
as in 2007; there would be a decline of  some $25 billion in bank lending, compensated by 
increases in equity flows. It is also argued that capital flows to emerging markets may even 
accelerate if  Europe joins the United States in easy monetary policy. That this possibility 
cannot be ruled out is suggested by the most recent estimates for private capital flows for 
2007 which have now put them above the earlier estimates by some $60 billion because of  
a stronger growth of  equity flows and limited impact of  the financial turmoil on investment 
in fixed income funds and international bank lending (IIF 2008, 19). The largest upward 
revision has been made for India, particularly for bank-related capital flows. If  continued, 
2007 2008
World  US Asia World    US Asia
IMF (01.08) 4.9 2.2 9.6 4.1 1.5 8.6
WORLD BANK (01.08) 3.6 2.2 10.0 3.3 1.9 9.7
ADB (03.08) – 2.2 8.7 – 1.5 7.6
UN WESP (01.08) 
(pessimistic)






IIF (01.08) 3.5 2.3 9.1 3.1 2.3 8.6
table 6.4: Growth estimates for 2007 and projections for 2008 (annual percentage change)
Source: IMF (2008), World Bank (2008), ADB (2008), UN (2008) and IIF (2008).
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this could also imply decoupling of  Asian equity markets from the United States and 
Europe and the persistence of  credit and asset bubbles in China and India.
It is quite likely that investors will now start differentiating among countries to a much 
greater extent than has been the case in recent years. Countries with large current account 
deficits, high stocks of  external debt, inadequate reserves and appreciated currencies in 
Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere may face a sudden stop and even reversal of  
capital flows and sharp increases in spreads, resulting in exchange rate and balance of  
payments crises.58 Given large stocks of  reserves, even a generalized exit from emerging 
markets would not create serious payments difficulties for most Asian countries, and the 
impact would be felt primarily in domestic credit and asset markets. Such an exit could 
be triggered by a widespread flight toward quality, with investors taking refuge in the 
safety of  government bonds in advanced countries, or a need to liquidate their holdings 
in emerging markets in order to cover mounting losses and margin calls.59 
The likelihood of  a rapid exit of  capital is difficult to assess, but it cannot be excluded. 
A number of  countries in Asia experienced a withdrawal of  foreigners from stock 
markets during the May–June 2006 global selloff. The amount of  money taken out was 
small, in the order of  some $15 billion, but it was the first reversal of  capital flows after 
the Asian crisis and synchronized across all the countries studied.60 Again there was a 
rapid liquidation by investors from advanced countries in several markets in Asia in 
summer 2007 as subprime losses started to surface. Thus the region may be susceptible to 
common adverse external financial shocks, quite independent of  specific circumstances 
prevailing in individual countries.
3. Trade linkages and growth in Asia
The decoupling debate is often carried out in terms of  linkages between trade and 
growth; that is, how the trade between Asia and the United States would be affected 
and what impact this would have on growth in Asia. These are contentious issues, but 
the weight of  arguments leans toward the view that trade linkages would not result in a 
major adverse impact on growth in Asia, even allowing for a high degree of  dependence 
on the United States market. Exports to the United States amount to some 8 percent of  
GDP in China and 6 percent in other Asian countries.61 In value added terms these ratios 
are lower, particularly in China and a few other assembly platforms such as Malaysia 
where exports still have high import contents even though domestic value added contents 
have been rising in recent years as a result of  upgrading.62 Consequently, even if  exports 
to the United States stop growing and even start declining in absolute terms as a result 
of  a recession and weakening of  the dollar, the Asian countries can still sustain rapid, 
albeit somewhat reduced, growth provided that other components of  aggregate demand 
continue growing at their recent pace. 
This line of  thinking clearly focuses on the impact of  exports on aggregate demand, 
rather than on the foreign exchange constraint. It is implicitly assumed that the countries 
affected can continue to maintain growth of  imports despite reduced export earnings. 
This would pose no major problem for those running large current account surpluses 
such as China, Malaysia and Singapore. Others with deficits, such as India, however, 
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would need to rely increasingly on capital inflows and/or draw on their reserves in order 
to finance the widening gap between imports and exports. 
This simple arithmetic is complicated by a number of  factors. First, the impact of  a 
slowdown in the United States also depends on how Asian export markets elsewhere are 
affected. The effect on growth in Europe can be significant because of  its direct exposure 
to the subprime crisis. Indeed, growth in the European Union is already falling below the 
levels of  earlier projections. Since exports to the European Union are about 7 percent of  
GDP in China and even more in other Asian emerging markets, a sharp slowdown in 
Europe could have a relatively large impact. The Asian trade balance with the European 
Union could deteriorate even further if  currencies in the region start rising against the euro. 
Second, for some countries indirect exposure to a decline in growth of  exports to 
the United States can be just as important because of  relatively strong intraregional, 
intra-industry trade linkages.63 More than two-thirds of  Chinese imports consist of  
intermediate goods, and about a third of  these are provided within the region, notably 
by Korea and Taiwan which individually account for around 10 percent of  total imports 
by China. This means that a decline in Chinese exports to the United States would bring 
about a corresponding decline in imports of  intermediate goods from the region. Thus 
countries exporting these goods to China would be affected by cuts not only in their 
direct exports to the United States, but also in their indirect exports through China. 
In these countries cuts in exports of  intermediate goods to China would not entail an 
important offsetting decline in imports. Consequently, they could be affected even more 
than China by import cuts in the United States even when their direct exports to the 
United States are relatively small. For instance it has been estimated that a 10 percent 
slowdown in United States imports would reduce China’s exports by 2.1 percent and 
Korea’s exports by 1.5 percent. The consequent drop in China’s imports from Korea 
would lower exports of  that country by another 1.3 percent (BIS 2007a). Thus, Korea 
might be more vulnerable to a United States slowdown not only because its exports have 
higher value added, but also because it is indirectly exposed through exports to China. 
This is likely to be true for Taiwan as well. 
Finally, domestic components of  aggregate demand are not independent of  exports. 
This is particularly true for investment. A deceleration in exports can lead to a sharp drop 
in investment designed to cater for foreign markets which can, in turn, aggravate the impact 
of  contraction in exports on aggregate demand. This effect can be particularly strong in 
China where investment is a large component of  aggregate demand and an important part 
of  investment is linked to exports. This includes greenfield FDI which has been channeled 
to export sectors through various restrictions and incentives, including tax rebates and 
foreign-exchange balancing requirements as part of  an aggressive export strategy (Yu 
2007). The likelihood of  a large drop in investment would be greater if  contraction in 
export markets is accompanied by currency appreciations and asset price declines.
4. Policy challenges
A combination of  severe external trade and financial shocks from the subprime crisis 
with domestic fragilities associated with credit, asset and investment bubbles could pose 
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serious policy challenges in Asia, but above all in China and India. Whatever the nature 
and extent of  contagion and shocks from the crisis, it is important to avoid destabilizing 
feedbacks between the real and financial sectors. A sharp drop in exports together with 
a rapid correction in asset prices could bring down growth considerably which can, in 
turn, threaten the solvency of  the banking system given the high degree of  leverage 
of  some firms, particularly in China.64 The appropriate policy response would be to 
expand domestic demand through fiscal stimulus, taking into account that a small dose 
of  deceleration of  growth toward more sustainable levels could be desirable. If  difficulties 
emerge in the financial sector, it would also be necessary to provide lender of  last resort 
financing. Nevertheless, it is important that policy interventions aim not at preventing but 
smoothing correction in asset prices and facilitating restructuring in sectors which have 
been overstretched thanks to easy financing conditions in recent years. 
However, China would need not just a countercyclical macroeconomic expansion, 
but a more durable shift in the composition of  aggregate demand from exports toward 
domestic consumption because, as noted above, the crisis is likely to bring a sizeable 
external adjustment in the United States.65 Current economic conditions in China, 
including the twin balance of  payments surpluses, growing reserves carried at high costs 
and risks, an undervalued currency, and an unprecedented growth in production capacity 
heavily dependent on external markets, cannot be defended on the grounds of  economic 
efficiency or expediency. This combination is sometimes linked to China’s development 
strategy. According to this view, a rapid reduction in unemployment through export-
led growth calls for trade surpluses, undervalued exchange rates and capital controls. 
It is also argued that the viability of  this strategy also depends on China’s willingness to 
provide the external financing needed to the United States by translating its current and 
capital account surpluses into dollar reserves (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004; 
Aizenman 2007).
However, as the experience of  late industrializers, including first-tier NIEs and Japan, 
demonstrates, a development strategy emphasizing exports does not require generation 
of  large and persistent current account surpluses through undervalued exchange rates. 
An undervalued currency often leads to terms of  trade losses, and this seems to be the 
case in China (Yu 2007). It can also discourage technological upgrading and productivity 
growth. For these reasons many of  the early industrializers in East Asia, including Japan, 
rarely resorted to cheap money for industrial development − by contrast they occasionally 
tolerated moderate appreciations in order to provide incentives for productivity growth.
A combination of  current and capital account surpluses lacks a strong rationale. 
If  capital inflows continue at their recent pace or accelerate, a policy of  controlled 
appreciation of  the yuan combined with much tighter control over inflows and a long-
term strategy of  expansion of  Chinese investment abroad, including in developing 
countries, would appear to be a desirable response on several grounds. It would help 
achieve a soft landing by easing the upward pressures on asset prices, reducing the rate 
of  liquidity expansion and enhancing monetary policy autonomy, and bringing down 
investment to sustainable levels. It would also ease inflationary pressures in product 
markets, particularly those linked to oil and food imports, and reduce the pace of  reserve 
hoarding and associated costs and risks. 
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But perhaps a greater challenge would be to secure expansion of  the internal 
market based on a much more rapid growth of  consumption than has hitherto been 
the case. Since the early years of  the decade, growth in consumption in China has 
constantly lagged behind income and investment. During 2002–2007, the average 
growth rate of  consumer spending was around 8 percent per annum while gross fixed 
capital formation grew at a rate of  15 percent and exports 25 percent. Consequently, 
the share of  consumption fell below 40 percent of  GDP − almost half  of  the 
figure in the United States, and considerably less than the share of  investment.66 
The imbalance between the two key components of  domestic demand has meant 
increasing dependence of  Chinese industry on foreign markets. Indeed, China 
appears to be trading a lot more than would be expected on the basis of  observed 
historical patterns linking trade to population size, income levels and resource 
endowments. 
The disparity between consumption and investment and the consequent dependence 
on foreign markets is largely a reflection of  the imbalance between profits and wages. 
It is true that success in industrialization crucially depends on the pace of  capital 
accumulation which, in turn, depends very much on the volume of  profits and the 
extent to which they are used for investment rather than consumption. High corporate 
retentions and a dynamic profit–investment nexus, rather than high household savings, 
were indeed the key distinguishing components of  successful industrialization in East 
Asia (Akyüz and Gore 1996). China is not an exception in this respect where corporate 
retentions exceed 20 percent of  GDP due to a high share of  profits in value added, the 
practice of  nonpayment of  dividends to the government by state-owned enterprises, and 
tax incentives for retentions and investment.67 
In most late industrializers, particularly Japan and Korea, wages and household 
consumption grew in tandem with productivity and underpinned the expansion of  
productive capacity by providing a growing internal market. In China, by contrast, 
despite registering impressive increases, wages have lagged behind productivity growth 
and their share in value added has declined, and this is almost perfectly mirrored by the 
downward trend in the share of  private consumption in GDP.68 Since the early years 
of  the decade labor productivity in the manufacturing industry has grown by some 
20 percent per annum while nominal wage increases have been under 15 percent and 
real wage increases even lower. Profits rose faster than sales and the share of  labor cost 
in total gross output in mining, manufacturing and utilities fell from 11.5 percent in 2002 
to 7.1 percent in 2006; for the economy as a whole, the share of  wages in GDP fell to 
about 40 percent after fluctuating between 50–55 percent in the 1990s. Furthermore, 
there are large precautionary savings out of  wage incomes because of  the absence of  
adequate public health, education and social security services. These savings are now 
increasingly held in stock trading accounts as the real return on bank deposits has been 
barely positive. 
All these imbalances are presumably among the problems that Premier Wen Jiabao 
was referring to when he pointed out at the National People’s Congress in March 2007 that 
“the biggest problem with China’s economy is that the growth is unstable, unbalanced, 
uncoordinated and unsustainable.” They need to be addressed independent of  the shocks 
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from the subprime crisis if  China is to avoid the kind of  difficulties that Japan faced 
during much of  the 1990s following the asset and credit bubbles and excessive investment 
in the late 1980s.69 Expansion of  public spending in areas such as health, education 
and social security, as well as transfers to poorer households, financed, at least partly, 
by greater dividend payments by state-owned enterprises, can play an important role in 
lifting consumption spending. If  needed, this expenditure policy can also be combined 
with tighter credit policy in order to check the rapid growth in investment. Any incentive 
that higher interest rates may generate for arbitrage flows may be offset by tighter capital 
controls including implicit and explicit taxes and administrative restrictions. 
The shift toward a balance between domestic consumption and exports would 
necessitate a gradual restructuring of  the industry so as to alter the product composition of  
supply to suit domestic tastes and preferences. China’s export products are often designed 
for foreign markets and the existing capacity in some sectors cannot be fully utilized on the 
basis of  expansion of  domestic demand. On the other hand, since skills and equipment 
are often industry-specific, they cannot be easily shifted between industries. This means 
that adjustment in the production structure would be realized primarily by a reallocation 
of  new investment and skills in favor of  areas with domestic demand potentials. However, 
this should not cause a major difficulty given the state guidance of  investment.
In East and Southeast Asian economies closely linked through production networks 
based on vertical integration, domestic stimulus would be needed to offset reduction in 
exports to advanced countries and China. Given too many burdens are already placed 
on monetary policy, including control over inflation and management of  capital flows 
and exchange rates, the task falls again on fiscal policy. Most countries in the region have 
considerable scope to respond by fiscal expansion, in very much the same way as they 
were able to do during the weakness of  global demand after 2000 (Akyüz 2006). The 
scope is somewhat limited in countries like India, Malaysia and Pakistan with relatively 
sizeable fiscal deficits. For these countries it is particularly important to design fiscal stimuli 
in such ways that they do not add to structural deficits. This is particularly important for 
India where budget deficits have been growing despite acceleration of  growth, suggesting 
procyclical fiscal policy.
On the external side, Asian developing countries appear to have sustainable current 
account positions as well as relatively large stocks of  reserves to weather any potential 
worsening of  their trade balances as a result of  a slowdown in exports. Countries such as 
India, Pakistan and Vietnam, which have recently been running current account deficits 
between 3 and 5 percent of  GDP, could see their deficits rise further as exports slow 
down and growth of  income and imports is sustained. Given the relatively high levels of  
reserves, this should cause no serious problems. However, if  slowdown in markets abroad 
is accompanied by a sudden stop or reversal of  capital flows, the ability of  these countries 
to give a positive response to external shocks could be greatly compromized. In the case 
of  India, the adverse impact on the economy could be aggravated by the bursting of  the 
asset market bubble. The twin structural deficits in fiscal and external accounts thus need 
greater attention for reducing vulnerability to shocks.
Low income countries dependent on official financing are no doubt highly vulnerable 
to a sharp deterioration in global economic conditions, and many of  them could see 
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rapid increases in their current account deficits with a slowdown in trade in goods and 
services. Indeed, in several of  them, including small island economies, current account 
deficits as a proportion of  GDP are already in double digit figures. The external 
financing needs of  these countries may well exceed the amounts available under normal 
access limits in the IMF, and they should be able to have access to additional financing 
through augmentation of  resources made available under PRGF arrangements and the 
Exogenous Shocks Facility. 
Finally, a reasonable degree of  consistency would need to be ensured in the region 
among policy responses of  individual countries to external financial and trade shocks 
from the subprime crisis. A coordinated macroeconomic expansion would certainly be 
desirable, but it would be even more important to secure cooperation and consistency 
in exchange rate policies. Despite a clear division of  labor and complementarity of  
trade based on vertical integration, trade patterns in East and Southeast Asian emerging 
markets are becoming increasingly competitive as followers in industrial development 
are rapidly closing the gap with the more advanced economies through upgrading and 
building production capacity to substitute imported components and parts with domestic 
production. Under these conditions divergent movements in exchange rates can become 
highly disruptive and conflictual. Experience shows that such movements can become 
particularly intensive at times of  severe external shocks and instability of  trade and 
capital flows. If  shocks are severe, some countries may even be tempted to respond by 
beggar-my-neighbor exchange rate policies.
It is, therefore, important to engage in regional consultations in exchange rate policies 
and explore durable currency arrangements. The experience of  the European Union in 
exchange rate cooperation starting with the demise of  the Bretton Woods system and 
culminating in the European Monetary Union holds valuable lessons, even though it 
may not be fully replicated since the region is not yet ready to float collectively vis-à-vis 
the G3 currencies (viz., the dollar, euro and yen). There are other, more flexible, options 
available including common pegs or a system of  managed floating vis-à-vis G3 currencies 
with intraregional parity grids which deserve attention.70 Complementary arrangements 
should also be considered, including common sets of  measures to curb excessive capital 
inflows, formal arrangements for macroeconomic policy coordination, surveillance of  
financial markets and capital flows and effective short-term intraregional credit facilities 
based on an extension of  the Chiang Mai initiative. 
F. Conclusions
The world economy is going through difficult times. With financial turmoil rapidly 
deepening, it has now become quite likely that the United States will face economic 
contraction in the period ahead and, on some accounts, it may even experience the 
most serious recession since the Great Depression despite expansionary monetary 
and fiscal measures. There is no coordinated expansion by the G7 in sight. Spillovers 
from this crisis to developing countries will certainly surpass the adverse international 
repercussions of  crises in emerging markets in the 1990s. However, for the first time in 
modern history, hopes seem to be largely pinned on developing countries, particularly 
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in Asia, for sustaining stability and growth in the world economy. On the one hand, 
the SWFs from emerging markets are increasingly looked at as stabilizing forces in 
financial markets by providing capital to support troubled banks in the United States 
and Europe. On the other hand, economic prospects in the world economy seem 
to hinge, more than ever, on the ability of  Asian developing countries to decouple 
their growth and continue surging ahead despite adverse spillovers from advanced 
countries. 
In Asia the impact of  these spillovers will be felt at a time when the region is facing 
fragility and imbalances resulting from trade and financial policies and strategies pursued 
in recent years, including credit, asset and investment bubbles and excessive reliance on 
foreign markets. However, economic fundamentals in the region are generally strong 
enough to allow a positive response to trade shocks from contraction of  markets abroad 
and swings in exchange rates. Countries with weak fiscal and current account positions 
look somewhat vulnerable to a sudden stop and reversal of  capital flows, but this is 
not seen as likely to occur. On balance, therefore, Asian developing countries can be 
expected to continue with rapid, albeit somewhat reduced, growth provided that they 
undertake countercyclical and structural measures needed to address domestic fragility 
and imbalances and counter the adverse effects of  external shocks from the subprime 
crisis. 
Current conditions demonstrate once again that when policies falter in regulating 
financial institutions and markets, there is no limit to the damage that they can inflict 
on an economy. Furthermore, in a world of  closely integrated markets, every major 
financial crisis has global repercussions. This means that shortcomings in national 
systems of  financial rules and regulations are of  international concern − more so for 
those in major advanced economies than in emerging markets because of  their greater 
global repercussions. So far piecemeal initiatives and efforts in international fora such 
as the IMF, the BIS and the Financial Stability Forum have not been able to prevent 
recurrence of  virulent global financial crises. A fundamental collective rethinking with 
full participation of  developing countries is thus needed for harnessing financial markets 
and reducing systemic and global instability.
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21 Not all Asian countries hit by the crisis manifested vulnerability in all these areas (UNCTAD 
TDR 1998, Akyüz 2000). 
22 The underlying figures in Table 6.2 are on net–net basis for equity flows and gross basis for 
debt flows; that is, net outflows of  FDI and portfolio equity by residents are deducted from 
net inflows by nonresidents. Thus, the current account balance plus private capital flows 
minus net lending by residents (and errors and omissions) would give changes in reserves − see 
IIF (October 2007, box 3). The countries included are China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand in Asia; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine in Europe; and Algeria, 
Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia in Africa/Middle East.
23 That the push factor is generally more important in boom–bust cycles in international capital 
flows is also noted by the World Bank (2003, 26): the “dynamics of  net capital inflows and 
the changes of  official reserves over the cycle do indeed indicate that the push factor is more 
important for middle income countries, while the pull factor dominates in high income 
countries.” 
24 On different forms of  carry trade and interest differentials, see BIS (2007a, 83–88); UNCTAD 
TDR (2007, chap. 1) and IIF (October 2007).
25 For current account and growth figures in Central and Eastern Europe (excluding the Russian 
Federation) see IMF (2007c, Tables A4 and A12).
26 The proportion of  domestic-currency sovereign debt held by nonresidents in emerging 
markets is estimated to have reached 12 percent − Mehl and Reynaud (2005) and De Alessi 
Gracio, Hoggarth and Yang (2005). The expansion appears to be particularly rapid in Latin 
America due to high levels of  sovereign debt. Available data shows that foreign investment in 
local-currency government securities went from less than $15 billion at the beginning of  2003 
to $200 billion by the end of  2006− see Tovar and Quispe-Agnoli (2008). Moreover, some 
Latin American countries have been able to issue local-currency-denominated global bonds 
at rates below those in domestic markets because of  lower jurisdiction spreads (Tovar, 2005; 
IMF, 2005). 
27 For further discussion of  components of  capital flows to Asian emerging markets see BIS 
(2007a), IMF (2007d and 2007e) and McCauley (2008).
28 For a discussion of  adequate level of  reserves see UNCTAD TDR (1999, chap. 5). For an 
attempt to empirically determine the optimum level of  reserves based on welfare criteria see 
Jeanne and Rancière (2006).
29 See BIS (2007a, 51) which points out that this correlation has been higher during the most 
recent periods of  global market volatility.
30 For the evidence cited in this section see Chai-Anant and Ho (2008). The evidence is from six 
emerging Asian markets− India, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
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31 See IIF (October 2007, Chart 13). IMF (2007e), however, finds that institutional investors 
appear to have little impact on equity prices in emerging markets, but introduce considerable 
volatility because of  herd behavior. 
32 Data on equity prices and price−earnings ratios are from IMF (2007e). 
33 For an analysis of  developments in Asian housing markets see IMF (2007b) which somewhat 
underplays the extent of  the bubble and the risks involved, but nevertheless points out that 
speculative dynamics cannot be ruled out, notably in China, India and Korea. 
34 Korean and the United States data from OECD (2007, annex, table 60). For the others see BIS 
(2007a, 50) and IMF (2007b).
35 For credit conditions and interest rates in Asia see BIS (2007a, 39–41), Mohanty and Turner 
(2006, 43), and IMF (2007c, 5). 
36 For a discussion of  why boom–bust-recovery cycles harm investment see Akyüz (2008).
37 See Goldstein and Lardy (2004), Nagaraj (2005) and Branstetter and Lardy (2006) on excess 
capacity, waste and sustainability of  the investment boom in China. 
38 See notably Disyatat and Galati (2005), Mihaljek (2005) and Mohanty and Turner (2006), and 
for a general survey of  the issues involved see Sarno and Taylor (2001). 
39 Most Latin American and European emerging markets have experienced sizeable 
appreciations in real effective exchange rates − see UNCTAD TDR (2007) and IIF (October 
2007). According to UNCTAD figures, real effective exchange rates were relatively stable in 
India and China during 2002–2006 while Indonesia saw an appreciation of  over 20 percent 
and Malaysia close to 10 percent. Appreciations in Korea and Thailand were in the order of  
10 percent − see also BIS (2007a, 41, 81). India, the Philippines and Thailand saw relatively 
strong appreciations in 2007.
40 The fiscal (or quasi-fiscal) cost of  each dollar of  reserves acquired through intervention can be 
written as: ig – ir = (ig – ix) + (ix – ir) where ig, ir and ix are the rates, in common currency, on 
government domestic debt, reserve holdings and external borrowing, and typically ig > ix > ir. 
The margin between ix and ir is determined mainly by the credit risk and between ig and ix by the 
exchange rate risk. When nonresident claims are only in foreign currencies, the first term on the 
RHS is captured by the holders of  public debt at home and the second term is the net transfer 
abroad − what Rodrik (2006) calls the social cost of  foreign exchange reserves. For the distinction 
between the two types of  transfers and costs see UNCTAD TDR (1999, chap. 5). Mohanty and 
Turner (2006) provide some estimates of  fiscal cost of  intervention in emerging markets.
41 Fiscal cost from ESCAP (2007, 21) and central government deficits from IMF (2007d, 20). 
42 Here capital account surplus is used in the conventional sense; that is, surplus on nonreserve 
financial account. 
43 Borrowed in the sense that they accompany increased claims by nonresidents in one form or 
another, including direct and portfolio equity investment, which entail outward income transfers. 
44 In most emerging markets in Table 6.2 reserves are fully borrowed since the current account is 
broadly balanced. In some, notably in Europe, however, net capital inflows are used partly to 
finance current account deficits and partly to add to reserves. 
45 For instance Brazil also earns reserves by running a current account surplus, but this is 
accompanied by sluggish growth. Because of  a high degree of  vulnerability to deterioration 
in the market sentiment, monetary and fiscal policies have been kept tight, restraining growth 
and imports. With the recent acceleration of  growth toward 6 percent, the Brazilian current 
account has indeed started to run deficits. 
46 On external debt see IMF (2007c). According to BIS (2007a, 94), at the end of  2006 reserves 
in China were 13 times the short-term debt, defined as bank debt with a maturity up to and 
including one year plus international debt securities with a maturity of  up to one year. 
47 See Williamson (1995) on the rationality of  reserve accumulation under such conditions. Polak 
and Clark (2006, 555) refer to the fear of  floating in explaining reserve holding in China, Korea 
and Singapore.
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48 This figure appears quite modest if  one takes the average spread over the full boom–bust cycles 
in capital flows to emerging markets. For instance the average spread of  emerging market 
bonds exceeded 700 basis points during the 1990s and never fell below 400 basis points.
49 Since “borrowed” reserves of  some countries fall short of  their total external debt, realization 
of  this aggregate benefit would require lending by countries with excess reserves to those with 
deficits at rates earned on reserves. 
50 These include direct restrictions over foreign borrowing by residents and access of  nonresidents 
to domestic securities markets, supplemented by market-based or administrative restrictions 
over maturity and currency mismatches in banks’ balance sheets and restrictions designed to 
limit exchange-rate- related credit risks − for a discussion see Akyüz (2008).
51 For recent measures in Asia see BIS (2007a); IMF (2007b and 2007e); and McCauley (2008).
52 For a discussion of  inward and outward FDI in India see Chandrasekhar (2008).
53 For comparison with the 1970s and the factors driving the recent hikes in oil prices see 
UNCTAD TDR (2005) and for current market conditions and prospects IMF (2007c, chap. 1). 
54 Large differences between growth rates for world output given by the IMF and other institutions 
in Table 6.4 are due to the use of  purchasing power parity by the IMF.
55 Just as this paper was being finalized the IMF cut its outlook for global growth for 2008 for the 
second time this year, to 3.7 percent, and argued that a global recession – defined as a global 
growth rate below 3 percent – was a possibility. The projection for developing Asia is also cut 
from 8.6 percent to 8.2 percent, and the United States is expected to slip into a mild recession 
in 2008 (IMF World Economic Outlook April 2008).
56 The World Bank (2007, table 1.3) simulates the impact of  what it calls a prolonged recession 
in the United States on the world economy, triggered by a sharp fall in residential investment 
wherein growth in the United States would fall to 1 percent. This would cause a deceleration 
of  growth in developing countries by no more than 0.6 percentage points.
57 On some accounts it might reduce the Chinese growth to 8 percent (Chancellor 2008). 
58 According to a World Bank (2007, table 1.2) simulation, a once-and-for-all increase of  200 
basis points in emerging market spreads could bring down growth in developing (low and 
middle income) countries by 1.7 percentage points in 2008 and 0.9 percent in 2009. 
59 McCauley (2008, 1) argues that a systematic withdrawal of  funds from Asia in the latter sense 
requires a new image whereby “Asian markets provide liquidity under stressed conditions to 
portfolios managed in the major markets.”
60 See Chai-Anant and Ho (2008). The countries concerned are India, Indonesia, Korea, the 
Philippines, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
61 As of  the end of  2006 China’s exports were just under 40 percent of  its GDP with slightly over 
20 percent of  total exports going to the United States. For the remainder of  the region the 
average export–GDP ratio is somewhat higher, above 40 percent, but the share of  the United 
States in total exports is much lower. 
62 Increases in the domestic content of  exports render China more vulnerable to external trade 
shocks. On upgrading and delinking of  China’s exports from imports see Cui and Syed (2007) 
and Cui (2007). 
63 That is, imports and exports within the same product categories− see UNCTAD TDR (2005), 
ADB (2007a), and IMF (2007d) for trade patterns and intraregional trade in Asia.
64 BIS (2007a, 56) notes that in China the bulk of  recorded profits are earned by relatively few 
enterprises while the rest has high leverage, so that if  growth slows significantly, a substantial 
proportion of  bank loans can become nonperforming. 
65 For a simulation of  the trade impact of  a sizeable adjustment in the United States deficits on 
countries in the Americas see Weisbrot, Schmitt and Sandoval (2008). In a high adjustment 
scenario where the United States’ trade deficit falls to 1.0 percent of  GDP by 2010, declines in 
exports of  some of  the countries heavily dependent on the United States such as Canada and 
Mexico are quite high, reaching 4 percent of  GDP. However, these countries’ exports to the 
United States as a proportion of  GDP are more than twice the level of  China. 
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66 Figures on growth in the components of  aggregate demand are from the WB CQU (August 
2005; September 2007; February 2008). See also Aziz and Dunaway (2007) on the evolution 
of  the shares of  private consumption and investment in GDP. 
67 See WB CQU (August 2005), Kuijs (2005), Yu (2007), and Aziz and Dunaway (2007).
68 On recent behavior of  labor productivity, profits and wages and consumption see Kim and 
Kuijs (2007), and WB CQU (August 2006; and February 2007). 
69 On parallels between China today and Japan in the late 1980s, see Summers (2007a) and 
BIS (2007a, 150) which argues that “given the recent rates of  credit expansion, asset price 
increases and massive investment in heavy industry, the Chinese economy also seems to be 
demonstrating very similar, disquieting symptoms.” On the role of  sluggish wage growth in 
Japan see UNCTAD TDR (2002 and 2003). 
70 Such a regime was proposed in a paper jointly prepared by staff  of  the French and Japanese Ministries 
of  Finance: “A possible solution for many emerging market economies could be a managed floating 
exchange rate regime whereby the currency moves within a given implicit or explicit band with its 
center targeted to a basket of  currencies. […] Managed free-floating exchange rate regimes may be 
accompanied for some time, in certain circumstances, by market-based regulatory measures to curb 
excessive capital inflows” (Ministry of  Finance, Japan 2001, 3–4).
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Chapter VII
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS  
AND ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
IMPACT, POLICY RESPONSE AND 
MEDIUM-TERM PROSPECTS1
A. Introduction
After several years of  impressive growth, the world economy encountered an equally 
impressive downturn starting in the third quarter of  2008, triggered by financial fragility 
and imbalances generated by speculative lending and investment and debt-driven 
spending in major advanced economies (AEs), notably the United States. Initially, there 
was widespread optimism that growth in developing and emerging economies (DEEs) of  
East Asia2 would be decoupled from the difficulties that pervaded AEs and the region 
would continue to surge ahead as an autonomous growth pole. Sound balance of  payments 
positions and self-insurance provided by large international reserves accumulated from 
current account surpluses and/or private capital inflows were expected to protect them 
against the kind of  financial shocks that had devastated the region during 1997–98. In 
the event, however, the region could not avoid a significant drop in growth, in large part 
because of  a sharp contraction in exports. Growth fell even in countries such as China 
which responded to fallouts from the crisis with massive countercyclical fiscal packages 
and aggressive monetary easing, while in many others growth fell to negative territory for 
the first time since the 1997 crisis. 
Like the earlier episodes of  instability, this crisis too has revealed certain structural 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities among various DEEs in Asia. As a result of  the growth 
strategies pursued, economic activity has come to depend heavily on exports to major 
AEs or international capital flows or remittances from workers abroad and hence 
become highly vulnerable to their interruption. Furthermore, despite the measures 
taken in response to the lessons drawn from recurrent crises, almost all Asian DEEs now 
manifest increased susceptibility to financial boom–bust cycles and gyrations in equity, 
property and currency markets because of  their closer integration with major financial 
centers through liberalization of  the capital account and significantly increased presence 
of  foreign financial institutions and investors in their markets. 
There is now increased agreement that the dependence of  countries in the region on 
foreign markets and/or external financing needs to be reduced, particularly since the 
world economy is unlikely to go back to the conditions prevailing before the outbreak 
of  the crisis, characterized by rapid expansion of  exports to AEs and plenty of  footloose 
capital and cheap money. Moreover, the original enthusiasm about bringing international 
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financial markets and institutions under tighter global regulation and control has so far 
yielded little result and in all likelihood instability in international financial markets and 
capital flows will continue unabated. Thus, a key lesson from this crisis is that DEEs 
ought to look for a strategic rather than full and close integration with markets in AEs, in 
both trade and finance, and need to rebalance domestic and external sources of  growth. 
This chapter is produced as part of  a research project sponsored by the Third World 
Network (TWN) and coordinated by this author on the impact of  the global crisis on 
Asian DEEs and the policy issues that need to be addressed for securing sustained 
growth and stability over the medium term. The countries studied in the TWN project 
include China (Yu 2010), India (Chandrasekhar 2009), Korea (Lee 2010), Malaysia 
(Goh and Lim 2010), Pakistan (Haque 2010), the Philippines (Lim 2010), Singapore 
(Lim and Jaya 2010) and Turkey (Uygur 2010). While drawing on the findings of  these 
studies, discussions in this paper are organized around issues rather than countries, 
also using data and information provided by other studies and for other countries in 
the region.
The following section explores the link between the current crisis and the forces driving 
the preceding economic expansion. It is argued that the property and consumption 
surges in the US and elsewhere after the turn of  the millennium produced not only 
a strong economic expansion, but also financial fragility and global trade imbalances 
that culminated in the subsequent crisis. Section C examines the transmission of  the 
impact of  the crisis through three main channels: finance, remittances and trade. This 
is followed by a discussion of  the policy response to fallouts from the crisis and its role in 
recovery. Medium-term growth prospects and policy challenges are examined in Section 
E. It is argued that a return to “business as usual” is not a viable option and coming 
years are likely to see tightened global economic and financial conditions in comparison 
with precrisis expansion, including an external adjustment in the US based on export 
expansion and instability and sluggish growth in the European Union. This means that 
medium-term growth prospects of  the Asian DEEs hinge crucially on their success in 
reducing their dependence on foreign markets and/or capital flows. Assessed on the basis 
of  possible evolution of  the global economic environment and domestic policy spaces 
and options, the Asian DEEs are not expected to go back, over the medium term, to the 
kind of  rapid and sustained growth they enjoyed in the years before the crisis. Slowdown 
in growth is expected to be greater in countries suffering chronic current account and 
budget deficits. The concluding chapter summarizes the systemic and structural strengths 
and weaknesses of  the countries in the region and the policy approaches needed in order 
to reduce vulnerability to external shocks. 
B. the Great Financial Bubble, Global Expansion and Imbalances
After the turbulent years of  the 1990s and early 2000s, characterized by recurrent 
financial crises in emerging economies, financial instability and sluggish and erratic 
growth in Japan and the dot-com boom–bust cycle in the US, the world economy enjoyed 
a period of  exceptional growth and stability until the outbreak of  the global crisis in 2008. 
Average growth of  the world economy during 2002–2007 exceeded that of  the 1990s 
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by almost one-half  (Table 7.1). This was entirely due to acceleration in DEEs where 
growth was twice as fast as in the 1990s, exceeding even the rates attained during the 
golden age. Almost all developing regions and countries enjoyed faster growth than in 
the 1990s and many Asian DEEs with already high growth rates also saw a significant 
acceleration. All this took place in conditions of  a high degree of  price stability, with 
average consumer inflation hovering around 2 percent in AEs, 6 percent in DEEs and 
less than 4 percent in Asian DEEs. 
This period also witnessed a rapid expansion of  international trade and capital flows. 
World exports of  goods and services in dollars increased by 2.5 times during 2002–2007, 
with most Asian DEEs experiencing double digit export growth rates. From the beginning 
of  the decade the DEEs as a whole started to run growing current account surpluses with 
the AEs, notably the US where current account deficits exceeded 6 percent of  GDP on 
the eve of  the crisis. The current account surplus of  DEEs was as high as $660 billion 
in 2007 and almost two-thirds of  this was due to East Asian DEEs and the rest to fuel 
exporters (FEs). 
After falling to some $50 billion in 2002, net private capital flows to DEEs (that is, 
net nonresident inflows minus net resident outflows) rose to $620 billion in 2007, and the 
Asian DEEs were one of  the main recipients. The twin surpluses on current and capital 
accounts allowed the DEEs to accumulate large amounts of  international reserves which 
increased fivefold during 2002–2008 and reached $5 trillion; more than half  of  these 
belonged to Asian DEEs. The period also saw a rapid increase in workers’ remittances, 
1991–2000 2002–2007   2008   2009 2010*
World 3.1 4.4 3.0 –0.6 4.2
AEs 2.8 2.5 0.5 –3.2 2.3
DEEs 3.6 7.0 6.1 2.4 6.3
Asian DEEs 7.4 8.9 7.9 6.6 8.7
China 10.4 10.7 9.6 8.7 10.0
India 5.6 8.0 7.3 5.7 8.8
Indonesia 4.0 5.3 6.0 4.5 6.0
Philippines 3.0 5.7 3.8 0.9 3.6
Korea 6.1 4.8 2.3 0.2 4.5
Malaysia 7.1 5.9 4.6 –1.7 4.7
Thailand 4.4 5.6 2.5 –2.3 5.5
Singapore 7.6 6.8 1.4 –2.0 5.7
Pakistan 3.9 5.9 2.0 2.0 3.0
Turkey 3.7 6.8 0.7 –4.7 5.2
table 7.1: Real GDP growth (annual percentage change)
Source: IMF WEO Database. 
* Projections
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from less than $100 billion at the beginning of  the decade to some $330 billion on the eve 
of  the crisis, ranking only behind foreign direct investment (FDI) as a source of  external 
financing for DEEs (Ratha et al. 2009). 
This above-trend performance of  the world economy and widening global trade 
imbalances were greatly helped by the factors that subsequently led to the most severe 
postwar global financial crisis and recession. At the center of  the crisis were the financial 
bubbles that were allowed to drive the US economy from the mid-1990s onwards. The 
combination of  advances in information technology and sharp reduction in policy rates 
in response to the 1990–91 recession created the dot-com bubble in the second half  of  
the 1990s when equity prices rose to unsustainable levels. This was also accompanied 
by a housing bubble. Exceptional capital gains on stocks gave a major boost to spending 
on consumption and property, and this made a major contribution to the decline in 
household savings, bringing it down from 7.7 percent of  disposable income in the early 
1990s to 2 percent at the end of  the decade.3 
The US housing bubble continued with even greater force with the bursting of  the 
dot-com bubble in the early years of  the present decade for several reasons. First, the 
US Federal Reserve responded to the bursting of  the dot-com bubble and the collapse 
in equity markets by bringing policy rates to historical lows for fear of  asset deflation 
and recession. Second, the collapse of  the stock market made investment in property 
even more attractive. Finally, a new piece of  legislation introduced in the late 1990s 
allowed greater room for banks to engage in and expand speculative lending through 
securitization. All these combined to produce a massive expansion in lending for property 
investment as well as for household consumption. Capital gains from the property boom 
helped bring down personal savings even further, as homeowners increasingly extracted 
equity to finance consumption, making it disappear altogether in the middle of  the 
decade and raising the household debt to some 140 percent of  disposable income.4 
The policy of  easy money and low interest rates in the US was also mirrored in several 
other AEs. Interest rates in Japan were brought down to almost zero as a result of  efforts 
to break out of  deflation. Even the otherwise conservative European Central Bank joined 
in and brought interest rates to unusually low levels. 
Low interest rates, stagnant equity prices and ample liquidity played a major role in 
redirecting private capital flows to DEEs in search of  quick windfall gains and arbitrage 
profits. Oil surpluses also added considerably to the surge in capital flows. Unlike China 
which has run twin surpluses on current and capital accounts and used them entirely 
for investment in international reserves, FEs have had deficits on their capital account. 
They used about one-third of  oil surpluses generated after 2002 for investment abroad, 
mainly through sovereign wealth funds, and two-thirds for reserve accumulation. Unlike 
in the 1970s, the oil surpluses were not recycled through commercial banks, but were 
used for direct equity and portfolio acquisitions, including in DEEs. These investments 
supported widening current account deficits and appreciating exchange rates in some 
DEEs in Europe and elsewhere, including Turkey.
The global financial bubble and widening trade imbalances in the run-up to the 
2008–2009 crisis are occasionally explained in terms of  a global savings glut rather than 
monetary and regulatory slippages in the US, including by former and present governors 
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of  the Fed (Bernanke 2009; Greenspan 2009). According to this view, high savings in 
several Asian emerging economies, notably in China, brought down long-term interest 
rates globally, thereby reducing incentives for private savings in the US and some other 
economies. At the same time, investment of  these savings in the US markets resulted 
in significant increases in funds available for domestic lending, creating aggressive 
competition for borrowers and lowering lending standards. Briefly, according to this 
view, the global savings glut resulting from export-led growth strategies of  Asian DEEs 
was responsible for the build-up of  financial fragility, excessive debt-driven spending and 
collapse of  household savings, and for rising current account deficits in the US in the 
run-up to the crisis. 
It is true that low interest rates and the surge in consumer spending in the US were 
supported by exchange rate, balance of  payments and reserve policies of  surplus East 
Asian countries, notably China. These policies were motivated by the lesson drawn 
from the 1997 crisis that at times of  turbulence DEEs cannot rely on support from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and they would need to secure self-insurance 
by sustaining sound current account positions and accumulating large amounts of  
international reserves. They thus managed their currencies in close pegs to the dollar, 
avoiding appreciations, achieving growing trade surpluses and investing them − and their 
net private capital inflows − in US Treasuries and the debt of  government-sponsored 
agencies such as the mortgage firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On the eve of  the 
crisis around 90 percent of  China’s and 65 percent of  FEs’ holdings of  US Treasuries 
were long term. Consequently, when the Fed started to tighten monetary policy after 
2004, long-term rates moved only a little and the yield curve flattened, giving rise to 
what is known as Greenspan’s conundrum. Thus, monetary policy lost its effectiveness in 
checking private borrowing and spending, notably for investment in property.5 
There can be little doubt that without large inflows from China and FEs, the financial 
bubble in the US could not have been sustained for long. Both the dollar and long-term 
interest rates would have eventually come under strain. This would have made it difficult 
for the US to pursue lax monetary and regulatory policies and ignore the spending boom 
and mounting current account deficits.
However, the link between savings and current account imbalances on the one 
hand, and the financial bubble in the US, on the other hand, is much more complex 
than is typically portrayed by the proponents of  the “savings glut” argument. First, 
as noted, the housing and consumption boom in the US started long before China 
began running large trade surpluses. Second, low interest rates do not always give 
rise to surges in consumer spending. For over a decade the Japanese economy 
suffered from underconsumption despite historically low interest rates, which often 
became negative in real terms. Furthermore, personal savings have been strong in 
some other surplus countries, notably Germany, where interest rates were also low. 
US households were willing to incur a growing amount of  debt not so much because 
of  low interest rates as because of  widespread and firmly held expectations that 
property prices would keep on rising. Expansionary monetary policy and regulatory 
shortcomings allowed the banks to expand lending while spreading the risks widely to 
investors both inside and outside the country through exotic and opaque instruments. 
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Capital inflows helped to keep a lid on long-term rates, but it was excessive household 
debt and overinvestment in property, not a cutback in the supply of  Chinese savings, 
that brought an end to speculative lending, the housing bubble and the consumption 
spree in the US. 
Indeed, without profligate American consumers and reckless lending by American 
banks, China would not have been able to run large and growing trade and savings 
surpluses. As discussed subsequently, in the event of  the US starting to live within its 
means, it would be very difficult for China to maintain simultaneously strong growth, 
large and growing trade surpluses and exceptionally high savings. In such an event a 
return to growth of  some 10 percent would depend very much on a considerably faster 
growth of  consumption in China than has been the case so far and sizeable declines in 
the shares of  national savings and current account surpluses in GDP. 
C. Asian Vulnerabilities and Spillovers from the Crisis 
Contrary to the initial hype about decoupling, Asian DEEs have been severely affected 
by shocks and contagion from the financial turmoil in AEs, to a much greater extent 
than during the 1997 crisis. Growth slowed down sharply everywhere at the end of  2008 
and about half  of  the countries examined here are estimated to have registered negative 
growth in 2009, with the swing from the average growth attained during 2002–2007 
ranging between 5 and 12 percentage points in Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore 
and Turkey (Table 7.1). 
With few exceptions, the exposure of  Asian DEEs to shocks and contagion from 
the crisis has its origin in their growing financial and economic linkages with the AEs, 
rather than their domestic macroeconomic imbalances and financial fragilities. Closer 
and deeper integration with major financial centers and rapidly growing gross assets 
and liabilities positions of  DEEs with the AEs have intensified the transmission of  
financial stress to asset, banking and currency markets in the region. Large stocks of  
assets invested in AEs have exposed the Asian DEEs to losses resulting from declines 
in asset prices and increased defaults. Similarly the surge in private capital inflows 
exposed them to withdrawal of  funds from equity and debt markets, putting pressure 
not only on international reserves and exchange rates, but also on domestic asset prices. 
The crisis led to a contraction of  credit in DEEs due to cutbacks in international bank 
lending and local lending by foreign banks’ affiliates in DEEs as well as declines in 
interbank cross-border lending for funding by domestic banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg 
2010). Strong fiscal, balance of  payments and reserve positions did not insulate the East 
Asian DEEs against adverse spillovers and shocks, but helped to contain their impact 
on the real economy, by allowing, inter alia, considerable space for countercyclical 
policy response.6 
Trade has been the principal channel of  transmission of  deflationary impulses from 
the crisis, particularly in countries where exports have been growing faster than domestic 
components of  aggregate demand. In others, declines in exports impinged on economic 
activity not so much by reducing aggregate demand, but by tightening the payments 
constraint and thereby narrowing the space for countercyclical policy response.
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1. Losses on foreign asset holdings
The period since the early 2000s has seen an unprecedented accumulation of  foreign 
assets by Asian DEEs invested in AEs, due to a surge in private capital inflows and the 
emergence of  large and growing current account surpluses. Countries such as China 
have enjoyed twin surpluses on their current and capital accounts while in many others 
with current account deficits such as India, capital inflows have exceeded by a very large 
margin the needs for current account financing. 
Most Asian countries followed a policy of  stable and competitive exchange rates, not 
only as part of  an export-led growth strategy, but also to avoid the kind of  difficulties that 
were laid bare during the 1997 crisis resulting from currency appreciations, large and 
growing current account deficits and lack of  self-insurance.7 As a result, they intervened 
heavily in currency markets in order to absorb the excess supply of  foreign exchange, 
thereby preventing large appreciations and accumulating large amounts of  international 
reserves. A few others, notably Turkey, chose to float independently and accumulated 
reserves only to the extent deemed necessary to meet external payments rather than to 
prevent appreciations. Most of  the reserves − at least some 60 percent of  the total − are 
held in dollar-denominated public sector liabilities, including those issued by government-
sponsored agencies in the US. 
As capital inflows and/or current account surpluses continued to grow, many countries 
found it extremely difficult and costly to fully sterilize the impact of  interventions on 
domestic liquidity. Rather than checking capital inflows through tighter direct and 
indirect controls, they chose to liberalize resident outflows for both direct and portfolio 
investment abroad. Private portfolio investment abroad by Asian DEEs in AEs, excluding 
reserves, rose from less than 5 percent of  GDP in the late 1990s to over 10 percent in 
2007, while international reserves held by central banks increased even more rapidly, 
exceeding on average 40 percent of  GDP. 
The increased holding of  foreign assets has no doubt resulted in greater exposure of  
Asian DEEs to instability in their market valuations as well as exchange rate swings. There 
is no readily available information on the exposure of  commercial banks and institutional 
investors in Asia to toxic derivatives and on counterparty risks with respect to their asset 
holdings in AEs. However, the amounts involved appear to be small compared to the 
global scale of  the problem. On the eve of  the outbreak of  the crisis, Chinese commercial 
banks’ holding of  bonds issued or guaranteed by the US mortgage firms Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac is estimated to have been in the order of  some $25 billion. The Bank of  
China is reported to have lost some $2 billion on its holdings of  collateralized securities, 
including those backed by US mortgages (Pearlstein 2008; Yu 2010). The investment 
portfolio of  Temasek, Singapore’s state-owned investment company, fell by over 30 
percent in 2008 due to losses on Western banks, and further losses were reported on 
assets sold during 2008–2009 (Bowring 2008). 
More importantly, Asian central banks appear to have invested large amounts of  their 
international reserves in debt issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
which had combined liabilities of  around $5.5 trillion. Holdings by central banks outside 
the US of  such debt are estimated to be in the order of  $1 trillion, and large amounts 
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are also known to be held in private portfolios. China’s holding of  US agency debt is 
estimated to be at least 10 percent of  its GDP, mostly in Fannie and Freddie assets (Pesek 
2008). Had the US government not taken over these institutions, losses could have been 
severe. Central banks are also known to have invested in equities in AEs as well as bonds. 
For instance, the loss of  $6.3 billion incurred by the Monetary Authority of  Singapore in 
the fiscal year ending in March 2009 on assets invested in the US, Europe and Japan was 
partly due to equity price declines.
2. Capital flows and financial and currency instability
During 2002–2007 cumulative net private capital flows to Asian DEEs added up to 
only $500 billion, but this was associated with a massive gross cumulative inflow of  
$2.5 trillion (IMF WEO May 2009). A large proportion of  these inflows were in direct 
and portfolio investment and only a small proportion in bank loans. At the end of  
2007, the stock of  portfolios held by the residents of  AEs in Asian DEEs was about 
25 percent of  the GDP of  these economies (Balakrishnan et al. 2009). This represents 
a significant increase in foreign presence in the securities markets of  Asian DEEs, 
making them highly susceptible to changes in market sentiments in AEs. In Korea, 
for instance, nonresident holding of  equities reached almost one-half  of  market 
capitalization (McCauley 2008). In China foreign share as a percentage of  market 
capitalization increased from 2.5 percent in 2001 to 23.2 percent in 2006 and in India 
from 6.6 percent to 10 percent in the same period (BIS 2009). The share of  foreigner 
transactions in 2005 in average daily turnover was around 20 percent in Korea, 
30 percent in Thailand and 70 percent in Taiwan (Chai-Anant and Ho 2008). The share 
of  nonresidents in long-term local-currency-denominated bonds rose in Indonesia and 
Malaysia to reach 15–20 percent in 2007 (World Bank 2009, 29). 
The surge in nonresident capital inflows was associated with rapid credit expansion 
in several Asian countries. On the one hand, low interest rates in AEs and large and 
continued inflows of  capital encouraged governments in several DEEs to lower interest 
rates and expand domestic credit without facing the risk of  external liquidity problems 
and exchange rate pressures. On the other hand, the impact of  interventions in foreign 
exchange markets on domestic liquidity could not always be fully sterilized, particularly 
in countries where the banking sector was not closely controlled. Thus, in several Asian 
emerging economies too monetary conditions became extremely expansionary, leading 
to a rapid credit expansion. 
The increased foreign presence associated with the surge in nonresident capital inflows 
and domestic liquidity expansion played a major role in generating stock, property and 
investment bubbles and currency appreciations in several Asian DEEs. Stock market 
bubbles were most marked in China, India, Turkey and Korea where equity prices in 
dollar terms rose between 135 and 500 percent during 2003–2007 (Table 7.2). These 
countries also experienced property bubbles, driven partly by foreign acquisition and 
partly by domestic credit expansion. From the early 2000s investment in India and 
China started growing much faster than income, with its share in GDP rising by 10 
and 7 percentage points, respectively. Exchange rates saw significant nominal and real 
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2003−2007 2007−2008 2008−2009
China 502.1 −51.9 58.8
India 349.5 −65.1 100.5
Indonesia 30.4 −57.6 120.8
Korea 136.9 −55.9 69.4
Malaysia 67.5 −43.4 47.8
Pakistan 28.2 −75.7 78.1
Philippines 25.4 −53.8 60.2
Taiwan 55.2 −48.7 75.1
Thailand 78.0 −50.3 70.0
Turkey 332.1 −63.4 92.0
table 7.2: Equity prices in US dollars (period-to-period percentage change)
Source: IMF GFSR (September 2003; September 2004; September 2005; September 2006; September 
2007; September 2008; October 2009). 
Dollar rates Yuan rates
Boom   Bust Recovery Boom    Bust Recovery
Chinese Yuan 9.4 10.8 0.1 − − −
Indian Rupee 18.6 −17.1 10.7 8.4 −25.1 10.7
Indonesian Rupiah −1.8 −20.5 24.6 −10.1 −28.3 24.4
Malaysian Ringgit 11.8 −3.6 7.6 1.3 −13.2 7.6
Pakistan Rupee −5.3 −24.0 −4.5 −13.2 −31.3 −4.6
Philippine Peso 17.4 −2.9 4.4 7.5 −12.3 4.3
Singapore Dollar 13.8 0.4 9.3 5.0 −9.1 9.5
S. Korean Won 28.5 −34.8 25.3 17.6 −41.2 25.1
Taiwan Dollar 5.6 −3.6 6.2 −3.2 −13.0 6.6
Thai Baht 40.5 −10.4 7.6 28.8 −19.0 7.5
Turkish Lira 28.3 −21.1 13.2 17.2 −28.7 13.6
table 7.3: Exchange rate swings (percentage change in nominal bilateral rates) 
Source: OANDA Historical Exchange Rates. http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ 
(accessed 10 February 2010).
Boom: January 2003–July 2007.
Bust: August 2007–February 2009.
Recovery: March 2009–December 2009.
appreciations not only in countries pursuing independent floating (Korea, the Philippines 
and Turkey) but also managed floating (India, Singapore and Thailand) (Table 7.3).8 
These bubbles came to an end with spillovers from the global crisis. Capital inflows to 
emerging markets, including bank-related flows, initially kept up, but after the collapse 
of  Lehman Brothers and the deepening of  the credit crunch, there was a sharp decline 
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starting in September 2008. Redemption by highly leveraged hedge funds in the US 
and the UK which had been very active in Asian equity markets in earlier years was a 
main driver of  withdrawal of  nonresident investment. In a way emerging economies 
in Asia and elsewhere were providing liquidity to portfolio managers and institutional 
investors in mature markets in order to cover their mounting losses and margin calls and 
to reduce debt. 
As the crisis deepened, resident outflows increased while nonresident inflows declined, 
and for 2008 as a whole both gross and net private capital flows to Asian DEEs were 
significantly lower than in 2007 (IMF WEO April 2010). These fluctuations were closely 
followed by sovereign spreads on foreign and local currency bonds. Premium on credit 
default swaps (CDS) was between 100 and 200 basis points for most of  the Asian DEEs 
before the outbreak of  the crisis and withdrawal of  funds from the region. From late 2008 
they started shooting up, reaching 500 basis points for Malaysia and Thailand, 700−800 
for Korea and the Philippines and 1,200 for Indonesia. The increase in spreads on 
domestic bonds was even steeper, particularly in countries with sizeable financing needs. 
In Indonesia, spreads on ten year government local currency bonds surged to 1,260 
points over US Treasuries (World Bank 2009, 30). However, they stabilized gradually 
after the first quarter of  2009, with spreads on CDS falling to a range of  250−500 basis 
points.
With the rapid exit of  foreign and resident investors and global retrenchment of  risk 
appetite, equity and currency markets came under pressure in Asia. Equity markets lost 
more than half  of  their values in 2008 in most countries examined here (Table 7.2). 
Booms in property markets also came to an abrupt end, with house prices declining in 
China in December 2008 for the first time since the government started releasing the 
data in 2005 and urban fixed asset investment falling after September 2008, forcing the 
government to take measures to revive the property market.9 In Korea the slump that 
started in 2008 threatened to set off  a process of  debt deflation, reminiscent of  the 1997 
crisis when housing prices fell by some 13 percent (Citigroup 2009). 
Because of  the sharp slowdown in net capital flows, several currencies that had faced 
strong upward pressure against the dollar after 2003, particularly the Indian rupee, 
Indonesian rupiah, Korean won, Thai baht and Turkish lira, started falling sharply during 
summer 2008 (Table 7.3). Given the strong deflationary trade impulses from the crisis, 
this was often seen as a welcome development. Indeed, unlike in 1997, governments were 
unwilling to use their reserves for stabilizing their currencies. However, in some of  these 
countries, notably India and Korea, reserves declined sharply as a result of  rapid exit of  
capital and widening current account deficits.10
After the first quarter of  2009, however, these trends have been reversed. With 
aggressive monetary easing in the US and sharp cuts in interest rates across the AEs 
generally, capital flows to DEEs soon recovered, driven to an important extent by dollar 
carry trade (Roubini 2009). This, together with significant easing of  monetary policy 
in several DEEs, gave rise to new bubbles in asset markets and put upward pressures 
on currencies and commodities. In all Asian economies, equity prices stood at much 
higher levels at the end of  the year than at the beginning (Table 7.2). In some cases − 
India and Indonesia − they fully recovered the losses incurred earlier. However, as doubts 
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mounted about the strength of  the recovery in major AEs toward mid-2010, stock 
markets again came under severe pressure in many Asian countries, notably in China. 
Similarly, from March 2009 almost all currencies in the region started to go up against 
the dollar, with appreciations being generally stronger for countries which had faced 
stronger declines previously, notably Korea, Indonesia and Turkey (Table 7.3). This 
reflected in part the general weakening of  the dollar after the first quarter of  2009 vis-à-
vis other major reserve currencies, notably the euro, after considerable strengthening in 
the second half  of  2008 and the early months of  2009. Nevertheless, in most cases the 
decline of  the dollar vis-à-vis Asian currencies has been steeper. 
An important consequence of  these large swings in Asian currencies against the dollar 
is increased instability of  intraregional exchange rates of  East Asian countries closely 
connected through trade and investment, notably China, Korea and the major member 
countries of  the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as indicated by the 
swings in regional currencies vis-à-vis the yuan (Table 7.3). Before the outbreak of  the 
financial crisis, most currencies in East Asia appreciated against the yuan, and the Thai 
baht appreciated against other ASEAN currencies along with their growing strength 
against the dollar. This was sharply reversed after mid-2007 when almost all currencies 
fell against the yuan. More recently, after early 2009, this was reversed once again with 
all currencies − except the Pakistan rupee − rising against both the dollar and the yuan. 
These sharp swings in intraregional exchange rates have no doubt been greatly 
influenced by differences in capital flows, current account positions and overall 
macroeconomic conditions in different countries. Nevertheless, their origin also lies in 
differences in currency regimes pursued by the countries in the region, which now span 
the entire spectrum between the two corners. At one corner there are economies with 
independent floating − Korea, the Philippines and Turkey. At another there is Hong 
Kong with a currency board. While India, Thailand and Singapore have been using 
relatively flexible regimes, China and Malaysia followed very tightly managed pegs (IMF 
2008). Whether or not the change introduced in June 2010 in the yuan peg policy in 
China would result in more flexible exchange rates remains to be seen. 
3. Remittances
Both East and South Asia are among the main recipients of  remittances from workers 
abroad, together accounting for more than 40 percent of  total inflows to DEEs. 
According to World Bank estimates, among the top five recipients of  remittances in 
2008, there were three Asian countries − India ($52 billion), China ($49 billion) and 
the Philippines ($19 billion) (Table 7.4). These countries retained their positions as top 
recipients of  remittances in 2009 (Ratha et al. 2010). In the Philippines remittances made 
it possible to generate current account surpluses despite large and persistent trade deficits 
(Lim 2010). In Pakistan during 2002–2007, remittances amounted to $25 billion, exceeding 
net capital inflows by more than 50 percent and accounting for about 20 percent of  total 
foreign exchange receipts (Haque 2010). 
Remittances add to growth in two ways. First, they help ease the balance of  
payments constraint, thereby allowing domestic spending to rise without facing foreign 
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exchange shortage. This is particularly important in countries which run structural 
trade deficits such as India, Pakistan and the Philippines. Second, income from workers 
abroad is often translated into domestic consumption, thereby adding to effective 
demand, output and employment. This is identified to be a main source of  growth in 
the Philippines in recent years where remittances boosted incomes by some 10 percent 
(Lim 2010). 
The crisis tends to reduce remittances because of  falling employment and wage 
incomes and declines in the flow of  migration. Where migrant workers are employed in 
cyclically sensitive sectors such as construction, the impact can be felt disproportionately 
by foreign workers.11 However, despite the rapid increase in unemployment in the major 
host countries, notably in construction, remittances to DEEs have been more resilient 
than both private capital flows and export receipts. They grew strongly during 2008, but 
slowed down in the last quarter of  the year. According to recent estimates by the World 
Bank, in 2009 they fell by 6 percent to $316 billion. The decline is mostly concentrated 
in Latin America because of  close linkages with the US, notably in construction, while 
for South and East Asia they continue to register modest increases (Ratha et al. 2010). 
In Pakistan remittances rose by $1 billion in 2008 while portfolio investment 
disappeared and FDI remained unchanged (Haque 2010), and there was a further 
increase in 2009, despite the slowdown in transfers from the US, thanks to continued 
growth from the Gulf. The Philippines also saw increases in 2008 and 2009, with higher 
remittances making up for declines in other sources of  foreign exchange (Lim 2010). In 
India there was a large increase in 2008, by some $12 billion, despite the contraction in 
the US and Europe which together account for close to 60 percent of  total remittances 
to that country, particularly from workers in IT-related sectors, linked closely to the 
export of  software services (Chandrasekhar 2009). Part of  these transfers to India seem 
to have been used for investment in local markets, attracted by currency depreciations 
and declines in asset prices, including property.
2003 2007 2008 2009 As % of  GDP 2007
China 15.1 38.8 48.5 47.0 1.0
India 21.0 37.2 51.6 47.0 3.3
Indonesia 1.5 6.2 6.8 6.6 1.4
Korea 0.8 1.1 3.1 2.9 0.1
Malaysia 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.0
Pakistan 4.0 6.0 7.0 8.6 4.2
Philippines 10.2 16.3 18.6 19.4 11.3
Thailand 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.8 0.7
Turkey 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.3 0.2
table 7.4: Remittances (billions of  US dollars)
Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook (November 2009).
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Despite the continued relative strength of  remittance flows to South and East Asia, over 
the medium term they are unlikely to return to the rapid growth experienced in precrisis years, 
particularly if  recovery in the US and Europe turns out to be sluggish and jobless, creating 
not only unemployment but also xenophobia and discrimination against foreign workers, and 
construction activities in the Gulf  continue shrinking with persistent weakness of  oil prices.12 
Indeed, the most recent World Bank projections for remittances in 2010–2011 suggest faster 
growth than earlier projections, but weaker than in precrisis years (Ratha et al. 2010). 
4. Export shocks
Trade has been by far the most important channel of  transmission of  deflationary 
impulses from the global crisis.13 After growing by close to 10 percent per annum during 
the years before the crisis, world trade volume started to fall sharply in the last quarter of  
2008 and throughout the first half  of  2009. Despite the subsequent recovery, it registered 
a decline of  close to 13 percent for the year as a whole (WTO 2010). 
In most Asian DEEs in the years preceding the crisis exports were the most dynamic 
component of  aggregate demand, growing faster than domestic investment and 
consumption and at double digit rates in China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Singapore and 
Turkey. With the downturn of  the global economy, this rapid growth was followed by a 
sharp downturn in the last quarter of  2008, with exports falling at double digit rates in 
most countries until the last quarter of  2009 (Table 7.5).
The impact of  export contraction on economic activity has varied according to 
the importance of  exports in the income generation process in comparison with the 
components of  domestic demand. To account for the contribution of  different components 
of  demand to income and growth, one needs to go beyond the conventional growth 
accounting based on ex post national income identity. The trade balance or net exports 
(that is, exports minus imports) describe the ex post contribution of  trade to income, 
but do not provide a correct measure of  dependence of  income on exports because 
all imports are deducted from exports and imports used for domestic consumption and 
investment are not accounted for. They thus underestimate the contribution of  exports 
and overestimate the contribution of  domestic demand to GDP. 
On the other hand, the standard exports X–GDP ratio overestimates the income 
(value added) generated by exports because it ignores the foreign (import) content of  
exports. Since exports use, directly or indirectly, imported intermediate goods, parts and 
components, any contraction in exports would bring, pari passu, a contraction in imports 
used for the production of  exportables, thereby tempering the impact of  export declines 
on income and growth. Thus, in order to correctly assess the impact of  export shocks 
on income and growth, it is necessary to identify direct and indirect import contents of  
exports, using input–output linkages. 
Furthermore, a contraction in exports reduces income not only directly but also 
indirectly, through its effects on domestic consumption and investment. The Keynesian 
multiplier establishes an indirect link between exports and income through consumption. 
There are also strong knock-on effects of  exports on investment, particularly where an 
important part of  manufacturing is export-oriented. 
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Estimates for import contents of  different components of  aggregate demand and spillovers 
from exports to domestic demand are not always readily available for DEEs. However, 
it is known that a common feature of  East Asian DEEs closely linked to international 
production networks is that not only their X–GDP ratios but also the import content of  
their exports are high.14 
Evidence suggests that the import content of  Chinese exports is between 40 and 50 
percent; that is, domestic value added generated by exports is less than 60 percent of  their 
gross value. In value added terms the share of  exports in GDP is no more than 20 percent. 
A very large proportion of  the foreign content of  exports consists of  imported parts and 
components directly used in sectors producing exportables. Almost two-thirds of  domestic 
value added contained in exports are generated in industries supplying inputs to sectors 
producing exportables. Around 60 percent of  imports are used, directly and indirectly, for 
exports; less than 15 percent for consumption; and some 20–25 percent for investment. 
Despite high import content, one-third of  growth of  income in China in the years 
before the outbreak of  the global crisis is estimated to have been due to exports because 
of  their phenomenal growth of  some 25 percent per annum. This figure goes up to 
40 percent if  spillovers to domestic consumption are accounted for and further to 50 
percent if  knock-on effects on domestic investment are added. The sharp contraction 
of  exports in 2009 is estimated to have dragged down GDP by more than 3 percent, 
without allowing for spillovers to domestic demand.15 This meant a sharp swing of  more 
than 6 percentage points in the contribution of  exports to GDP compared to precrisis 
years. Despite massive government intervention, this is only partly offset by faster growth 
of  domestic demand so that GDP growth in 2009 is estimated to have remained some 3 
percentage points below the 2002–2007 average. 
2004–2007 Average growth 2008 2009 a
Growth (Y-o-Y) As % of  GDP Growth (Y-o-Y) As % of  GDP
China 24.1 37.8 8.6 36.5 – 15.9
India 17.0 20.4 12.8 22.7 – 26.4b
Indonesia 12.0 31.7 9.5 29.8 – 19.4
Korea 12.9 40.5 5.7 52.9 – 14.3
Malaysia 8.9 115.0 1.3 103.6 – 24.9
Pakistan 9.1 15.2 17.9 12.8 – 22.1b
Philippines 9.7 47.1 – 1.9 36.9 – 29.2b
Singapore 13.0 233.6 1.3 234.3 – 20.2
Thailand 7.5 72.8 5.5 76.4 – 12.0
Turkey 16.1 22.6 20.7 23.9 – 22.6
table 7.5: Real export of  goods and services
Source: WB China Quarterly Update (December 2008; November 2009; March 2010), ADB Key 
indicators (2009) and IMF IFS Database.
a. Merchandise exports.
b. Average for the first three quarters of  2009. 
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Available evidence suggests that the import content of  exports is lower in Indonesia, 
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand than in China. With the exception of  Indonesia, 
these countries also have higher X−GDP ratios (Table 7.5). Consequently, in value 
added terms the share of  exports in GDP is higher in these countries than that in China, 
reaching 30–40 percent. This means that they are more susceptible to export shocks. 
Thus, it is estimated that the impact of  export contraction in these countries during 
2008 on GDP varied between 4 and 6 percent. Malaysian and Singaporean exports 
have higher import contents than Chinese exports, but these countries also have much 
higher X−GDP ratios than China. Consequently, in value added terms their exports 
account for a higher share of  GDP than not only China but also the first group of  
countries. Accordingly, export shocks in 2009 had a stronger impact on GDP growth in 
these countries, possibly reaching double digit figures. 
All in all, it can be estimated that, on average, contraction of  exports during 2008–
2009 reduced GDP in East Asian DEEs by 5–6 percent. When spillovers to domestic 
demand are accounted for, this figure is likely to be much higher. Indeed, according to 
an estimate by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP 2010, box 1) for East Asian DEEs and Japan, the impact of  the 2009 
shortfall in exports on GDP reaches 7.8 percent, accounting for both direct and indirect 
effects. 
India, Pakistan and Turkey also suffered significant drops in exports from the last 
quarter of  2008. However, in the run-up to the crisis, growth in these countries was 
not as dependent on exports as in East Asia. They are less integrated into international 
production networks and their X−GDP ratios are much lower − in India and Turkey less 
than half  the average X−GDP ratio in East Asia, and in Pakistan less than one-third. 
While data and information on import content of  exports are not readily available for 
these countries, in value added terms the share of  exports in GDP is likely to be around 
15 percent in India and Turkey and 10 percent in Pakistan.16 This would mean that the 
contraction in exports during 2008–2009 pulled down GDP by some 4–5 percent in 
India, 3–4 percent in Turkey but less than 2 percent in Pakistan. 
These considerations suggest that the more successful exporters of  manufactures with 
very high X−GDP ratios have been hit particularly hard by trade shocks emanating from 
the global crisis even when the import content of  their exports is relatively high. These 
include not only countries which enjoyed large current account surpluses such as China, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, but also Korea where the current account was 
broadly in balance in the run-up to the crisis, but an important part of  the manufacturing 
industry was export-oriented. 
By contrast, countries which are not so closely integrated into the global trading 
system and international production networks in manufacturing suffered relatively less 
from contraction in exports. These include India, Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the 
Philippines where domestic demand played as important a role in precrisis economic 
expansion as exports. In India, both domestic consumption and investment grew 
rigorously. Consumption, particularly of  upper income groups, was stimulated by a credit 
boom resulting from financial deregulation and rapid inflow of  capital, while investment 
in property rather than industry was the most dynamic component of  domestic demand 
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(Chandrasekhar 2009). In the Philippines rapid expansion of  private consumption 
supported by growing remittances resulted in an above-trend growth during 2002–2007 
despite the falling share of  investment in GDP (Lim 2010). All three countries maintained 
broadly sustainable external positions, running small current account surpluses or 
deficits. Turkey, which also enjoyed above-trend growth based on domestic demand, 
was externally more vulnerable to export shocks because of  a large current account 
deficit and heavy dependence on capital inflows. Consequently it has been hit hard by 
the combination of  sharp declines in capital flows and export earnings. 
d. Policy response and recovery
The growth outcome during 2008–2009 naturally depended not only on the incidence 
of  shocks but also on the policy response. The space for countercyclical policy varied 
considerably among countries. The East Asian economies have generally been able to 
respond by expansionary monetary and fiscal measures, but growth losses could not be 
prevented even where strong stimulus packages have been put in place. Thus, despite the 
original hype that growth in East Asia would decouple from advanced economies and 
could even help prevent the world economy plunging into recession, many countries in 
the region could not avoid negative GDP growth in 2009. For the sample of  DEEs in 
Table 7.1, growth for 2009 was around 5 percentage points below the average growth 
over 2002–2007. 
The reaction to the reversal of  capital flows and the hike in risk premia after the 
collapse of  Lehman Brothers was quite different from the response to the exodus of  capital 
in previous emerging market crises, including the East Asian crisis of  1997. Although 
Indonesia initially succumbed to the Washington Consensus instinct and resorted to 
interest rate hikes in an effort to stabilize the currency, this was soon reversed. The large 
stock of  reserves accumulated from current account surpluses and capital inflows in 
precrisis years was not used to any significant degree for exchange rate stabilization. 
Rather, as already noted, currencies were allowed to fall, as this was seen to provide some 
buffer against the severe drop in exports. 
 Unlike in the 1997 crisis, no country resorted to control over capital outflows, neither 
for residents nor for foreigners. Instead, several measures were announced to boost 
confidence and increase the resilience of  the financial system to shocks. Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand expanded deposit insurance. Korea also provided 
guarantees on interbank transactions and external debt of  domestic banks up to $100 
billion. Singapore introduced a Deposit Insurance Scheme in October 2008 to avoid 
erosion of  bank deposits, guaranteeing all Singapore dollar and foreign currency deposits 
of  individual and nonbank customers in banks, finance companies and merchant banks 
licensed by the Monetary Authority of  Singapore until 31 December 2010 (Lim and 
Jaya 2010). China, Korea, India and Thailand injected capital into financial institutions. 
With the stabilization of  capital flows, monetary authorities in almost all countries 
started to cut policy rates from the last quarter of  2008, including those with relatively high 
inflation such as Turkey, in order to stimulate domestic demand. In addition, quantitative 
easing has been sought in several ways. Reserve requirements have been reduced in 
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several countries in order to increase liquidity in the banking system. In India, Indonesia 
and Korea central banks not only provided liquidity support to financial institutions in 
local currency, but also used international reserves to lend in foreign currency in order to 
offset the reduction in external financing, notably to exporters. Moreover, as capital flows 
recovered, currency interventions were no longer sterilized, unlike in the period before 
the outbreak of  the crisis (Akyüz 2008). In the third quarter of  2008 China stopped 
issuing central bank bills to sterilize the impact of  dual surpluses on its current and 
capital accounts, adding significantly to credit expansion (Yu 2010).
East Asian countries with favorable combinations of  current account and 
reserves positions faced no balance of  payments constraint in pursuing expansionary 
macroeconomic policies to offset the impact of  drastic declines in exports by increasing 
domestic consumption and investment, particularly since capital flows quickly stabilized 
after the initial reversal. Nor did they face fiscal constraints since their central government 
budgets were either in surplus or moderate deficits and debt and debt burden were quite 
moderate compared to most other DEEs. India too had significant policy space despite 
a higher sovereign debt ratio than East Asian countries.17 Its current account deficit 
was relatively small compared to reserves despite some large initial losses due to capital 
outflows. At some 4 percent of  GDP, its central government budget deficit was moderate 
and its debt burden was not onerous. 
The main exceptions among the countries examined here were Turkey and Pakistan, 
with current account deficits in the order of  5–6 percent and declining reserves (Uygur 
2010 and Haque 2010, respectively). In the face of  sharp declines in export earnings 
and reduced and unstable capital flows, both countries saw the payments constraint 
tighten considerably. Use of  tariffs and other trade measures to alleviate the payments 
constraints was not part of  the accepted thinking of  policymakers in these countries, as in 
most other DEEs, even though doing so would have been quite legitimate under current 
multilateral rules (Akyüz 2009b).
Both Pakistan and Turkey had little scope for fiscal expansion. Pakistan had already 
a large budget deficit of  some 6 percent of  GDP and resorted to procyclical fiscal 
tightening. In the event, it managed to grow moderately in 2009 under an IMF program, 
by one-third of  its average growth after 2002, while its current account deficit doubled. 
In Turkey the main concern was to secure sovereign debt sustainability by generating a 
primary surplus of  some 5 percent of  GDP. Besides, the government was quite confident 
that the crisis would bypass Turkey. In any case, given the dependence of  the economy on 
foreign capital and a high level of  indebtedness, a strong countercyclical fiscal expansion 
could have undermined market confidence, thereby curtailing access. In the event the 
fiscal incentives came too late and too little. Growth collapsed in 2009, with a swing of  
about 12–13 percentage points from the 2002–2007 average. As expected, the current 
account deficit fell as imports contracted faster than exports while the central budget 
deficit rose sharply to exceed 5 percent of  GDP. 
In East Asia the countercyclical fiscal response was unprecedented, not only for the 
region alone but also the developing world as a whole.18 On some estimates, the fiscal 
package in 15 DEEs in East, South and Central Asia amounted to 7.5 percent of  2008 
GDP, almost three times the average level in the G7 major industrial countries. China 
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introduced the largest fiscal package, close to $600 billion, but in terms of  share of  GDP 
some smaller countries implemented even bigger packages; e.g., the Thai fiscal stimulus 
package amounted to some 17 percent of  GDP compared to 13 percent in China. Fiscal 
packages were also relatively large, in excess of  5 percent of  GDP, in Malaysia, Singapore 
and Korea, but somewhat smaller in the Philippines, India and particularly Indonesia.19 
Unlike in advanced economies, countercyclical fiscal packages in Asia placed 
much less emphasis on tax cuts and focused on increases in spending, particularly 
in infrastructure investment. Since public works are politically easier to control than 
current spending and tax cuts, this approach is consistent with the Keynesian approach 
to countercyclical fiscal intervention which calls for fiscal consolidation at times of  
expansion (Akyüz 2006). The main exception was Indonesia where over 80 percent 
of  the fiscal stimulus package consisted of  tax breaks and subsidies to consumers 
and business. India also used taxes and subsidies while China, Malaysia, Korea and 
Singapore focused on infrastructure spending. Although some attention has been paid 
to rural infrastructure and building schools and hospitals and public housing projects, 
in general spending targeting the poor, including social transfers, has been a relatively 
small part of  stimulus packages. 
In China less than 20 percent of  the fiscal package has been allocated to social 
spending, with the rest going mainly into infrastructure investment in roads, railways, 
ports and airports. It has pushed the investment rate to 50 percent of  GDP, and aggravated 
the problem of  excess capacity that had pervaded several sectors and increased the 
dependence of  growth on exports. Policies designed to revive real estate demand and 
an unprecedented growth of  mortgage lending to households created a bubble in the 
property market, with real estate investment growing by close to 40 percent. While 
private consumption held up thanks to several incentives, particularly for car purchases, 
it did not provide much impetus to offset the sharp decline in exports. The increase in 
investment is estimated to have contributed between 80 and 90 percent of  growth in 
2009 (Wolfe and Ziemba 2009a and 2009b; Hung 2009). 
Large as they may have been, stimulus packages have not always been adequate 
to deal with the consequences of  export shocks for economic activity.20 According to 
estimates by ESCAP (2010), only in less than half  of  East Asian DEEs (i.e., China, India, 
Korea and Thailand) were the announced fiscal packages sufficiently large to offset the 
overall impact of  the decline in exports on GDP. However, this did not prevent loss 
of  growth compared to precrisis years even though these countries also pursued highly 
expansionary monetary policy.
There are several reasons for the absence of  a very strong correlation between 
the size of  fiscal stimulus packages and growth performance across countries, even 
allowing for diversity in the incidence of  export shocks. First, there appear to have been 
considerable variations in the impact of  trade and financial shocks on private domestic 
demand, notably investment. The impact has been particularly strong in Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines where private investment, notably in durable 
equipment, slowed down or contracted significantly. This, together with a slowdown in 
FDI, is the main reason for sharp drops in the share of  domestic investment in GDP 
during 2008–2009 in these countries even though in most cases government investment 
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spending rose as part of  the countercyclical policy response to the crisis (ADB ADO 
2010). Second, there are slippages in the implementation of  announced measures. 
Third, infrastructure investment projects take a long time to implement fully. Finally, in 
most cases, fiscal packages were introduced from late 2008 onwards to be implemented 
in several steps, extending into 2010 and even beyond. In Thailand, for instance, the 
second package introduced in 2009 was for implementation in 2010–2012. Nevertheless, 
it is beyond doubt that countercyclical fiscal policy in Asia has been highly effective in 
stabilizing output and promoting recovery in the face of  severe external shocks, both 
directly through its impact on aggregate demand and indirectly by helping maintain 
confidence among consumers and investors.
While recovery is stronger than expected at the outset of  the global crisis, current 
projections for 2010 put growth well below the average rates attained in precrisis years 
(ADB ADO 2010, table 1). Without doubt much of  that growth is coming from monetary 
and fiscal stimulus packages introduced from the last quarter of  2008. With exit from 
stimulus packages, growth will depend on private spending. A main concern is that a 
premature exit, in both major industrial and developing economies, could short-circuit 
recovery, leading to sluggish growth or even another dip in economic activity.
In this context, exit can refer to two different things: ending or reversing reflationary 
measures. In the former sense, exit would mean ending cuts in interest rates or quantitative 
easing on the monetary front, and phasing out tax cuts and additional discretionary 
spending on the fiscal front. In the case of  reversal, there would be monetary tightening 
and interest rate hikes and fiscal consolidation designed to reduce structural budget 
deficits. 
Central banks have ended interest cuts and liquidity expansion in almost all major 
developing and developed economies. In AEs there are signs of  the beginning of  
monetary tightening, with the US Fed raising the interest rate it charges on short-term 
loans to banks and Canada raising policy rates. In several DEEs in Asia, including China, 
monetary tightening has started as interest rates and/or banks’ reserve requirements are 
raised gradually with the upturn in growth and inflation. On the fiscal side, there appear 
to be no plans for new packages even though some spending programs introduced earlier 
extend to the current year and the next. While fiscal consolidation is not yet in sight 
anywhere in the developing world, in view of  large deficits that emerged, Asian DEEs are 
urged to go back to fiscal prudence, rather than maintaining fiscal activism in response 
to continued growth slowdown (ADB ADO 2010). While the US administration appears 
to be reluctant to undertake fiscal retrenchment before recovery is strongly in place 
and growth is restored, sovereign debt problems and pressures from currency and bond 
markets are forcing premature fiscal adjustment in Europe. 
Even without a monetary and fiscal policy reversal, the current pace of  recovery 
may not be maintained if  stimulus programs so far put in place do not lead to sustained 
increases in private spending. Indeed, the 1990s witnessed several failed fiscal pump-
priming attempts in Japan in conditions of  financial fragility whereby recovery stalled 
when fiscal injection came to an end. Such an outcome cannot be entirely ruled out in 
the current recovery. Since precrisis growth in East Asia was driven mainly by exports, 
a central issue over the medium term is whether they can go back to export-led growth 
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and the kind of  policy challenges they face in the likely case that there may be no return 
to business as usual. This clearly depends not only on policies in China and Asian 
DEEs, but also on the evolution of  the global economy and policy and performance 
of  major AEs.
E. Medium-term Prospects and Policy Challenges
1. Adjustment and growth in major advanced economies
A return of  the global economy to the kind of  rapid and broad-based expansion enjoyed 
from the early years of  the decade until 2008 is no doubt desired by all, but the main 
question is how to achieve this without the accompanying financial fragilities and trade 
imbalances that led to the most severe postwar global economic crisis.21 There is wide 
agreement that a return to “business as usual,” with the US continuing to consume 
beyond its means and absorbing Chinese exports by issuing growing amounts of  dollar 
liabilities, is not a sustainable option − it is a recipe for heightened international monetary 
and financial instability and disorderly and deflationary adjustment to global economic 
imbalances. 
The prospects for global stability and growth are thus believed to depend crucially on 
rebalancing the US and China − the largest deficit and surplus countries, respectively. 
In view of  the central place occupied by the dollar in the international reserves system, 
it is recognized that international monetary and financial stability crucially depends on 
spending discipline by the US, in line with its income, allowing for a fundamental and 
sustained balance of  payments adjustment. However, in order to maintain growth, the 
US should not simply cut domestic absorption but also shift to export-led growth. An 
orderly US adjustment would also require, inter alia, a shift by China from export-led to 
consumption-led growth and the realignment of  the exchange rate of  the yuan against 
the dollar. In this way, prospects for global stability are expected to improve without 
sacrificing growth.22 
A significant adjustment by US consumers is already underway, brought about by 
massive losses of  personal wealth caused by the subprime crisis. Personal savings have 
moved into positive territory and, on recent trends, may reach 10 percent of  disposable 
income in coming years.23 By contrast, stimulus and bailout packages have resulted in a 
significant increase in fiscal deficits, which now exceed 10 percent of  GDP, pushing the 
public debt ratio toward 100 percent. Clearly, with consumer spending staying behind 
income growth, attempts to reduce public deficits and debt through tax increases and 
spending cuts would be highly deflationary. 
Given consumer retrenchment, a growth-driven US fiscal adjustment would require 
strong export growth. Indeed, a shift from consumption-led to export-led growth is the 
main objective of  the National Export Initiative (NEI) launched by President Obama 
in his State of  the Union Address, which targets a doubling of  exports in five years.24 
However, even with rapid export expansion, US growth is likely to be sluggish due to the 
decline in potential growth brought about by the crisis.25 Actual growth may fall even 
further if  bond markets force a swift fiscal adjustment. In other words, the US may have 
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to pay the cost of  decades-long bubble–bust cycles and aggressive monetary and fiscal 
policy easing in response to consequent crises by going through slow and unstable growth 
for some years to come. But, whether or not growth slows down over the medium term, 
net demand stimulus from the US to East Asian DEEs is likely to be significantly lower 
than in the years preceding the financial crisis. This means that domestic demand in 
surplus countries, including China, needs to expand much faster than in the past in order 
to maintain a relatively rapid global growth. 
Germany and Japan are also among the major surplus countries that need to adjust 
and add to global demand. Although these countries often escape attention because their 
bilateral trade surpluses with the US are much smaller than that of  China, they have also 
been running large amounts of  current account surpluses − $250 billion in Germany and 
$210 billion in Japan before the onset of  the crisis, compared to $370 billion in China. 
They have both been siphoning off  global demand without adding much to global growth. 
During 2002–2007, exports grew 25 times faster than domestic demand in Germany 
and 8.5 times in Japan while this figure was less than 3 for China. In both countries, the 
contribution of  exports to growth was much higher than that in China during the years 
preceding the crisis. This lack of  dynamism in domestic demand has been due to the falling 
share of  consumption in GDP along with stagnant or falling real wages, slow employment 
growth and the downward trend in the share of  wages in GDP. 
In Germany reliance on exports for growth through wage restraints (or the so-called 
“competitive disinflation”) at the expense of  consumer demand has been compromising 
growth and stability in other eurozone countries which are unable to restrain wages to the 
same extent, but locked into a common currency. It has played a major role in growing 
external imbalances and debt accumulation in several eurozone countries including 
Greece, Portugal and Spain where current account deficits as a percentage of  GDP have 
been hovering around double digit figures and debt ratios have been rising rapidly. The 
region is highly vulnerable to financial turmoil due to the combination of  large and what 
looks like unsustainable sovereign debt in these countries and a high degree of  exposure 
of  European banks to sovereign default. 
Avoiding such an outcome would call for strong growth, but this has been severely 
constrained by continued beggar-my-neighbor policies of  Germany. The deflationary 
policy bias would be aggravated by premature fiscal consolidation which the countries 
in the region seem to be determined to pursue under the pressure of  bond and currency 
markets, posing the risk of  a double dip. According to the IMF (2010 and WEO April 
2010), potential growth in the euro area, currently at zero, will only reach 1.5 percent 
over the medium term and actual growth would remain below the rates attained during 
precrisis years. With increased concerns over sovereign insolvency and premature fiscal 
retrenchment, the figure may even be lower, if  positive at all. Under these conditions, 
even if  the specter of  a double-dip recession could be averted, Europe is unlikely to 
provide a rapidly expanding market for East Asian exporters for several years to come. 
Japanese growth prospects look as bleak as Europe’s, expected to be the worst among 
the G7 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(Fujioka 2010). Sluggish markets in the US and the EU would cut down Japan’s growth 
not only directly but also indirectly since Japan provides over 15 percent of  China’s total 
280 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
intermediate imports used in the production for exports. Indeed, a very large proportion 
of  negative export shocks to China during 2008–2009 were passed on to Japan alongside 
Taiwan and Korea, as the main suppliers of  parts and components to China. Therefore, 
Japan is unlikely to provide much independent growth stimulus to lesser developed 
countries in the region. 
2. Sustaining rapid growth in Asia
With consumer retrenchment and external adjustment in the US and sluggish growth 
or stagnation in the EU and Japan, it will be very difficult for the world economy to 
return to the kind of  rapid growth enjoyed in the years preceding the global economic 
crisis. This means considerably dampened export prospects for Asian DEEs. Fiscal and 
balance of  payments adjustment and monetary tightening in the US could also lead to 
considerably tightened global financial conditions over the medium term. They could 
result in significant increases in interest rates, strengthening the dollar and leading to a 
rapid unwinding of  dollar carry trade. By triggering rapid and sustained capital outflows, 
these could wreak havoc in DEEs heavily dependent on foreign capital flows.26 
The impact of  these possible changes in the global economic environment on 
the countries under study would vary considerably depending on their underlying 
macroeconomic and structural conditions. The growth outcome will also depend on the 
policy response, the space for which also varies significantly across countries. In these 
respects, a distinction can be made between, on the one hand, the South and West Asian 
countries, India, Turkey and Pakistan, where domestic demand has been a more dynamic 
component of  growth than exports and external accounts are in structural deficits, and, 
on the other hand, China and the East Asian DEEs linked to the Sinocentric production 
network where growth is export-led and much less dependent on foreign capital inflows. 
3. South and West Asia
Turkey and Pakistan need to overcome a number of  structural weaknesses in order to 
be able to return to the kind of  rapid and sustained growth they enjoyed in the years 
before the global crisis. This may be difficult to achieve rapidly even under drastic 
policy changes. Turkey suffers from a fundamental disequilibrium in its current account 
balance. Even though its current account deficit has narrowed since the last quarter of  
2008, it will certainly start climbing with any acceleration of  growth based on domestic 
demand. Thus, it could need, inter alia, a major currency alignment to help achieve 
external adjustment without facing deflation. It is important that this takes place in an 
orderly way, rather than through a rapid exit of  capital and an attack on its currency 
that may be triggered by postponing adjustment, which would lead to defaults in the 
private sector with extensive liability dollarization as well as severe difficulties in servicing 
domestic public debt. 
Turkey also needs to raise national savings in order to reduce its dependence on 
foreign capital. Currency adjustment can play a role in this since there appears to be 
an inverse correlation between real appreciations and private savings (Uygur 2010). 
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However, the country also needs to raise its fixed investment rate significantly – from 
some 20 percent of  GDP before the crisis and 17 percent now − in order to accelerate 
structural change through upgrading and moving out of  labor-intensive manufactures. 
This is absolutely essential because its markets are wide open to cheaper Asian exporters 
of  manufactures and it has very little room for trade policy measures in view of  its 
customs union agreement with the EU. With its national savings rate hovering around 
16 percent of  GDP since 2003, closing the external gap while raising investment is a 
daunting task. Thus, Turkey can face severe problems regarding stability and growth if  
the global economic environment in coming years does not turn out to be as favorable 
as in precrisis years. 
Much of  this is also true for Pakistan. From 2002 onwards Pakistan enjoyed above 
historical growth, driven primarily by inflows of  capital and remittances: during 2002–
2007 net capital flows and current transfers accounted for as much as 45 percent of  
total foreign exchange receipts, with exports covering less than three-quarters of  imports 
(Haque 2010). However, the country had been facing serious difficulties in maintaining 
growth and keeping deficits under control long before the onset of  the global crisis – a 
process which culminated in an IMF program. Medium-term prospects regarding capital 
inflows and remittances do not look very bright. In all likelihood, recovery in advanced 
economies will continue to be jobless for some time to come and activity in the Gulf  
cannot pick up without a sustained upturn in oil prices. Therefore, following the modest 
recovery in sight over 2010–2011, the Pakistan economy may well return to the more 
moderate growth rates of  the 1990s. 
Although India has been running current account deficits constantly since the middle 
of  the decade, the contribution of  its exports to growth is much greater than is commonly 
appreciated. As noted, the share of  value added exports in GDP is in the range of  15–17 
percent. With Indian real exports growing, on average, by 17 percent per annum during 
2004–2007, it can be estimated that around one-third of  GDP growth in that period was 
due to exports, even without accounting for spillovers to domestic demand.27 It would be 
difficult to replicate this export performance over the medium term. With unchanged 
pace and pattern of  domestic demand, Indian growth over the medium term is thus 
likely to be about some 2 percentage points below the average enjoyed in the years before 
the crisis, coming down to around 7 percent. This is still respectable − more than twice 
the so-called Hindu growth of  the 1960s and 1970s. It could be possible to push this 
up by faster expansion of  domestic demand, but this would widen the current account 
deficit, possibly to 5 percent of  GDP. Coming at a time when global financial conditions 
can become quite tight, this could make the economy highly vulnerable to sudden stops 
and reversal of  capital flows. Thus, it might be wiser to settle at a somewhat lower growth 
rate than try to replicate the 9–10 percent growth of  the earlier period and expose the 
economy to such risks. 
4. China28
For countries closely linked to the East Asian production network, the policies and 
performance of  China, as well as major AEs, hold the key for medium-term growth 
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prospects, given the sheer size of  China and their close trade linkages. For the reasons 
already discussed, China cannot go back to precrisis export growth rates in excess of  25 
percent per annum, more than three times the projected medium-term growth in world 
trade volume (IMF WEO April 2010, table A17). An aggressive export push in the markets 
of  AEs or DEEs is likely to meet strong resistance, creating conflicts in the trading system. 
If, on the other hand, the rate of  expansion of  Chinese exports comes down to a more 
acceptable level, say to 10 percent, then, without a fundamental change in the pace and 
pattern of  domestic demand, its growth may barely reach 7 percent. Growth may drop a 
lot more if  the credit-driven investment bubble bursts, exposing bad loans and giving rise 
to difficulties in overstretched banks and, eventually, to a financial crisis.
One option is to expand rapidly in the markets of  poorer economies where imports 
are constrained by foreign exchange availability, by simultaneously providing them the 
necessary financing through lending and/or direct investment. However, there are limits 
to what these economies could absorb while securing sustainable external debt and asset 
positions. For instance, total merchandise imports of  least developed countries (LDCs) are 
less than 10 percent of  Chinese exports and for sub-Saharan Africa the ratio is less than 
one-to-five. Besides, Chinese expansion in these markets could threaten the domestic 
industry in certain sectors such as clothing, a main manufactured export item of  several 
low income countries, including the larger ones such as Bangladesh and Vietnam. While 
such an option would certainly help both the poorer countries and China in expanding 
trade, it should be seen as a step in the transition from export-led to domestic-demand-
led growth, rather than as a way of  postponing the necessary adjustment. 
Another option would be to lower the foreign content of  exports by upgrading and 
import substitution of  high-tech parts and components so as to enhance their contribution 
to growth. Such a transformation has been underway, but even if  accelerated considerably, 
it will take a long time to have its effects felt on domestic content of  exports. Besides, it 
would imply continued growth of  the Chinese trade surplus, thereby aggravating global 
imbalances. 
The solution should be sought primarily in raising domestic consumption much faster 
than has been the case so far. Since the beginning of  the decade until the global financial 
crisis, investment in China went ahead of  consumption and the demand gap was filled 
by rapidly growing exports. The share of  private consumption in GDP fell from over 
50 percent in the 1990s to around 36 percent on the eve of  the crisis while that of  
investment rose to 45 percent. Consumption as a share of  GDP remained stable during 
the 2008–2009 downturn while the investment rate has been pushed up to 50 percent 
by the stimulus package. With a sustained slowdown in the pace of  exports, a return to 
a path of  some 9–10 percent growth will require reversing the downward trend in the 
share of  private consumption and the upward trend in the share of  investment in GDP.
The main reason for underconsumption in China is not excessive household savings. 
They are no doubt high, but not always higher than those in other DEEs. In the past few 
years they have remained around 20 percent of  GDP, broadly the same as household 
savings in Malaysia in the 1980s and in India in recent years. As a proportion of  
household disposable income, they are in the order of  28 percent compared to 32 percent 
in India. However, at more than 50 percent of  GDP, the Chinese national savings rate 
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exceeds that of  India by a large margin because of  significantly higher corporate savings 
or profit retentions − over 20 percent of  GDP compared to 10 percent in India. Chinese 
corporate profits and savings are also much higher than those in late industrializers in 
Asia. While household savings as a proportion of  disposable income have been rising in 
recent years, their share in national savings has been declining because of  sharply rising 
corporate savings.29
The disparity between consumption and investment and the consequent dependence 
of  China on foreign markets is largely the outcome of  the imbalance between wages 
and profits. Wages in China constitute a very large proportion of  household income 
because government transfers and investment income, including dividends, are very 
small. Despite registering impressive increases, wages have lagged behind productivity 
growth and their share in value added has been declining. The downward trend in the 
share of  wages in GDP is almost perfectly mirrored by the share of  private consumption 
in GDP.30 This has no doubt been a factor in the recent labor unrest in China.
A return to trend growth in China thus crucially depends on a sizeable increase in the 
share of  household income in GDP and a corresponding decline in corporate profits and 
investment, which are boosted by tax incentives and the practice of  nonpayment of  dividends 
to the government by state-owned enterprises. This calls for a higher share of  wages in value 
added and significantly greater government transfers to households, particularly in rural 
areas where incomes remain depressed. Greater public spending on social infrastructure in 
health, housing and education would not only improve social welfare but also serve to reduce 
relatively high precautionary household savings. These expenditures and income transfers 
can be financed with dividend payments by state-owned enterprises. 
As noted, with its emphasis on investment, the recent policy response in China to 
fallouts from the crisis has done little to address the problem of  underconsumption. It 
will be in a weaker position to give a similar positive response to fallouts from a possible 
second dip in global economic activity that may result from debt difficulties and premature 
fiscal tightening in Europe. Indeed, the longer the adjustment to underconsumption is 
delayed, the greater the vulnerability of  China to instability of  economic activity in its 
main markets in AEs. Instability in the latter economies is likely to persist since the crisis 
response has not eliminated its root causes – namely, excessive indebtedness and rapid 
liquidity expansion. 
5. China’s East Asian suppliers
As noted, the dependence of  growth on exports is greater in East Asian DEEs closely 
participating in the Sinocentric production network than in China. These economies 
have direct exposure to a sustained slowdown in exports to the US and the EU, which 
together account for more than a quarter of  total exports of  some of  these countries. 
They also have a significant indirect exposure through China. Although China has 
become the largest export market for an increasing number of  East Asian DEEs, an 
important part of  Chinese imports from them is used for inputs into exports of  final 
consumer goods to the US and the EU. For every $100 worth of  processing exports of  
China to the US and the EU, about $35 to $40 accrue to East Asian DEEs. 
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As an export hub to the US and the EU, China is a major importer from East Asian 
DEEs, but it is not a major market for them since an important part of  Chinese imports is 
destined to exports rather than used internally. Domestic consumption in China generates 
proportionately much less demand for imports from East Asian DEEs than its exports 
to the US and the EU. Consequently, a shift by China from export-led to consumption-
led growth could result in a significant slowdown of  its manufactured imports from East 
Asian DEEs. Thus, at its current pattern of  domestic spending, the Chinese market is not 
a good substitute for US and EU markets for East Asian DEEs. It cannot replace the US 
even if  it maintained GDP growth of  some 10 percent based on domestic consumption 
rather than exports; its GDP is about one-third of  the US, the share of  households in 
GDP is much smaller, they save a much higher proportion of  disposable income and 
the import content of  household consumption is much lower than in the US. Briefly, a 
China–US rebalancing can make it quite difficult for East Asian DEEs to sustain rapid 
export-led growth. 
 To become a regional locomotive, China would need to raise not only its domestic 
consumption as a proportion of  GDP, but also its import content and, in particular, its 
imports of  final goods from the region. While the share of  such goods in Chinese imports 
from the region has been increasing in recent years (Athukorala 2008; Kim et al. 2009), 
production sharing continues to dominate the intraregional trade. Moreover, even if  
there is a rapid increase in domestic consumption and its import content in China, many 
East Asian DEEs may not be able to expand their exports rapidly because intraregional 
network trade is crucially different from trade in final goods. A shift from the former 
to the latter would call for industrial restructuring and a significant change in the mix 
of  exports. For the same reason a shift to alternative markets may prove to be difficult 
even for smaller countries supplying parts and components to China. The same problem 
would also be encountered in reducing dependence on exports by shifting to domestic 
markets.
Outside China a main reason for excessive reliance on exports is underinvestment. In 
several economies including Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan and Indonesia, 
investment rates have been hovering around 20 percent of  GDP in recent years, less than 
half  the rate in China. In none of  these economies have investment rates recovered to 
the levels attained before the 1997 crisis (Table 7.6).31 Even recognizing that the precrisis 
investment boom was an unsustainable bubble driven by massive capital inflows, recent 
investment rates are too low to generate rapid growth of  either productive capacity or 
effective demand. 
Exceptionally high investment in China and low rates of  investment in the rest of  East 
Asia are related. Generous incentives provided by China to export-oriented FDI play 
an important part in attracting large amounts of  investment from the region. There is a 
need to redistribute aggregate investment within East Asia, from China toward the rest. 
This would be greatly helped if  China were to start focusing on domestic markets and 
dismantling incentives to export-oriented FDI.
Private consumption has also been weak in most East Asian countries. In Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand its share in GDP barely reaches 55 percent − much 
below the rates in more affluent countries such as the US (over 70 percent) and the EU 
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(some 60 percent). Singapore is another underconsumption economy in the region where 
the share of  private consumption in GDP has been declining since the beginning of  the 
decade − it is now below 40 percent while national savings are as high as 53 percent of  
GDP, very much as in China. In some of  these cases too underconsumption has its origin, 
in part, in low and/or declining shares of  wages in income.32 They thus face the dual task 
of  raising both consumption and investment while allowing wages to grow faster. 
F. Conclusions: Policy Issues and Lessons
The global crisis has uncovered systemic and structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities in 
certain areas in the Asian economies examined here and strengths in others. Given that 
global economic conditions are likely to be less favorable than those prevailing before the 
outbreak of  the crisis, it is important to address these weaknesses and vulnerabilities in 
order to be able to return to the rapid and sustained growth enjoyed in the earlier part 
of  the decade.
First, start with strengths. In almost all countries the financial sector has shown a 
significant degree of  resilience to shocks from the subprime crisis. This is in part due 
to various measures taken in the aftermath of  financial crises of  the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Exposure of  the banking system to toxic assets has been limited. This has 
been so also for indigenous institutional investors which were allowed greater freedom 
to invest in foreign securities from the early years of  the decade in order to, inter alia, 
ease the pressure of  the surge in capital inflows and growing current account surpluses 
on currencies. Losses on reserves invested in mortgage-based securities of  government-
sponsored institutions in the US have also been limited. 
Self-insurance provided by large stocks of  international reserves and strong payments 
positions have certainly been a key element in the resilience of  the financial system to 
shocks. These not only prevented any threat to financial stability during the rapid exit 
of  capital in the early months of  the crisis, but also allowed implementation of  strong 
countercyclical policies without facing a payments constraint. 
Korea could not demonstrate the same degree of  resilience to financial shocks as 
other East Asian countries in large part because it had chosen to liberalize the capital 
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table 7.6: Investment in Asia (percentage of  GDP)
Source: ADB ADO (2000; 2008).
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account almost fully in the aftermath of  the 1997 crisis and allowed considerable 
build-up of  external financial fragility in much the same way as it had done in the run-up 
to the 1997 crisis. However, large reserves and a sustainable payments position helped 
avoid financial meltdown. Turkey and Pakistan found themselves with large and growing 
current account deficits on the eve of  the crisis, in large part because they had allowed 
their economies to be driven by easy money from abroad. Both countries had already 
faced difficulties in sustaining growth before the outbreak of  the global crisis. With these 
two exceptions, all countries have had adequate fiscal and balance of  payments space to 
respond to shocks through countercyclical policies. 
A common feature of  the countries examined here is their high degree of  
susceptibility to financial boom–bust cycles and gyrations in equity, property and 
currency markets. This is in large part due to excessive and widespread capital 
account liberalization for both residents and nonresidents. Indeed, in all East Asian 
countries the capital account is much more open and integration into the global 
financial markets is much closer today than was the case on the eve of  the 1997 crisis 
(Akyüz 2008). This crisis has shown the risks of  full integration with markets in global 
financial centers and the need to adopt a strategic approach to financial opening 
and integration. Both the capital account regimes and policies regarding rights of  
establishment of  foreign financial institutions thus need to be reassessed, particularly 
since the initial enthusiasm for tightening the control over major players in global 
financial centers has died away. 
The subprime boom–bust cycle has also entailed gyrations in intraregional exchange 
rates in East Asia. A main reason is the co-existence of  inconsistent exchange rate regimes 
in the region, ranging from hard pegs to various brands of  soft pegs and independent 
floating. This is a potential source of  conflict and not a sound basis for deepening 
regional economic integration. Quite apart from reorienting their integration into the 
international financial system, the region also needs relatively close cooperation over 
exchange rate policies (Akyüz 2009a).
Finally, the crisis has uncovered a high degree of  vulnerability of  East Asian DEEs 
to trade shocks, raising the question of  whether the end of  export-led growth has been 
reached. This echoes the dilemma that Arthur Lewis pointed out in his Nobel Lecture 
three decades ago (Lewis 1980), that dependence of  growth in DEEs on AEs through 
trade would make it difficult to catch up and close the income gap. The solution proposed 
by Lewis was to develop an internal market in DEEs and South–South trade. East Asia 
has ample space in these respects. Traditionally the balance of  payments constraint is 
seen as the main reason for the dependence of  DEEs on exports. But East Asian DEEs 
export not simply to earn foreign exchange for imports needed for capital accumulation 
and utilization of  productive capacity, but to find markets for goods for which there is little 
or no domestic demand because of  imbalances between investment and consumption 
and profits and wages. The solution is not to turn inward, away from world markets, 
but to stop relying on cheap labor and cheap currency and start allowing wages and 
private consumption to grow in tandem with productivity and underpin the expansion 
of  productive capacity by providing growing internal and regional markets in final goods, 
very much as in the first tier newly industrialized economies. 
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notes
 1 First published in TWN Global Economy Series in 2010. The author is grateful to Joseph Lim and Irfan 
Haque for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft, to Xuan Zhang for assistance with the 
data used in this paper, and to Lean Ka-Min of  the Third World Network for editorial assistance. 
 2 For the purpose of  this study East Asian DEEs are defined to include the newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs; Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong), China and members of  the 
Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Asian DEEs include, in addition, South and 
West Asian countries.
 3 On the contribution of  the dot-com bubble to the decline in the personal savings rate in the 
United States, see Maki and Palumbo (2001). 
 4 On the housing boom, see Baker (2008), and on expansion and crisis, see Akyüz (2008).
 5 This lending behavior by China and FEs also created problems for the so-called special 
investment vehicles (SIVs) which operated on the assumption that the yield curve would remain 
steep, borrowing short and lending long. 
 6 Balakrishnan et al. (2009) measure the pass through by means of  a financial stress index that 
combines correlation between banking stocks and overall market stocks, stock market returns 
and volatility, sovereign debt spreads and an exchange market pressure index comprising 
currency depreciations and declines in reserves, and find that transmission of  shocks to 
emerging economies has been very rapid and financial stress experienced has been more severe 
than that during the 1997–98 Asian crisis, particularly in countries with larger stocks of  foreign 
liabilities to AEs.
 7 For a detailed discussion of  the issues taken up in the next two paragraphs, see Akyüz (2008).
 8 This distinction between independent and managed floating is based on the classification 
by the IMF (2008) based on actual, de facto arrangements, not officially announced 
arrangements.
 9 See Xinhuanet (2009) and Forbes (2008). In earlier years, concerned about the growing speculative 
spree, China had adopted measures to stem increases in property prices (ESCAP 2007, 10).
10 On the behavior of  reserves in India and Korea during 2008, see Obstfeld et al. (2009). 
11 This was observed during the Asian crisis in Malaysia where rising unemployment mostly 
affected migrant workers (Akyüz 2006). 
12 According to Ratha and Mohapatra (2009), almost all major destination countries have 
tightened controls against migrant workers. 
13 This section draws on Akyüz (2010b), using more up-to-date data on exports for more recent 
years.
14 These include China, the newly industrialized economies (NIEs; Korea, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong) and the members of  ASEAN.
15 The impact of  export contraction on GDP is estimated using g
x (1 − δ) (X/Y), where gx is the 
growth rate of  exports, δ is the import content of  exports and X/Y is the share of  exports in 
GDP as conventionally measured (Akyüz 2010b). 
16 Agarwala (2009) assumes that in India the import content of  exports is no more than that of  
domestic demand. This gives a figure of  20 percent for 2007–2008. On this assumption, in 
value added terms the share of  exports in GDP would be around 17 percent. 
17 The average sovereign (central government) debt in East Asia is less than 40 percent of  GDP. 
The only major economy with a high debt ratio is the Philippines where it is close to 60 
percent. The average ratio in South Asia is much higher, with Indian central government debt 
exceeding 60 percent of  GDP and general government debt 80 percent.
18 On fiscal stimulus packages, see United Nations (2010), Khatiwada (2009), ESCAP (2009 and 
2010), ADB ADO (2010), IMF WEO (October 2009) and IMF REOAP (October 2009).
19 Difficulties in identifying fiscal stimulus measures are revealed by widely different figures given 
by different international organizations for some East Asian countries; cf. United Nations 
(2010, table I.4), ADB ADO (2010, Figure 2.4.1) and ESCAP (2009, table 1). 
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20 Khatiwada (2009) reaches the same conclusion on the adequacy of  fiscal measures for a sample 
of  32 countries including the G20 major economies where stimulus spending in 2009 was 
1.7 percent of  GDP as compared to the 2 percent recommended by the IMF.
21 For a further discussion of  the issues taken up in this section, see Akyüz (2010a).
22 This was broadly the plan promoted by the IMF in its multilateral consultations to reduce global 
imbalances on the eve of  the crisis. Although the crisis has resulted in sizeable changes in external 
positions and savings patterns, the Fund recognizes that imbalances are not a problem of  the past 
and there is still a need to remove global imbalances (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2009).
23 On US consumer adjustment in the coming years, see Glick and Lansing (2009).
24 Achieving this target would require, inter alia, an active industrial policy to redirect investment 
in export sectors. For a discussion of  the main ingredients of  the NEI, see Akyüz (2010a).
25 According to the IMF (WEO October 2009), after a sharp decline during 2008–2009, potential 
output growth will pick up only slowly to about 2 percent over the medium term; see also IMF 
(2010).
26 On the possible impact of  dollar carry trade on assets and currencies, see Pineda et al. (2010). 
27 Agarwala (2009) estimates that the contribution of  exports to GDP growth during 2003–2008 
in India was at least 26 percent. With spillovers to domestic consumption, this figure is raised to 
31 percent. 
28 This and the following sections draw on Akyüz (2010b) which contains further analysis and 
evidence on the issues discussed here.
29 On household and corporate savings in early industrializers, see Akyüz and Gore (1996) and 
UNCTAD TDR (1997, table 44). On savings in China and India, see Prasad (2009). See also 
Anderson (2007) for a discussion of  household and corporate savings in China.
30 On the behavior of  labor productivity, profits and wages and consumption, see Kim and Kuijs 
(2007), WB CQU (August 2005, August 2006 and February 2007), Kuijs (2005), Yu (2007), and 
Aziz and Dunaway (2007). 
31 See Akyüz (2009a). Singapore experienced a property boom in 2007 which took investment to 
some 30 percent of  GDP (Lim and Jaya 2010). 
32 This is most clearly the case in Singapore − see Lim and Jaya (2010) who reiterate that Singapore 
has a First World per capita income level but a Third World income distribution profile. 
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THE STAGGERING RISE  
OF THE SOUTH?1
A. Introduction and Summary
In the early days of  the global economic crisis, growth in developing and emerging 
economies (DEEs) was widely expected to be decoupled from the difficulties facing 
advanced economies (AEs). Strong growth that many DEEs had been enjoying since 
the early years of  the millennium was expected to continue with some moderation and 
prevent AEs and the world economy from falling into recession. In the event, however, 
growth in DEEs slowed considerably in 2009 as a result of  contraction of  exports and 
financial contagion. AEs fell into recession and world income declined for the first time 
in several decades.
Nevertheless DEEs recovered rapidly, with many emerging economies restoring 
growth rates close to those enjoyed before the crisis. By contrast, growth in the US 
has been anaemic and erratic, and deepened debt difficulties and financial fragility in 
the eurozone have raised the spectre of  a second dip. This two-track world economy, 
the widening growth gap between the South and the North, has resuscitated the 
decoupling hypothesis that growth dynamics of  emerging economies have gained 
considerable autonomy. While it is generally recognized that it may take several years 
for AEs to overcome their debt overhang and return to stable and rigorous growth, 
it is also believed that the rise of  the South will generally continue unabated in the 
coming years and income levels in several DEEs will converge rapidly to those in 
early industrializers. Thus, the global crisis is seen as a turning point in the economic 
balance of  power between the North and the South, with many emerging economies 
such as China, India and Brazil gaining a greater presence and role in the world 
economy.  
Strictly speaking, decoupling means desynchronization of  business cycles. This is not 
really consistent with increased global integration of  markets or “globalization.” Indeed, 
evidence shows that the deviations of  economic activity from underlying trends continue 
to be highly correlated between DEEs and AEs. This was also evident during the post-
Lehman downturn when a large majority of  DEEs experienced a significant slowdown 
despite strong countercyclical policy responses.2 
There is, however, a more important question of  whether trend growth in the 
developing world has shifted up relative to that in AEs. Even though business cycles 
are synchronized, a significant rise in trend growth in DEEs could still result in a rapid 
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increase in living standards and convergence to income levels of  AEs. This was basically 
the issue raised by Arthur Lewis in his Nobel Lecture: 
For the past hundred years the rate of  growth of  output in the developing world 
has depended on the rate of  growth of  output in the developed world. When the 
developed grow fast, the developing grow fast, and when the developed slow down, 
the developing slow down. Is this linkage inevitable? More specifically, the world has 
just gone through two decades of  unprecedented growth, with world trade growing 
twice as fast as ever before. […] During these prosperous decades, the less developed 
countries (LDCs) have demonstrated their capacity to increase their total output at 
6 percent per annum, and have indeed adopted 6 percent as the minimum average 
target for LDCs as a whole. But what is to happen if  the more developed countries 
(MDCs) return to their former growth rates, and raise their trade at only 4 percent 
per annum: is it inevitable that the growth of  the LDCs will also fall significantly 
below their target? (Lewis 1980, 555).  
Lewis thus saw trade as the main link between growth in the South and the North. 
His main concern was that since the growth gap between the two was small, some 2 
percentage points, a significant deceleration in AEs and hence in world trade would 
mean that the South would not be able to make significant progress in development. He 
then went on to propose that DEEs should develop internal and regional markets to gain 
greater autonomy. 
Growth in the South no doubt shows a rapid shift in the new millennium compared to 
previous decades, including even the postwar golden age which Lewis was referring to. The 
central question in this paper is thus whether and to what extent this rapid rise of  the South 
constitutes a shift in the trend growth of  DEEs relative to AEs. This calls for an explanation 
of  the sudden surge of  growth in the South, to identify the factors and conditions driving 
it and to assess whether they can be sustained over the longer term. In making such an 
assessment, discussions here will focus on major emerging economies which constitute a 
large part of  the developing world both in population and income, and particularly on 
China because of  its strong impact on other DEEs. However, many of  the conclusions also 
apply to smaller economies, exporters of  both manufactures and commodities. 
A correct assessment of  the respective roles played by domestic and external factors 
in the acceleration of  growth in DEEs is necessary in order to avoid complacency 
and reduce exposure to shocks. In this respect the main conclusion here is that while 
there have been significant improvements in economic management in DEEs after the 
recurrent crises of  the 1990s and early 2000s and these may have somewhat raised the 
trend growth in some, the exceptionally favorable international economic conditions 
made a major and in many cases much greater contribution to the general acceleration 
of  growth in the South. These conditions were shaped mainly by policies in AEs. The 
only emerging economy which has had a major impact on global conditions, notably on 
commodity prices and hence on commodity exporting countries, is China, but its own 
growth depends very much on exports to AEs because of  its development strategy and 
underlying structural characteristics. 
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Until the outbreak of  the global crisis, policies in AEs created, directly or indirectly, 
a favorable global environment for DEEs in trade and investment, capital flows and 
commodity prices. But the credit, consumption and property bubbles resulting from the 
same policies led to financial fragility and global imbalances which culminated in the 
Great Recession. The crisis brought to an end the expansion of  markets in the North, 
the boom in commodity prices and capital flows to DEEs. However, sharp cuts in interest 
rates and quantitative easing in response to the crisis in AEs has restored the surge in 
capital flows to DEEs. This, together with a strong countercyclical policy response in 
major emerging economies, notably in China, has restored growth in the South and 
reversed the downturn in commodity prices. Consequently, growth in major emerging 
economies, including in export-oriented economies, has increasingly come to depend on 
domestic demand and this is reflected by a sharp reduction in current account surpluses 
in East Asia and growing deficits elsewhere.
The pace and pattern of  domestic-demand-driven growth that emerging economies 
have been enjoying since 2009 cannot be sustained. First, in deficit countries such growth 
depends on continued and, in fact, increased inflows of  capital, but the conditions driving 
the recent surge in capital inflows cannot be expected to last forever. There are already 
strong signs of  growing nervousness among international investors and lenders, creating 
heightened instability in capital flows to emerging economies and asset and currency 
markets. Second, the major growth pole in the South, China, cannot keep on creating 
investment bubbles in order to fill the demand gap triggered by the slowdown of  its 
exports to AEs, as it has done since the outbreak of  the crisis. Furthermore, even if  AEs 
can return to rigorous and sustained growth, it would not be possible for China to go 
back to the precrisis pattern of  growth, rapidly increasing its penetration of  markets of  
AEs, with the US acting again as a global locomotive and running growing deficits and 
debt. Such a process is not sustainable and could seriously destabilize the international 
trading and monetary systems.
Emerging economies such as BRICS and others need to reconsider their development 
strategies in order to gain considerable autonomy in growth and become major players in 
the global economy, rather than remaining as markets for Goldman Sachs and the like. First, 
starting with China, the East Asian surplus economies need to reduce their dependence on 
markets in AEs by promoting national and regional markets. They need to expand domestic 
consumption rapidly and this calls for a significant increase in the share of  household income 
in GDP. China has already become a major driver of  growth in commodity-rich economies 
because of  its growing demand for commodities. It can also become an important market 
for manufactures from other DEEs provided that it shifts from export-led to consumption-
led growth and increases the import content of  its consumption.
Second, deficit DEEs need to reduce their dependence on foreign capital. Most of  
them also need to increase investment significantly. The majority of  these countries are 
commodity exporters and the two key determinants of  their economic performance, 
capital flows and commodity prices, are largely beyond their control. Reducing 
vulnerability on both fronts crucially depends on their progress in industrialization. 
This is also true for deficit countries relying on export of  services and remittances, 
such as India.
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B. the Growth record
At the end of  the 1990s and the early 2000s, many economies in the developing world 
were in disarray. East Asia was still recovering from the 1997 crisis while a host of  other 
emerging economies were falling into payments and financial crises one after another; 
Brazil and Russia in 1998, Turkey 2000–2001 and Argentina 2001–2002. The prospects 
for the global economy were dimmed by the bursting of  the dot-com bubble in the US at 
the beginning of  the decade, coming on top of  prolonged deflation in Japan and uneven 
growth in the EU.
For the entire period from 1990 to 2002, the average growth in DEEs exceeded 
the average growth in AEs by just over 1 percentage point and in per capita terms 
there was hardly any income convergence. The picture was even worse in the 1980s 
when a large number of  DEEs were suffering from severe payments difficulties 
caused by a debt overhang and sharp declines in commodity prices. Until the new 
millennium the only major economy in the South that was able to close the income 
gap with AEs by leaps and bounds was China, with an average growth rate close 
to 10 percent during 1990–2002 compared to less than 4 percent in the rest of  the 
developing world (Table 8.1). 
All these changed in the new millennium. From 2002 until the outbreak of  the subprime 
crisis, the growth difference between the DEEs and AEs shot up to 5 percentage points. 
This was not because of  deceleration in AEs, but an unprecedented acceleration in DEEs 
where the average growth rate almost doubled from the 1990s. The global crisis led to 
a loss of  momentum in DEEs during 2008–2009, but their growth difference with AEs 
widened further because of  a severe recession in the latter countries. Despite subsequent 
recovery in AEs, growth in DEEs has continued to be faster by about 4 percentage points 
in 2010–2011 – a margin still considerably larger than those during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Taking the whole decade from 2002 until 2012, the average growth in DEEs exceeds 
the average growth in AEs by more than 5 percent per annum. This is unprecedented. 
As noted, during the postwar golden age DEEs also grew at a very fast pace, by some 6 
percent per annum, but growth in AEs was also high, with the gap being no more than a 
couple of  percentage points.3 
However, there has been considerable diversity in the pace of  acceleration of  growth 
among DEEs. During precrisis years acceleration was faster in Africa than the two other 
main regions even though the African growth rate remained below that of  Asia. By 
contrast, the Western Hemisphere saw only a modest rise in average growth compared 
to the 1990s. Among analytical groups, fuel exporters saw faster acceleration than either 
the exporters of  nonfuel commodities or manufactures – from just over 1 percent in the 
1990s to 7.5 percent between 2003 and 2008. Among the major emerging economies, 
Russia, Argentina, Turkey, India and South Africa enjoyed much faster acceleration than 
the others. In the first three countries this was due to rapid recoveries from severe crises 
which had caused large output losses at the end of  the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
The acceleration of  growth in DEEs since the beginning of  the new millennium is 
not due to China. Indeed, growth in China during the 1990s was almost as fast as that in 
the 2000s.4 However, it is notable that in the 1990s China was not widely perceived as an 
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emerging economic power capable of  challenging the US dominance until it had started 
running growing trade surpluses with the US and accumulating large dollar reserves.
C. Global Economic Conditions
1. International trade and investment
The new millennium witnessed a rapid growth in world trade which increased, in 
nominal dollars, by 2.5 times by 2008, with the average annual growth in total exports 
reaching twice the rate of  growth of  world output. This period also saw a significant 
increase in the share of  DEEs in world trade, rapid expansion of  South–South trade and 
growing global imbalances. The current accounts of  AEs as a whole, which had already 
turned into red at the end of  the 1990s, constantly deteriorated until the outbreak of  the 
crisis. This was entirely due to mounting deficits of  the US and to a lesser extent the UK, 
as the eurozone was broadly in balance, and Japan and the remaining AEs were running 
surpluses. This was reflected in growing surpluses of  DEEs, which came to exceed $600 





2008 2009 2010 2011
All AEs 2.7 2.7 0.1 –3.5 3.0 1.6
All DEEs 3.9 7.6 6.1 2.7 7.4 6.2
Developing Asia 7.0 9.6 7.9 7.0 9.5 7.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.6 4.8 4.2 –1.5 6.2 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.9 6.3 5.6 2.8 5.3 5.1
Selected DEEs: 
Argentina 1.9 8.8 6.8 0.9 9.2 8.9
Brazil 1.9 4.0 5.2 –0.3 7.5 2.7
China 9.6 11.6 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.2
India 5.4 8.6 6.9 5.9 10.1 6.8
Indonesia 4.2 5.5 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5
Mexico 3.0 3.4 1.2 –6.0 5.6 3.9
Russia –0.9 7.5 5.2 –7.8 4.3 4.3
South Africa 1.9 4.8 3.6 –1.5 2.9 3.1
Turkey 3.5 6.9 0.7 –4.8 9.2 8.5
Malaysia 6.6 5.9 4.8 –1.5 7.2 5.1
Korea 6.6 4.3 2.3 0.3 6.3 3.6
Thailand 4.8 5.6 2.6 –2.3 7.8 0.1
table 8.1: Real GDP growth in selected economies (annual percentages of  constant price)
Source: IMF WEO (October 2012).
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the rest to Fuel Exporters (FEs). This, together with large inflows of  capital, resulted in 
an unprecedented rise in the international reserves of  DEEs, which reached $5 trillion in 
2007 despite substantially increased capital outflows (Chart 8.1).5
The rapid expansion of  exports and growing current account surpluses of  DEEs owe 
a great deal to US spending extravaganza. The US private savings had already began to 
fall and current account deficits to rise in the mid-1990s largely because of  a strong wealth 
effect of  the dot-com equity market bubble on private consumption and a boom in the 
property market. The spending spree continued with greater force in the 2000s when the Fed 
responded to the bursting of  the dot-com bubble by bringing down policy rates to historical 
lows for fear of  asset deflation and recession, and new legislation introduced in the late 1990s 
allowed greater room for banks to expand high-risk lending for property. Capital gains from 
rising house prices in the 2000s sustained the spending boom as homeowners increasingly 
extracted equity to finance consumption. As a result, household savings, which formed some 
6 percent of  GDP in the early 1990s, started to fall rapidly and disappeared altogether on 
the eve of  the 2008 crisis. This was mirrored by growing external deficits − the US current 
account was broadly balanced in the early 1990s, but it registered a deficit of  over 6 percent 
in 2007. Indeed the evidence provided by research in New York Fed shows a strikingly strong 
positive correlation between house price appreciations and current account deficits not only 
in the US but also in other countries that have subsequently experienced the highest degree 
of  financial turmoil (Ferrero 2012).
In Europe, the UK went through a similar property bubble, but was running a relatively 
small current account deficit. In the eurozone, deficits in peripheral countries were rising 
not only vis-à-vis the core economies, notably Germany, but also the rest of  the world, 
reaching on average 7 percent of  GDP in Spain and 9 percent in Portugal and Greece. 
These deficits resulted from loss of  competitiveness due to wage settlements in excess of  
productivity increases in conditions of  rising private consumption and property spending. 
The participation of  these countries in the European Monetary Union facilitated the 
financing of  these deficits by significantly lowering the risk premium. Banks in Germany, 
France and elsewhere in Europe were more than willing to pump in funds to finance 
these deficits – a process which culminated in the eurozone crisis, in much the same way 
as the boom–bust cycles in lending to several emerging economies in the past. Germany 
pursued a policy of  wage deflation – competitive disinflation – running surpluses against 
most other eurozone members and the rest of  the world, including the US. Japan was in a 
similar situation, relying for growth on exports and generating current account surpluses 
which reached 5 percent of  GDP in 2007. Thus, the US was acting as a locomotive not 
only to export-led East Asian DEEs but also to Japan and Germany (Akyüz 2011b). 
The increased outsourcing to the Sinocentric production network by transnational 
corporations from AEs has made a significant contribution to growing exports from East 
Asia. China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 significantly accelerated this 
process by granting that country a Permanent Normal Trade Relations status in the 
US and eliminating discriminatory, WTO-inconsistent measures against its exports. This 
removed the uncertainties regarding the issuance of  the yearly waiver by the US president, 
and played a central role in the rapid increase in FDI to China, which doubled the levels 
of  the late 1990s to reach $80 billion in 2007. Thus, China and other East Asian DEEs 
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participating in the Sinocentric production network benefited not only from growing 
exports to AEs, but also from investment and technology brought in by transnational 
corporations to expand exportables.6 Until the global crisis, Chinese exports to AEs and 
FDI inflows reinforced each other. After 2008, when exports slowed down considerably, 
FDI inflows to Chinese manufacturing remained sluggish, even though China was able 
to restore growth on the basis of  expansion of  domestic demand.7 
2. Capital flows and remittances
The new millennium witnessed the beginning of  the third postwar boom in capital flows 
to DEEs, mainly as a result of  exceptionally low interest rates and rapid expansion of  
liquidity in AEs, including the US, the EU and Japan.8 Both net flows and net inflows 
to DEEs peaked in 2007 before the outbreak of  the subprime debacle (Charts 8.1 
and 8.2). The surge in capital inflows was accompanied by rapidly narrowing spreads 
on emerging market debt, brought about by significantly improved risk appetite. 
This, together with low interest rates in AEs, resulted in a sharp decline in the cost of  
external financing for DEEs. Most DEEs enjoyed the increased risk appetite and shared 
in the boom in capital inflows irrespective of  their underlying fundamentals.
Chart 8.1: Balances of  payments in DEEs
Source: IMF, WEO database. BOP databases. 
notes: A minus sign indicates an increase. 
Capital flows comprise direct investment, portfolio investment and other official and private financial 
flows, exclude changes in reserves.
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Although capital flows among DEEs have also been increasing rapidly and China has 
become a major investor in some resource rich DEEs, a very large proportion of  capital 
came to DEEs from lenders and investors in AEs. However, China contributed to the 
expansion of  capital inflows to DEEs by investing its twin surpluses in current and capital 
accounts in reserves, mostly in dollars.9 Large acquisitions of  US Treasuries by China and 
FEs helped to keep long-term rates relatively low even as the US Fed started to raise short-
term rates. Thus, while growing US external deficits were being financed “officially” there 
was plenty of  highly leveraged private money searching for yield in DEEs. A mutually 
reinforcing process emerged between private flows to DEEs and official flows to the US – 
the former were translated into reserves of  DEEs and constituted an important part of  
official flows to the US, and supported lower rates there and private flows to DEEs.
Private capital inflows to DEEs held up initially during the subprime debacle despite 
growing strains in credit and asset markets in the US and Europe. However, with the 
collapse of  a number of  leading financial institutions in the US, notably the Lehman 
Brothers, the boom came to a halt in the second half  of  2008. The rapidly growing 
volatility in financial markets led to an extreme and generalized risk aversion, pushing 
up spreads on emerging market debt and triggering a flight to safety into US Treasuries 
and appreciation of  the dollar vis-à-vis other major currencies, even though the US was 
the epicenter of  the crisis.
However, the contraction of  private capital inflows to DEEs was short-lived. They 
started to recover in the first half  of  2009, driven by historically low interest rates and 
rapid expansion of  liquidity in major AEs brought about by monetary policy response 
to the crisis as well as better growth performance in DEEs and a shift in risk perceptions 
against AEs. In the second half  of  2011, a generalized increase in risk aversion led to the 
exit of  capital from several DEEs (IMF WEO 2012 January, update), but according to the 
latest available projections by the IMF (WEO September 2011), both net private inflows 
and net flows will continue to remain strong in 2012, though still below the 2007 peaks.
DEEs also enjoyed a rapid growth of  workers remittances, at an average annual rate 
of  some 20 percent between 2002 and 2008, rising from less than $100 billion at the 
beginning of  the decade to more than $320 billion in 2008, exceeding all categories of  
capital inflows except FDI (Chart 8.3). Much of  these also came from AEs, with Europe 
accounting for almost half  of  total inflows followed by the US. Some major emerging 
economies were among the top receivers, including India, China, Mexico and Indonesia. 
In 2007 remittances amounted to 1–1.5 percent of  GDP in China and Indonesia, around 
3 percent in India and Mexico, over 4 percent in Pakistan and 11 percent in the Philippines. 
In many of  these countries they led to a significant improvement in the current account, 
reducing deficits and even generating surpluses despite large trade deficits. 
With the outbreak of  the crisis remittances registered a moderate decline in 2009. 
However, the subsequent recovery has been weak; during 2010–11 they are estimated 
to have grown by less than half  of  the rate observed during precrisis years. According 
to recent projections by the World Bank (Mohapatra et al. 2011) they would grow by 
7–8 percent per annum in the coming years, subject to serious downside risks associated 
with persistent unemployment in Europe and the US and hardening political attitudes 
toward new migration.
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Chart 8.2: Net private capital flows to developing countries, 2000–2010
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.





































With rapid liquidity expansion and acceleration of  growth in the global economy, 
commodity prices started to rise in 2003, gaining further momentum in 2006 
(Chart 8.4). The factors driving the boom included a strong pace of  activity in DEEs, 
notably in China, where commodity intensity of  growth is high, low initial stocks, weak 
302 LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
supply response and the relatively weak dollar. These markets also became increasingly 
financialized after the beginning of  the decade as financial investors sought to diversify 
into commodity-linked assets and low interest rates led to a search for yield in 
commodity markets (UNCTAD TDR 2011). In the case of  food, diversion to biofuels 
and rising cost of  fertilizers and transport due to high oil prices also played a role.
Despite growing financial strains in the US, commodity prices continued to increase 
before they made a sharp downturn in August 2008. This boom–bust cycle in commodity 
prices in the middle of  the subprime crisis was largely due to shifts in market sentiments 
regarding the future course of  prices. Initially, the subprime crisis was seen as a hiccup 
and the downturn in economic activity was expected to be short-lived, including by the 
IMF (WEO July 2008), followed by a rapid and robust recovery. However, with mounting 
financial difficulties in the US and the collapse of  the Lehman Brothers, sentiments 
turned sour and growth prospects were dampened. Investors pulled out large amounts 
of  money from oil and non-oil futures, more or less at the same time as capital flows to 
DEEs were reversed and the dollar started to strengthen. By the end of  October 2008, 
food was 27 percent and oil 45 percent below their peaks.
Again the downturn in commodity prices was short-lived and the upturn in 2009 
coincided with the recovery of  capital flows to DEEs and the decline of  the dollar. After 
falling in late 2008 and early 2009, index trading also started to gain momentum as 
commodity prices turned up in spring 2009 as a result of  increased demand from DEEs, 
notably China, in conditions of  continued expansion of  international liquidity and 
historically low interest rates. Investment in commodities recovered rapidly while the 
number of  exchange traded options and futures rose to unprecedented levels (BIS 2010). 
Despite recent weakening of  markets for metals and minerals and several agricultural 
commodities, prices remain significantly above the levels of  the early 2000s.
d. Impact on Macroeconomic Balances in dEEs
The past ten years have witnessed considerable improvements in macroeconomic 
conditions in DEEs. Alongside the acceleration of  growth, fiscal and payments deficits 
have declined considerably and inflation has been brought under control in a large 
majority of  countries. Improvements in economic management and institutions, following 
a number of  policy errors resulting from adherence to the Washington Consensus, have 
no doubt played an important role in bringing these about. However, extremely favorable 
global conditions have also made a major contribution and indeed played a more crucial 
part in many countries. 
DEEs have generally manifested greater fiscal discipline in recent years. Average 
central government deficits were hovering around 3.5 percent of  GDP at the beginning 
of  the 2000s (IMF WEO October 2007). By 2006–2007 they came down to around 
0.5 percent. During the same period, the average external debt of  DEEs declined from 
around 40 percent of  GDP to 25 percent. Total public debt as a proportion of  GDP 
also declined considerably in many highly indebted emerging economies, particularly on 
account of  rapidly falling external debt. In the seven largest Latin American economies, 
the public debt fell, on average, from over 50 percent of  GDP in the early 2000s to 
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35 percent in 2007 while the share of  the foreign currency debt fell from some 60 percent 
to less than 40 percent in the same period (IDB 2008). Securing the conditions for overall 
debt sustainability has become an overriding objective in fiscal management, even 
though it has occasionally resulted in highly regressive tax regimes relying increasingly 
on indirect taxes.10
Considerable progress has also been made in bringing inflation under control since 
the beginning of  the decade. Average consumer inflation in DEEs was close to 30 percent 
per annum throughout the 1990s. It came down to single digit levels, just over 6 percent 
during 2003–2007. This is largely because of  sharp declines in inflation in Latin America 
toward the levels of  more stable Asian economies.
 Drawing on the lessons from past crises, DEEs have generally been more successful in 
managing exchange rates, capital flows and balance of  payments, even though there are 
notable exceptions, including many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and 
South Africa – those more seriously affected by the 2008–2009 crisis. Almost all emerging 
economies moved away from fixed currency pegs which had proved highly damaging 
by encouraging boom–bust cycles in capital flows, exchange rates and current account 
balances, with severe impact on employment and growth. Many DEEs, particularly 
in Asia, followed various shades of  managed floating, heavily intervening in currency 
markets in pursuit of  strong payments and reserve positions. Even though several DEEs, 
notably in Latin America, have adopted inflation targeting and left their currencies 
largely to markets, they have nevertheless paid greater attention to their current account 
positions and the adequacy of  reserves in meeting short-term external obligations. The 
resilience of  domestic financial institutions and markets to shocks has also been improved 
through tighter prudential regulations and supervision, and significantly increased 
Chart 8.4: Commodity prices and commodity imports of  China, 2000–2010
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capitalization. All these have been reflected in significantly improved credit ratings of  
major emerging economies.
However, improvements in macroeconomic balances in DEEs have not been 
independent of  the favorable international economic environment. In Latin 
America, an important part of  the decline in budget deficits after 2002 was due to 
rising commodity prices, with revenues from commodity taxes, profits and loyalties 
accounting for as much as 50 percent of  the total increase in the fiscal revenue ratio 
in some countries (Cornia et al. 2011). Indeed, the fiscal record was less impressive 
in terms of  structural balances since several governments in the region pursued 
procyclical expansion in spending. According to the IMF (REO November 2007) 
during 2006–2007 structural primary (noninterest) balances in the region were 
weaker than actual primary balances while the IDB (2008) finds that only Chile was 
in structural fiscal surplus. Similarly, an ECLAC report (Jiménez and Gómez-Sabaini, 
2009) argued that much of  the improvement in the fiscal situation after 2002 was the 
result of  the steady increase in commodity prices and warned that a sharp decline in 
these prices could seriously jeopardize the fiscal achievements. Indeed, the fiscal space 
gained during the subprime expansion was largely lost with the reversal of  commodity 
prices in 2008–2009, when budgets went into deficits in the region by some 3 percent 
of  GDP (ECLAC 2010).
The situation is much the same for current account balances in commodity exporters 
in Latin America and Africa. At the end of  the 1990s and early 2000s current accounts 
in these regions registered deficits in the order of  3–4 percent of  GDP. By 2007, both 
regions had moved to a surplus, at a rate of  some 1 percent of  GDP in Latin America 
and over 3 percent in Africa. Again, an important reason was the increase in oil and non-
oil commodity prices, which resulted in a 50 percent improvement in the terms of  trade 
in Latin America between 2002 and 2006. It is estimated that without terms of  trade 
gains from commodity price increases, the current account of  the region would have 
shown a deficit of  about 4 percent of  GDP, more or less at the same rate as that observed 
before the Tequila crisis (Calvo and Talvi 2007; Ocampo 2007). Indeed, external deficits 
started to grow after 2008 with the decline in commodity prices and increased reliance 
on domestic demand for growth. 
In several cases, success in bringing inflation under control also owes a greater deal 
to favorable international financial conditions and the generalized surge in capital flows. 
Even though fixed pegs were abandoned and floating was adopted along with inflation 
targeting, the exchange rate operated as an anchor for inflationary expectations, as net 
capital flows exceeded current account deficits and led to nominal appreciations. In 
countries such as Brazil and Turkey high interest rates did not bring inflation under control 
by restricting credit expansion and domestic spending – in both cases credits expanded 
by 20–30 percent per annum and growth was driven by consumer spending. Rather, they 
accelerated capital inflows, particularly carry trade, resulting in significant appreciations of  
the nominal exchange rate. In such cases currency appreciations also played an important 
part in reducing the ratio of  foreign currency denominated debt to GDP.
Finally and more importantly, not all DEEs enjoying the acceleration of  growth in the 
2000s have seen commensurate improvements in domestic savings, capital accumulation 
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or productivity – a factor which raises considerable doubt about the sustainability of  
strong growth. The average savings rate in middle income countries during 2000–2008 
was lower than the rate in the 1990s while the record on investment and productivity was 
mixed (World Bank 2011).
Among the major emerging economies, apart from China, only India has registered 
large increases in domestic savings and investment alongside rapid growth (Table 8.2). 
However, despite reforms designed to promote manufacturing, almost three-quarters 
of  Indian growth in the 2000s came from services while the share of  manufacturing 
has stagnated at around 15 percent of  GDP, more or less the same level as in the 
early 1990s. In manufacturing and services the well-performing export sectors are 
capital- or skill-intensive rather than labor-intensive, manifesting a vent-for-surplus 
style expansion based on the mobilization of  a backlog of  underutilized skills (Gupta 
et al. 2008). Infrastructure bottlenecks top the list of  impediments to manufacturing 
development. Unless these are removed and manufacturing starts expanding rapidly, 
the Indian resurgence may well remain a one-off  miracle of  the kind seen in some 
countries in past decades, such as Brazil in the late 1960s and the early 1970s and 
Turkey in the 1980s.
In Latin America the average savings rate has shown a moderate increase, largely on 
account of  improvements in fiscal balances resulting from the commodity bonanza.  In 
Argentina the increase is sizeable but in Brazil the savings rate has continued to remain 
at too low a level to provide a reliable basis for capital accumulation needed for rigorous 
and sustained growth. In Turkey, despite rapid growth and improvements in public 
savings, domestic savings declined substantially and an important part of  investment was 
financed by capital inflows as the savings gap reached almost 6 percent of  GDP during 
the boom years of  2006–2007 (Uygur 2011).
Again there is considerable diversity in the pace of  capital accumulation among the 
DEEs which enjoyed a significant acceleration of  growth in the 2000s. In Latin America 
private investment rose as a share of  GDP, but remained well below the levels in other 
regions (IMF REO October 2008). As noted by IDB (2008), Latin American private 
investment and productivity during the post-2002 expansion did not perform significantly 
better than during the previous expansion of  the 1990s even though external conditions 
were exceptionally more favorable – with world growth stronger by 1.4 percentage 
points, commodity prices higher by 76 percent and emerging market bond spreads lower 
by some 400 basis points. In Brazil, at less than 20 percent of  GDP, investment has 
remained too low to provide a rapid increase in productive capacity. High real interest 
rates, extremely low public investment as well as the long-standing problem of  lack of  a 
strong animal spirit among the entrepreneurial class have been major factors.11 Low rates 
of  investment in Brazil, as well as some other DEEs in the region, is a major reason why 
Latin America continues to have a poor record in productivity compared to East Asia 
(Palma 2011). The average total factor productivity growth in the seven largest Latin 
American countries during 2003–2006 is found to have been lower than that during the 
1991–94 expansion (IDB 2008). 
In several economies in East Asia, including Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, 
Taiwan (China) and Indonesia, investment rates have been hovering around 20 percent 
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of  GDP in recent years, less than half  the rate in China. Large current account 
surpluses in some of  these economies reflect low rates of  domestic investment rather 
than exceptionally high domestic savings rates. For instance, in recent years savings rates 
have been quite similar in India and Malaysia, but while the current account in India 
has been in balance or deficit, Malaysia has had a surplus reaching double digit figures 
as a percentage of  GDP. In none of  these East Asian economies have investment rates 
recovered the levels attained before the 1997 crisis.12 Even recognizing that the precrisis 
investment booms were unsustainable bubbles driven by massive capital inflows, recent 
investment rates have been too low to produce rapid and sustained growth of  the kind 
many of  these economies had enjoyed during the earlier phases of  their industrialization, 
creating concerns that some of  them run the risk of  getting caught in a middle income 
trap (Radhi and Zeufack 2009).
E. Impact on Growth in dEEs
The exceptionally favorable global economic conditions prevailing before the outbreak 
of  the crisis not only improved internal and external balances and stability in DEEs, but 
also contributed to the expansion of  economic activity, directly or indirectly. China and 
other export-oriented East Asian DEEs benefited significantly from credit, consumption 
and property bubbles created by speculative lending and investment in the US and 
Europe, growing rapidly based on exports to these markets, running increasing current 
account surpluses and accumulating large amounts of  reserves.  In most DEEs in Latin 
Year 2000 2002 2007 2010
Savings I CA Savings I CA Savings I CA Savings I CA
Argentina 13.0 17.5 –3.1 20.5 10.8 8.5 26.6 24.1 2.4 22.8 24.4 0.8
Brazil 14.5 18.3 –3.8 14.7 16.2 –1.5 18.4 18.3 0.1 17.0 19.3 –2.3
China 36.8 35.1 1.7 40.3 37.9 2.4 51.9 41.7 10.1 53.4 48.2 5.2
India 23.3 24.3 –1.0 25.5 24.1 1.4 36.7 37.4 –0.7 34.2 36.8 –2.6
Indonesia 27.1 22.2 4.8 25.4 21.4 4.0 27.3 24.9 2.4 33.3 32.5 0.8
Korea 33.3 30.6 2.8 30.5 29.2 1.3 31.5 29.4 2.1 31.9 29.2 2.8
Malaysia 35.9 26.9 9.0 32.7 24.8 8.0 37.5 21.6 15.9 32.9 21.4 11.5
Mexico 22.8 25.5 –2.8 21.5 23.5 –2.0 25.7 26.5 –0.9 24.4 25.0 –0.5
Russia 36.7 18.7 18.0 28.5 20.0 8.4 31.3 25.4 5.9 25.1 20.3 4.8
South Africa 15.6 15.7 –0.1 16.7 15.9 0.8 14.3 21.2 –7.0 16.5 19.3 –2.8
Thailand 30.4 22.8 7.6 27.5 23.8 3.7 32.8 26.4 6.3 30.6 25.9 4.6
Turkey 17.0 20.8 –3.7 17.3 17.6 –0.3 15.2 21.1 –5.9 13.6 20.1 –6.6
table 8.2: Gross national savings, investments and current accounts in selected DEEs 
(percentage of  GDP)
Source: IMF WEO (September 2011). 
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America and Africa, the combination of  increasing commodity prices and declining cost 
of  external financing significantly reduced the payments deficits and allowed to expand 
domestic demand and accelerate growth. In oil-importing emerging economies such as 
India and Turkey, capital inflows were more than sufficient to meet the deficits created by 
oil price shocks, again allowing rapid growth based primarily on domestic demand. India 
additionally enjoyed a rapid growth in workers’ remittances which reached 3.3 percent 
of  GDP in 2007. 
Low interest rates in AEs and the surge in capital inflows also allowed most emerging 
economies to pursue expansionary monetary policies and maintain historically low 
interest rates, stimulating domestic demand. Large inflows of  capital in excess of  current 
account needs in deficit countries or coming on top of  current account surpluses in 
surplus countries, contributed to expansion by creating asset bubbles.  Equity prices rose 
sharply between 2002 and 2007 both in dollar and local currency terms. The increase 
was particularly strong in Brazil, China, India and Turkey, and many of  these also 
experienced credit and property booms both due to increased entry of  nonresidents 
to domestic asset markets and the impact of  capital inflows on domestic monetary 
conditions (Akyüz 2010). In several countries, growing workers’ remittances from abroad 
were also translated into domestic consumption, thereby adding to demand, output and 
employment.
It is not always easy to identify precisely the relative contributions of  global conditions 
and domestic policies to growth in DEEs. However, evidence strongly suggests that 
extremely favorable global conditions played a much more predominant role in the 
acceleration of  growth in DEEs in the new millennium than is typically appreciated in 
the popular debate on the rise of  the South. This is particularly true for commodity-rich 
economies of  Latin America and Africa which, together with India and Turkey, account 
for much of  the recent acceleration of  growth in the South.
Empirical research in the Inter-American Development Bank on the role of  external 
factors in boom–bust cycles in Latin America over 1990–2006 has come to the conclusion 
that an important part of  growth in the period after 2002 could be explained by improved 
global conditions (Izquierdo et al. 2008; IDB 2008). Using industrial production in AEs, 
US interest rates, the terms of  trade and risk spreads on international sovereign debt 
as proximate measures of  international economic conditions, it is found that growth 
in Latin America after 2002 would have been lower by 2 percent had these variables 
remained at the levels predicted in the late 1990s on the basis of  their historical patterns. 
Growth would have been lower even by a greater margin if  the unfavorable global 
economic conditions (high risk spreads and interest rates, low commodity prices and 
severely depressed capital inflows) that were prevailing in the aftermath of  the Russian 
crisis had persisted. Cohan and Yeyati (2012) have reached similar conclusions on the 
impact of  external conditions on the performance of  Latin America, using a Global 
Wind Index consisting of  three basic indicators of  the external environment – risk 
appetite, commodity prices and global growth.
Until the outbreak of  the crisis, growth in East Asian DEEs relied heavily on exports. 
In China during 2002–2008 exports grew on average by 25 percent per annum while 
domestic consumption lagged income growth (Table 8.3). During this period, about 
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GDP Consumption Gross Capital Formation Exports Imports
2002 9.1 7.4 13.2 29.4 27.4
2003 10.0 6.6 17.2 26.8 24.9
2004 10.1 7.1 13.4 28.4 22.7
2005 10.4 7.3 9.0 24.3 11.4
2006 11.6 8.4 11.1 23.8 15.9
2007 13.0 10.1 11.4 19.9 14.0
2008 9.6 8.8 10.2 8.6 5.1
2009 9.1 8.5 19.8 −10.4 4.3
2010 10.3 8.0 11.6 27.6 21.8
2011 9.3 8.0 10.7 12.4 13.2
table 8.3: Growth of  real GDP and its components in China (in percent)
Source: WB CQU (November 2005; December 2008; November 2009; and November 2010).
Partner
2005 2007 2010
$, billions % of  total $, billions % of  total $, billions % of  total
Africa 10.4 1.5 19.7 1.7 29.8 2.0
Latin America 17.2 2.5 40.0 3.5 70.7 4.8
Asia 92.0 13.2 169.5 14.9 248.0 16.8
Total DCs 
(Africa +LA+Asia)
119.6 17.1 229.3 20.2 348.5 23.6
The resta 579.2 82.9 904.8 79.8 1125.7 76.4
World 698.7 100.0 1134.0 100.0 1474.3 100.0
table 8.4: Manufactured exports of  China to various regions
Source: UNCTADstat. 
note: regions are defined according to Global System of  Trade Preferences countries (GSTP). 
a. Includes AEs, emerging countries in Central and Eastern Europe and CIS. 
one-third of  GDP growth in China was due to exports, taking into account their direct 
and indirect import contents. If  the multiplier effect of  exports on domestic consumption 
and knock-on effect on domestic investment are added, this proportion goes up to almost 
50 percent.13 Much of  these exports went to AEs (Table 8.4).
Exports of  East Asian DEEs closely linked to the Sinocentric production network, 
including Korea and Taiwan (China) and the major ASEAN countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) also grew rapidly during this 
period, but except Vietnam, not as rapidly as China’s. The share of  exports in GDP is 
higher in the majority of  these countries than in China, both in gross value and value 
added terms. This, together with relatively rapid growth of  exports, meant that precrisis 
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growth in ASEAN+2 depended even more on exports than in China. Indeed estimates 
suggest that during 2003–2007 about 60 percent of  growth in Korea, Taiwan (China) and 
Thailand and even a greater proportion of  growth in Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam 
came from exports, taking into account their import contents. Most of  the exports went 
to AEs, directly or through China by providing the latter country parts and components 
for its exports to AEs. 
F. the role of  South–South trade and China 
Rapid growth in DEEs in the new millennium has not only resulted in a significant 
increase in their share in world income, but has also been associated with a sizeable 
increase in their share in world trade and an unprecedented expansion of  South–South 
trade. These are often taken as a manifestation of  decoupling of  the South from the North 
and the increased capacity of  major DEEs such as BRICS to provide growth impulses to 
other developing countries and even to AEs. However, a closer examination shows that 
the picture is much more nuanced than is portrayed by this popular presentation of  the 
increased role of  the South in the world economy. 
There is no doubt that the share of  DEEs in world income has increased rapidly in 
the new millennium as a result of  their significantly faster growth than AEs regardless of  
how it is measured (Table 8.5). However, the measurement of  the shares of  economies 
in world income in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) as an indication of  their relative 
importance is highly misleading. It is the market (exchange) values of  goods and services, 
not the PPP values, that determine the economies’ contributions to global supply and 
demand and the expansionary and deflationary impulses they transmit to others. The 
share of  DEEs in world income is considerably smaller when measured in market 
exchange rates, both in current or constant (2005) dollars, than when measured in PPP. 
In fact, despite a large increase, in constant dollars the share of  DEEs taken together is 
still less than the share of  the US. In current dollars, their share is considerably higher 
because of  a sharp appreciation of  the currencies of  most major DEEs against the 
dollar. China is the only country with a significant share in world income in comparison 
with AEs; in current dollars it is second only to the US. Its share would be considerably 
higher if  it had allowed its twin surpluses to appreciate the yuan faster than has been 
the case.
The share of  DEEs in world trade has also increased significantly, in the order of  
10 percentage points between 2000 and 2010, both for imports and exports, to reach 
around two-fifths of  total world trade (Table 8.5). China accounts for the bulk of  the 
trade by DEEs. It exports more than any other economy in the world and it comes 
second after the US in imports. The shares of  other DEEs, including Brazil and India, in 
world imports and exports are much smaller.
South–South trade as a proportion of  world trade has also seen a significant increase 
in the new millennium (Table 8.6). East Asia accounts for three-quarters of  South–
South trade and China’s share is around 40 percent. China also comprises close to 
60 percent of  South–South imports in Asia and 58 percent and 65 percent of  Asian 
DEEs’ imports from Africa and Latin America, respectively (ADB 2011). Again, the 
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shares of  other DEEs in South–South trade are small – for India it is around 5 percent 
and for the rest of  the developing world, including Latin America and Africa, it is around 
25 percent. 
These imply that major DEEs other than China, including India and Brazil, cannot 
act as a driving force for the South. In any case, the expansionary impulses that these 
economies could generate for other DEEs depend very much on large and continued 
inflows of  capital, because they tend to run current account deficits except at times of  
strong growth in the rest of  the world.
There is considerable double counting in the estimated shares of  DEEs and South–
South trade in world trade. Since trade is conventionally measured in gross value not in 
value added terms, a country’s exports contain imports from and, hence, value added 
generated in other countries. Typically, the import content of  exports of  DEEs has been 
growing as a result of  their increased participation in international production networks 
supplying final goods to AEs. It is also greater than the import content of  exports of  AEs 
(Koopman et al. 2010; Akyüz 2011a; Riad et al. 2011). This is particularly true for East 
Asian DEEs participating in the Sinocentric production network as well as for Mexico 
which has become an assembly hub in NAFTA. This means that in value added terms, 
the share of  DEEs in world exports would be lower and that of  AEs higher than the 
shares indicated by official figures. 
The Sinocentric East Asian production network involves considerable South–South 
trade in intermediate goods, parts and components closely linked to final exports to AEs. 
In that region goods in process often cross borders several times before reaching their 
final destinations while in NAFTA – as well as in the European production network – 
foreign inputs usually come directly from AEs and there are little imports from other 
DEEs for exports to AEs (Riad et al. 2011). It is estimated that only 22 percent of  exports 
of  major East Asian DEEs to each other are destined to final demand in these economies 
while 60 percent go to final demand in the US, Europe and Japan (Lim and Lim 2012). 
In China, imported parts and components and other intermediate goods that are 
directly or indirectly used in the production of  exportables reach 40 percent of  gross 
value of  exports. By contrast, the import content of  consumption in China is much 
lower than that in AEs – about a quarter of  the import content of  US consumption. 
During 2003–2007, around 60 percent of  total Chinese imports are estimated to have 
been used for exports, under 15 percent for consumption and some 20–25 percent for 
investment.
Chinese merchandise imports are dominated by manufactures (Table 8.7). More than 
half  of  these come from DEEs. East Asian DEEs account for a large proportion of  these 
imports, mostly in parts and components used in China’s export industries (Athukorala 
2011; Lee, Park and Wang 2011). China also imports intermediate parts and components 
from AEs. In fact, Japan is its largest supplier, with a share of  17 percent of  such imports 
by China. 
High import content of  exports means that a relatively important part of  Chinese 
exports receipts accrues to countries that provide direct and indirect inputs to export 
industries in China. In processing exports, which constitute close to 80 percent of  
China’s total exports to the US, more value added is earned by East Asian economies 
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supplying parts and components to China than by China itself. China has become the 
single most important market for many of  them, particularly for Korea and Taiwan 
(China) – the two main suppliers of  parts and components other than Japan. In the 
precrisis years only about 12 percent of  exports from Korea and Taiwan (China) went 
directly to the US and EU each, but as much as 25 percent to China. However, a large 
proportion of  the latter also ended up in the US and EU as inputs in Chinese exports 
to them. 
This means that growth in many East Asian DEEs depends on exports to AEs directly 
and through China, even to a greater extent than growth in China itself. Although East 
Asian DEEs absorb about one-fifth of  Chinese manufactured exports (Table 8.4), these 
are partly in parts and components for exports to AEs, not for domestic consumption. 
More importantly, economic activity in these countries and hence their imports from 
China depend very much on their exports to AEs, both directly and through China. 
Many of  these economies suffer from underconsumption as well as sluggish investment 
noted above. Thus, they do not provide a strong autonomous market for China’s exports 
and an alternative to AEs. A slowdown in AEs would reduce their exports to them both 
directly and through China, thereby slowing economic activity and hence reducing their 
imports from China.
GDP Exports Imports
In constant  
dollars (2005)
In current dollars In PPP In current 
dollars
In current  
dollars
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
United 
States
28.6 26.1 30.9 23.1 23.5 19.5 12.1 8.4 18.9 12.8
EU 31.9 28.5 26.4 25.8 25.0 20.4 38.0 33.9 37.7 34.2
Japan 10.9 9.3 14.5 8.7 7.6 5.8 7.4 5.1 5.7 4.5
DEEs 18.5 25.8 20.3 34.2 37.2 47.9 31.9 41.8 28.8 39.1
Argentina 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
Brazil 2.0 2.2 2.0 3.3 2.9 2.9 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.2
China 3.6 7.6 3.7 9.3 7.1 13.6 3.9 10.4 3.4 9.1
India 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.6 3.7 5.5 0.7 1.5 0.8 2.1
Indonesia 0.6 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.9
Mexico 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.6 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.0 2.7 2.1
South Africa 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6
Turkey 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.2
table 8.5: Share of  selected economies in world income, exports and imports in 2000 and 
2010 (percent)
Source: GDP in current dollars and PPP terms from IMF WEO (September 2011), GDP in constant 
2005 dollars from World Bank database; and exports and imports data from UNCTAD, UNCTADstat.
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2000–2001 2006–2007 2009
South–South trade as share of  world trade
Exports 10.2 15.0 17.7
Imports 9.6 14.1 16.1
Trade 9.9 14.5 16.9
developing Asia’s share of  South–South trade
Exports 79.8 79.8 80.3
Imports 71.6 69.3 68.5
Trade 75.7 74.6 74.4
China’s share of  South–South trade
Exports 35.1 40.8 41.6
Imports 36.9 37.8 38.4
Trade 36.0 39.3 40.0
India’s share of  South–South trade
Exports 3.1 3.7 4.9
Imports 1.6 2.4 5.8
Trade 2.4 3.0 5.4
Other South’s share of  South–South trade
Exports 20.2 20.2 19.7
Imports 28.4 30.7 31.5
Trade 24.3 25.4 25.6
table 8.6: South–South trade (percent)
Source: ADB, ADO (April 2011).
The share of  oil and non-oil commodities in China’s imports has been growing. It 
now exceeds one-third of  the total, compared to less than 20 percent in the early 2000s 
(Table 8.7). Over 60 percent of  these now come from DEEs, including Africa and Latin 
America. Although they are also used as inputs into exports, it can be expected that the 
commodity import content of  Chinese exports is less than their manufacturing import 
content. Thus, a greater proportion of  commodity imports are used to meet domestic 
demand than manufactured imports in China. 
China has started to exert a strong and growing influence on commodity prices since 
the beginning of  the new millennium (Farooki and Kaplinsky 2011; Farooki 2012). As 
seen in Chart 8.4, there is a close correlation between the evolution of  Chinese imports 
and commodity prices. After hovering around 4 percent of  world commodity imports 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, China’s share started to rise, doubling by 2007 when 
the global growth and commodity prices peaked and reaching almost 11 percent 
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in 2010. In 2009, total world demand, Chinese imports and commodity prices all fell. By 
the end of  2010, total world demand was still below the peak of  2008, but commodity 
prices went up along with a strong recovery in Chinese imports, which surpassed its 2008 
peak by 22 percent.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the impact of  China on Latin American business 
cycles is stronger through rising commodity prices and demand spillovers to third markets 
than through bilateral trade, and much greater than that of  India (Lederman et al. 2009). 
It is also found that because of  these indirect effects, since the mid-1990s, the impact of  
shocks to Chinese GDP on Latin America has grown by three-times while that of  shocks 
to US GDP has declined by half  (Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2011). Still, it should be borne in 
mind that until the crisis, a large part of  China’s growth itself  depended on its exports 
to AEs.
b) Manufactured imports of  China from various regions 
Partner 2003 2007 2010
$, billions % of  total $, billions % of  total $, billions % of  total
Africa 0.8 0.3 1.8 0.3 2.6 0.3
Latin America 4.4 1.4 8.1 1.2 11.4 1.3
Asia 161.1 49.2 373.3 55.3 473.1 53.2
Total DCs (Africa 
+LA+Asia)
166.3 50.8 383.2 56.8 487.1 54.7
The rest 160.9 49.2 291.2 43.2 402.6 45.3
World 327.2 100.0 674.5 100.0 889.8 100.0
a) Commodities imports of  China from various regions
Partner 2003 2007 2010
Nonfuel Fuel Nonfuel Fuel Nonfuel Fuel
Africa 2.3 4.9 7.9 26.1 19.5 41.5
Latin America 10.0 0.4 37.5 5.3 66.7 13.0
Asia 15.5 19.5 48.3 56.1 66.6 100.0
Total DCs (Africa +LA+Asia) 27.8 24.9 93.7 87.6 152.8 154.5
The rest 27.3 4.3 80.3 17.6 146.0 34.5
World 55.1 29.2 174.1 105.1 298.9 189.0
table 8.7: Manufactured and commodities imports of  China from various regions 
(billions, $)
Source: IMF, Direction of  Trade, and UNCTAD, UNCTADstat.
note: Hong Kong, Korea, Macau, Taiwan and Singapore are defined as developing countries and 
reported externally. Nonfuel commodities are defined as industrial metals, food, beverages and 
agricultural raw materials in terms of  the SITC (Revision3) classification groups with codes 0, 1, 2, 4, 67 
and 68, also including precious metals and stones (667+971); the manufactured goods (SITC 5 to 8 less 
667 and 68); fuels (SITC 3).
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G. Crisis and recovery
With the outbreak of  the crisis, the international economic environment deteriorated 
rapidly in all areas that had previously supported expansion in DEEs. Capital inflows 
were reversed and net flows turned negative. Commodity prices made a sharp downturn, 
losing much of  the gains recorded after the beginning of  the decade. Economic activity 
contracted rapidly in AEs, leading to a sharp drop in world trade and exports of  DEEs. 
The reversal of  capital flows created a generalized downward pressure on the 
currencies of  almost all DEEs. India, Korea, Turkey and South Africa experienced 
sharp depreciations and suffered large reserve losses. Equity markets of  all major 
DEEs came under heavy selling pressures and lost over 80 percent of  the gains made 
during the earlier boom in a matter of  a few months. However, the reduced exposure to 
currency risks, large stock of  reserves accumulated during the boom, greater readiness 
of  international financial institutions to provide liquidity to countries threatened by 
contagion and, above all, the quick recovery of  capital flows prevented the instability 
from being translated into a fully fledged financial crisis even in economies heavily 
dependent on foreign capital.14   
Trade has been by far the most important channel of  transmission of  deflationary 
impulses from the global crisis, both for exporters of  manufactures and commodities. 
After growing by close to 10 percent per annum during the years before the crisis, world 
trade volume started to fall sharply in the last quarter of  2008 and throughout the 
first half  of  2009. Despite the subsequent recovery, it registered a decline of  close to 
13 percent for the year as a whole.
The impact of  export contraction on economic activity varied according to the 
contribution of  exports to growth in comparison with domestic demand. Exports of  East 
Asian DEEs, including China, made a sharp downturn in the last quarter of  2008, falling 
at double digit rates in 2009 (Table 8.3). On average this reduced GDP by 5–6 percentage 
points. With spillovers to domestic demand, the figure reaches almost 8 percentage points.15 
Loss of  output due to declines in exports was more moderate in India and Turkey, in the 
range of  3–4 percentage points. In these countries declines in exports were comparable to 
those in East Asia, but export ratios were much lower both in gross value and value added 
terms and growth had relied more on domestic demand. This was also true for some 
major commodity exporters such as Brazil. In other words, the more successful exporters 
with high exports–GDP ratios were hit particular hard by the crisis. 
The growth outcome depended not only on the incidence of  shocks but also on the 
policy response. The policy space was limited in countries which were running large 
current account deficits on the eve of  the crisis, such as Turkey and South Africa where 
the combination of  sharp declines in capital flows and export earnings resulted in large 
drops in GDP. However, even where there was a rigorous countercyclical policy response, 
growth rates were lower during 2008–2009 than in precrisis years, in some cases by a 
very large margin. Among the regions the largest drop was in Latin America, which went 
into recession in 2009 (Table 8.1).
There has been widespread resort to cuts in policy interest rates and monetary and 
fiscal expansion, but the policy response in East Asia, notably in China, played a central 
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role in the subsequent recovery not only in the region alone but also in a wider range of  
DEEs. The countercyclical fiscal response was unprecedented, not only for the region 
alone but also the developing world as a whole.16 On some estimates, the fiscal package 
in 15 Asian DEEs amounted to 7.5 percent of  2008 GDP, almost three times the average 
level in G7 countries (ESCAP 2009). China introduced a large package, close to $600 
billion or 13 percent of  GDP. Fiscal packages were also relatively large in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Korea, but somewhat smaller in India.17 Unlike in AEs, they 
placed much less emphasis on tax cuts but focused on increases in spending, particularly 
in infrastructure and property investment.
In China less than 20 percent of  the fiscal package was allocated to social spending 
with the rest going mainly to investment. It pushed the investment rate toward 50 
percent of  GDP financed by rapid credit expansion and debt accumulation by 
local governments. This has created unused capacity in infrastructure and added to 
excess capacity that had already existed in several industries such as steel because of  
overinvestment in previous years. More importantly, policies designed to revive real 
estate demand and an unprecedented growth of  mortgage lending created a bubble in 
the property market with real estate investment growing by close to 40 percent. While 
private consumption held up thanks to several incentives such as subsidies for vehicle 
and appliance purchases, it did not provide much impetus to offset the sharp decline 
in exports. Around 80 percent of  growth in 2009 was due to investment. As the effects 
of  this package started to fade out, another investment boom emerged, with fixed 
investment growing by 26 percent and property investment by 33 percent year-on-year 
in the first half  of  2011 (Xinhuanet 2011). As of  the end of  2011, property investment 
doubled as a share of  GDP from the early 2000s, accounting for more than half  of  the 
rise in total investment. 
The Chinese stimulus package gave a strong push to economic activity in Latin 
America and Africa by helping reverse the decline in commodity prices. Indeed, changes 
in the composition of  demand from exports toward domestic investment generated 
especially strong spillovers to commodity exporters. This is because while China’s exports 
have very high import contents in manufactured parts and components supplied by East 
Asian DEEs and Japan, property and infrastructure investment has typically higher 
import contents in commodities.18 For this reason, in 2010 commodity imports of  China 
stood 75 percent higher than those in 2007 while the increase in manufactured imports 
was just over 30 percent (Table 8.7). 
This means that the new demand pattern driving Chinese growth after 2008 has 
helped commodity exporters more than that during the precrisis expansion when Chinese 
growth was driven mainly by exports. Indeed, this is found to be the reason why Latin 
America recovered much faster than was initially anticipated: “the evidence shows that 
Latin American growth owes more to a fast-growing economy that enacted a powerful 
fiscal stimulus during the global crisis (China), and relatively less to the economy that was 
at the epicenter of  the crisis (United States)” (Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2011, 4).
The shift from exports to investment resulted in a steep reduction in the current 
account surplus of  China, from over 10 percent of  GDP in 2007 to 4–5 percent in 
2010–11. Again, many East Asian countries saw sizeable declines in their surpluses as a 
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result of  slowdown of  their exports to AEs as well as exports of  parts and components 
to China. In the same vein, in DEEs which had been relying predominantly on domestic 
demand for growth, such as Brazil, India and Turkey, current account deficits started 
to grow. 
However, so far, growing current account deficits have not posed serious payments 
difficulties because of  rapid recovery of  capital inflows. In fact, as during the subprime 
expansion, from early 2009 net flows started to exceed current account deficits, creating 
currency appreciations and asset bubbles. Equity markets recovered sharply and in most 
major emerging economies including Brazil, China, India and Turkey, private sector 
borrowing started rising faster than GDP, posing the risk of  overheating (IMF 2011). 
Major deficit economies, Brazil, India, Turkey and South Africa, started appreciating 
faster than East Asian surplus countries. Unlike during the subprime expansion, some of  
these such as Brazil, as well as several others with sound payments positions, became less 
willing to see their currencies appreciate as their exports were slowing. They did not only 
intervene in currency markets more vigorously, but also resorted to market-based capital 
control measures, though often without much effect on the size of  inflows (Akyüz 2012).
As a result of  countercyclical stimulus packages, the recovery in commodity prices 
and capital flows, growth in DEEs resumed after a brief  interruption during 2008–2009 
despite the sharp slowdown in AEs. In Argentina, Brazil, India, Korea and Turkey, 
average growth during 2010–2011 approached or exceeded the levels achieved before 
the subprime crisis (Table 8.1).
h. Sustainability and Vulnerabilities
However, there are a number of  reasons to believe that the forces that have been driving 
growth in DEEs since 2009 cannot be sustained over the medium term. Nor is it possible 
to return to the extremely favorable international economic conditions prevailing before 
the outbreak of  the global crisis. This means that unless fundamental changes take 
place in the way DEEs are integrated into the world economy – unless they reduce their 
dependence on foreign markets and capital – the recent staggering ascendancy of  the 
South may prove to be a passing phenomenon and the speed of  their convergence to 
income levels of  AEs could slow considerably in the coming years. 
China is now widely recognized to be suffering from underconsumption due to 
low shares of  wages and household income in GDP and high precautionary savings. 
The share of  wages in GDP has been constantly falling since the mid-1990s, bringing down 
the share of  household income from almost 70 percent of  GDP to less than 60 percent 
(Akyüz 2011b). Virtually in every year since the beginning of  the 2000s, consumption 
has lagged GDP, resulting in continued reduction in its share (Table 8.3). This has also 
been the case after the outbreak of  the global crisis. On the eve of  the crisis private 
consumption accounted for around 36 percent of  GDP, it is now less than 34 percent – a 
figure one would expect to see only during war times! The need to raise consumption is 
recognized by policymakers in China, but the main problem is that they have been trying 
to raise consumption primarily by reducing the household propensity to save rather than 
by lifting the share of  household income in GDP. Cuts in interest rates generally fail to 
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make a dent in consumption spending, adding, instead, to the property bubble. It is also 
unlikely that increased availability of  consumer credit would boost private consumption. 
A reduction in precautionary savings would depend very much on adequate public 
provisioning of  health, education and housing services. Recent focus on investment in 
social housing is certainly a step in the right direction, but much more is needed in 
all social areas, including health and education, in order to expect a significant drop 
in precautionary savings. In any case, even a relatively large drop in the savings rate 
would not bring much increase in the share of  consumption in GDP in the absence of  a 
significant increase in the share of  household income in GDP.
Export prospects are equally dim. None of  the three major markets for Chinese 
manufactures, the US, Europe and East Asia, offer much room for expansion. In the 
US consumers continue to deleverage as the ratio of  household debt to GDP still hovers 
around the levels of  2003 and unemployment remains at historic levels despite recent 
improvements. The US itself  is seeking export-led growth, trying to hit the target set by 
President Obama in 2010 to double exports over five years. Japan went into recession in 
2011 and growth prospects in the coming years are not bright (World Bank 2012a). Even 
if  Europe avoids a severe recession, its growth is widely expected to remain anaemic 
and unbalanced for several years to come. China’s exports to the eurozone have already 
shown double digit declines in the last months of  2011, leading to a decline in total 
exports in November on a quarterly basis (Plowright 2012). East Asian DEEs as a major 
market for Chinese exports are even more vulnerable than China to a slowdown in the 
US and Europe because of  their dependence on these markets, directly or through China. 
The rest of  the developing world does not provide an important market for China – 
in any case, many commodity exporters themselves depend on strong growth in China 
to maintain momentum. Therefore, China will have to rely increasingly on domestic 
demand to maintain its stellar growth.
Nor is the slowdown in exports a temporary, cyclical problem that could disappear 
with an eventual return of  the US and Europe to rigorous and sustained growth. 
A full recovery in AEs will no doubt give some room to China for faster expansion of  its 
exports. However, it is quite unrealistic to expect that China can go back to a precrisis 
pattern of  expansion when its growth was driven primarily by exports to AEs. With 
Germany and Japan continuing to adhere to export-led growth, this would also mean a 
return of  the US to precrisis conditions, acting as a locomotive for the rest of  the world. 
That would be a recipe for the breakdown of  the international monetary and trading 
system. If, on the other hand, China cuts the rate of  expansion of  its exports to a more 
acceptable level, say to 10 percent, then, without a fundamental change in the pace and 
pattern of  domestic demand that prevailed before the outbreak of  the global crisis, its 
growth might barely reach 7 percent (Akyüz 2011a).
In China a stop-gap strategy of  offsetting the slowdown in exports with accelerated 
investment cannot work indefinitely. Investment in social housing may appear to be a 
way out, but it is unlikely to compensate for declining investment opportunities in other 
areas including manufacturing, infrastructure and commercial real estate (Pettis 2011b). 
Continuing to invest in the latter areas despite excess capacity may help postpone the 
underconsumption crisis, but only for it to come back with greater force. A debt-driven 
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investment bubble at a rate of  50 percent of  GDP is no less fragile than the US-style 
consumption and property bubbles or the investment bubbles that several East Asian 
countries were experiencing before the 1997 crisis. It cannot avoid ending up with 
massive overcapacity and nonperforming loans. The boom in the property sector has 
already come to an end with property prices falling in a large number of  cities, with 
strong adverse spillovers to other sectors. The increased debt difficulties have prompted 
the government to call for a rollover of  local government loans by creditor banks 
(Rabinovitch 2012). 
A sharp slowdown in China resulting from a contraction in investment or exports 
would also mean the end of  favorable conditions in commodity markets. There is 
already a softening of  commodity prices. Even though oil prices have been relatively 
stable, non-oil commodity prices, including metals and minerals and several agricultural 
commodities, have declined since summer 2011, and both oil and non-oil prices are 
projected to decline further in 2012 (IMF WEO 2012, January Update; World Bank 
2012a). A steep fall would no doubt result in sizeable losses for commodity exporters in 
Latin America and Africa. On the other hand even if  commodity prices remain high, 
growth in Latin America (and Africa) could still fall since commodity prices may affect 
the level rather than the growth rate of  GDP – that is, to maintain a high rate of  growth, 
commodity prices would need to keep on rising (IDB 2008). Growth losses would be more 
severe if  commodity declines are accompanied by worsened global financial conditions. 
Estimates on the impact of  external factors on Latin American business cycles suggest 
that a combination of  terms of  trade and financial shocks – reversal in capital flows and 
hikes in risk spreads – could produce a steep decline of  growth in Latin America or even 
push the region into outright recession (IDB 2010; Izquierdo et al. 2008). 
The risk–return configuration that has so far sustained strong inflows of  capital to 
DEEs is indeed susceptible to sudden changes. Even though it is almost impossible to 
predict the timing of  stops and reversals and the events that can trigger them, it must 
be clear that the conditions that have been driving the surge in capital flows, historically 
low interest rates in AEs and favorable risk appetite for investment in DEEs cannot last 
forever. The immediate threat is a sharp increase in global risk aversion due to prospects 
of  falling growth and increasing imbalances in major emerging economies, economic 
contraction and financial fragility in the eurozone, the political stalemate in the US over 
fiscal policy and geopolitical oil supply risks. Any combination of  these could lead to a 
sharp reversal of  capital flows to DEEs and a hike in risk spreads, very much in the same 
way as seen during the Lehman collapse.
Indeed, growing risks in many of  these areas have been making international investors 
highly nervous, creating considerable instability in capital flows and asset and currency 
markets. After mid-2011 many emerging economies saw sizeable capital outflows and 
sharp drops in asset and currency markets (Chart 8.5). India has seen FDI disappear 
and even China is reported to have experienced net capital outflows during October and 
November 2011 (Fleming 2012). For the first time since the Asian crisis, Chinese reserves 
fell in the last quarter of  2011, by almost $100 billion. At the end of  2011, the MSCI 
equity index was lower by 16 percent in Mexico and South Africa, 23 percent in China and 
Brazil, and over 35 percent in Turkey compared to the peaks reached in summer 2011. 
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Again, in the second half  of  2011, the nominal effective exchange rates dropped by 10 
percent in Brazil and India, 15 percent in Mexico, and 18–20 percent in South Africa 
and Turkey, following strong appreciations after 2009 with the recovery of  capital flows. 
Declines against the dollar were even steeper – about 25 percent in Turkey and between 
15 and 20 percent in the rest.
 These declines have partly been reversed at the beginning of  2012 with improvements 
in the US economy and perceptions of  reduced risk of  default in the eurozone. In view 
of  continued expansion of  liquidity and historically low interest rates in Europe and 
the US, this upturn may persist, leading to a renewed surge in capital inflows to DEEs. 
However, continued global economic and financial fragility could tilt the balance and 
lead to a rapid flight to safety and liquidity well before monetary conditions and interest 
rates return to normalcy in the US and EU. 
Chart 8.5: Equity prices and nominal exchange rates, September 2008 – December 2011
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In the event of  persistent and sharp declines in capital inflows and commodity 
prices, the most vulnerable countries are commodity exporters with large current 
account deficits. Other deficit countries such as India and Turkey are less vulnerable 
because they could benefit from falling energy bills. Even though most deficit DEEs have 
relatively large international reserves, these are borrowed reserves accumulated from 
capital inflows, rather than earned from current account surpluses. They have thus their 
counterparts in equally large net foreign exchange liabilities, often in the form of  liquid 
portfolio flows and short-term loans, which present a potential threat in the event of  loss 
of  confidence. The East Asian DEEs with strong current account and reserves positions 
may not face severe payments and currency instability even in the event of  a generalized 
and rapid flight from emerging economies. However, their financial markets are highly 
exposed to destabilizing impulses from abroad because of  increased foreign presence 
and closer integration into the international financial system, as seen during the Lehman 
collapse. In both deficit and surplus countries, the consequent damage could be more 
severe since the reversal may last much longer and the policy space in responding to 
renewed instability and downturn is now significantly narrower. 
These latent destabilizing and deflationary impulses are already weighing down on the 
outlook in DEEs. The latest (January 2012) projections by both the World Bank (2012a) 
and the IMF (WEO 2012, January Update) have Europe going into a mild recession in 
2012 and global growth falling below 3.5 percent in PPP or some 2.5 percent in constant 
dollars. EIU (2012) projects 2.0 percent growth in world output at market exchange rates 
for 2012, gradually rising to 3.0 percent by the middle of  the decade. IMF downside 
scenario for deepened financial instability and severe recession in Europe puts global 
growth in 2012 at below 2 percent in PPP. 
It now appears that growth in emerging economies has passed its apex. Current 
projections by the World Bank (2012a) and the IMF (WEO 2012, January Update), 
put growth in China at less than 8.5 percent in 2012 for the first time since 2002. The 
Chinese government has now lowered the growth target for 2012 to 7.5 percent, half  a 
percent below the targets set in the previous seven years, with an export growth target 
of  10 percent. Although such targets have generally been exceeded in the past, this 
reflects the recognition of  the difficulties faced in sustaining rapid growth and the need 
to improve its quality (Economist 2012; Xinhuanet 2012a and 2012b). Growth could be 
much lower if  exports and/or investment falter. According to the IMF (2012), a deep 
recession in Europe could bring China’s growth to some 4 percent in the absence of  a 
strong domestic policy response. Again, it is estimated that with zero growth in property 
investment, ceteris paribus, GDP growth in 2012 could fall to 6.5 percent, but with a 10 
percent decline, it could come down to 5.3 percent (Chovanec 2012). On some accounts 
the crisis has not yet hit China. When it does, the slowdown can be much more severe, 
with growth coming down to 3 percent and even less by 2015–16 (Pettis 2011a, 2012). 
A recent report jointly produced by the World Bank and Development Research Center 
of  the State Council of  China (World Bank 2012b) also warns of  the risk of  a rapid 
deceleration and crisis but argues that China can maintain over 8 percent growth until 
2015 and between 6 and 7 percent in the coming two decades, provided that it undertakes 
the reforms recommended in the report and that it can avert the risk of  hard landing in 
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the short term with countercyclical measures supportive of  long-term structural reforms. 
It appears that these contrasting prognostications differ not so much in the risks facing 
China but its ability to give an appropriate and timely response and the nature of  the 
reforms that need to be introduced. 
According to recent projections, India may barely reach 7 percent instead of  climbing 
to China-like double digit rates as previously intended by its policymakers. The Indian 
government is reported to be planning a fiscal stimulus for FY2013 to jumpstart the 
economy (Lamont 2012). After reaching an Asian-like rate of  7.5 percent in 2010, Brazil 
is rapidly decelerating and seems to be poised to go back to its historical average of  some 
3 percent. This is also true for the other major economies of  Latin America, Argentina 
and Mexico, with projected growth rates under 4 percent. Turkey is coming down sharply 
from 8–9 percent toward 3–4 percent and South Africa seems to be sticking to its paltry 
recovery from the 2009 recession with a similar growth rate.
I. Conclusions: reconsidering Policies and Strategies
Developing countries face two interdependent challenges which call for rethinking their 
development policies and strategies. First, in the immediate future, they face the risk of  
a significant drop in their growth rates which can be quite severe if  Europe falls into a 
deep recession, bringing down the US. Second, over the medium term, DEEs cannot 
go back to the pace and pattern of  growth they enjoyed during the subprime expansion 
and since 2009 even if  AEs succeeded in recovering fully and settling on a rigorous and 
stable growth path. 
DEEs now have narrower policy space for a countercyclical response to deflationary 
and destabilizing impulses than they had after the Lehman collapse. In many emerging 
economies fiscal and external imbalances have widened significantly in the past few years. 
Nevertheless, they need to deploy all possible means to prevent a sharp slowdown of  
economic activity and a hike in unemployment. Many DEEs, notably in Latin America, 
have some space in trade policy since their bound tariffs are above the applied tariffs, but 
the margins are generally quite narrow for the majority of  DEEs. A way out would be 
to invoke, as a last resort, GATT (and GATS) balance of  payments safeguard provisions, 
designed to address payments difficulties arising from a country’s efforts to expand its 
internal market or from instability in its terms of  trade. If  used judiciously, such measures 
would not necessarily restrict the overall volume of  imports but their composition. 
Selective restrictions over nonessential, luxury imports, as well as of  imports of  goods and 
services for which domestic substitutes are available, could ease the payments constraint 
and allow increasing imports of  intermediate and capital goods needed for the expansion 
of  domestic production and income, thereby facilitating expansionary macroeconomic 
policies.
Provision of  adequate international liquidity by multilateral financial institutions 
could naturally alleviate the need for restrictive trade measures, even though it would 
not be wise for many DEEs, notably poor countries, to use such liquidity for importing 
nonessential goods and services. This could be done through a sizeable SDR allocation, 
in proportion to the needs, not the IMF quotas of  DEEs, or lending without procyclical 
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conditionality. Liquidity provision by multilateral institutions should be designed to 
support income, trade and employment in DEEs, rather than international creditors to 
them. This means that in the event of  continued and large outflows of  capital, countries 
should be prepared to impose exchange restrictions and even temporary debt standstills, 
and these should be supported by the IMF through lending into arrears.
China cannot introduce another massive investment package to maintain an 
acceptable pace of  growth without compromising its future stability. Any countercyclical 
policy response should be consistent with the longer-term adjustment needed to maintain 
rigorous growth and should address the underlying problem of  underconsumption. An 
immediate increase in private consumption could be achieved through large transfers 
from the public sector, especially to the poor in rural areas, and sharply increased public 
provision of  health and education – the former would raise the purchasing power of  
households and the latter would help reduce precautionary savings. These expenditures 
and income transfers can be financed by dividend payments by state-owned enterprises, 
thereby simultaneously curbing excessive investment. China also needs to raise the share 
of  wages in GDP a lot faster than is promised by recent measures in order to shift to a 
consumption-led growth path (Akyüz 2011a). 
Through its growing demand for commodities, China is already playing a key role 
in growth in commodity-dependent economies. However, it is not an important market 
for exporters of  manufactures. At present, the size of  its consumer market is less than 20 
percent and its total (direct plus indirect) imports for consumption is less than 10 percent 
of  those in the US, even though Chinese GDP is around 40 percent of  the US GDP. 
This is not only because of  the exceptionally low share of  household income in GDP and 
a high household savings rate, but also extremely low import content of  consumption. 
Therefore, to provide an important market for DEEs, China needs not only to raise the 
shares of  wages and household income in GDP and lower precautionary savings, but also 
to increase the import content of  consumption.
A shift to wage-cum-consumption-led growth does not mean that China ceases 
to be a major exporter of  manufactures to finance its growing imports. Even though 
an important part of  the increased consumption demand might be met by domestic 
producers, such a shift would entail a significant increase in imported manufactured 
consumer goods. China also needs to export manufactures in order to finance its growing 
commodity imports which have now reached almost 10 percent of  GDP, and imports of  
capital goods from more advanced economies. In other words, a shift to consumption-led 
growth by China may not significantly reduce the share of  imports and exports in GDP. 
These may in fact remain at much higher levels than would be expected for such a large 
economy.
For other DEEs policy challenges vary, but they are all linked, one way or another, to 
accumulation and productivity growth. Commodity exporters in Latin America have little 
control over the two key determinants of  their economic performance, namely capital 
flows and commodity prices, and their main policy challenge is how to break out of  this 
dilemma and gain greater autonomy in growth. They need to reduce dependence on 
foreign capital. Even though the wealthy in Latin America receive a greater proportion 
of  national income than those in Asia, they save and invest a much lower proportion of  
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their incomes. Low levels of  investment and productivity growth are the main reasons 
for Latin American deindustrialization, somewhat aggravated by recent booms in 
commodity markets and capital flows. In Brazil the need for reversing this process and 
moving into high-tech manufacturing is widely recognized, but it seems that the country 
is poised to deepen its dependence on commodities by pinning its hopes on oil in the 
deep waters of  the South Atlantic (Gall 2011). Low public and private investment and 
high dependence on foreign capital is the very first problem that needs to be addressed, 
not only in Latin America but also in some exporters of  manufactures such as Turkey. As 
seen in Southeast Asia, a high rate of  savings does not always translate into an equally 
high level of  investment and, as seen in India, a high level of  aggregate investment does 
not necessarily translate into a rapid industrial growth. Overcoming all these difficulties 
calls for targeted public interventions, including a judicious use of  macroeconomic and 
industrial policy tools.
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Jörg Mayer, Manuel Montes, Rubens Ricupero, Bob Rowthorn and Juan Somavia for comments 
and suggestions, and to Xuan Zhang for statistical assistance. The usual caveat applies.
  This paper argues that the unprecedented acceleration of  growth in the developing 
world in the new millennium in comparison with advanced economies is due not so 
much to improvements in underlying fundamentals as to exceptionally favorable global 
economic conditions, shaped mainly by unsustainable policies in advanced economies. 
The only developing economy which has had a major impact on global conditions, 
notably on commodity prices, is China. However, growth in China has been driven 
first by a rapid expansion of  exports to advanced economies and more recently, after 
the global crisis, by an investment boom, neither of  which is replicable or sustainable 
over the longer term. To maintain a rapid growth, export-led Asian economies need 
to reduce their dependence on foreign markets. For Latin American and African 
commodity exporters, gaining greater autonomy and achieving rapid and stable growth 
depend on their success in reducing reliance on capital flows and commodity earnings – 
the two key determinants of  their growth which are largely beyond national control. 
 2 Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2008) find decoupling between AEs and DEEs, but increased coupling 
within each group. Wälti (2009) argues that assessment of  decoupling should not be based on 
actual growth rates but deviations from trend (or potential output) and on that basis there is no 
decrease in the synchronicity between DEEs and AEs. Rose (2009) comes to broadly the same 
conclusion while Yeyati (2009) argues that the 2000s witnessed an increase in the correlations 
of  DEEs and G7 cycles. For further discussion see also Kose and Prasad (2010).
 3 For an account of  long-term historical trends, see Nayyar (2009).
 4 Nevertheless, the increased weight of  China in DEEs raises the average growth of  DEEs since 
Chinese growth has been considerably faster than the rest during both periods.
 5 Here capital inflows refer to the acquisition of  domestic assets by private nonresidents while 
sale of  assets are negative inflows. Capital outflows refer to the acquisition of  foreign assets by 
private residents, including foreign companies and individuals that have established residence 
in DEEs, and sales are defined as negative outflows. Net private capital flows is the difference 
between net capital inflows and net capital outflows. 
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 6 Reduction of  tariffs and nontariff  barriers in China after its accession to the WTO also 
facilitated the emergence of  East Asian trade networks and growing intraregional trade 
(ADB 2011).
 7 FDI inflows to China peaked in 2008 before falling in 2009. In 2010 they were still below 
the level of  2008 (UNCTAD WIR 2011). Moreover, there was a sharp increase of  foreign 
investment in property, with the share of  FDI going into real estate rising to 23 percent in the 
latter year (SAFE 2011).
 8 This and the following section draw on Akyüz (2012).
 9 Here capital account surplus is used for surplus on nonreserve financial accounts. 
10 This has been the case in Turkey where special consumption and value added taxes account for 
a growing proportion of  total tax revenues. By contrast, there have been improvements in the 
distributional impact of  taxes as well as the tax−GDP ratio in Latin America (Cornia et al. 2011). 
11 A measure of  this is the ratio of  private investment in GDP to the income share of  the top 20 
percent. This ratio was around 25 percent in Brazil both in the 1980s and 1990s compared to 
70 percent in Korea in the former period and over 53 percent in the latter (UNCTAD TDR 
2003). Palma (2011) uses private investment as a percentage of  the income share of  the top 
decile and finds that in 2009 this ratio was twice as high in Asia, including Korea, China, India 
and Vietnam as in Latin America, including Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile.    
12 Except for a property boom in Singapore (Lim and Maru 2011). 
13 On the estimation of  import content of  exports and the contribution of  the exports to growth 
in GDP in the East Asian countries discussed in this section, see Akyüz (2011a).
14 According to IDB (2010), the increased readiness of  international financial institutions to 
provide liquidity played a central role in restraining financial instability in Latin America.
15 According to an estimate by ESCAP (2010, box 1) for East Asian DEEs and Japan, the impact 
of  the 2009 shortfall in exports on GDP reached 7.8 percentage points, accounting for both 
direct and indirect effects.
16 For fiscal stimulus packages, see United Nations (2010), Khatiwada (2009), ESCAP (2009 and 
2010), ADB (2010), and IMF WEO (October 2009).
17 Difficulties in identifying fiscal measures are revealed by widely different figures given by 
different organizations for some East Asian countries; see UN (2010, table 1.4), ADB (2010, 
figure 2.4.1), and ESCAP (2009, table 1). 
18 It has been reported that the property sector accounts for almost half  of  Chinese steel use and 
is a major driver of  demand for other commodities, such as copper (Plowright 2012).
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